Christophe is wrong when he says that Scarrott’s testimony doesn’t hold water. Unfortunately, he is not the only one has made the error of discarding inconvenient evidence when researching Titanic’s accident. A century of alleged historical accounts have ignored this eyewitness on the basis his words do not agree with conventional wisdom. Instead of looking deeper for the truth, authors and documentarians have formed conclusions about the iceberg incident and then look for bits and pieces of evidence that support those conclusions. The results are quick and simple answers to complex questions. For instance, it’s easy to say that the berg “sliced open” Titanic’s bow even though that’s not possible. Steel is stronger than ice. To explain what really happened during those critical seconds requires time consuming study of steel, ice, ship construction, mass and momentum, helm actions, engine orders, metallurgy, etc. Explaining how Titanic came to be damaged could take a book full of dull math, chemistry, and physics. It’s so much easer – if not truthful – to say “the berg sliced open the ship” than it is to learn what really happened. And, this is the real purpose of conventional wisdom – to reduce complex truths to understandable myths.
Myth is fine for a Hollywood entertainment, but it’s not valid historic research. Good forensic research is the reverse of conventional wisdom. Conclusions are formed only after consideration of all of the evidence. Scarrott’s words must be put into the context of the Titanic tragedy just as much as the words of Fourth Officer Boxhall, quartermaster Hichens, or lookout Fleet. Nobody has special standing. No testimony from any witness is exempt from careful scrutiny. And, no testimony can be discarded without hard evidence it was a deliberate falsehood.
Scarrott was sailor with full knowledge of what the lookouts’ bell code meant. Forehandedness is the mark of a true seaman and this requires being aware of his surroundings at all times. He didn’t have to be a part of the bridge team to take notice of that signal. Scarrott even took note that the crow’s nest warning sounded shortly after 7 bells, which occurred at 11:30 pm on the crew clocks. (The actual time the lookouts rang their warning bell would have been 11:34 pm for the crew – which is only 4 minutes after 7 bells.) Every word of his testimony shows Scarrott was well aware of the time of night and what the bell sounds around him meant. He was outside the crew’s mess where he could have heard the crow’s nest bell quite clearly. (That location is pretty much where you would have expected him to be as part of the on-duty Starboard Watch on a Sunday.) Bottom line: Scarrott’s testimony holds water as well as, if not better, that many other witnesses. There are simply no holes in it. The problem is that what Scarrott said discredits conventional wisdom and, so, cannot be accepted by those supporting the popular version of the accident.
There is no contradiction in my statements about turning left to dodge an iceberg already on the port side. Please go back and read what I said. Nobody can deny that Murdoch would have been a damned fool to have made a dodge to the left for an iceberg passing a ship’s length off his port side. Just the distances required for such a turn preclude any seaman or lubber alike from making such a blunder. Murdoch was no beginner. His experience in Olympic told him the ship would have advanced some 1,500 feet in its original direction and the bow would have transferred about 120 feet to port to rotate two points. It’s the transfer that convinces me nothing of the sort happened.
But, Christophe seems to have missed that I never claimed that Murdoch turned left for an iceberg on his port side. What I said is that Captain Smith initiated the two point turn to the south (which was left) in order to stay away from the field of ice already visible ahead. Murdoch did not have the authority to make this sort of course change, so it must have come from Captain Smith. That order would have been given before Boxhall prepared for the compass comparison. The course change order also cane prior to the lookouts spotting the “black mass” of the berg against the hazy line of ice. In view of the then-extant circumstances, the captain’s order would have been viewed as a prudent action.
When the lookouts spotted that “dark mass” silhouette, it was actually about 4 degrees to port of the ship’s track. On a dark night with nothing of the ship’s rigging visible as a reference, that’s close enough to dead ahead to have require the three strokes on the crow’s nest bell. Any officer hearing that signal and looking ahead would have seen the silhouette as soon as it came over his horizon. Another myth of conventional wisdom is that the lookouts were sending a warning of impending danger. That’s not the case. Their three strikes only meant that something of interest had been spotted on the horizon. It was up to the officer of the deck (Murdoch in this case) to decide what – if any – action to take for the safety of the vessel.
No matter how much you want to believe otherwise, quartermaster Hichens was not made aware of any navigational information. Navigation was proprietary to the officers. Hichens just steered whatever course he was given. He might have heard talk about ice and probably surmised that the two-point turn was to avoid “the ice.” In any event, he did put the helm down to starboard as he claimed and it was to avoid ice. The only embellishment to that part of his story was the claim of being “hard over.” The two-point turn would have been under standard rudder, the most rudder angle possible that would not cause discomfort for the passengers. The vibrations and heeling of a ship making a “hard over” emergency turn can be disquieting.
