Fireman's Passageway WTD's and other miscellany...

[Robby House]

Okay, I want make sure I'm picturing this correctly. So WTB B makes up the forward most wall of the Fireman's Tunnel/Staircase...(at least from the Tanktop level to G-Deck before the bulkhead's aft jogging job). When Titanic impacts the ice, the force of impact exerted against WTB B cause it thrust "inboard" in the opposite direction towards the port side. The rivets that connected the tunnel/stairs to this bulkhead where compromised enough to allow ingress once flooding in Hold 2 reached the level of damage on the opposite side of the wall. I've included a crude hand doodle to describe my interpretation of architect William Garzke's theory. Just making sure I follow correctly.

Robby

PS- Exactly what and where is the access trunk? I'm not sure I follow this description. Are the talking about the spiral staircase leading down to the TankTop level?

The above from naval architect William Garzke, posted earlier by Ioannis, to me appears to be the only rational explanation for what Henderickson saw at the bottom of the staircase. You can see the starboard side of this access trunk in the diagram I posted above next to the starboard side spiral staircase. (The view is looking aft so the starboard side is on the left.) This point was immediately behind WTD B in Hold 2. The only double-bottom protection in that space is the tanks shown.

formed the forward-most wall of the Fireman's passageway (at least for the first few decks before jogging aft) or more specifically the spiral staircase leading to the Fireman's passageway. When Titanic makes contact with the iceberg, the impact against WTB B sort of jars or juts it in the direction of the portside (kind of at a 90 degree angle juxtapostion to the fireman's passageway. Along the steam of where the Tunnel is physically attached to WTB B the force of the impact is sufficient enough to The impact is sufficient enough to have effected a seam opening somewhere along where the fireman's tunnel is physically attached against WTB B.

The above from naval architect William Garzke, posted earlier by Ioannis, to me appears to be the only rational explanation for what Henderickson saw at the bottom of the staircase. You can see the starboard side of this access trunk in the diagram I posted above next to the starboard side spiral staircase. (The view is looking aft so the starboard side is on the left.) This point was immediately behind WTD B in Hold 2. The only double-bottom protection in that space is the tanks shown.

 

[David G. Brown]

Robby -- check Sam's cross section drawing above. Note that the outboard margin plates of the tanks are almost normal to the hull, but angle sharply inboard toward as the go upward to meet the tank top which supports the firemen's tunnel. Any thrust diagonally upward -- such as from a grounding -- would be transferred along these margin plates to the structure above. Lots of things could result. The structure could have been strong enough to resist any loss of integrity from the iceberg. Or, at the opposite end of the scale the tunnel could have been ruptured right along toward bulkhead D. And, there are as many possibilities in between to account for just about any theory of how water got into the tunnel.

The place of maximum vulnerability is the stair tower encasing the two spiral ladders. These ladders were set about halfway outboard P&S of the tunnel walls, probably to give maximum room for men entering and exiting the ladders during change of watch. It is the outermost area of the stair toward which is most likely to have failed in Garzke's scenario.

One "fooler" in Sam's drawing is the shape of the iceberg. I'm not saying that Sam was incorrect about that, just we don't know anything about the face presented to Titanic.. For Garzke's idea to work best it the thrust from the iceberg has to be virtually in line with the margin plates. The conventional sideswipe would prevent the sort of damage he envisions. A true grounding on the bottom would lessen the force transmitted to the stair tower and make Garzke's idea less plausible. But, we don't know the shape of the berg at the area of the hull in way of that tower. So, all we can do is add Garzke's concept to the pile of plausible possibilities.

My view is that the description of the flooding is of relatively new ingress. The tunnel is not filled and it is possible to see water running under force. Neither of these would be visible nearly 20 minutes after impact on the iceberg simply because the area should have been flooded to deeply. There would have been some swirls on the surface, but otherwise the situation would have been a lot less exciting than what Hendrickson described. This is one case where less obvious ingress indicates greater damage done earlier than spurting water done close to the time of its discovery.

