Prelude To An Allision - Titanic's Fatal Encounter Revisited

Everybody seems to be hair splitting by quibbling over a few seconds here or there when in reality by the time they identified the berg it was most likely too late to avoid a collision. If you already had three people looking forward, is anybody sure that any more would have been able to see the berg that much sooner to change what happened? The only certain way that berg could have been avoided is if they had come to full stop at sunset and remained that way until dawn. But we know that would never have been seriously considered nor should it have been.
 
Everybody seems to be hair splitting by quibbling over a few seconds here or there when in reality by the time they identified the berg it was most likely too late to avoid a collision. If you already had three people looking forward, is anybody sure that any more would have been able to see the berg that much sooner to change what happened? The only certain way that berg could have been avoided is if they had come to full stop at sunset and remained that way until dawn. But we know that would never have been seriously considered nor should it have been.

Reducing speed to 15kts would have been sufficient to avoid hitting the berg in more or less all possible exact configurations of Titanic and the berg’s relative positions at first sighting. This would have made Titanic three hours late into NY after she sped back up in the morning.
 
We have Dan on another thread awhile back and others awhile back quoting Captain Pritchard and other Captains that they would proceed ‘full steam’ ahead into a region of reported ice, but unless I am mistaken, no questioning of other precautionary measures that they would have taken which Captain Smith did not order.
I believe Sam has explained the mindset behind the belief of Captain Pritchard et al that it was the right thing to proceed at full speed through an ice field because they believed that they - or at least the Lookouts and/or the OOW - would have spotted the iceberg in time to avoid impact. As Sam said in an another post a few months ago, they were all wrong; I agree that all 14 of them grossly overestimated the ability of their crew to see a medium-sized iceberg in flat-calm conditions on a very dark & moonless night like the one the Titanic was sailing that Sunday.

As far as explaining their desire to maintain maximum speed through an ice-field so that they could get out of it as quickly as possible makes no sense whatever - it is worse than moronic. It is like a bus driver wanting to drive through the Swiss Alpine Pass Roads at full speed so that he could get his passengers to safety as quickly as possible. As you have pointed out - and I agree - that defending comments by a group of men simply because they were all Captains of experience is meaningless; over 100 years down the line, we can never know the convoluted motivations that might have been there for them to have made such statements.

The same thing applies to considering as Gospel the impressions offered by another experienced person over a dinner table.

The simple fact is that Murdoch should not have been alone on the bridge, and if he anticipated things correctly he would not have excused Boxhall, and surely would have been told either by Lightoller or Moody himself that Moody expected ice around 11pm that Sunday night.
On principle that is logical but considering how vague, contradictory and unreliable Boxhall's statements were after the accident - both during the official Inquiries and elsewhere over the years - we don't know what transpired between him and Murdoch between 11pm and 11:40pm. It would be difficult to provide evidence for or against for something like this, but if, as I have presumed, Boxhall was in the toilet when the Titanic collided with the iceberg, he might have gone in there only a few minutes before. In other words, it is possible Boxhall was on the bridge with Murdoch before then and obtained the 1/O's permission to get a break, his position being taken over by Moody. Such an exchange would have been brief and not particularly overheard by Hichens enclosed in his wheelhouse and of course, Moody died with Murdoch in the sinking. If that had happened, why Boxhall did not mention it himself would be anyone's guess, of course.

I accept that it is a major presumption on my part about Boxhall's whereabouts but it is one way of explaining the sequence of events during the 30 minutes or so leading up to the collision.

But whether Boxhall or Moody had provided their eyes on watch in that timeframe, I do not believe that it would have made any difference. It was way too dark, the ship had too much momentum and whoever had spotted "it" on the horizon first - Fleet, Lee, Murdoch, Moody - it would have already been too late. At most, they might have gained 5 seconds and we've already discussed above why that would not have avoided the impact.

The only certain way that berg could have been avoided is if they had come to full stop at sunset and remained that way until dawn
In theory that is correct, but I don't believe they had to go that far. Unlike the Californian, the Titanic was not surrounded by ice - it had not even encountered any as yet. But they knew that they were approaching the ice field and so reducing speed and perhaps additional lookouts might have avoided the accident.
 
Wasn't Boxhall one of the officers who calculated we reach the ice region by 11pm. Therefore you would of thought he would of bought to Murdoch attention.
 
Wasn't Boxhall one of the officers who calculated we reach the ice region by 11pm. Therefore you would of thought he would of bought to Murdoch attention.

Maybe he did; as I said, Boxhall did not mention any ice-related exchange with Murdoch but that does not mean it never happened. Also, the Titanic had not yet encountered ice at 11pm AST that night.

What we cannot be certain is Moody's exact position on the bridge at the time of the accident. In, say, 15 minutes leading up to the sighting of the iceberg, perhaps longer, only Murdoch, Moody and Hichens were on the Navigating Bridge and Hichens, the only survivor from those three, was enclosed in his wheelhouse unable to see outside. We know that OOWs were sometimes relieved by their colleagues for meal breaks etc - like Murdoch & Lightoller earlier that night. Therefore, it is theoretically possible that after he permitted Boxhall to take a break, Murdoch had Moody adding his pair of eyes on the bridge. Neither Fleet/Lee in the crow's nest nor Hichens within the wheelhouse nor Boxhall from wherever he was could have known the point from which Moody hurried to answer the telephone.

PS: Looking at BB's deckplans, the only Officer's Toilet (Other than the Captain's own) appears to be on the port side of the central section with a lot of intervening structures in-between - vents, fans, the 1st smokestack, chart room, wheelhouse and of course the navigating bridge itself - between it and the crow's nest. So, if Boxhall really had been in the lavatory with the door closed, I doubt if he could have heard the sound of the 3 bells from there. But he would certainly have felt the first impact and if so, for him to 'finish off', quickly clean-up, readjust his uniform and go to the bridge would have used up the time that it looks like it took for him to arrive there.
 
Strictly speaking there was no officers whom survive on the bridge who saw the iceberg contact. The only two on the ship whom survive and did see the contact with the iceberg where two in the crow nest..
The more I heard what was going on the bridge between the officers quite frankly sounds was bit of a shambles. With the greatest regrets captain Smith and may be harsh on him, but coming across he didn't have proper control or lack discipline communication between his officers.
 
I applauded Sam’s chapter on Boxhall in his book.

Boxhall got a very easy time that watch, and as the disaster ensued. And when we consider the mistakes Boxhall made that are undeniable, it must surely be the case that Boxhall was not on good form.

Neither was Captain Smith.

Captain Smith provided the first CQD position by dead reckoning without taking into account the stellar positioning and calculations as if he knew nothing of them.

That suggests to me that Captain Smith wasn’t ‘with it’ that Sunday evening.

And when Boxhall completed the stellar navigation stuff, he also wasn’t ‘with it’ as he got it wrong.
 
Wasn't it or not the responsibility for a captain to check the junior officers navigation position? I got the impression they could in those days get the correct position plus and minus a mile. If that was the case and be 20 miles off course that can only be down to a lack of concentration on the job.
 
Any miscalculation of position is only relevant as far as the CQD/SOS wireless signals were concerned but would have been irrelevant as far as the accident itself. While the Captain, Murdoch, Boxhall, the lookouts etc would have known that they were in the vicinity of ice, they would not have any specific idea about the position of individual icebergs, including the one with which the Titanic collided that night. And since no ship including the Californian could have arrived on time to make a difference as far as the loss of life was concerned, we cannot say that Smith or Boxhall not being "with it" that night was directly responsible. Of course, the wrong positions sent might have hindered the subsequent rescue effort but by a combination of luck and bravado, Captain Rostron and his Carpathia found all the survivors.

