Which message has been altered?

[Gordon Mooneyhan]

I've been plugging away for the past 2+ years researching the Titanic's sinking. I have come across two messages from the SS Mesaba sent on April 14, 1912, at 7:50 p.m. One is prefixed "Ice Warning," and the other is prefixed "SG."

This is the one prefixed "Ice Warning."

This one has the "SG" prefix.

According to the Marconi Company, all copies of Marconi documents submitted to the British Board of Trade (BBOT) inquiry were stamped "COPY." This one has that stamp, while the first one doesn't.

I would be interested in hearing explanations as to why there are two different messages from the Mesaba at the exact same date and time. I have a theory, but I'm open-minded enough to accept that I might be wrong and am willing to listen to others.

According to the book "Titanic Calling Wireless Communications During the Great Disaster," the Marconi company had two prefixes for Master's Service Message, SG and MSG. From the perspective of traffic handling, having two different "codes" for the same term makes no sense and opens up the opportunity for confusion. People whom I greatly respect on this site have said that "SG" wasn't a prefix. So why would a non-existent prefix be put in a copy given to the BBOT? I can't answer that question.

I'll admit that I'm not a big fan of conspiracy theories. Yet my thinking to explain the two messages borders on a conspiracy.

When news of the BBOT inquiry was announced, the Marconi Company began assembling all messages related to the Titanic into a single volume for the inquiry. Not knowing where the investigation would lead and wanting to protect the company, either Guglielmo Marconi or someone with authority in the company altered the Mesaba message. Although navigational messages were supposed to be given priority, making it a "Master's Service Message" would demand an acknowledgment from Titanic, and one was never received. That blames Titanic.

I would love to hear other explanations for how/why this happened.

73 (Morse code for best regards),

Gordon

 

[Arun Vajpey]

I admit that the two messages appear different in several respects including the writing style; that part might be significant. Stanley Adams, the wireless op of the Mesaba, testified at the British Inquiry that Captain Clarke handed him an ice message to be transmitted that he, the Captain, had written on paper. I have wondered what Adams meant by "paper" - just a piece of note paper or a proper wireless form? Admittedly, it sounds like the former and is much more likely, I guess. Captain Clarke was not called in to testify at either inquiry.

Of the two messages shown above, the first one, the one in which the time of 7:50 pm appears to be corrected, is the one quoted in the book Signals Of Disaster by Booth and Coughlan. As you say, it does not have the 'COPY' stamp and IMO the writing seems somewhat deliberate rather than spontaneous, which I find odd for an operator hastily scribbling the words. The handwriting is certainly different on the two forms.

Of course, Adams told the British Inquiry that Captain Clarke handed him two ice messages at the time:

22028. So that you had got these two ice reports which he had given you in writing which you incorporated into one message which you then transmitted?
- Yes.

The second message, with the COPY stamp could be that combined one. It has a note about the Titanic acknowledging receipt of the message, just like Adams testified:

22034. "'Mesaba' Office, 14th April, 1912.
- Prefix Ice Report. From 'Mesaba' to 'Titanic.' In latitude 42 N. to 41.25, longitude 49 W. to longitude 50.30 W., saw much heavy pack ice and great number large icebergs, also field ice, weather good, clear." I need not ask you in detail about your recollection, but did you get an acknowledgment from the "Titanic"?
- Yes.

22035. Have you got it on your procès-verbal?
- The acknowledgment?

22036. Yes?
- No, it is on the original message itself.

And again,

22038. (The Attorney-General.) No; your Lordship will see why. (To the witness.) Will you just let me look at it for one moment? (The document was handed to the learned Attorney-General.) Here is the original message. I do not quite follow what it is; perhaps you will explain it to us. You say that that enables you to say that the "Titanic" had received it?
- I sent this message, and the "Titanic" sent: "Received, thanks." If I had not received that acknowledgment I should not have put the office I had sent it to, the time, and my signature. As soon as I received the official received signal I timed it, dated it, put the office sent to, and initialled it.

22039. I think I understand it now. Is it your practice, first of all, to do this: You send the message first of all, and then this part in the column: "Office sent to, time sent and by whom sent," if I follow you correctly, is not filled up, is it?
- No, not until I get the received acknowledgment.

That strongly suggests that the longer message, the one with the COPY stamp, is the one written and later submitted by Stanley Adams and so the 'original'. The only query I have about that is a curious number on the left upper corner of that message, No: 200 followed by what appears to be a date - 26/04/12. Just a coincidence in numbers?

It also brings into question origins of the other message, the one that is usually seen on most printed works about the Titanic tragedy including the book Signals Of Disaster.

PS: I have referred to only the testimony statements made by Adams and the aforementioned books. In Titanic Calling, there is a comment that Lord Mersey was not convinced that the Mesaba message ever reached the bridge, let alone Captain Smith. But G E Turnbull, the deputy manager of Marconi Company, is supposed to have commented that in his opinion it was 'inconceivable' that the Titanic's wireless ops did not take the Mesaba's message to the bridge.
There is an article called The Mesaba File here on ET which might have some relevant information but IMO the author was heavily biased in his views about other ships involved (which are reflected in his conclusions) and so have not referred to it in this post.

 

[Gordon Mooneyhan]

I admit that the two messages appear different in several respects including the writing style; that part might be significant. Stanley Adams, the wireless op of the Mesaba, testified at the British Inquiry that Captain Clarke handed him an ice message to be transmitted that he, the Captain, had written on paper. I have wondered what Adams meant by "paper" - just a piece of note paper or a proper wireless form? Admittedly, it sounds like the former and is much more likely, I guess. Captain Clarke was not called in to testify at either inquiry.

Of the two messages shown above, the first one, the one in which the time of 7:50 pm appears to be corrected, is the one quoted in the book Signals Of Disaster by Booth and Coughlan. As you say, it does not have the 'COPY' stamp and IMO the writing seems somewhat deliberate rather than spontaneous, which I find odd for an operator hastily scribbling the words. The handwriting is certainly different on the two forms.

Of course, Adams told the British Inquiry that Captain Clarke handed him two ice messages at the time:

22028. So that you had got these two ice reports which he had given you in writing which you incorporated into one message which you then transmitted?
- Yes.

The second message, with the COPY stamp could be that combined one. It has a note about the Titanic acknowledging receipt of the message, just like Adams testified:

22034. "'Mesaba' Office, 14th April, 1912.
- Prefix Ice Report. From 'Mesaba' to 'Titanic.' In latitude 42 N. to 41.25, longitude 49 W. to longitude 50.30 W., saw much heavy pack ice and great number large icebergs, also field ice, weather good, clear." I need not ask you in detail about your recollection, but did you get an acknowledgment from the "Titanic"?
- Yes.

22035. Have you got it on your procès-verbal?
- The acknowledgment?

22036. Yes?
- No, it is on the original message itself.

And again,

22038. (The Attorney-General.) No; your Lordship will see why. (To the witness.) Will you just let me look at it for one moment? (The document was handed to the learned Attorney-General.) Here is the original message. I do not quite follow what it is; perhaps you will explain it to us. You say that that enables you to say that the "Titanic" had received it?
- I sent this message, and the "Titanic" sent: "Received, thanks." If I had not received that acknowledgment I should not have put the office I had sent it to, the time, and my signature. As soon as I received the official received signal I timed it, dated it, put the office sent to, and initialled it.

22039. I think I understand it now. Is it your practice, first of all, to do this: You send the message first of all, and then this part in the column: "Office sent to, time sent and by whom sent," if I follow you correctly, is not filled up, is it?
- No, not until I get the received acknowledgment.

That strongly suggests that the longer message, the one with the COPY stamp, is the one written and later submitted by Stanley Adams and so the 'original'. The only query I have about that is a curious number on the left upper corner of that message, No: 200 followed by what appears to be a date - 26/04/12. Just a coincidence in numbers?

It also brings into question origins of the other message, the one that is usually seen on most printed works about the Titanic tragedy including the book Signals Of Disaster.

PS: I have referred to only the testimony statements made by Adams and the aforementioned books. In Titanic Calling, there is a comment that Lord Mersey was not convinced that the Mesaba message ever reached the bridge, let alone Captain Smith. But G E Turnbull, the deputy manager of Marconi Company, is supposed to have commented that in his opinion it was 'inconceivable' that the Titanic's wireless ops did not take the Mesaba's message to the bridge.
There is an article called The Mesaba File here on ET which might have some relevant information but IMO the author was heavily biased in his views about other ships involved (which are reflected in his conclusions) and so have not referred to it in this post.

Arun,

Thanks so much for your reply. I understand your reasoning and prefer it over a conspiracy theory. Against my better judgment, I did read the Mesaba File, and I concur with your opinions about the author's bias. Thinking about the date you mentioned, 26/04/12...could that be the date that message was put into the file for the committee? The Titanic keeps showing more and more information. Eventually, you reach a point where you have to stop researching and start writing, otherwise all the time would be spent researching.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

The information in the Mesaba ice report is very questionable.
The southernmost latitude of the ice sent to Titanic, 41° 25’N, is 10 miles further south than the 41° 35’N latitude that Mesaba's Captain Clarke put in his message to Parisian’s Captain Hains as well as in the report that Clarke filed with the Hydrographic Office on April 19. Where did that 41° 25’N latitude come from? Did Mesaba really get only as far south as 41° 35’N as reported to Parisian and written in that Hydrographic Office report? If so, then why was a latitude of 41° 25’N put in that ice warning message to Titanic and other steamers that afternoon and evening?

 

[Arun Vajpey]

The information in the Mesaba ice report is very questionable.

Agreed. But despite the question mark over the coordinates, it was an Ice Message and at least one of them was specifically meant for the Titanic - both the messages posted by Gordon above have MGY - Titanic's call sign. I am not sure that the 'Sparks' on board the Titanic - perhaps Phillips - who received the message was in any position to determine the validity of the position coordinates mentioned therein. His job would have been to deliver it to the bridge and the question remains - did he?

 

[Samuel Halpern]

His job would have been to deliver it to the bridge and the question remains - did he?

We know that the message was received by Phillips at 9:52pm Titanic time (Bride was asleep at the time) and acknowledged as received. I believe Phillips was by then quite busy communicating with Cape Race. Lightoller' watch was up at 10:00 and he would have stayed on the bridge until Murdoch' eyes became adjusted to the dark, perhaps another 10-15 minutes at most. If Phillips left the wireless room to hand the message to the OOW on the bridge, then we don't have any knowledge about that. My guess is if Murdoch received it, he would have given it to Moody to read, who in turn, would have taken it into the chartroom to read and post up. Since the bridge team expected to be up to the ice anytime after 11pm, the Mesaba message probably would have made no difference regarding course or speed. The practice was to stay on course at speed until and unless specific danger was seen. Smith would not have been called. The prefix needed for that is MSG, which is telegram addressed to the commander of one vessel to another.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

If Phillips left the wireless room to hand the message to the OOW on the bridge, then we don't have any knowledge about that. My guess is if Murdoch received it, he would have given it to Moody to read, who in turn, would have taken it into the chartroom to read and post up

I agree. If the message arrived at 9:52 pm when Phillips was busy with messages to/from Cape Race, it is unlikely that he would have taken it to the bridge before 10:15 pm, by which time Lightoller would have left. As you say, if Phillips had brought in the message, Murdoch would have seen it and he definitely would then have had Moody read and post it in the chart room. If that had happened around 10:30 pm, would Boxhall have seen it?

