Break Up

[Michael H. Standart]

>>...and their actions that night prior to the collision indicate a certain disregard to potential hazard.<<

Or perhaps a lack of respect for the conditions. It wouldn't be the first time a ship was killed that way, and tragically, it won't be the last.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

Will. Disregarding a potential hazard or failing to take action that we think is prudent today is not the same thing as lack of situational awareness. The sea state not only was known but also communicated. They were fully aware that a flat calm would reduce their ability to see a berg. This was clearly pointed out by Lightoller concerning his conversation with Capt. Smith. The seeing conditions and sea state were communicated to Murdoch when he took the bridge at 10 pm. The officers were fully aware of the situation. Capt. Smith chose to take a risk and continue on the same course at full speed. Was it lack of respect for the conditions or just overconfidence in one's ability to see and avoid doesn't really matter. Maybe it was a little of both. But you cannot say that they were unaware of the situation or lost sight of the situation because of some other event happening that we know about. And that is my point.

Now if someone want's to point to a specific example of loss of situational awareness occurring on board the Titanic that night, I can certainly point to one that may have had an effect on the eventual outcome. But it doesn't involve a communications failure between any of the officers, lookouts or quartermasters.

 

[Will C. White]

Sam-In the military I was taught that losing sight of the 'big picture' is being situationally unaware, in that by not understanding and accounting for all the factors that go into whatever solution you arrive at, then your solution is flawed in some way. If Smith wasn't situationally unaware, in that he had digested all the information available to him, then he was negligent because he wilfully engaged in conduct that lead to the loss of the ship. We can't just always say "that was how it was done then"-even Captain Lord had enough brains to stop when he encountered what he felt was an ice hazard. I believe a more prudent master would have taken more precautions, and that is why I say he was "unaware"-it just doesn't come upon you suddenly-it's a series of small errors over time that ends in some type of major failure.

 

[Michael H. Standart]

>>If Smith wasn't situationally unaware, in that he had digested all the information available to him, then he was negligent because he wilfully engaged in conduct that lead to the loss of the ship.<<

Hmmmmmmmmmmm...."willfully" may be a bit of a stretch in this case. (You could also be right.) I'm more inclined to think that the "Everything they knew was wrong" line is a bit closer to the mark. Everything I've seen in testimony...notably Lightoller's...suggests that they thought they were engaged in prudant seamanship.

The twisted wreckage on the bottom indicates otherwise, but that's not how they saw it at the time.

 

[David G. Brown]

Regarding Sam's two questions--

1. Was there some particular piece of information that someone knew about but failed to communicate which might have made a difference to the outcome?

No, there was no one "key" to the loss or lack of situational awareness. This question reflects a misunderstanding the situation. It is possible for a bridge team to have all of the facts at hand, but still be unaware. It is how the information is handled and how the decisions are made that is critical.

2. Was there something that happened that caused someone to loose sight of something that they were aware of that contributed to the accident?

As with question #1, there was no single event that triggered the loss of awareness. However, I do believe that Captain Smith's arrival on the bridge may have been the final major contributing factor. He effectively took the "deck" while leaving Murdoch with the "con." But, Captain Smith's role was never spelled out. It was just the nature of the supordinate/superior relationship in pre-WW-I British society, especially the quasi-military society of ship's officers.

Loss of situational awareness can be caused by one instantaneous event. But, this is not usually the case. It is more often the slow buildup of events, actions, assumptions, and even standard operating procedures.

Sam will understand if I say that loss of situational awareness is much like to a machine where all of the parts are in tolerance, but all too big. The machine won't work because as a whole it is totally out of the range of tolerance.

Factors leading to the awareness problems in Titanic range from the layout of the bridge to the unofficial rules governing the use of telephones. They range from the usual and customary practice of dead reckoning in 1912 to the time of night. They include the odd lack of discussion about ice between Murdoch and Lightoller. And, we can't forget Moody's early prediction of ice did not raise the hairs on the back of Lightoller's neck. The passengers sleeping below had their role to play, as did Ismay. The success of the ships Nessmore (twice) and Arizona with ice encounters did not help. Even the procedure for forwarding ice reports and posting them had influence, as did the relationships between captain and officers as mentioned above. So many things came into play. Most were relatively minor. By themselves, they were non-events, non-factors. But, added together, they meant Titanic was doomed to ride over an iceberg.

--David G. Brown

 

[Samuel Halpern]

quote:

It is how the information is handled and how the decisions are made that is critical.

I absolutely agree with that. However, the issue in an accident investigation is to determine cause. When an accident is said to be caused by a situational awareness problem, specific factors can be pointed to that show why that is the case such as some critical piece of information that was not conveyed, some ambiguous information that was given, some preoccupation that took place, etc. I don't believe that is so clear cut here. I do believe that the officers and Capt. Smith believed that they would be able to see and avoid ice under seeing conditions that they were well aware of. That widely held belief proved to be wrong. However, if there were any doubt as to their ability to see and avoid, then we have a clear case of negligence.

Will. Capt. Lord did not slow down or stop his ship until ice was seen ahead. And he was forced to take emergency action in doing so by reversing his engine to full astern and going hard-aport on the helm. He was lucky.​

 

[David G. Brown]

Sam-- I have clear cut proof of the loss of situational awareness. It lies in unequivocal fact, but the explanation takes more words than is polite to put on this forum. However, I still believe you are looking for some one specific cause for the accident. Such is absolutely never the case except for lawyers and bureaucrats. In the real world accidents are the sum of events. Admiralty law took this into account years before Titanic was launched by establishing comparative damages in ship collisions. