Question 3 Bells from the Crow's Nest

Arun Vajpey

Member
Is there any information about the average frequency with which the lookouts in the Crow's Nest rang 3 bells because they saw - or thought they saw - an object ahead in the ship's path during transatlantic voyages in the early part of the 20th century leading up to the Titanic disaster? There is more relevance to that question than meets the eye.

Specifically, did any of the Titanic's lookouts ring 3 bells during that maiden voyage before Fleet historically did so sometime between 11:39 and 11:40pm on the night of Sunday 14th April 1012?
 
Is there any information about the average frequency with which the lookouts in the Crow's Nest rang 3 bells because they saw - or thought they saw - an object ahead in the ship's path during transatlantic voyages in the early part of the 20th century leading up to the Titanic disaster?
Good question! Lightoller's testimony implies that false alarms were relatively common because the lookouts were expected to err on the side of caution and it was up to the OOW to confirm their sightings. If I remember correctly he said that the telephone from the crows nest was often used to cancel an erroneous bell ring, and the lookouts were not penalised for such false alarms.
 
Lightoller's testimony implies that false alarms were relatively common
Thanks Richard, because that's precisely what I was trying to get at.....at least one of the points, anyway. The excerpt below is the relevant extract from Lightoller's testimony in England:

The Commissioner:
That is true, but the three bells indicated nothing more than that there was something ahead.

14293. (Mr. Scanlan.) Something right ahead, My Lord, and then the telephone message conveyed it. (To the witness.) If one of those men on the look-out had seen something and applied the glasses is it not possible that he might have been able to identify it as an iceberg sooner than with the naked eye?
- He might be able to identify it, but we do not wish him to identify it. All we want him to do is to strike the bells.

14294. I will put this to you: Supposing a man on the look-out fancies he sees something and strikes the bell, and it turns out not to be anything, I should think he would be reprimanded?
- He is in every case commended.


14295. (The Commissioner.) I do not understand that. Is he commended when he signals that there is something ahead when there is nothing ahead?
- Yes, your Lordship.


14296. (Mr. Scanlan.) If he did it frequently in a journey would not the commendation take the form at the end of the voyage of paying him off and dispensing with his services?
- Not at all. The man is not an absolute fool; he knows that if he is trying to keep a good look-out, particularly amongst ice, and he suspects he sees anything, he will strike the bell; if it turns out to be nothing he may come on the bridge and say, "I am sorry that I struck the bell when there was nothing;" but he is invariably told, "Never you mind; if you suspect that you see anything strike the bell, no matter how often."


But did it happen like that in reality? Even though the dark, moonless and ultra-calm conditions that the Titanic encountered that Sunday night were quite rare, they must have occurred occasionally on other nights. Also, there might have been other reasons on other ships and other nights why a lookout could have been uncertain if he was really seeing something ahead - mist, haze, rain and even the wind in their faces can play momentary tricks on lookouts. That being the case, one would have thought if a lookout rang the 3 bells immediately every time he thought that he saw something ahead in the ship's path, the warning would have been at least in the "not infrequent" category. But that does not appear to have been the case; I don't think the lookouts rang 3 bells that frequently.
 
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That being the case, one would have thought if a lookout rang the 3 bells immediately every time he thought that he saw something ahead in the ship's path, the warning would have been at least in the "not infrequent" category. But that does not appear to have been the case; I don't think the lookouts rang 3 bells that frequently.
Good point. In fact we have some evidence that the lookouts did not ring quite as 'immediately' as Lightoller suggested, because Fleet said that he spoke to Lee about his suspected sighting before ringing the bell.

I'm not sure where this is taking us though. If false alarms were common it might in theory explain a delay by the OOW while he checked the sighting for himself but even if they were not common he would still have to observe the object himself to judge his best manoeuvre.
 
“It was the beautifullest night I ever seen. The stars were like lamps. I saw this black thing looming up; I didn’t know what it was. I asked Lee if he knew what it was. He couldn’t say. I thought I better ring the bell. I rang it three times.”

This was told by Fleet to Leslie Harrison.
 
I think there are quite a few cases where we should be prepared to accept a significant probability of false alarm to push as close to 100% probability of detection as possible. In my case with tornado warnings. (See the "Plainfield syndrome")
 
I'm not sure where this is taking us though.
I'll explain my reasoning but you have already answered it, Richard.

