Folks, I've been away doing money-making writing and getting boats in the water (no, not lifeboats).
You cannot make the conventional story fit together into a cohesive whole because the one-berg, hard a-starboard, 35 to 50 second time frame is poppycock created just to confuse things. Allow an example:
Boxhall's tea story is pure sea story. I'd use stronger words, but there are those who revere the man. He was a damned fine officer and a loyal one to boot. That explains the tea fabrication. But, if his story were true, he was admitting dereliction of duty that should have subjected him to criminal prosecution for material participation (by failure to do his duty)in the subsequent accident. He was on duty, which means Boxhall was legally and morally bound to be on deck. His cabin by definition was "below," and therefore off limits unless Boxhall had been formally relieved of duty--which he never claimed because it didn't happen.
Another absurdity in conventional wisdom:
The conventional story has built-in proof of its own improbability. It is impossible to put the obligatory left turn under starboard helm into context with a head-on approach to the fatal berg. It can't be done any more than you can strike a match on a wet cake of soap -- unless the hard-over maneuver was completed and the ship steadied up on a new course. A ship making a hard-left turn cannot strike an iceberg in the manner of Titanic--forefoot first--and not have damage along the entire side. Laws of physics rule here, not opinion.
And, conventional wisdom makes a fool of Murdoch:
If you accept the left-turn-starboard-bow strike, then you are absolutely forcing Murdoch to have turned left to dodge an object on the port bow. Even a junior officer would know better than that. Again, the conventional story has lead to an absurdity. Murdoch did not turn left for an object to his port.
Now for some rational thought:
There seems little doubt, however, that the ship did turn to port under hard-astarboard helm. Now, apply logic. If the physical evidence on the hull combined with the laws of physics require a head-on approach--as described by the lookouts--and, if Murdoch did not turn left to dodge something to his port, then what the hell did happen?
The answer is plain as the nose on J.P. Morgan. Titanic turned left two points (per Hichens) and steadied up aimed at the fatal berg. The ship struck and turned to starboard due to a combination of friction, Newtonian physics, engine orders, and port helm (per Olliver) to create damage in the pattern reported by various witnesses.
Now, why would Murdoch have turned left using a "hard a-starboard" helm order? Obviously, to dodge something else than the deadly iceberg. And, since as far as we know Titanic struck on only one iceberg, this object which caused Murdoch's helm order must have been passed without incident. That is, the object for which "hard a-starboard" was issued was not the object which the ship hit.
What sort of "objects" big enough to be a danger to Titanic were within range that night? We know of only icebergs. Yes icebergS. Look at the photos taken from Carpathia in the morning and read the descriptions of the survivors to find out how many bergs there were. BergS. Lots of 'em, plural.
All of the defences of conventional wisdom ignore the procedures and practices of operating a White Star Liner at sea. This is perhaps an honest oversight, but none-the-less it prevents an honest historical assessment of events. Quite simply, you have to know what each member of the bridge team should have been doing at the time of the accident. And, you have to understand how and why their actions would have influenced Murdoch's decisions and/or the accident.
At 11:30 p.m. Boxhall and Olliver should have been gone from the forebridge. By IMM/White Star regulation they had to be on the standard compass platform. And, Moody had to be in the wheelhouse with Hichens. All four men were to be engaged in steadying the ship by standard compass for the purpose of insuring accurate navigation. Please note that during the minutes leading up to the accident Olliver admitted to being on the platform while Boxhall waffled on this point. Tea in his room? Balderdash. Boxhall was on the platform doing his required duty. To think otherwise is to believe in fairy tales.
Scarrott's 6 to 8 minutes between the lookout's warning bell and impact fits perfectly into the timing of the compass evolution described in the above paragraph.
George Behe unearthed considerable information about how the lookouts spoke of being ignored by the bridge. Some of that frustration seems to appear in their testimonies.
At about 22 knots, Titanic would have gone 2 to 3 miles during Scarrott's 6 to 8 minutes. This fits nicely the anticipated distance over which icebergs were expected to be seen by mariners.
The obvious conclusion is that Murdoch took note of the first iceberg upon the lookout's report. He took no action, however, because of the ongoing compass evolution. What Murdoch could not know because of the p-poor internal communications system was that the oil lamps in the standard compass needed trimming. An evolution that should have taken a minute or two became three times that long. Finally, Murdoch had no choice but to order a "hard a-starboard" turn to dodge the first berg.
It now becomes necessary to look again at the physics of the way ships maneuver. In a turn, the stern swings out. This means toward the object Murdoch was dodging. If he had begun his maneuver at a greater distance, he would not have required a "hard over" command. The use of hard over rudder indicates he needed a lot of turn quickly. The only reason for that would have been because the danger was close aboard. Using "hard over" for a close-aboard object invites swinging the stern into it, thereby defeating the avoidance maneuver. It follows, therefore, that Murdoch's call for "hard a-port" required an additional limitation on the angular rotation of the hull to prevent swinging the stern into harm's way.
Thanks to Hichens we know that Titanic completed about a two--point turn prior to impact. His knowledge of the exact rotation indicates he needed to know that information to obey Murdoch's orders. By confirming the degrees of the turn, Hichens unwittingly gave circumstantial evidence that Murdoch's full helm order was "hard a-starboard two points." Such an order would have satisfied the two requirements for successfully dodging a close aboard object--changing the heading and limiting the stern swing.
This leads back to what the lookouts saw, and gives a logical explanation for the discussion which took place between Fleet and Lee prior to Fleet's phoning the bridge. They saw the ship finally turn left to avoid the visible first berg and then the bow steadied up pointed at the second berg. There was no bell code for what they saw happening. Fleet had no choice but to use the telephone.
At this point we have to examine the descriptions of the fatal berg. The eyewitnesses were consistent in saying that it had a dark appearance as the ship approached. Then, it seemed to have a light outline around the dark mass of ice as it passed abeam. Finally, it appeared light in color (like other icebergs) as it went astern. This amazing color-changing iceberg wasn't really all that unusual, however. The descriptions are consistent with the appearance of an iceberg which has recently capsized. The underbelly now exposed would be black as the ship approached. A white edge would appear as it came abeam because the viewer would see both the old weathered (white) ice and the dark underbelly. Finally, as the ship passed the observer would see only the white weathered ice.
A capsized berg presenting its dark underbelly to the liner would have stood a good chance of not being perceived. However, that chance grows to an almost certainty if it were in close proximity to a brighter berg. The way the human eye works would almost guarantee that the second, darker spot would be unnoticed until the whiter first object was removed from the picture.
And, so hangs the tale. Titanic turned left to avoid one danger only to run over a second.
Boxhall was loyal. He knew what happened, but he stood by the company regulations against airing IMM/White Star problems in public. His absurd story of tea in his room is just one example. It was such a preposterous story that it cannot be considered a lie. But, he must have told someone exactly what happened. The proof was in the modifications to Olympic.
While it was in H&W's yard for Titanic-related refits, the standard compass was quietly moved from amidships to the more conventional location on the wheelhouse roof. Or, to be more precise, a new standard compass was installed above the wheelhouse. White Star ordered that the old compass and platform remain in position even though it was functionally useless. Britannic was built with only one standard compass above the wheelhouse--but an eyewash compass platform was added, most likely to avoid answering embarrassing questions.
-- David G. Brown
