Professional California Consensus

[monica e. hall]

Interesting post, Malcolm. I'm no expert, but I do agree one must question to what extent we are judging 1912 by modern standards, and whether this is fair, or even just historically sensible.

I think there are two major issues (more obviously, but these spring to mind). One was communications. Pre-1912, stricken ships often could not communicate their difficulties, and so merely sank without trace, rather than there being no major sinkings. Without survivors' or communications evidence, it's hard to hold inquiries resulting in better practice.

The other aspect which struck me is economic. In those days the US and European economies were the manufacturing powerhouses of the world, and that makes a difference. Many more people employed in making things, selling them, and making money (not for everyone of course). But it means the driver behind economic activity is different. It means, among other things, that the willingness to sacrifice profit for safety is not challenged as well as it has been over the last 50 years, and of course, the Trades Union movements pre-WW1 were far less influential.

Over the last 50 years, and especially the last 20, the manufacturing balance has changed globally. Older economies are now far more regulated, often due to the fact that there are far more people not employed in manufacturing, and thus deployed in regulation or services. Also accompanying this trend is greater accountability and compensation. You don't find that in China, and they don't seem to hold many Inquiries either.

Maybe it goes too far. In the UK we are so regulated we can barely move.

 

[Senan Molony]

David,

I think you are applying crazily demanding standards in relation to alleged "failure."

Captain Lord cannot take action in regard to things he does not know about. Neither can Stone.

He can't know about the performance level of his crew unless he is there watching them.

There was no lapse, incidentally, because Stone was merely puzzled.

In any case there is no "failure" on Captain Lord's party in "not properly training his crew" - that is a ridiculous assertion, and I have read many on this board.

Certification of ship's officers was a matter for, ahem, you've guessed it, the Board of Trade.

And if seamen should be trained up to a standard capable of divining and assessing every possible contingency over their visible horizon, then it is an exacting standard indeed!

It is hard enough to get qualified seafarers today, just as in the days of "lascars"... let alone lateral-thinking geniuses who would annoy their sleeping Captains with a diagnostic list of every conceivable interpretation of various situations.

Such busybodies would be swiftly paid-off at the next port.

Sure, I agree 100pc myself, it would have been nice if Stone had woken up the wireless operator. Fact is, he didn't.

As to "responsibility" residing with a Captain for the actions of everyone on his ship (even when he is asleep), well I give you the example of your own Commander-in-Chief.

President Bush is, by your same standard, which is theoretically true, ultimately responsible for the actions of his military.

He is responsible, your argument runs, whether or not he knew about the murder, torture and inhumane treatment which appalled the world at Abu Ghraib.

Of course the President didn't know about it at the time. I emphatically do not say he did, but by your standards, it doesn't matter.

He might know about ongoing issues now, as the world does, but that's another issue. But these were active crimes, rather than condign punishment on the grounds of "failure to notice someone else's trouble."

I am glad you agree the injustices meted out to Captain Lord. He lost his job.

Who took the fall for Abu Ghraib, incidentally?
Certainly not your President, despite his notionally having the "ultimate responsibility." Certain not his "Secretary for Defense," a step further down the ladder.

I'll tell you who took the fall.

Lindie England on the bottom rung. And one or two other dogsbodies, whoops, unfortunate choice of word, my apologies.

The idea that Captain Lord, who was asleep, should somehow take responsibility for his crew's inability to divine that another ship had not been navigating with due care and attention is rather beyond me.

It is politics that always decides 1) whether there needs to be a fall guy, and 2) who that fall should be. Too bad, Ms England.

So, notional levels of accountability are all very well, but largely impractical or unreal and each situation will always come down to its specifics in terms of where any moral responsibility may lie, if indeed at all.

>>As to Lord's response to learning of Titanic's situation...hmm. If I were in his shoes on the deck of a one-compartment freighter surrounded by bergs, growlers, and field ice...hmmm. Damned if I would move.<<

As a rhetorical gambit we can see that this remark is capable of being read as a "look-no-hands" smear against the Captain of the Californian - or a "consolation" head-pat.