In fact we have some evidence that the lookouts did not ring quite as 'immediately' as Lightoller suggested, because Fleet said that he spoke to Lee about his suspected sighting before ringing the bell.
THAT is the point, and the second one of my OP, something that has to do with what I have long believed but cannot be proven because even Fleet (and probably Lee) did not realize it themselves; that there was a brief latency, probably around 20 seconds between the moment that Fleet first got the mental impression that there was something ahead in the ship's path and his arm moved to actually ring the bell (longer, if he checked with Lee, like Fleet said). Even if he believed that he had rung it almost immediately but I don't think it was the case because it was not a "fight or flight" type of reaction.

If you are walking down a very dark path and something unexpectedly jumps out right in front of you, your reaction will be immediate and without thought. But on the other hand, you think that there might be something indistinct ahead, the normal tendency is to wait until you are at least partly certain that something is there, even though you can't yet identify it. I believe that was the case with Fleet spotting the object ahead that night.

My point of where that is taking us is to do with the ship's speed and why I believe if Titanic had been slowed earlier, there was a good chance of avoiding the impact, all other things being the same. If you for one moment accept my line of reasoning, it follows that it was abut 30 seconds at least (15+15) from the moment that Fleet thought he saw "something" ahead and Murdoch have that hard-a-starboard order. In those 30 seconds the Titanic had moved about 1150 feet while going at 22 knots.

If on the other hand the speed had been reduced to 15 knots earlier, the ship would have covered about 750 feet before the helm order came.....400 feet further away from the berg. Since Sam showed that the turning circle was not much affected by the speed, there was the chance that an attempt at an evasive action would have been successful.
 
Thanks Richard, because that's precisely what I was trying to get at.....at least one of the points, anyway. The excerpt below is the relevant extract from Lightoller's testimony in England:

The Commissioner:
That is true, but the three bells indicated nothing more than that there was something ahead.

14293. (Mr. Scanlan.) Something right ahead, My Lord, and then the telephone message conveyed it. (To the witness.) If one of those men on the look-out had seen something and applied the glasses is it not possible that he might have been able to identify it as an iceberg sooner than with the naked eye?
- He might be able to identify it, but we do not wish him to identify it. All we want him to do is to strike the bells.

14294. I will put this to you: Supposing a man on the look-out fancies he sees something and strikes the bell, and it turns out not to be anything, I should think he would be reprimanded?
- He is in every case commended.


14295. (The Commissioner.) I do not understand that. Is he commended when he signals that there is something ahead when there is nothing ahead?
- Yes, your Lordship.


14296. (Mr. Scanlan.) If he did it frequently in a journey would not the commendation take the form at the end of the voyage of paying him off and dispensing with his services?
- Not at all. The man is not an absolute fool; he knows that if he is trying to keep a good look-out, particularly amongst ice, and he suspects he sees anything, he will strike the bell; if it turns out to be nothing he may come on the bridge and say, "I am sorry that I struck the bell when there was nothing;" but he is invariably told, "Never you mind; if you suspect that you see anything strike the bell, no matter how often."


But did it happen like that in reality? Even though the dark, moonless and ultra-calm conditions that the Titanic encountered that Sunday night were quite rare, they must have occurred occasionally on other nights. Also, there might have been other reasons on other ships and other nights why a lookout could have been uncertain if he was really seeing something ahead - mist, haze, rain and even the wind in their faces can play momentary tricks on lookouts. That being the case, one would have thought if a lookout rang the 3 bells immediately every time he thought that he saw something ahead in the ship's path, the warning would have been at least in the "not infrequent" category. But that does not appear to have been the case; I don't think the lookouts rang 3 bells that frequently.
I would think there is an implicit delay, particularly on a night such as the one Titanic struck ice.

A lookout might 'see' something ahead, and then would focus on that thing for a few seconds trying to discern if he is actually seeing something before ringing the bells.

I would think that, on a dark and moonless night without waves even seeing something directly ahead would, in the first moments, be like seeing something in your peripheral vision. You think you just saw something, but you are not entirely sure.

Of course, much has been made of the "haze" Fleet reported seeing on the horizon just prior to the encounter with ice.

I always interpreted this as Fleet and Lee actually seeing field ice, but not really being able to resolve it as anything distinct; and it was only after staring into that haze that Fleet finally realized that he was staring ice that was right in front of him, which is when he rang the bell.

