Prelude To An Allision - Titanic's Fatal Encounter Revisited

[Samuel Halpern]

If that was the case and be 20 miles off course

That 20 miles ahead of the DR story came from Boxhall in 1962. I for one don't believe that that particular detail was accurate.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

Wasn't Boxhall one of the officers who calculated we reach the ice region by 11pm.

No, according to Lightoller, the 11pm estimate came from Moody.

 

[Bob Read]

Reducing speed to 15kts would have been sufficient to avoid hitting the berg in more or less all possible exact configurations of Titanic and the berg’s relative positions at first sighting.

What precedent for this night would have been instructive? What was the widely accepted procedure when in an area of ice? That’s right. It was get through the area as quickly as possible. Hindsight caused a reevaluation but for the time in 1912, in clear weather, the accepted standard was to proceed with all speed. You can disagree with that strategy all you want but it was the conventional wisdom of the time.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

Food for thought If Captain Smith was on the bridge from 11pm on. Would he be facing the same situation as Murdoch did?

Yes, and it would have been Smith, by being out on the bridge, who would have been in direct command and the one to issue any orders. The only questions would have been, who sees and reports the iceberg first, and how long would it take for Smith to issue orders?

On September 20th 1911, Olympic, under the command of Trinity House pilot George Bowyer, was struck by HMS Hawke just north of the Isle of Wright. In the final minute before Hawke struck Olympic, as she appeared to be drawn toward Olympic, Captain Smith (who was out on the starboard bridge wing keeping an eye on Hawke) called out to Bowyer (who was next to compass at the wheel on the forebridge), “I do not believe he will go under our stern Bowyer.” Bowyer then told Smith, “If she is going to strike let me know in time to put our helm hard-aport.” Smith did not reply immediately, and a second or two later Bowyer asked, “Is she going to strike us or not, sir?” Smith then said, “Yes Bowyer, she is going to strike us in the stern.” Immediately, Bowyer sang out, “Hard-aport!” and helmsman Albert Haines just managed to get Olympic’s wheel over hard to his right when Hawke struck.

This scene was told by Bowyer under oath during the Olympic/Hawke trial in November of that year. I will leave it to others to speculate how quickly, or not, orders would have been issued, and therefore what would have been the result.

 

[Bob Read]

I will leave it to others to speculate how quickly, or not, orders would have been issued, and therefore what would have been the result.

Given the Hawke anecdote, it kind of argues against those who think Smith would have brought some magic to the bridge that Murdoch was lacking.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

is there any survivor statement by Hichens, Olliver or Boxhall that might throw a light on where Moody actually was at the time Fleet rang the 3 bells?

According to Hichens, Moody was in the wheelhouse when the telephone came down from the nest just a few seconds after the 3 bells. And it was Moody who informed Murdoch that an iceberg was seen ahead.
As to the question of why Moody was stationed in the wheelhouse, and not out on the ridge wing, again the answer is that there was no apparent reason given the perfect visibility to have him out on the bridge wing. In the wheelhouse he was close to the 4 telephones that were located there and could also keep an eye out to see that the helmsman was doing his job and not slacking off, especially late at night. (Remember, these guys get only 4 hours to sleep before coming back on duty.) I can show you some course recorder data of what a good helmsman is supposed to do, and what a not so good helmsman can do, from the MS Stockholm taken in the hours before the 1956 collision with Andrea Doria, and why some required closer supervision than others. I'll post this later when I get the chance.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

Given the Hawke anecdote, it kind of argues against those who think Smith would have brought some magic to the bridge that Murdoch was lacking.

You're probably right. Ironically, if Smith would have been there and delayed orders long enough, the ship would have struck more nearly head-on, suffering severe casualties, but likely would have stayed afloat.

 

[Bob Read]

but likely would have stayed afloat.

That has been argued back and forth but color me skeptical.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

I can show you some course recorder data of what a good helmsman is supposed to do, and what a not so good helmsman can do, from the MS Stockholm taken in the hours before the 1956 collision with Andrea Doria, and why some required closer supervision than others.

