Rob --
There are parts of the story I've not included just for brevity and to avoid arguments not germane to Boxhall's lies. But, the surviving officers knew Hichens would have to testify about the starboard helm turn and would say it was two points. That alone should have sounded alarms in the head of any competent investigator. The surviving officers also knew the duration between the sounding of the crow's nest bell and impact. Once again, that five to eight minute duration blows apart the "berg from nowhere" theory. Worse, it implies the ship was in peril for that length of time and nobody did anything to correct the situation. And, if Boxhall admitted he was doing his normal rounds somebody would certainly have asked why at 11:40 o'clock when they were not due until 12:00 o'clock.
Why did the officers have used 11:40 o'clock for the time of impact? Properly, they should have used unaltered April 14th hours. By using crew time they hid from notice that the fourth officer should have been walking to the compass platform. They hid the duration of the compass evolutions and avoided questions about the embarrassing five to eight minutes. LIkewise, they explained away why Boxhall was off the bridge. None of those should have been happening at 11:40 o'clock. But, if they had used 12:04 in unaltered time, all would have been exposed.
The surviving officers also knew that somebody had to give a plausible explanation of Murdoch's actions that would make two deliberate lies seem true. They had more to do than just explain how the ship ran into something reported five to eight minutes earlier. The also had to make sure the cover story contained the possibility of both a starboard and a port helm maneuver in Murdochs story to explain the inconsistencies between the testimony of Hichens and that of Olliver.
So, Boxhall had to create a fiction about why he was walking forward when the lookouts rang their bell. He had to put himself on the bridge at the right moment to hear Murdoch's alleged "port around...too close" story. Then, he had to get himself off the bridge but not say why he left as he could not say he was going rounds.
I must point out that while we have corroborating witnesses to the presences of Olliver, Hichens, Moody, Murdoch, and Smith all on the bridge after the accident, there is no such corroboration for Boxhall. Nobody saw him there at the moment he was supposedly overhearing Murdoch's report to Captain Smith.
It is my belief that the officers of the bridge team did not fully comprehend why the accident took place. Everyone on watch had apparently been doing their duty just as they had many nights previously. Likewise for the ratings. The lookouts made their report in plenty of time to avoid an accident. From what we know Olliver and Hichens were steady at the wheel and executed their other duties with care. What went wrong? They had never heard of "lack of situational awareness" in 1912. No one yet understood the concept nor how to recognize this deadly problem when it occurs.
Titanic's loss of situational awareness began when Captain Smith came on the bridge and prudently began plotting ice reports. While I do not want to argue the point now, there is pretty good evidence that Titanic's master took action at least a half hour prior to the actual iceberg accident. He turned one point to the south at 11:30 o'clock in unaltered April 14th time. From the survivor's testimonies nothing was said, and nobody noticed. But Captain Smith had quietly begun taking the two key aspects of bridge management off the shoulders of First Officer Murdoch and placed them on himself. These aspects are known to the Navy as "the deck" and "the con." The officer with the deck decides where the ship is to go and when it is to maneuver. He does not issue the orders necessary to accomplish this. That duty goes to the officer who has the con. This officer issues steering and engine orders to make good what the deck requests.
Until the captain returned to the bridge that night both "the deck" and "the con" rested in Murdoch. This is a quite normal situation well out to sea on a merchant vessel. By starting his own plot, Captain Smith began to erode the first officers' deck responsibilities. And, at 11:30 o'clock in unaltered time Smith issued an order that moved the deck responsibility went from first officer to captain in an unnoticed transfer of responsibility. Neither man was aware it even happened. So, nearly a half hour later when the fatal berg was spotted more that two miles ahead nothing happened. Murdoch expected Smith to issue another order. Murdoch would then have conned the ship as requested. Captain Smith remained in his personal navigation room out of visual contact with the world around Titanic. He still expected Murdoch to handle the deck responsibilities. Two men -- one responsibility -- nobody responsible -- nobody aware of problem.
Murdoch undoubtedly observed the ship approaching the iceberg. In relative motion his experienced seaman's eye would have told him the berg would pass safely off the port side. As a result, any expectation he head of an order from Captain Smith waned. The danger was actually subsiding. Meanwhile, Captain Smith was issuing orders to Boxhall to alter course at 12:00 o'clock by two points (per Hichens recollection) to the south. As Boxhall walked out of the officer's quarters he took with him the responsibility of "the con." Once again, nobody really noticed the subtle change. Murdoch thought he had the conl. Smith had the deck but thought it was Murdoch's responsibility. Meanwhile, an iceberg was moving rapidly off the starboard bow.
Whether Murdoch knew about the planned two-point course change or not is mootl. He would not have countermanded the captain's orders without some specific reason. With danger passing safely to port there was no reason. The timing of Boxhall's helm instructions from the compass platform was inopportune. Due to bad luck the iceberg was about two points off the port bow when Titanic began curving left. Boxhall was quite deliberately pointing Titanic at its doom. It was accidental, yes, but never-the-less effective.
At that moment Captain Smith was confident his ship was being taken away from danger. He was probably looking forward to when another maneuver might be needed. Murdoch was expecting the Captain's maneuver to take the ship clear of the berg. Boxhall was following orders as was Hichens. Moody was noting everything for the scrap log. All that changed when Hichens sang out that Titanic was steadied up on its new course. Two famous words must have slipped from Murdoch's mouth and been blown away by the 22 knot ship's wind.
Everyone in the bridge team was doing his job, but nobody was overall in charge of the ship. Loss of situational awareness was no in command of Titanic.
After impact. After the lifeboats were launched. After the hull split in two. After
Carpathia's arrival. After all that the officers gathered aboard the rescue ship. We know they did. There is at least one photo. We can be reasonably certain they were not discussing the weather. Those men had just lost their ship and more than 1,500 lives. They knew there would be an investigation and somebody would be blamed. Careers, livelihoods and perhaps even personal freedom were all at stake. Put yourself in their position. What would you have been discussing?
-- David G. Brown