Something else. While Hendrickson gives an exciting account of that water, it does not seem to be comin in under 30-odd feet of head pressure. I've not fought a leak that deep in a hull. My experience with a fitting one-third that deep tells me that a 1.5-inch opening will teach the hardest bitten seaman how to pray faster than a convent full of nuns. Gob smacked is the only term you can use in public.

I'm also intrigued by Hendrickson meeting engineer Hesketh not in the boiler room, but somewhere near the head of Scotland Road on E Deck. Given that boilers needed to be made safe and fires to be raked, it seems odd that an engineer would be so far from the critical action. And, when Hesketh made his report it was as if the engineer already knew about the flooding. Instead of asking to be guided to the flooding, instead the engineer told Hendrickson to go get lamps for the boiler rooms which were dark because of a power failure.

To understand the Hesketh/Hendrickson interaction, we have to delve into possible motives for the engineer's lack of interest in the flooding of the tunnel and his overriding need for oil lamps.

Darkened boiler rooms are difficult to dangerous places to work. So, lamps would be a necessity. But, why would an engineer have gone to E deck to find men to fetch them? He could -- and probably should -- have delegated a leading stoker to do that job. However, of far more importance would have been operation of the valves controlling the bilge pump intakes. Duplicates of valves down on the tank top level were placed on E deck. This allowed them to be opened or closed even if the compartmant were flooded. Adjusting these valves would normally be done under the direct supervision of an officer.

There were two 3 1/2 inch suctions in the tunnel.

My addition to the pile of plausible possibilities is that somehow a wrong valve was opened and water gravitated into the tunnel through the bilge piping system. Hesketh wasn't worried because he had either taken care of the problem or know about it was was about to have his working party close that valve.

-- David G. Brown


PS -- At this point in the discussion somebody always asks about a rupture of the FW tank whichstradled the tunnel in way of bulkhead C. As far as I know, nobody tasted the floodwater to find out if it was sweet or salt.

 

[Jim Currie]

Has anyone ever thought that the water possibly poured down the spiral staircase on the starboard side then across to the port side? If you read Hendickson's evidence carefully, you will find that it was probably quite a time before he saw that water at the bottom of the tunnel. He described it as seeming to pour out of the tunnel and flow across from starboard to port. However he also said, and I quote:

"894. Was it coming hard? A: - Yes, it was more than rushing in; it was falling in.

If it was falling in then it was coming from a point above the forward entrance to the tunnel The only place that could have been was through a door on G deck just aft of the No. 1 hatch cover. In the intact condition, G Deck was a mere 5 feet above the waterline.
We know for sure when it was at the level of the top of No.1 hatch coaming on G deck before midnight because when Lookout Lee came down out of the Crow's Nest. the water was pouring out of No.1 hatchway and across the deck of the firemen's accommodation.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

Hendrickson was on G deck when he looked down that staircase. The leading firemen's quarters where he came out of were on the port side just forward of the stairs. This was about 10 minutes after the ship struck. David asked why Hesketh was on E deck when Hendrickson arrived? The answer comes from Barrett:

1970. Now tell us what happened after that. We have come back to No. 5, and you say they were attending to the pumps there. What was the next thing that happened? - They rang through from the engine room to send all the stokers up and me to remain there.

The stokers went up the escapes onto E deck. That is where Hesketh would have found them because,

1987. Now what happened after that? - The lights went out.

It must have been soon after when Henderickson arrived.

 

[Robby House]

Brad Payne's excellent work titled Titanic's Vertical & Lateral Watertight Doors indicates that the two swinging doors leading from the Fireman's Vestibule into Cargo Hold #3 was indeed NOT watertight. An Analysis of Titanic's Vertical and Lateral Watertight Doors I had originally asked the question when looking into the possible sources of ingress seen by the crew at the bottom of the spiral staircase leading from the Fireman's quarters to the tunnel at TankTop Level. Of course even with water flooding the vestibule area through these non-watertight swinging doors, the flooding would have been been contained within this room as there was another watertight door that prevented water from entering the actual tunnel from vestibule. So the ingress seen within the tunnel's staircase well came from another source unless the WTD at the aft end of the tunnel was prevented from fully closing due to some obstruction.

