If you were capt Smith

[Dave Gittins]

The Leyland Line policy quoted is exactly the same as the White Star Line policy. IMM owned the majority of Leyland. Captain Lord in fact did exactly what Smith did. He went at his usual speed (reduced a bit to save coal) until he met ice. If he'd been going faster, he may well have wrecked his ship.

Before swallowing the 'everybody did it' story, ask who called the captains who testified in Britain. They were hand-picked by counsel for White Star. There is evidence that other captains were willing to change course or slow down when ice was about. Captain Moore of Mount Temple is an example. Rostron was also miles off the shortest track to his destination, having checked the ice warnings before leaving. There is more evidence on this in the US civil case.

 

[Parks Stephenson]

<font color="#000066">Before swallowing the 'everybody did it' story, ask who called the captains who testified in Britain. They were hand-picked by counsel for White Star.

This is true, but the line given by the Mail Boat captains examined fits with the character of that elite segment of the industry at that time. That's why the discussion during the Day 31 final arguments is interesting. I would feel comfortable in speculating that the outstanding safety record enjoyed by the Mail Boats up until April 1912 contributed to the industry's attitude and they were therefore caught completely unaware by what happened to Titanic.

It certainly would be interesting to nail down Olympic's transit speed on the westbound crossing immediately ahead of Titanic's, or Mauretania's PIM just behind. Maybe one of these days I'll get around to it, if someone else doesn't get there before then.

Another justification for maintaining speed that I don't believe was brought out in the testimony (I picked this up in other contemporary literature) was that speed was to be maintained in order for the rudder to be at its most effective. We've had the discussion elsewhere about the smaller rudders that merchant ships were saddled with, compared to their military contemporaries. I have read where it was felt in the merchant marine that for maximum manoeuvrability to avoid hazards, a full rate of speed should be maintained. It should be remembered that Murdoch came within a hair's breadth of vindicating that belief.

At any rate, if you have other evidence (besides Moore's and Shackleton's testimony at the Enquiry...as well as official Line policy, for reasons discussed elsewhere) that would show that Captain Smith was not navigating his ship with respect to speed in the manner in which most Mail Boat captains did at that time, I would be most interested to see it. I mean that sincerely, and completely without sarcasm.

Just to be clear, I will state once again that I believe excessive speed through a known ice field was the primary causal factor behind the collision. I believe Captain Smith takes full responsibility for creating a situation that allowed the collision to occur. So, I am not out to exonerate Smith. However, I do want to attempt to view his actions in the proper perspective. He was, after all, a Master of experience and good record, the most highly respected captain in one of the world's most competitive shipping lines. Culpable? Yes. Negligent? No. In my view, Smith's actions fall between those two synonyms, which may be one of the reasons why the Wreck Commission had trouble coming up with a satisfying verdict.

Parks

 

[Dave Gittins]

Captain Robert Niss, a German captain with great experience of ice, testified in the US. He testified that on a clear, starlit night ‘he could not guarantee to see ice far enough ahead to avoid striking it’. Even in moonlight, the visibility of ice depended on the relative positions of the moon and the iceberg. Had he entered an ice zone, he would have slowed to a safe speed. Another German, Captain Henry Meyerdierks supported his remarks on visibility. His solution would have been to change course.

At the heart of the story is overconfidence in the crew's ability to see ice in time.

 

[Erik Wood]

Great Posts by all, let me add my 15 cents (possibly up to a quarter depending on how winded I am today.)

Charles B. said: "The bottom line is that the deck officers and the lookouts knew almost to the minute what time to expect to come upon the icefield."

One of the many problems that we have when disecting the bridge actions that night is we tend to lump them in with todays standards. I don't think it was possible for Smith or any of his officers to know exactly where the ice would be and when. I am more then sure they had a good idea but they didn't know for sure. Much like todays forecasts for waves and such, just because it says or you plot the weather doesn't mean that when you get there it will be doing the same thing.

We have to keep things in 1912. Today I could track the ice on radar from 100 miles away. Then, they didn't know where it was until they ran into it.

That being said the use of the speed was excessive no doubt. Regardless of how fast ships normally travel through ice, this ship hit a big floating berg. Just because something is routinely done doesn't make it safe and prudent seamanship. I enter the Detroit River at 13 knots and contiue at that speed untill the Livingston Channel. Is it safe? not exactly. Is it what every other Laker Captain does? Yes.

Parks wrote a great paragraph quoted here:

quote:

Just to be clear, I will state once again that I believe excessive speed through a known ice field was the primary causal factor behind the collision. I believe Captain Smith takes full responsibility for creating a situation that allowed the collision to occur. So, I am not out to exonerate Smith. However, I do want to attempt to view his actions in the proper perspective. He was, after all, a Master of experience and good record, the most highly respected captain in one of the world's most competitive shipping lines. Culpable? Yes. Negligent? No. In my view, Smith's actions fall between those two synonyms, which may be one of the reasons why the Wreck Commission had trouble coming up with a satisfying verdict.

Smith was guilty of being a ship master in 1912 and following what was common practice instead of doing what was prudent for the safe navigation of his vessel. Every ship master that has ever sailed any kind of ship anywhere has done it at least once. Put the companies schedule or the needs of the passenger ahead of safety. It is one of the many Catch 22's of the job. Damned if you do and damned if you don't.

Captains are really truck drivers with a fancy title and a bigger more dangerous highway, not to mention a bigger and fancier truck. The schedule must be kept and if you don't, you can look for a new job.​

 

[Charles Barlow]

Capt. Wood,

I admit I overstated that the officers knew "almost to the minute" when to expect the ice. They did know however what watch to expect it on and I believe Lightoller said to expect to be in the ice by 11:00 (23:00). My main point was that it has been said that if some particular ice warning messages had been posted on the bridge that it or they may have influenced the ship's handling that night. My contention is that they had a pretty good idea when to expect the ice and chose to continue at near full speed until they actually eyeballed the ice for themselves, so I doubt that the addition of any additional or particular ice warning would have made any difference.

Chuck

 

[Erik Wood]

Chuck,

I couldn't agree more with your last post. I think the famed Mesaba warning would have only proved that the ice was where Smith and company thought it was. I don't think that it would have made much difference. I think he would have steamed along at 22 knots until they saw the ice from them selves.

 

[Parks Stephenson]

<font color="#000066">Captain Robert Niss, a German captain with great experience of ice, testified in the US.

Now, you and I are switching chairs. Niss was a selected witness. I'm not saying that should be held against him, or that his word is not valid, but the German front is not solid:

<font color="#006600">Sir Robert Finlay: The Norddeutscher Lloyd say: "Steamers were going full speed as long as the weather kept clear. The s.s. 'Bremen' reduced to 8 knots on the 20th April from 2.20 to 4.20 a.m. in the ice region because it was rainy weather." There is a letter from the Norddeutscher Lloyd Company. It is dated the 18th June, my Lord, and is about five pages from the end of the bundle.
[...]
The Attorney-General: If you look at the letter it makes it clear that this is a summary. My Lord has not got the letter yet.
Sir Robert Finlay: Your Lordship will find it about the middle of the bundle. All the letters are annexed. It is headed "Bremen," and is addressed to "Messrs. Keller, Wallis and Co., London." We duly received your favour of the 7th instant and enclosed letter of the Board of Trade of the 6th instant. We have made all the enquiries we could since, and beg to answer to the questions as follows: (a.) The original telegrams received by those of our steamers that were in the Western Atlantic when the "Titanic" disaster happened have been delivered to the Supreme Court, London, by the Marconi Company already. (b.) Our steamers were going full speed as long as the weather kept clear. The s.s. "Bremen" reduced to eight knots on the 20th of April from 2.20 to 4.20 a.m. in the ice region, because it was rainy weather. (c.) Our Captains are bound to keep the track, though they have the right to leave it as soon as they think it being necessary for the safety of the ship." I think this bears clear evidence, my Lord, of it having been written in English by a German.

<font color="#000066">Captain Henry Meyerdierks supported his remarks on visibility. His solution would have been to change course.

I don't think anyone argued against that course of action, even in London.

<font color="#000066">At the heart of the story is overconfidence in the crew's ability to see ice in time.

Agreed. But the question is: Did Titanic's crew display a greater degree of overconfidance compared to other Mail Boat crews of the time? Obviously, every Master has a unique command style, so I'm not looking for exceptions, but rather a trend. Could this disaster have happened to another Mail Boat?

<font color="#000066">I don't think it was possible for Smith or any of his officers to know exactly where the ice would be and when. I am more then sure they had a good idea but they didn't know for sure.

I would agree...I see evidence to support this in the fact that most of the witnesses arguing for maintaining speed talked of slowing down only when they had the ice in sight.

And this would be the point where Dave Brown would come in and say that's why the ice had to be dark/blue, regardless of what colour it might actually have been.