At the moment Boxhall initiated the two–point turn to avoid the ice, the fatal berg was a third of a nautical mile (roughly 2,200 feet) ahead of the ship. It actually posed no threat if nothing had been done. No one did the relative motion plotting. If they had, they would have seen that the real danger was that the berg lay roughly 24 degrees off the port bow. The turn occupied more than the 37 seconds of the test maneuver made with Olympic because it was under standard helm in Titanic and not hard over rudder as with the sistership. With advance and transfer figured in, the result was that when Titanic steadied up on its new course the berg was 45 to 55 seconds in the future – just enough time for Boxhall to reach a point abreast of the captain’s quarters when Murdoch operated the engine room telegraph.
A modern forensic investigator ignoring the myths surrounding Titanic would now recognize the real cause of the accident. It was loss of situational awareness. This is a primary cause in most air, sea, and highway accidents. The people involved all think they are doing the right thing and being safe right up until what flyboys call the “O.. S...” moment. The U.S. Air Force started investigating this phenomenon after WW-II to find out why so many well-trained pilots flew perfectly good airplanes into the ground. Since then, situational awareness has become a prime focus of training for pilots as well as members of ships’ bridge teams. The concept was totally unrecognized in 1912 so we cannot fault the men for not recognizing the condition.
When Captain Smith returned to the bridge after dinner he joined the bridge team by assuming the conn. That is, he began plotting ice in order to choose the course to steer. First Officer Murdoch still had the deck, meaning he was responsible for issuing the steering and engine orders to make good what the conn directed. Lack of situational awareness was not yet a problem, but the physical layout of the ship’s bridge was about to get in the way of good bridge team management. Due to the placement of Titanic’s standard compass any course changes had to be done from that platform.
Here’s where things got confused. Although Murdoch nominally held the deck, in actuality the job had passed to Fourth Officer Boxhall. He was the man who would issue the course change order and steady the ship on its new course. Boxhall, not Murdoch was delegated to make the captain’s course change order come true. Unfortunately, there was no official announcement of any change in the responsibilities among the officers. As a result, everyone in the bridge team thought they were acting for the ship’s safety when in reality nobody was seeing the “big picture.” Captain Smith from the blindness of his navigation room was maneuvering his ship to avoid the field of ice. Murdoch believed the course change would avoid the berg announced by the lookouts. Boxhall assumed he was just obeying orders and that Murdoch still had the deck. You might say that despite licenses and titles, despite officer or crew status, despite that every man in the bridge team was doing his duty – nobody was really in overall charge of Titanic during those last minutes before impact.
Poor Boxhall was up there in the 22-knot ship’s wind behind funnel #2. He had not seen the “black mass” reported by the lookouts. He probably did not care about it anyway because he knew the captain’s order would turn ship the ship to its left and presumably leave whatever the lookouts spotted to starboard. Hichens could see nothing inside the shuttered wheelhouse except the compass in front of the wheel. Murdoch continued on watch, but was now effectively “out of the loop” in the chain of command. The First Officer was little more than a passenger as Titanic closed on its ice nemesis.
Even so, everything seemed right. The lookouts had reported that “black mass” in plenty of time. Captain Smith had given orders everyone expected to turn Titanic away from both that danger and the ice field. In WW-II fighter pilot lingo, everyone was “fat, dumb, and happy.” Then Murdoch had that gut-wrenching moment. Everything went to Hell as he watched the bow center on that iceberg. The first officer became the first person in Titanic to be jarred into true situational reality.
Murdoch’s initial reaction was to ring down an engine order. Boxhall heard the telegraph bells and there were witnesses to the telegraph ringing in the engine room. He knew that it would take time for the engineers to switch from a mid-ocean mentality to maneuvering stations. Murdoch had to get the engineers making that transition first before closing the watertight doors. What order he rang down is a mystery. My view that it involved only the starboard engine is based on what happened a few seconds later as the ship touched on the berg. Murdoch ordered “hard a-port” which would have turned the ship to its right and driven the bow hard against the berg. The only engine orders that make sense with this helm order are either STOP or BACK on the starboard screw. Either one would make the stern swing more quickly away from the ice danger and pull the side of Titanic away from the berg.
That “hard a-port” helm order was observed by quartermaster Olliver as the ship came onto the ice. Olliver is another eyewitness deliberately overlooked by conventional wisdom. As with Scarrott, what he said goes counter the myth. But, Olliver was there and the people who discredit him were not.