You may not have intended it that way, David, but I am pointing out how it has a reflection on the case we are discussing.

But in fact it runs completely counter to the response of the Californian once what actually happened became known.

Here are the facts:

As soon as Captain Lord of the Californian did learn about the distress (not initially, that Titanic had sunk, BTW) he made all available speed to the rescue.

He crossed to the SOS position (wrong) and then re-crossed the icefield at full speed - something the Mount Temple which had been on the west sie of the icefield in the SOS vicinity since at least 4.30am did not do.

Nobody blamed Captain Moore, even though his ship, Mount Temple, had learned of the SOS from the very earliest.

Of course, any "totally evil" Master who was in fact aware of a ship being in distress, but disinclined to do anything about it, need only make a gesture if he was half-hearted, or even genuinely determined to let lots of people freeze to death.

He need only limp at a knot or two in the general direction and plead ice afterwards. Captain Moore pleaded ice for failing to reach the actual scene.

The Californian stayed still until the later morning because she simply did not detect any emergency.

The next morning Captain Lord ploughed through the "mass of ice"... at full speed -- ice which the Mount Temple would not even enter slowly, because they had a company rule to avoid ice in all circs.

That is the actual position.

>>Lord's own failure to get a better performance out of his crew.<<

President Bush's....

No, of course not!

Regards,

S

 

[David G. Brown]

Folks, the fact that Lord was damned near crucified in the public press and in the BOT report is proof that I am basically correct. The man failed to cover his rear end. If he had been more attentive to these seemingly minor details, Lord would have been unassailable.

As I have said, the decision made for him by the less than perfect performance of his crew was probably the correct one--do nothing. Lord's ship was in a situation that did not allow for heroics. Any seaman looking at the facts has to come to that conclusion.

Even so, he was cast as the devil, the man who allowed 1,500 people to die. This was a grossly unfair accusation made doubly so by the fact he was never given a chance to formally clear his name. And, I submit, it was this public condemnation that is proof that what I have written is essentially correct. Lord left himself wide open for what happened--fair or unfair-- he simply did not protect his backside.

As to the difference between Lord's nighttime actions and his daytime responses, there is nothing unusual. While "night" is not considered to be "reduced visibility," (because darkness is normal once a day after sunset and before sunrise, darkness is not reduced visibility) darkness does alter the circumstances of the case. The fact he chose to run at speed through the ice during daylight has no bearing upon the situation in the darkness.

One final personal note before letting this subject rest. No, I do not think I've been too "picky" or that I'm applying 21st century approach to Captain Lord's failures vis-a-vis his crew. What I said applied in 1912 as well as today. The men on watch had little else to do but be sharp in look-out. Why in the hell shouldn't we expect better performance from the whole lot of officers as well as from Captain Lord under the circumstances? What else was so pressing that night as to excuse inadequate lookout and sloppy bridge management?

Having served in a variety of organizations over my life, I've seen that when the person in charge does not trust his subordinates, the subordinates reciprocate. Lord's crew responded much like the crews of other ships throughout history in which the skipper did not trust the crew nor delegate authority. Of course, this is subjective interpretation based only upon my personal anecdotal experience.

And, I think that the rest of Captain Lord's career indicates he came to the same conclusion. But, it would appear that Lord learned from his Californian experience and seems to have improved his style of leadership in later years.

Honestly, I've said all that I want to say about Lord and the Californian. The debate will continue, probably past when Titanic's hull becomes a rust heap. But, from here on I plan to observe.

-- David G. Brown

 

[Senan Molony]

Hi David,

You know, this was all a long time ago, and the fate of only one man is being discussed, as Pontius Pilate pointed out.

The good of the people, and all that... So, hey, don't sweat it.

I do disagree with you however when you suggest that because someone is crucified - that fact simplicitur and per se - then that person must have "failed to protect himself" in some way. A new sin, indeed!

A sacrificial victim cannot cover himself in advance by anticipating a possible crucifixion over something he knows nothing about!