Getting back to the accident itself, is there any survivor statement by Hichens, Olliver or Boxhall that might throw a light on where Moody actually was at the time Fleet rang the 3 bells? We know he was the J/O on bridge duty and while theoretically Murdoch might have delegated Moody a task that momentarily had taken the latter off the navigating bridge, the fact that the 6/0 answered Fleet's phone call without delay confirms that this was not the case and Moody was physically present on the bridge at the time. Hichens' testimony indicates that Moody only supervised the QM carrying out Murdoch's helm orders after it (they) was(were) given and not that the 6/O was inside the wheelhouse before. That clearly indicates that just before anyone saw that 'something on the horizon', Moody was also on the navigating bridge with Murdoch and IMO the most logical thing in that case would have been to be scanning the ocean ahead like his superior, perhaps from the port bridge wing.
 
That clearly indicates that just before anyone saw that 'something on the horizon', Moody was also on the navigating bridge with Murdoch and IMO the most logical thing in that case would have been to be scanning the ocean ahead like his superior, perhaps from the port bridge wing.
If you’re right , now we have four people scanning the horizon and still they collided with the berg. How many more would have made all the difference in avoiding the berg? I believe the answer is that more lookouts would not have made any difference. Would Murdoch have taken any action unless and until he had visually confirmed what someone else might have seen before him?
 
I never said that more lookouts by themselves would have made any difference. On the contrary, I have always supported Sam's view that given the ship's speed (and its very high momentum given its size) along with the very dark conditions, it would already have been too late by the time
anyone saw the object on the horizon.

But I do believe that if Smith had ordered the ship's speed to be reduced earlier, there was a good chance that the accident could have been avoided. With  that scenario, additional lookouts could have provided further insurance.
 
We have Dan on another thread awhile back and others awhile back quoting Captain Pritchard and other Captains that they would proceed ‘full steam’ ahead into a region of reported ice
The key point being overlooked here is visibility. There was 100% clear visibility (to the horizon) on the night in question - and according to captains of the day - and today - *that* is the protocol for maintaining speed. Reported positions of ice quickly become irrelevant in moving currents, so visibility is the key determining factor. Not just for ice, but other potential unreported dangers such as derelicts and other vessels.

It wasn't just 14 captains in 1912 either. Today the protocol of maintaining speed in clear conditions still stands.

As far as explaining their desire to maintain maximum speed through an ice-field so that they could get out of it as quickly as possible makes no sense whatever - it is worse than moronic. It is like a bus driver wanting to drive through the Swiss Alpine Pass Roads at full speed so that he could get his passengers to safety as quickly as possible.
I think you are missing the point. In your Swiss Alpine Pass illustration, what if there was a threat of an avalanche? That aligns better with the facts. i.e. it would be dangerous to slow down. Maintaining speed - but only in clear conditions - was all about avoiding danger in the first place.

How many more would have made all the difference in avoiding the berg?

Precisely! The issue was not the number of lookouts, but the fact that for some perhaps unexplained reason (fanciful stories of mirages and hazes need not apply) the iceberg was not spotted in enough time to be avoided. It somehow remained invisible to at least three well-trained eyes actively looking for it.
 
Since others have repeatedly stressed on additional lookouts, I was interested in knowing where Moody might have been that night, that's all. In fact, I think he was also watching the horizon and like you said Bob, with 4 of them doing so it was still too late to avoid the iceberg. I was trying to stress that point myself.
 
The issue was not the number of lookouts, but the fact that for some perhaps unexplained reason (fanciful stories of mirages and hazes need not apply) the iceberg was not spotted in enough time to be avoided. It somehow remained invisible to at least three well-trained eyes actively looking for it.
It was NOT an "unexplained reason" at all. The flat calm sea and quite severe darkness would have meant that any number of lookouts would not have made the difference at that speed and momentum. As I have said above, by the time anyone spotted what would turn out to be the iceberg, it would already have been too late s far as the Titanic was concerned.
 
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