Final Hours in the Marconi Room

[marina_irc]

I think we can easily conclude that at least 2 warnings of ice on the evening of the 14th April were not taken to the bridge on Titanic. One was the MSG sent by The Californian to the Antillian, that was also sent to Titanic. Though Evans and Captain Lord were never asked whether a MSG was directly sent to Titanic. If it wasn’t a MSG then it was of navigational status and should have been actioned by Bride.

The other was the Mesaba ice report (of navigational status) that Phillips received shortly before 10pm.

Then we have Sutherland on the Parisian in press reports saying he was sending out repeated messages of ice. The Parisian, according to Sam’s excellent analysis, played a part in all this.

Adams on the Mesaba was also sending out repeated ice reports that afternoon. (We have considered this on another thread, and Steven Christian has provided the names of the ships whose call signs Adams recorded).

I don’t know why Titanic didn’t ask about the Parisian MSG warning of icebergs to The Californian, or why Bride didn’t immediately respond to The Californian MSG or report it was sent of what appears to be exactly the same ice bergs. (Bride was doing his accounts he claimed). We know that the Parisian and The Californian were attempting to estimate their distances between each other and Titanic. They were all pretty close at various times, and all easily within wireless range.

Then we have Evans’ to Phillips chatty “we are stopped surrounded by ice”. That Phillips replied with “DDD”.

Bearing in mind that The Californian had sent a message to the Titanic that Bride ignored some 6 hours earlier of 3 icebergs seen 5 miles south, surely anyone of any competence ought to have linked the dots, rather than be on a death wish?

This is a truly shocking state of affairs in respect of the way Bride and Phillips handled possible MSGs but certainly a great many actual and potentially far more messages of ice warnings of navigational status that Deputy Manager George Turnbull of Marconi said should immediately have been taken to the bridge.

And yet Marconi was also providing shipboard installations primarily to make money off of passenger traffic. This created a fundamental tension in what the Marconi operators likely saw as their real job.

 

[Julian Atkins]

Sorry, @mitfrc , I’ve edited my post since your reply.

I think we don’t know much about the contracts for Marconi sets on ships in 1911/2. The Marconi Operators might have been told all sorts of things, but on the vast majority of ships fitted, they had no or very few passengers.

 

[marina_irc]

Sorry, @mitfrc , I’ve edited my post since your reply.

I think we don’t know much about the contracts for Marconi sets on ships in 1911/2. The Marconi Operators might have been told all sorts of things, but on the vast majority of ships fitted, they had no or very few passengers.

Not a problem. I would suspect the liner “sparks” ended up with a different view of their job than the ones on cargo ships, mind. It would be amazing if the contract for Marconi on the Titanic could be found.

 

[Bob Read]

With the conventional wisdom being to get through an area of ice as quickly as possible, how exactly would any additional warnings have been the deciding factor for Smith to reduce speed?

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Right, so maybe we can’t really reasonably expect them to have gotten it right, but the lack of appreciation for how critical its safety function is was indeed one of the critical contributing factors to the high death toll.

This created a fundamental tension in what the Marconi operators likely saw as their real job.

IMO the issue was not one of confusion with the command structure (which was well understood by all) or prioritising incoming wireless messages, for which there was a protocol (with navigation related ones taking priority over private messages), but the difference in perception of wireless messages between the operators and the ship's Captain/Officers. In 1912 shipboard wireless telegraphy was still bit of a novelty and despite incedents such as the Binns/Republic one, its importance was not yet fully appreciated by all concerned. People like Captain Smith and to some extent even his Officers would have risen in the ranks without any experience of this technology till the start of the 20th century and so better versed with other forms of communication. Even after the Marconi Company was established and use of wireless telegraphy became relatively common, the service would have remaind something of a novelty in the senior officers' minds and its importance might not have been prioritised in their pre-trained minds.

On the other hand, most wireless operators like Phillips and Bride were young, learned about the new technology whilst in their late teens and trained specifically for its use. Many of them might not have had the "natural born sailor" turn of mind and added to that was the fact that they were empoyees of the Marconi Company rather than the shipping line. But once on board a ship, they would have come under the Captain's overall command and the use of their equipment would have been according to the protocol. It is possible that in 1912 this relationship was still not fully grounded and depite existence of a clear protocol, there could have been differences in the manner by which things like ice related messages were perceived. Those perceptive differences might have been the reason why Captain Smith stopped short of issuing specific orders to his wireless ops that all ice related messages relevant to the Titanic's route should be sent to the bridge; it may also have been one of the reasons why Phillips and Bride did not do so off their own back.

With the conventional wisdom being to get through an area of ice as quickly as possible.

I know that it was conventional "wisdom" at the time but exactly how did they believe that getting through an area of ice as fast as possible make it any safer or better in some other way? It is like modern HGV dirvers having to pass through roads known to be slippery with ice and deciding that the best way was to get through as fast as possible. It does not make any sense.

 

[Bob Read]

I know that it was conventional "wisdom" at the time but exactly how did they believe that getting through an area of ice as fast as possible make it any safer or better in some other way?

Now there’s your avenue for research. The reason at the time must have been rational or it wouldn’t have become conventional wisdom. The key to this practice was good visibility. Visibility was good. With a flat calm and no moon it was not as ideal as it could have been but it was still considered good visibility. Hindsight tells us it was not good enough. But how many captains at the time would have considered conditions good enough to maintain speed?

 

[Arun Vajpey]

But how many captains at the time would have considered conditions good enough to maintain speed?