I am thinking of what we might call the "first crucifixion."

Did the Nazarene "fail to cover himself"?

Does crucifixion and his alleged "failure" to prevent it prove some sort of guilt?

Of course not.

It proves only the perceived need of the mob or the establishment for someone to be hung up to dry.

>>The fact he chose to run at speed through the ice during daylight has no bearing upon the situation in the darkness.<<

A leopard does not change its spots, David.

A couldn't-care-less sea captain will not fling his ship through ice at full speed in daylight because it could cost him his ship and his job.

There is the selfish man's personal interest right there.

It is self-evident.

The fact that he did shows the personal risks Captain Lord was prepared to run once he knew there was an emergency.

Ice will break your hull whether it is day or night!

Think on that, anyone who fancies there may have been a conscious knowledge and a conscious betrayal of the duty of all seafarers the previous night.

That idea, which is carefully not directly made in recent posts, is of itself preposterous.


>>Lord's crew responded much like the crews of other ships throughout history in which the skipper did not trust the crew nor delegate authority.<<

An unfair and unworthy implication.

The record of the British Inquiry shows Captain Lord did not criticise Officer Groves (who threw him to the wolves with his daydreaming), NOR Officer Stone.

So, in fact, the Captain DID trust his crew and DID delegate authority. And accepted responsibility for their actions.

And the facts also are that Captain Lord - whatever he was like as an individual, whether kind-hearted, funny, obnoxious or dull - was an exemplary seafarer.

He told the truth to both the American and British Inquiries, even though the truth, in many instances (such as his well-founded doubts about the SOS position) made his position appear more difficult.

His examination results can still be seen today, and in fact his 1912 estimation of the Titanic's sinking position was nine nautical miles better than that of the British Inquiry!

The debate only continues because injustice cries through the ages.

.

 

[Noel F. Jones]

David G.Brown: “...the master of any ship is at all times responsible for the training of his crew and for the execution of their duties.”

Malcolm Wardlaw: “…His failure was ...in not properly training and disciplining his crew to the point that he was fully apprised of the situation that night.”

Gentlemen you are adducing a uniquely military concept. The crew of a merchant ship come aboard as ‘finished products’ in the various ratings in which they have entered themselves. If subsequently found to be incompetent they stand to be disrated. If subsequently found to be undisciplined they stand to be punished in accordance with the MSA. The only training a shipmaster is directly responsible for is that of the apprentices or cadets assigned to him.

Noel

 

[David G. Brown]

Noel-- sailors may come "finished" in terms of their official paperwork, but it is the master's responsibility to make them function as a team. That takes "training" in the broad sense of the word which encompasses things like bridge team management, navigational practices, etc. which are not covered in the classroom ashore.

What happens when the crew fails? Ask Captain Hazlewood about the wrath that falls upon the master of a tanker that is run aground by one of those "finished" mates.

The captain has always been held responsible when the excrement hits the ventilation device. The authorities have to pin the blame on someone and lawyers need their prey to earn a living.

-- David G. Brown

 

[Michael H. Standart]

>>Gentlemen you are adducing a uniquely military concept.<<

Not so uniquely military, Noel. The concept of the ship's Commander being the ultimate authority and the one with the final responsibility for absolutely everything on his ship has been around since the time of Sir Francis Drake. (And he drove the point home by executing some rivals on one of his priveteering expeditions against the Spanish.)

Merchent captains obviously don't have the power of the headsman's axe these days, but that final authority and final ultimate responsibility part remains.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

Putting aside the issue of what steamer or steamers were really seen that night, based on the information that was given to Capt. Lord that night, it seems I have to agree with Senan that Capt. Lord should not be viewed as culpable to the charge of failure to come to the aid of a steamer in distress.

 

[Noel F. Jones]

If such expressions as ‘bridge management team’ had been uttered in 1912 they would have been met with blank stares.

Francis Drake was a privateer with gunners and armed boarding parties who would undoubtedly have been periodically exercised at their military duties.