The helmsman during the period shown on the top strip of the course recording needed greater supervision by Stockholm's 3/O than the one who was at the helm during the period when the lower strip recording was taken. The 3/O, who was in command of Stockholm, was splitting his time between watching the radar, overseeing the helmsman, and keeping up a radar plot of the situation. They also had a lookout in the nest. Stockholm, heading east in the westbound shipping lane, was in the clear; while the Doria, heading west at slightly less than full speed, was in dense fog. Both ships were using their radars.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

That has been argued back and forth but color me skeptical.

Skepticism is good. So was I, which is why I dug deeper into the question:
See: http://www.titanicology.com/Titanica/BraceForCollision.pdf

 

[Arun Vajpey]

According to Hichens, Moody was in the wheelhouse when the telephone came down from the nest just a few seconds after the 3 bells. As to the question of why Moody was stationed in the wheelhouse, and not out on the ridge wing, again the answer is that there was no apparent reason given the perfect visibility to have him out on the bridge wing. In the wheelhouse he was close to the 4 telephones that were located there and could also keep an eye out to see that the helmsman was doing his job and not slacking off, especially late at night.

Thanks, but IMO Moody in the wheelhouse all the time supervising the QM would have been unnecessary and counter-productive; was it SOP at the time? Simply being a few seconds closer to the phones would have served little purpose since, as probably in this case too, an alert OOW would have responded to the bells and had the information about the object before the phone call came though. As for 'keeping an eye on the helmsman' would that not been monotonous and especially within the wheelhouse, contribute to loss of alertness on part of the 6/O himself? On that flat, calm, clear but very dark night, I would have thought Moody would have been far more useful had he been out on the other bridge wing, adding his pair of eyes to those of Murdoch. Granted, under the combination of navigational and atmospheric conditions prevailing as the Titanic approached the iceberg, Moody's additional eyes might not have made any difference, but the him on the bridge seems more logical at the very least.

 

[marina_irc]

Since others have repeatedly stressed on additional lookouts, I was interested in knowing where Moody might have been that night, that's all. In fact, I think he was also watching the horizon and like you said Bob, with 4 of them doing so it was still too late to avoid the iceberg. I was trying to stress that point myself.

Extra lookouts might have specifically been relevant if they’d been closer to the ship’s waterline. Sam explains this phenomenon very well in how the horizon was more distinct closer to the water’s surface that night (and this isn’t some weird freak thing either but normal in such conditions). Stationing lookouts on the forepeak therefore might have made a difference, and this was in fact the policy of one of the transatlantic lines in ice per the testimony at the inquiry.

 

[Julian Atkins]

My view, and I am very grateful for Sam’s further comments on this, is that Moody being in the wheelhouse with Hichens was an utterly pointless exercise and useless waste of this Officer unless there were concerns in respect of Hichens’ lack of attention.

Given what Hichens later did in his lifeboat later on (which seems quite despicable) then perhaps there were concerns at the time?

Of the very many accounts I have read of quartermasters at the helm, Hichens is the only one I have found of an officer of the bridge standing by him checking his every move - though no move checking was required - as all Hichens had to do was maintain a constant course!

One thing I think has been overlooked is the way that crew were employed at that time. The smaller Lines such as the Leyland Line seem to have been pretty good at recruiting a regular crew.

Ergo why on earth would anyone in April 1912 employ the destitute Reginald Lee as a lookout who was to die within 18 months? Or Fleet who had not had an eye test for 5 years? (And as we know committed suicide in later life). Hichens also had a colourful end.

This wasn’t a pirate ship with Long John Silver - it was the maiden voyage of the largest ship built so far - but the vagaries of the the appalling employment system for crew in 1912 meant that key crew members were not a ‘crack’ crew. Far from it.

I think this also needs to be taken into account when considering Sam’s excellent ‘Allision’ book.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

but the vagaries of the the appalling employment system for crew in 1912 meant that key crew members were not a ‘crack’ crew. Far from it.

If what you say is true, then more the reason for having someone keeping an eye out on the helmsman.

 

[Mike Spooner]

Wasn't it Hitchin first crossing with WSL? So keeping an eye on him wasn't a bad idea. But to have an officer is a bit over the top as other QM could of done the same thing.