I think Sam Halpern has discussed that a few times before. Although sighting of ice fields and icebergs in that sector of the ocean at that time of the year was fairly common, an actual collision with one was very rare. I think someone posted recently about when a ship impacted with an iceberg previous to the Titanic and if I recall correctly, it was quite a while before. That might have led Captains and officers to a false belief that even at a speed of around 22 knots their Lookouts and/or OOWs would be able to spot an iceberg in time and get their ship out of the way as long as the weather was clear. While that presumption might have been true under most conditions, it was not applicable on a very dark and moonless night with a flat calm sea, especially on a fast moving very large ship like the Titanic. And so it proved.

Although a lot has been said about those 11 Captains testifying that they would have maintained course and speed exactly like Captain Smith did, that does not tell us how many other captains would have played it safe and slowed their ships down, posted additional lookouts altered course as appropriate etc. Judging by their actions with their own ships that Sunday night, it is possible that Captains Moore and Lord of the Mount Temple and Californian rspectively, might have done so. Those two were facing the exact same conditions as Captain Smith and so their precautions IMO would be more relevant (what Captain Lord did or didn't do later is completely irrelelvant to this topic)

 

[Bob Read]

While that presumption might have been true under most conditions, it was not applicable on a very dark and moonless night with a flat calm sea, especially on a fast moving very large ship like the Titanic.

The presumption about the weather conditions, although not absolutely ideal, was proved wrong only with hindsight. Conventional wisdom is achieved through long experience. I speculate that few other captains in Smith’s position would have acted differently. His own highly trained officers did not post additional lookouts or ask Captain Smith about reducing speed. I think we are imposing a standard on Captain Smith that wasn’t a standard at the time.

 

[Mike Spooner]

Captain Smith has done the Atlantic crossing many times over and icefields too. We hear of 11 other captains don't back of there speed if it clear vision ahead. Smith has decide not to rely on wireless ice warnings messages but on a gut feeling and probably done it many times before and never had a problem. But this time he was caught out. Did the Marconi operators give enough warning? When looking at what the officers had to say about ice warnings, yes they did taken notice of the ice warnings that lay ahead of them. Lightoller had calculator about 9.30 on we will reach the icefield region. Even the Junior officers had calculator about 11.00 for ice. As for Smith action plan. If it becomes at all doubtful, let me known at once! Ok the Marconi men may given more messages, but was good enough for the officers to workout why couldn't Smith do like wise to.
If Smith was rely on ice warnings, as the commander of the ship should of given an clear order to the wireless operators that all ice ahead must be reported to the bridge immediately.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

The presumption about the weather conditions, although not absolutely ideal, was proved wrong only with hindsight. I think we are imposing a standard on Captain Smith that wasn’t a standard at the time.

Maybe so, but is that not true of any investigation into an accident? As soon as the official American Inquiry into the Titanic disaster began, they had a limited amount of insight which gradually increased as more and more people testified. At the end of the day they were determined to find out how and why it happened and what could be done to reduce the chances of it happeneing again. The latter decision was reflected in the new regulations regarding lifeboats etc, upgrading of the Olympic and other ships and perhaps more than anything else, an increase in general awareness that something like that could happen. So the goalposts were moved, SOPs appropriately revised and so on.

As for us applying 'standards' to 1912 that did not exist at the time, that is the reason that such discussion forums as ET exist. We are also reading, researching and discussing to find out what the Titanic collided with the iceberg that Sunday night and in order to be able to do that, using hindsight coherently, correlation (if not comparison) with contemporary standards is inevitable.

 

[Gordon Mooneyhan]

Bride and Phillips were under pressure to make money for their company.

Words mean things, and that sentence implies that part of Bride and Phillips's job was to go and solicit messages to send. That is the inference in what you've stated. No doubt that they were under pressure to get the wireless messages sent, but soliciting messages to send was not in their job description.

 

[Bob Read]

Arun: I think investigations into disasters need to apply hindsight. The issue is labeling Captain Smith negligent when he was not according to existing standards of the time.

 

[Gordon Mooneyhan]

Not a problem. I would suspect the liner “sparks” ended up with a different view of their job than the ones on cargo ships, mind. It would be amazing if the contract for Marconi on the Titanic could be found.

I'm sure the contract does exist. It would be between the Marconi Company and White Star Line or between the Marconi Company and International Mercantile Marine. There would not be contracts for each individual ship. I suspect the contract is either in the Marconi or Cunard archives.

 

[Gordon Mooneyhan]

Arun: I think investigations into disasters need to apply hindsight. The issue is labeling Captain Smith negligent when he was not according to existing standards of the time.

Negligence law (at least in the United States), consists of five parts: Duty, Breach of Duty, Cause in Fact, Proximate Cause, and Damages. Captain Edward John Smith was guilty under the Cause in Fact; that is, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's actions were the cause of the injury. This is also called the "But-For Causation," meaning that the plaintiff's injury would not have occurred but for the defendant's actions. Had Captain Smith paused to look and comprehend the ice warnings, he would have altered his actions, and the accident would not have occurred.

This same reason is why Phillips and Bride were also negligent in their handling of navigational messages (even if you don't want to accept that the Marconi rules required navigational messages to be handled with priority).

 

[Bob Read]

Gordon: I don’t care how lawyers define negligence (or anything else for that matter). Captain Smith performed to the accepted standard of a British ship‘s captain in April 1912. If you want to declare him guilty by some arbitrary standard of your choosing, that’s your prerogative. The legal authorities brought no criminal action against White Star. As far as I know, nobody brought civil negligence or wrongful death suits against White Star. 2023 is not 1912.