All other titanic experts...

As you all know, Murdoch ordered HARD-A-PORT right after the initial collision...we all know that if the center screw(propellor) was turning at a small speed not even excessing 20-35 revolutions that the turning of the ship would have been greatly affected..But also if Murdoch had ordered hard-a-port immediatly at impact or even better before the collison the the ship would've had received less damage and less comparments would've been hit...If anyone would like to "attempt" to correct me or has some insights feel free to bringthem upon me at any time...oh a couple of things..take a look at my sixth officer moody fourm, he is the best titanic figure and I have TREMENDOUS knowledge on his past......and I have been informed that my distand relatives wrote "fultity"..a mr. Morgan Robertson..

Regards

Devan*titanic expert*
 
You make the mistake of underestimating the time taken to do things on a big ship. You simply can't turn the rudder quickly enough to do as you propose. The rudder was turned by a three cylinder steam angine and there was a time lag between the wheel being turned and the rudder going over.

The only evidence for the helm being put to port is from Olliver, who was quite clear that is was done after the berg was cleared. Hitchens did not recall it at all. I rather think Olliver is right because Titanic ended up pointing more or less north when she finally stopped. At some stage the rudder was centred, as shown by the wreck, but nobody mentioned that at the time.

I'm glad to see you apparently understand the steering orders, which is more than most do, but I don't believe there was a chance of turning the ship as you suggest. Murdoch himself is quoted as saying, "I was going to port round it but it was too close."
 
Dave...

yes I can see how my idea may seem a little farfetched, how ever if fleet or lee had seen the iceberg they oculd have avoided it all together but if the center propellor had been turning at a small rate the turning capabilities would of been much better and then if the helm had been ordered hard-a-port the idea would work simply because of center propellor aiding with the flow of water forced on the rudder, I think all the many possibilities according to avoiding he iceberg have their pros and cons but those that are actually practicle enough should be considered


Yours

Devan
 
Devan i agree with you. As for you Mr Dave Mudoch put the ship in reverse, how stupid. Putting a triple screw in reverse stops the middle screw( the one in front of the rudder), which makes turning nearly imposible. He should have kept the ship going in a forward motion then turned the wheel. He would have gotten much better results. Oh yea and by the way Mr. Dave I think you underestimated the time it takes to do things on a "Big Ship".
Thanks Alisa
 
Alisa, a technical point here, the only reason the center screw stopped on the Titanic was that the low pressure turbine which turned it didn't have reverse gearing. The real problem here is that throwning theship in reverse deprives the rudder of any slipstream to make it more effective. I've experienced this myself when I was allowed to take the wheel of a ship I was stationed on. The Officer Of the Deck ordered all astern full, and I lost steerage way when the ship was still doing 17 knots.

Cordially,
Michael H. Standart
 
A few days before her maiden voyage the Titanic was tested at sea. She was never brought up to full steam on all boilers. The rudder was significantly to small for her size and during the trial run her ballast pumps where not functioning properly so that she road much higher in the water than she was supposed to. Capt. E.J. Smith was chosen for this voyage because of his reputation as a "flyer", one who would take many chances in order to reach his destination early, even in waters fraught with icebergs. He had a well documented reputation for this. There was not a full moon and the water was as a "mill pond" which would do away with the tell tale water breaking at the base of the "bergs". No one knows for certain how close the berg was when sighted, how big it was and how large below the surface. Icebergs have more surface below the water than the have showing above. Up until the berg was sited the Captain and crew had no idea how the ship would handle with a full accompaniment of passengers, crew, cargo and ballast. Ballast being at a minimum for the conditions at the time and at a speed at which the ship had not been tested. Ignorance and pride fated this ship to her demise.In my experience piloting multi-engined, multi-screwed boats, not ships. What Murdock order should have worked, but, there was to many variables working against him. Namely the Captains orders.
 
Good Morning Gentleman, and ladies,

I am a passenger ship Captain so I think I can add some insight into why Murdoch went hard to port. It is very commonly understood now that reversing the engines was the worse thing that he could have done. You are some what right in saying that his order to port after his order to starboard was meant to minize damage but it was also meant to use the ship to push away the berg itself. By that time the ship was almost at a stop. In my experience the fatal thing was reversing the engines. By doing this he took away the power of the rudder. The rudder was way to small anyway for the triple screw. I have made the error before and I rammed a pier head on. They still would have hit given the estimated distances and there speed (which I figured out using common navigation math)but it would have been more of a glancing blow. Michael and I are discussing possible damage control that could have prolonged the life of Titanic and preventing her breakup. Would love some insight.