Also, his expeditions pre-dated the Merchant Shipping Acts somewhat. He may however have found himself within the orbit of Statutes 5 Eliz., c.5 Maintenance of Navy (1562) s.7 and 43 Eliz., c.2 Poor Relief (1600) s.5, respectively legalising and regulating the employment of apprentices at sea.

Reverting to British merchant ships, advancement of junior ratings such as Deck Boy, JOS, SOS and Stewards/Galley/Pantry Boys was by sea time, that is to say, by experience rather than structured training.

AB’s and latterly Efficient Deck Hands (EDH’s) were qualified by examination conducted by shoreside BOT superintendents who issued concomitant certificates of competency.

Deck and Engineer Officers were latterly granted Study Leave in order to qualify for their certificates after having accrued qualifying sea time in their subordinate ranks.

In short, it would be appropriate to say that advancement was by the passive ingestion of knowledge rather than formal training. This is not to say that certain shipowners did not latterly institute formal training programmes or that individual seniors did not voluntarily coach their juniors in anticipation of promotion.

Noel

 

[Michael H. Standart]

>>Francis Drake was a privateer with gunners and armed boarding parties who would undoubtedly have been periodically exercised at their military duties.<<

Which is quite true but that doesn't change the precedent he managed to set with the headsman's axe. That element of ultimate authority and the ultimate accountability of the commander has been there ever since. (At least the executioner was done away with in time.) You might want to read "To Rule The Waves" by Arthur Herman for more on that.

 

[Noel F. Jones]

Re Sir Francis Drake's expeditions:

I would need to consult his Letters of Marque but the arbitrary and terminal wielding of an axe seems more to suggest the exercising of a chain of command than the workings of a team, would you not agree?

And had the concept of 'teamwork' been invoked on a merchant ship prior to about 1980, I would opine that the aspiring exponent would have been directed to the nearest sportsfield.

Noel

 

[Michael H. Standart]

>>I would need to consult his Letters of Marque but the arbitrary and terminal wielding of an axe seems more to suggest the exercising of a chain of command than the workings of a team, would you not agree?<<

Looks more to me like he was setting up the chain of command and putting himself at the top by getting rid of the competition. He got away with it too. In any event, if you want to read the whole story, you might get a copy of that book I mentioned. It goes into the whole situation better then I can or even have the time for.

 

[Paul Slish]

David Brown wrote
"What happens when the crew fails? Ask Captain Hazlewood about the wrath that falls upon the master of a tanker that is run aground by one of those 'finished' mates."

I'm going by memory here. I recall reading at the time of the Exxon Valdez grounding, that the man steering the ship WAS NOT A QUALIFIED HELMSMAN. He should never have been at the helm in the first place.

I'm open to correction, but that is my memory.

Thanks, Paul

 

[Paul Slish]

Tracy Smith wrote some information she had obtained from Leslie Harrison about Second Officer Herbert Stone. If it is accurate he eventually became a Chief Officer. That is not a small accomplishment. I don't believe Charles Lightoller ever gained command as a merchant seaman. I don't think people would regard him an an incompetent.

Have any of the posters from England ever tried to contact Herbert Stone's family? Leslie Reade met with his son in 1965 and said he estimated him to be in his forties then. It is possible that John Stone or his brother or sister is still alive. Has anyone tried to locate them? Stone was married around 1912.

Stone was born in 1887. My grandfather was born in 1885 and grandmother in 1886. My grandparents had four children who lived to adulthood. Two are still living who were born in 1918 and 1921 respectively. So it is not out of the question that one of Herbert Stone's children could still be alive.

I'd be interested if anyone followed up personally with the family of Herbert Stone.

Cordially, Paul

 

[Dave Gittins]

I wouldn't place much importance on the fact that somebody didn't attain command. A master's certificate was like a university degree. It didn't guarantee promotion, or even employment.

Certificates of the period placed heavy emphasis on theory and they certainly could not be gained by dimwits. Whether their holders could apply theory correctly while under pressure was another thing.