Olliver’s testimony was precise about the order of the events he observed. Perhaps more important was his omission of details that he could not have observed first-hand. For instance, while Boxhall heard the engine order telegraph, Olliver was a few steps behind the officer and so did not. The sound of those bells would have been lost in the ship’s 22 knot wind around his ears. Just as Olliver entered the wind-protected captain’s bridge he heard Murdoch’s voice shout the “hard a-port” order just as he felt the ship go onto the ice. He then saw the top of the berg as it passed the bridge wing. This is logical. The forward bridge wall was too high for Olliver to see over as he approached along the port boat deck. He could see Murdoch at the watertight door switch and behind him the starboard bridge wing where the berg slid past. Finally, he stepped into the wheelhouse where Olliver also observed Hichens at the wheel sing out that the helm was hard over.
Ice contact between berg and ship started at the forepeak tank, a curios thing. That tank was as much as 15 or more feet above the depth of the keel. Had the ship been on starboard helm turning to the left, the forepeak would have been rotated inside the maneuvering circle where it would have been away from the iceberg. So, the ship was not turning to its left when contact was made. We have proof of this from the lookouts who were adamant the ship approached the berg straight-on. Consider two statements from lookout fleet:
“...we were making straight for it...” and,
“Iceberg right ahead... .”
Both of those statements could only have been true if Titanic were steaming on a straight course – neither turning left or right – straight at the iceberg. Yet conventional wisdom requires that the ship be in a hard left turn (“hard a-starboard” helm in 1912 parlance) during the final approach to the iceberg. The problem comes from the testimony of quartermaster Hichens who claimed he had the helm hard a-starboard at the time of impact. Here are his words digested from BOT Questions 948 to 952:
“...Just as she struck I had the order ‘Hard a-starboard.’ When she struck. Not immediately as she struck, the ship was swinging. We had the order, ‘hard a-starboard,’ and she just swing about two points when she struck. The helm was barely over when she struck. The ship had swung about two points...” – Quartermaster Robert Hichens.
As Jim pointed out above Hichens' words are quite interesting. From the lookouts we have the ship steaming straight for the iceberg. And from quartermaster Olliver we learned that Murdoch’s helm order as the ship struck was “hard a-port.” Both of these testimonies are in direct contradiction to what Hichens claimed in the above quotes. I choose not to believe that the quartermaster steering Titanic was a deliberate liar. Rather, he was an ordinary man knowing the full weight of the British government could come down on his head if he said the wrong thing. It was easy enough for him to confuse Captain Smith’s course change made to avoid ice with any emergency orders from Murdoch to dodge the iceberg.
It was my attempt to make the quartermaster into an honest man that revealed the two-point course change. With one minor quibble, Hichens’ words make perfect sense within the context of the other witnesses. If such a maneuver had been ordered, Captain Smith would have combined it with the half-hourly compass comparison. This would have maximized the work output of his junior officers, Boxhall and Sixth Officer Moody. Chronologically, the two-point course change – which Hichens was adamant he made – would have been completed within a minute of impact on the iceberg. This timing of the course change was corroborated by Boxhall who discussed it, but who could not have known about it because he would have been walking on the boat deck out of earshot of any orders given to Hichens. If Boxhall knew, he must have participated in the maneuver while on the compass platform.
Fleet and Olliver confirm each other even though the men saw the same events from quite different viewpoints. With the course change completed, Titanic began steaming straight ahead. As Fleet said, it aimed at the iceberg and never wavered as the distance between the two reduced by 37 feet every second. Just as the ship struck Olliver heard Murdoch shout an emergency helm order to Hichens and seconds later as the ship was on the ice the wheel came hard over. Olliver heard Hichens sing out that the helm was hard over. All of what Fleet and Olliver reported confirms the testimony of Hichens with the exception of his confusion over port and starboard helm. The ship’s head was swinging during the accident and the helm was barely over (or, not at all) when Titanic struck, just as Hichens said.
Fortunately, we do not have to parse Hichens testimony. We have physical evidence as to which direction Hichens really did steer. Without being told to center up, Hichens would have held the wheel hard over. If he kept starboard helm, the ship would have continued to swing its head around to the south. Instead, Titanic shot forward even after the engines were stopped. It did so curving off to its starboard, which required port helm in 1912 parlance. We know this to be true because of where the on-duty officers gathered to witness the berg – on the starboard bridge wing. Because of the officers quarters deckhouse it was impossible to see directly astern. Nor was it possible to see the port side from the starboard (or vice versa) bridge wing. If the berg were off to port after the accident, it could only have been seen off the port bridge wing. But, the men went to the starboard side – which gave them a good view astern. This shows that Titanic’s final ice maneuver was “hard a-port” just as Olliver testified.