Even if I am totally off base there, common sense and my own experience trying to identify things at a distance at night makes me believe that there had to have been some delay, if only a delay of a second or two between when Fleet first thought he might be seeing something and his decision to ring the bell and warn the bridge.
 
A lookout might 'see' something ahead, and then would focus on that thing for a few seconds trying to discern if he is actually seeing something before ringing the bells.
Quite true and on a night like the Titanic encountered the iceberg, that delay would have been a little more than a few seconds, perhaps as much as 20 seconds even though Fleet himself might not have been aware of it at the time. In fact, his statement "It was the beautifullest night I ever seen. The stars were like lamps." itself suggests that the night was very deceptive. The stars would have been distributed in their usual irregularly scattered pattern which meant that there would have been small "gaps" on the horizon where the sky met the sea. When the iceberg first appeared over the horizon and into Fleet's line of vision, it would have been just as another small gap in the star pattern and although it would have made an impression on his mind, it would have taken him several seconds to realize that it might actually be a dark object ahead in the ship's path and make the decision to ring the bell. Obviously, if Fleet had then asked Lee about it like he said -"I didn’t know what it was. I asked Lee if he knew what it was. He couldn’t say. I thought I better ring the bell. I rang it three times", it would have added some more seconds to that latent period. And the Titanic would have been closing on the iceberg all the while at around 37 feet a second.
 
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Quite true and on a night like the Titanic encountered the iceberg, that delay would have been a little more than a few seconds, perhaps as much as 20 seconds even though Fleet himself might not have been aware of it at the time. In fact, his statement "It was the beautifullest night I ever seen. The stars were like lamps." itself suggests that the night was very deceptive. The stars would have been distributed in their usual irregularly scattered pattern which meant that there would have been small "gaps" on the horizon where the sky met the sea. When the iceberg first appeared over the horizon and into Fleet's line of vision, it would have been just as another small gap in the star pattern and although it would have made an impression on his mind, it would have taken him several seconds to realize that it might actually be a dark object ahead in the ship's path and make the decision to ring the bell. Obviously, if Fleet then asked Lee about it like he said -"I didn’t know what it was. I asked Lee if he knew what it was. He couldn’t say. I thought I better ring the bell. I rang it three times", it would have added some more seconds to that latent period. And the Titanic would have been closing on the iceberg all the while at around 37 feet a second.
I have a question for you, just out curiosity an for my own edification. I recently perused Fleet's testimony at both the American and British inquiries and Fleet's answers were a lot shorter and terse than I remembered.

Clearly I was remembering some of the statements you are quoting, and I am just curious where they came from, or if I just skimmed Fleet's testimony too quickly?
 
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I was remembering some of the statements you are quoting, and I am just curious where they came from
I was quoting Sam Halpern from his post #6 above in this thread. That was not from either official inquiry but told by Fleet to Titanic researcher Leslie Reade when he interviewed the then 77 year-old former lookout in 1964. Fleet had made a similar statement in an interview 3 years earlier.

Considering that it was over 50 years after the disaster, we have to give Fleet some latitude normally allowed to any Old Sea Dog reminiscing.
 
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I was quoting Sam Halpern from his post #6 above in this thread. That was not from either official inquiry but told by Fleet to Titanic researcher Leslie Reade when he interviewed the then 77 year-old former lookout in 1964. Fleet had made a similar statement in an interview 3 years earlier.

Considering that it was over 50 years after the disaster, we have to give Fleet some latitude normally allowed to any Old Sea Dog reminiscing.

While only tangentially related to the topic of this thread, as some of the evidence here--for example Lightoller's statements on the issue--and common sense would dictate, there are also implicit baked in delays between the ringing of the bells and any action taken by the officers to alter the navigation of the ship.

On the night Titanic foundered, not only did the lookouts have to go through the process of becoming aware of a change on the horizon, and then determining there was ice directly ahead of the ship, but there were a number of things that I assume had to happen before Murdoch began to evasively maneuver Titanic.

Fleet had to ring down to the bridge and to communicate what he saw to Sixth Officer Moody, who then had to communicate this to Murdoch. Then, I am assuming, before Murdoch decided to take any action he had to sight the ice himself to verify the report.