What I am trying to think of is a theoretical scenario where Phillips took the Mesaba ice message to the bridge at around 10:30pm and handed it to Murdoch. If, as you say - and I agree - it had then been posted in the chart room, Boxhall would have been the only survivor to have seen it - IF it had indeed been displayed there. Upon returning to the wireless shack, would Phillips have then told Bride about it after the junior officer had been awake?

 

[Samuel Halpern]

would Boxhall have seen it?

If I recall, Boxhall said he was working sight data until about 10pm. He said he told Lightoller about the ship's 7:30 position about that time, which means it had to be a little before Murdoch arrived at 10, and he mentioned to Lightoller that the ship was on a course of S86W true. Boxhall said he gave the position to Capt Smith to put on his chart. Where Boxhall went and what he did after is anyone's guess. I think he said something about doing rounds, etc. I really should go back and check. Anyway, if, and I repeat, IF the message was delivered to the bridge while Murdoch was there, Murdoch would not have read it because it would have killed his night vision. That's why it would have been given to Moody to read and post. IMO, Boxhall was very vague about his actions and whereabouts after 10pm that night.

As for Phillips telling Bride, who knows? When Bride woke up, the ship was already stopped, and (according to Bride) Phillips told him that there was some sort of accident, and that he felt that the ship may have to go back to Belfast for repairs. We know that Phillips was working the wireless even after the ship struck the iceberg. At 11:47pm Titanic time (9:45pm NYT), Virginian PV had her standing by as “Cape Race working continuously with Titanic.” Last signal exchanged between Carpathia and Titanic (TRs) recorded in Carpathia's PV at that time. All this prior to first distress message going out at 10:25pm NYT.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

If I recall, Boxhall said he was working sight data until about 10pm. He said he told Lightoller about the ship's 7:30 position about that time, which means it had to be a little before Murdoch arrived at 10, and he mentioned to Lightoller that the ship was on a course of S86W true. Boxhall said he gave the position to Capt Smith to put on his chart. Where Boxhall went and what he did after is anyone's guess.

Thanks for that. I went through Boxhall's testimonies on either side of "The Pond" and tried to form a mental picture of his movements after he said that he saw Captain Smith with Lightoller around 9pm. I found the exercise rather difficult because of the vagueness associated with most of the Fourth Officer's statements and for quite a while thought that I was missing something. I am glad to note that you are thinking on similar lines.

Until a few years ago I formed the impression that Phillips took the Mesaba message to the bridge as soon as it was received because of the MSG/MGY prefix. I also thought that in that case it would have been Lightoller who received the message in the last few minutes of his shift and perhaps neglected to pass it to Murdoch when the 1/O took over the watch. But as you pointed out, Phillips was busy communicating with Cape Race at the time and might have left it till just after 10:15am or so to take the Mesaba message to the bridge, by which time, Lightoller would have retired to his cabin.

As for Phillips telling Bride, who knows? When Bride woke up, the ship was already stopped, and (according to Bride) Phillips told him that there was some sort of accident, and that he felt that the ship may have to go back to Belfast for repairs.

Thanks again. From that, it seems to me like Phillips was too busy in the immediate aftermath of the accident to have specifically mentioned the Mesaba's ice warning to his colleague. From that point on, the priorities of both men would have shifted to "what next?" rather than recall earlier events. In other words, it his highly likely IMO that Phillips did not tell Bride about the Mesaba's ice warning.

The above scenarios give rise to an interesting situation where Phillips could have taken the message to the bridge at approximately 10:15am and handed it to Murdoch; the 1/O in turn could have given it to Moody to read and post in the chartroom, which was by then empty because Boxhall had already left. Phillips meanwhile was back in the wireless shack busy with Cape Race and Bride asleep and oblivious to all this. So, if Boxhall never returned to the chart room after he left it around 10pm (or so), the Mesaba ice warning could have been pinned to the notice board there but gone unnoticed by any survivor. The only 3 men on board the Titanic who might have known about it - Phillips, Murdoch and Moody - died in the sinking.