Then there’s the evidence of the iron on the bottom. Titanic’s bow section lies facing a bit west of north. The hard a-starboard helm order of conventional wisdom would have pointed the bow more to the south. But, it faces more northerly exactly as would be expected of a westbound ship that made an emergency right turn prior to foundering.
The physical damage to the hull also supports Olliver’s claim that Murdoch ordered “hard a-port” to turn the ship to its right. The head-on approach described by Fleet virtually requires damage to the peak tank. Then, as the bow caromed to its left Hichens began applying the right rudder called for by Murdoch. This brought about a hard topside impact in way of the well deck as evidenced by ice chunks which tumbled to the deck there from the berg. There was a rebound and then another softer hard impact in way of boiler room #4. After that, the stern began swinging away from the iceberg and the two parted company. On the poop, quartermaster Rowe noted the ship’s stern swinging away from the berg as if under “hard a-port” helm. All of this was in keeping with the expected results of the helm and engine orders I proposed above.
A couple of things to clear up regarding the lookouts. One is that they said the bow went slightly to port as the ship slid onto the ice. Given their position relative to the flare of the bow and that they were seeing events in relative motion, I believe them. Beyond that, Isaac Newton pretty much demands that during the initial moments the bow did rebound to port. That was the old “equal and opposite reaction” coupled with “objects at rest tend to stay at rest” laws. The ship would have rebounded off the iceberg until the slowing starboard screw and right rudder began to take control of the situation.
As to Fleet’s use of the phone to call the bridge, lookout Hogg testified, “No, sir, we struck a bell. We never used the phone... .” I have another quote lost in my files from a lookout who said that calling the bridge would have been viewed as insubordination. The call would have been seen as the lookout being critical of his superior, something not done in 1912. In his testimony lookout Hogg qualified his use of “never” by saying that the telephone was used, “...only in going into harbors, or into ports, or in the case of anything serious.” Without doubt an iceberg dead ahead was something serious.
It should be obvious that I do not subscribe to the theory that Murdoch’s engine order was ASTERN FULL as conventional wisdom claims. Only 1,650 feet separated ship and berg. That was simply not enough room for reversing engines to have done any good whatsoever. In testimony Second Officer Lightoller testified that a “crash back” stop using the engines would have taken at least 1,200 feet. Add to that the time necessary for engineers to run from odd corners of the engine room to the controls on the operating platform. If that took 20 seconds, Titanic would have covered another 740 feet. That’s a total stopping distance needed of at least 2,300 feet. Murdoch didn’t have that much room. “Crashing back” the engines was not an option to avoid the iceberg and the First Officer would have been aware of that slight problem. He would also have known that reverse thrust would have reduced the rudder’s effectiveness in steering the ship.
Distance being too short to stop, and there being an open ocean in every direction the best option to avoid disaster was to steer around the berg. That would have required full effectiveness of the rudder. And, because Titanic was a triple-screw ship, Murdoch even had a way of increasing the rudder’s ability to turn the ship. That was to combine a helm order with reversing one of the two outboard screws. I believe Murdoch sent down an order involving only the starboard reciprocating engine. Slowing, stopping or reversing that engine would have aided the right turn (hard a-port) that evidence shows he chose to mitigate damage during impact. This is also why stewards Crowe, Ward and watchman Johnson all thought the ship had lost a propeller blade in an incident similar to one that sistership Olympic suffered. They noted the steady beat of the engines change on only one shaft much as a lost blade would have caused.
Titanic’s center screw was not powered by reciprocating steam engine. It was driven by a turbine with no reversing mechanism. At 22 knots there was no provision to cause the center propeller to stop rotating in an instant. The best the engineers could have done was to close the steam to the turbine and let it free wheel. A large automatic valve was provided for this purpose. It may have closed with enough of a “bang” to cause some people to think the berg struck in the stern. Whether it continued under power, or it free wheeled, the center propeller would have only slightly reduced the effectiveness of the center-mounted single rudder.
A decade ago I had a chance to talk to a former U.S. Navy seaman who was aboard an aircraft carrier that did a crash stop in the Mediterranean to avoid another vessel. He talked of the stern jumping up and down six feet or more. There were many injuries caused by sleeping sailors being thrown from their bunks. The carrier had four screws and far more power than Titanic. A crash back in 1912 would not have been quite that dramatic by half. But, it would have been the most remarkable event of the evening for steerage passengers short of the ship sinking. Nobody recalled the rumblings, vibrations, or even vertical motion of the stern resulting from a sudden reversing of the two outboard engines. This is why I discount conventional wisdom that the “engines were reversed.” The facts only support one engine being slowed or stopped before impact.
-- David G. Brown