The gods alone know at this point how much time this took, and part of me wonders if this explains the time it took between the Fleet's warning, and when Fleet reports that, at nearly the last possible moment, Titanic began to veer towards port.

I find myself suddenly wondering how quickly it ought to have took Titanic, when moving at full speed, to start to respond to her rudder being put hard over. Perhaps someone with more technical knowledge can chime in if they see this (I am looking at you Sam! :)).

Edit

Thanks for that information! I will have to try and track these interviews down.

On the one hand, my research on memory dictates that stories told by participants much after the event are the most likely to include false memories of things that did not really happen, or happened in a way differently than remembered.

On the other hand, official inquests into an accident that a person played a key role in are quite stress inducing, and one would be inclined I would think to answer questions as concisely as possible, leaving out much of the detail.

And, not to beat a dead horse here, but answers to inquest questions immediately after the incident are far more likely to induce a person to minimize their culpability as much as possible. So a man in Fleet's position is very unlikely to admit something like, "I saw something indistinct on the horizon, and was not sure I was actually seeing anything, so I waited two minutes until I realized that what I had been seeing was ice. Then I rang the bell three times and reported ice right ahead."
 
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While only tangentially related to the topic of this thread, as some of the evidence here--for example Lightoller's statements on the issue--and common sense would dictate, there are also implicit baked in delays between the ringing of the bells and any action taken by the officers to alter the navigation of the ship.
While there certainly were time gaps between each of those events, they were not delays as such. The term 'delay' implies that the action could have been carried out earlier, which was not the case; they were bound by limitations of human ability and practical necessity.

On the night Titanic foundered, not only did the lookouts have to go through the process of becoming aware of a change on the horizon, and then determining there was ice directly ahead of the ship, but there were a number of things that I assume had to happen before Murdoch began to evasively maneuver Titanic.

Fleet had to ring down to the bridge and to communicate what he saw to Sixth Officer Moody, who then had to communicate this to Murdoch.
It is generally believed that Murdoch reacted as soon as he heard the bells from the crow's nest and started to scan the ocean ahead; some even consider the possibility that the 1/O had spotted the object seconds before Fleet himself, but I am not one of them. IMO after the bells Murdoch spotted the object, identified it as an iceberg through his binoculars and was assessing the best course of action when Moody received Fleet's phone call. By the time Moody repeated Fleet's message aloud, Murdoch had already decided on his helm order.

Then, I am assuming, before Murdoch decided to take any action he had to sight the ice himself to verify the report.
That was an absolute necessity. Murdoch had to assess the relative position of the speeding ship's bow to the closing iceberg before giving the correct helm order. It was not - and could not have been - a knee-jerk reaction.

The gods alone know at this point how much time this took
Sam Halpern has broken this down very effectively in the table "Significant Events" of his book Prelude To An Allison. The only thing I would add to that would be the aforementioned latent period between Fleet's mind registering the possibility of a dark object ahead for the very first time and the moment he rang the first of the 3 bells.
 
While there certainly were time gaps between each of those events, they were not delays as such. The term 'delay' implies that the action could have been carried out earlier, which was not the case; they were bound by limitations of human ability and practical necessity.

Of course. I only mean by the word "delay" exactly what you are saying. There were necessary steps between the sighting of the ice from the crows nest and the ultimate action by Murdoch to avoid the ice.

In some sense one may argue some of those steps were 'technically' unnecessary, in as much as it would have been possible for Murdoch to have ordered the helm hard over the moment he heard the bells; however, if one thinks about what would be required for the safe operation of a vessel the size of Titanic, at least under normal circumstances, then one should realize that Murdoch being told what had been spotted, and then verifying that sighting before taking action, were both important and necessary.

It is generally believed that Murdoch reacted as soon as he heard the bells from the crow's nest and started to scan the ocean ahead; some even consider the possibility that the 1/O had spotted the object seconds before Fleet himself, but I am not one of them. IMO after the bells Murdoch spotted the object, identified it as an iceberg through his binoculars and was assessing the best course of action when Moody received Fleet's phone call. By the time Moody repeated Fleet's message aloud, Murdoch had already decided on his helm order.

Of course you are correct; however, according to the official narrative there were only three men on Titanic's bridge when the iceberg was sighted.

Those would be Murdoch who was on the navigation bridge, and Moody and Hitchens who were in the wheelhouse.