 

[Gordon Mooneyhan]

Arun and Sam, thanks so much for your replies. I like your theories better than mine, and mine was influenced by the past couple of decades of politics, where a conspiracy explains everything someone doesn't like. I discovered one thing, and unfortunately, don't remember the source. Still, it's attributed to Guglielmo Marconi, which is that Navigational Messages were supposed to be taken to the bridge when received, regardless of whether or not they had the MSG prefix.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Boxhall said he gave the position to Capt Smith to put on his chart.

That is the bit that I have difficulty in fitting into a timeline that does not affect the chronology of other related events as per current thinking. If Boxhall was telling the truth about giving Captain Smith that position, when could he have done it?

Also, going by his testimony statements, I am a bit confused about Boxhall's claimed sightings/interactions with Captain Smith after the 4/O said that he saw the skipper at around 9pm when he, Boxhall, emerged from the chart room and saw Smith talking to Lightoller on the navigation bridge.

Sam, as you say it was 9:52pm Titanic time when Phillips received and (according to Adams) acknowledged the ice warning from the Mesaba. Taking from there I have tired to form a timeline and wondered where Boxhall, the only survivor who theoretically might have seen the Mesaba message, fitted in. I stress that this is only a conjecture and subject to corrections:

• At 9:52pm Titanic Time, the ice warning from the Mesaba arrives in the wireless room. It is a specific MGY/MSG message and so Phillips is duty bound to take it to the bridge. But he is busy communicating with Cape Race at the time and so while he acknowledges it, he does not act immediately. Bride is still off duty and asleep.
• At 10pm Murdoch relieves Lightoller as the OOW on the bridge. But the 2/O remains there for around 10 minutes while Murdoch's eyes get night accommodation. Once that happens, Lightoller leaves the bridge and goes to his cabin.
• Phillips finally takes the Mesaba ice warning message to the navigation bridge and hands it to Murdoch. The latter, now adjusted to night vision, passes it to Moody who reads it, informs Murdoch about the contents and posts it on the notice board in the chartroom.
• Phillips meanwhile returns to the wireless room and continues to work on Cape Race and other duties. It is between 10:20 and 10:30pm by then and Bride is still asleep.
• The Titanic has its fateful collision with the iceberg at 11:40pm.

If those events are close to the truth, there are two points that I'd like opinions on.

First, when in relation to those did Boxhall leave the chart room / bridge and could he have returned before the accident? If Boxhall had left before Phillips delivered the Mesaba message and did not return till after the collision, he might not have known about it at all (unless Moody told him about it after the accident). Also, there is also the possibility that after coming to the bridge soon after the collision, Boxhall went briefly to the chartroom and if he had done so, he would have seen the Mesaba warning; but he was busy following Smith's orders to check below and later firing rockets and so might not have had the chance.

Second, is there a chance that at some stage between about 10:25pm and 11:40pm, Captain Smith came to the bridge briefly? If he had done, Murdoch or Moody would surely have told him about the Mesaba message and since it was prefixed MSG, Smith would likely have also read it.

In summary, even if Phillips had delivered the Mesaba warning to the bridge and it was posted, the only two survivors who could have known about it are Fourth Officer Boxhall and Junior Wireless Operator Bride (the latter if Phillips had mentioned it).

 

[Julian Atkins]

I would suggest that if you read the totality of Stanley Adam's testimony, all is clear, except the rather confusing answers at 22036 and 22037.

It is clear to me that the Marconigram form that Lord Mersey and Counsel and Adams were looking at on 11th June 1912 (day 21) was the first Marconigram form at the start of this thread ie the one in Booth 'Signals of Disaster'. Not the one marked "copy" that is in the Marconi Archive at Oxford.

Adams explains that he would not complete the time and office details until he had an acknowledgment that the message had been received. That is why Counsel and Lord Mersey refer to not seeing "received thanks" on the Marconigram form.