Erik
 
I have to agree with Mr. Wood. The ship was too big with too samll a rudder and when Murdoch ordered the engines "full astern" he slammed on the brakes and deprived the rudder of any legitimate slipstream it might have cought hold of. Ordering full astern decreased teh performance of the inadequate rudder. I dont think Fleet and Lee had a chance. They didnt have the binoculars, they hadnt been checked for vision problems in years, and need we mention the composition of the berg and the condition of the sea that nihght. THey were flying blind in the pitch darkness of the calm North Atlantic. The ship was doomed the minute Smith changed his course. The lookouts would have had to have spotted the berg much earlier than they did for the ship to even stand a chance.
 
MR Wood and & Mr. Standart:

I didnt see this part of your message until after i had responded. I am very interesed in possible damage control possibilities that would have prolonged the life of the ship. I have done some prelimenary calculations with the reate of water intake v time and i would like to compare notes on what "could" have been done in a effort to prolong the sinking. What are you thinking? As far as i have gotten is a sequencing of the bulkhead doors and some pump ideas. What do the two of you think?

[email protected]
 
Hi Jonathan, about the only way I can think of that would have prolonged the Titanic's stay on the surface would be to avoid hitting the berg in the first place. There has been specualtion that keeping the watertight doors open might have done it, but this was discredited by tank testing of engineers models several years ago. The bare bones fact is that with six sections...and possibly a seventh compromised, it's a wonder the ship lasted as long as she did.

You might want to click on Why? What if? as Roy Mengots website goes into this and a lot of other tech matters in detail. The homepage is at The Wreck of RMS Titanic and I consider this entire site a "must read". I've been over it several times and Roy Mengot knows what he's talking about.

Another site you might want to check out is Parks Sephensons page at Curious Facts for Titanic Historians. Click on the FAQ's section and go to page 7 as this deals with the notion of the Titanic's rudder being too small. (It really wasn't.)
 
I would have to agree with Mike on this one. There really isn't to much in the way of 1912 technology that could have been done (other then avoid hitting the berg) that could have been done to prolong the ships life.

The watertight door theory is something that I think we have gone over on this site at one point or another and Roy Mengot is a good source for that kind of information.
 
Good points made Michael and Erik.

Best regards,

Jason
happy.gif
 
As I pack a sea bag for Cap'n Erik's big shindig, I am preparing a paper that expodes a lot of the existing theories regarding Murdoch's maneuvers. (Some of those theories are my own.)

For one thing, it appears that Murdoch's first intention was to take the berg head-on. The helm was neutral, or nearly so, when he rang down on the emergency telegraph for ASTERN FULL. That would have crashed back the engines in a obvious attempt to mitigate damage from a head-on impact.

Murdoch's decision to go head-on at the berg was not known by the lookouts. They saw the ship continuing toward the iceberg despite their 3-stroke bell warning. So, Fleet decided to telephone the wheelhouse with his famous, "Iceberg right ahead."

Far sooner than the engineers could respond, however, the ship's forefoot struck on the ice. The mass of the berg was off to starboard where it now threatened to tear open the whole side of the ship. Murdoch reacted instantly with a "hard a-port" helm order to swing the stern away from danger. Pivoting the ship now became more important that stopping its forward motion. So Murdoch, assisted most likely by Boxhall, used both the emergency and regular telegraphs to send down ALL STOP. That prevented the engineers from reversing the engines which would have reduced the effectiveness of the rudder.

In any case, the "hard a-port" came after the ship struck and not before. It was a response to the developing situation and not part of a planned attempt to dodge the berg. And, while Murdoch may initially have intended to do a "crash stop," he rescinded that order within seconds as the situation changed.

The size of the rudder must have been adequate because the stern did not come into contact with the ice. See Parks Stephenson's site for a discussion of the Titanic's rudder and why it was not too small.

Curiously, both quartermasters were correct in their statements about helm orders. Hichens had been told to steer left under starboard helm just prior to the accident. All of his questions were directed toward events before the ship struck, so he spoke with assurance about going to starboard.

The "hard a-port" helm order came after the ship struck, as Olliver testified. Hichens was never asked about helm orders after the impact. It is probably of significance that the British inquiry did not call Olliver to testify.

Parks' site also talks about the engine order telegraphs and how the ones on the open forebridge were not illuminated so as to preserve the night vision of the officers. This being the case, Boxhall could not have read the emergency telegraph from the starboard side of the bridge. It was located to port of the auxiliary steering wheel. Yet Boxhall knew that ASTERN FULL had been telegraphed. This is good circumstantial evidence that he assisted in changing that first engine order to ALL STOP, even though he never mentioned it in his testimony.

The real question, however, is how did the ship run into an iceberg? None of the survivors could answer that question because they really did not know. It was as if the berg surfaced in front ot Titanic like a submarine from a Jules Verne novel. Obviously, that did not happen. Details in Topeka.

-- David G. Brown
 
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