As we have discussed elsewhere, while Boxhall was on duty, Boxhall's official statement is that he came onto the bridge at the very moment Titanic makes contact with that ice.

Of those three men we know with a certainty were on the bridge or in the wheelhouse, only Hitchens survived.

While other officers report what they heard second hand from Murdoch, and Boxhall testifies to "seeing" the telegraphs in the full-astern position (something that is contradicted by no fewer than 3 other witnesses), Hitchens was the only eye witness survivor.

And what do we know about Hitchens's testimony? He was in the wheelhouse, he heard and responded to the hard over order, he "heard the telegraphs ring," and witnessed Murdoch closing the watertight doors.

Hitchens's also says Murdoch ran onto the bridge wing at the American Inquiry, but then qualifies that with "I imagine... I was in the wheelhouse."

During the British Inquiry, Hitchens states four things of interest to me:

1. He states repeatedly that he could see nothing from the wheelhouse;

This tells us again that Hitchens's comments on Murdoch's movements on the navigation bridge prior to the collision during the American inquiry were complete speculation.

He really has no idea what Murdoch does, other than the ringing of the telegraph(s) and the issuing of the hard-a-starboard order.

2. Moody was in the wheelhouse with him during the entire series of events that led to Hitchens turn the wheel hard over;

This appears to confirm Moody was with Hitchens the entire time during the sighting of the ice and the maneuvering of Titanic.

This is only important to me in as much as it applies to something unrelated to this thread, but that we have discussed elsewhere.

Namely, that if Greaser Scott is correct about seeing both engine telegraphs ring stop simultaneously before the collision, someone else other than Moody must have been on the navigation bridge with Murdoch.

Note: Hitchens says nothing about Boxhall other than that Hitchens had "heard" that Boxhall was on his way to the bridge before the collision, but again he is very clearly completely unaware of what is actually happening on the navigation bridge from his position in the wheelhouse.

3. He heard the engine telegraphs ring before the hard over order was issued (he has no idea what those engine telegraph orders were); and

This is just interesting to me. If this testimony is accurate, Boxhall was truly not on the navigation bridge, and Greaser Scott is only correct about one thing--the all stop orders, if not simultaneously, at least appeared on both engine room telegraphs prior to the collision--then Murdoch had to move across the navigation bridge to move both telegraphs into the "all stop" position before issuing the hard-a-starboard order to Moody and Hitchens.

None of which is really important to my ultimate point here, sorry. :)

4. He says that at least half a minute passed between the ringing of the bell in the crows nest and the hard over order.

Now all of the other things I have talked about elsewhere aside, for example how humans respond when questioned about their roles in traumatic events, or about how Hitchens could be a participating member (as the only surviving crewman on the bridge leading up-to and through the collision) in Lightoller's "white wash," I do have to admit that we should question how accurate this statement is just based on how human perception of time can be distorted, particularly during and after traumatic events.

Meaning only that it could very well have been around 30 seconds, but it could also have been 5 seconds that felt like 30 seconds, or it could have been two minutes that in retrospect feels compressed into 30 seconds.

Regardless, taking this reported time between the bell strikes and the hard-a-starboard order at face value, 30 seconds passed between the bells and that order.

This is all a longwinded way for me to say, I agree with you! It seems very unlikely Murdoch saw the ice before, or even simultaneously, with Fleet and Lee.

If what Hitchens seems to indicate at the British inquiry is true, and he hears the telegraph first... we can assume it took Murdoch 15 seconds or so to identify what was sighted, then another 10 to 15 seconds to operate the telegraph(s) and relay the hard-a-starboard order to Moody and Hitchens.

If we assume, which is also very possible (maybe even probable), that Hitchens's memory is a bit mixed up and the telegraph orders happened simultaneously with, or just after, the helm hard over order... then it took 30 seconds for Murdoch to respond after the three gongs from the crows nest.

With this time period in mind, it makes far, far more sense to me that Murdoch had to take those 30 seconds to verify the information received from the crows nest before issuing orders aimed at avoiding the ice.

The other alternative is that Murdoch spotted the ice just before, or at the same time, as Fleet and Lee, and then waited 30 seconds to do anything about it.

Sam Halpern has broken this down very effectively in the table "Significant Events" of his book Prelude To An Allison.

Thank you! I do own this book, but I am currently 2,000 miles away from it. I will note this to take a look at when I get home.
 
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