It will also be noted that the Marconigram form read out at the British Inquiry on this date is exactly as per the one in Booth 'Signals of Disaster' and without the deviations and additions that are on the one marked "copy". Of particular importance is that the Booth one has "prefix ice report", and not 'prefix SG'. I have already explained elsewhere my view that a 'MSG' is a 'MSG', and not 'SG' and that I believe Hughes' 'Titanic Calling' to be contain a mistake on this point.

An 'ice report' takes (or should take) priority over private messages, and Adams additionally refers to a transposition/translation of his 'process verbal' that he was then 'standing by' expecting to receive a probable reply from Titanic's Captain. However, the important point is that Adams testifies that he continued to hear the operator on Titanic working with Cape Race. The clear inference is that Phillips did not stop what he was doing to take the Mesaba ice report to the bridge.

On page 51 of Hughes' 'Titanic Calling' he quotes from a letter dated 13th June 1912 from George Turnbull to Marconi himself that "The records of Cape Race show, however, that there was a break in the communications at the time the Mesaba message was sent". Hughes goes on to question this timing as the break occurred shortly before the Mesaba message was sent to Titanic. Turnbull didn't make this point in his testimony because he had not by then (22th/23rd May) received the Cape Race records.

If you have a look at Turnbull's testimony and especially 16221 - 16225, and 16238 and 16242 it would appear that a version of the "copy" Mesaba Marconigram was presented by Turnbull as the Mesaba message. Red additions, a list of eastbound ships sent the message. The acknowledgement 'received thanks'. What I think is clear to me is that Adams prepared a "copy" with additional information added for Marconi to submit to the British Inquiry, but then brought with him the original Marconigram when he testified some 5 or more weeks later.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

It is clear to me that the Marconigram form that Lord Mersey and Counsel and Adams were looking at on 11th June 1912 (day 21) was the first Marconigram form at the start of this thread ie the one in Booth 'Signals of Disaster'. Not the one marked "copy" that is in the Marconi Archive at Oxford.

Okay, thanks for that Julian. So, the confusing "26/04/12" on the left upper corner of the "COPY" message is really a date then?

If you have a look at Turnbull's testimony and especially 16221 - 16225, and 16238 and 16242 it would appear that a version of the "copy" Mesaba Marconigram was presented by Turnbull as the Mesaba message.
What I think is clear to me is that Adams prepared a "copy" with additional information added for Marconi to submit to the British Inquiry, but then brought with him the original Marconigram when he testified some 5 or more weeks later.

That explains the confusion, but was either Turnbull or Adams bending the rules here? I am not sure that I understand those actions.

An 'ice report' takes (or should take) priority over private messages, and Adams additionally refers to a transposition/translation of his 'process verbal' that he was then 'standing by' expecting to receive a probable reply from Titanic's Captain. However, the important point is that Adams testifies that he continued to hear the operator on Titanic working with Cape Race. The clear inference is that Phillips did not stop what he was doing to take the Mesaba ice report to the bridge.

Agreed. But do you think that Phillips took the Mesaba message to the bridge a little later like Sam considered only as a possibility (with a big "IF")? As I conjectured, it would make the situation more interesting if he had done so but if he had not, I can understand your feeling that Phillips had a share of the blame in the events that followed. Having said that, I believe Sam is right is saying:

Since the bridge team expected to be up to the ice anytime after 11pm, the Mesaba message probably would have made no difference regarding course or speed. The practice was to stay on course at speed until and unless specific danger was seen. Smith would not have been called.

 

[Julian Atkins]

So, the confusing "26/04/12" on the left upper corner of the "COPY" message is really a date then?

It is the edition of the date of the particular Marconigram pad being used. So the “copy” had to be written by Adams on or after this date and before I think it is 7th May when Marconi Co wrote to the British Inquiry containing the Mesaba details. If you look at page 15 in Booth ‘Signals of Disaster’ you will see details of the original and the 2 different ‘copy’ forms and Adam’s letter dated 6th May enclosing the 2 ‘copies’.

 

[Julian Atkins]

Page 15 of Booth ‘Signals of Disaster’.