Parks

 

[Erik Wood]

A couple of additional thoughts to my last post. The elusive Dave Brown has pointed out to me that we can't judge Captain Smith for doing something in 1912 by 2002 standards. There are several missing links between the two sets of standards.

The overall fact is that a ship under Smith's command hit a floating object in open ocean which resulted in the vessels loss. If you back track step by step you will find that it wasn't one solitary decision but several decisions over hours that resulted in the ship foundering. Regardless of visibility, speed or anything else. Those where all factors that should have and more then likely played apart in Smith decision making that night. The last and final word rested with him, even by yesterdays standard.

That being said seamanship in 1912 was more about luck then it was about technology. In my opinion.

 

[David G. Brown]

At Captain Erik's Topeka event I will present a paper on the events which created Titanic's accident. It is not yet complete, and I am anxious to finish the writing so I can find out what I have to say.

However, I believe we have evidence that Captain Smith acted twice on the evening/night of April 14 to take his ship around the known extent of the ice. He did not slow down, in my opinion, because the dangerous ice was in plain sight.

Details in Topeka--and here after that.

-- David G. Brown

 

[Erik Wood]

I am wondering now what Captain Dave is talking about. All of this talk about Topeka makes me wish the event was this weekend and not next.

This is shaping up to be a interesting event.

 

[Charles Barlow]

I'll suppose the first Capt. Smith act was to "turn the corner" farther south of the usual track. And for the second we'll have to remain in suspenders until after the Topeka Event. As for the ice being in plain sight, The Lookout Fleet testified at the American inquiry that the fatal berg was the first ice that he saw that evening or even including his 4:00 to 6:00 p.m. watch.
Chuck

 

[Erik Wood]

The trouble with the testimony is that answers questions we don't need answers to and leaves us with more questions when we are done reading it.

That being said I don't think that Fleet or Lee lied in the testimony. In due course I am sure Captain Dave will spill his beans.

 

[David G. Brown]

Fleet admitted that he did not know what time the ship struck the iceberg. He and Lee did not keep ship's time on their bell and there were no watches in the crow's nest. At one point Fleet said he thought the accident might have taken place before 7 bells (11:30 p.m.).

Scarrott was in the forecastle where, presumably, the time would have been struck quite audibly for the benefit of the crew living/eating/resting there. He quite definitely placed an alarm from the crow's nest at five or eight minutes prior to impact on the iceberg. That was too far in advance of the accident for the lookouts to have been warning of the fatal iceberg. But, it came at precisely the right chronology for it to have been the "trigger event" in the final chain of events that led to the accident.

One thing appears certain--Fleet and Lee gave only one warning of the fatal iceberg. They did not lie about that. Only one warning was given because there was no need to warn of that particular "dark mass" prior to 11:40 p.m.

Titanic did not get into the real field of ice. Rather, it struck on an outrider berg. This juxtaposition of field to deadly iceberg is often overlooked despite its critical importance to the outcome of events.

There is no "iron clad" proof, but I believe that a case can be built that Titanic struck on the outrider iceberg because its officers (specifically Captain Smith and First Officer Murdoch) became engrossed in avoiding the larger danger of the ice field and simply did not perceive the smaller iceberg.

Analogies are dangerous because they over-simplify. However, think of a car driver at night who swerves to avoid a danger he can see in the road and crashes into a utility pole along the berm that he could not see when he started to swerve.

Right now, it takes 50+ pages of 10 point type for me to develop that thesis. I am working on simplifying it for Cap'n Erik's Topeka event and after that will try to create a "post-able" version.

--David G. Brown

 

[Charles Barlow]

I know Fleet was an exasperating witness. His reluctance to judge time and distance is maddening. When he was asked how long after sighting the berg did the collision occur, he could or would not answer. Were I Senator Smith, I probably would have have had to been physically restrained to prevent my attempts to slap and choke Fleet right then and there. Even after 90 years Sen. Smith's exasperated sarcasm still shines through on Fleet's examination. "Was it 45 minutes?" "Was it a half hour?" ......
Anyway Mr. Brown, I'll patiently await your interesting hypothesis.
Take Care,
Chuck

 

[David G. Brown]

Fleet was a well-prepared witness. In other words, he was coached into how to avoid saying anything damaging. That is apparent from his testimony. Similar coaching can be descerned in the testiomonies of Boxhall, Lee, and Olliver. None offered anything more than was asked. I'm sure Senator Smith recognized what he was up against.

-- David G. Brown