Good stuff!

Robby

 

[Robby House]

Brad Payne's piece titled Titanic's Vertical & Lateral Watertight Doors indicates that they were no watertight. Pretty interesting read I thought.

Robby

They were watertight (as far as I know). The WTD were placed as the space could have been also used for storage of coal and the doors would have keep open. (The doors were closed when it was used for baggage.)
2 WTD were needed to keep BR 6 and the Firemenstunnel dry in case of damage at Hold No. 3 (and the doors were open).

 

[David G. Brown]

White Star Line wanted a way for the black gang to go to and from their quarters without coming into direct contact third class passengers. The tunnel at tank top level was the solution. However, it created a new set of problems. The circular stairs leading to the firemen's quarters on decks D, E, F, and G had to be made watertight despite a bulkhead jog on the G deck level.

Putting on their most creative hats, the design group at H&W made the firemen's tunnel a part of the stairway. Since the stairs were inside the 2nd compartment, the tunnel also became part of that compartment (hold #1) as well. So, thanks to the tunnel, part of hold #1 extends aft right through holds #2 and #3.

The WTD at the forward end of the vestibule is in line with bulkhead D, but it actually closes off Bulkhead B and, in effect, makes the firemen's tunnel part of hold #1.

There are two man doors (not watertight) leading from the vestibule into the coal bunker space beneath hold #3. This arrangement makes the vestibule a part of the hold.

The WTD at the after end of the vestibule closes off bulkhead D.

Closing the WTDs in an emergency could have trapped men either in the bunkers of hold #3 or the vestibule. So, an escape ladder was provided. It climbed up to E deck at the head of Scotland Road.

The tunnel could flood in three ways: 1.) damage from impact on the berg; 2.) gravitation of water from a flooded compartment via open bilge pump suction; or, 3.) water overtopping bulkhead B on deck G or above.

Damage from the ice seems unlikely as the tunnel was located about three feet inboard of the ships outer skin. So, #1 can probably be ruled out.

The second source has sunk many an unwary ship. Bilge pipes let water flow either way. If a suction is open to a flooded compartment, and then one is opened on the same pipe to a dry compartment, water will gravitate into the dry one. Foot valves can solve this problem. I don't know British regulations, but in the U.S. certain classes of passenger vessels were effectively prevented from using them until the mid-1980s due to fears the valves would not open when required in an emergency.

Water overtopping bulkhead B is a viable possibility except for timing. Water was not discovered coming into the tunnel until a bit less than 20 minutes after impact on the berg. That's when the watch off watch black gang began going below to relieve their counterparts on duty. Lookout Lee did not see members of the black gang bringing their kit up from flooded berthing spaces until about 45 minutes after impact.

In any event, flooding in the tunnel would have had no impact on either holds #2 or #3. The passage was water-tight through those compartments.

-- David G. Brown

 

[John E. Smith]

The fireman's tunnel is in the center on the tank top. So is the fireman's tunnel surrounded by cargo holds? Or is it just by itself?

Also, where I wrote the word "Hull" in blue, is that the side of the ship?


The areas I circled in red, I don’t know if those are cargo holds or just empty spaces.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

Area in red was part of the reserve coal bunker, cargo hold No. 3. The hull of th vessel tapered around the bottom. The area directly under the red area you circled was part of the double bottom.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

Section aft of bulkhead B showing access to firemen's tunnel.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

 

[John E. Smith]

Oh, ok. That makes sense now

 

[Alex Clark]

What is the reason for the curved top to the fireman's tunnel?

 

[Sururain]

Hello,
I have an additional comment/question concerning the flooding of the fireman's tunnel. According to the sonar map of the starboard bow interspaced with the locations of the hull seams, a map estimating the locations of all the hull punctures has been made. The fracture that occured between both sides of WTC-B appears to have occured on the Orlop deck. Doesn't this imply that the Garzke explanation for flooding is invalid? If the collision with the ice berg occured above the tank top at WTC-B then how could the seams of the fireman's tunnel attached to WTC-B have been distorted, and thus allow for flooding of the tunnel?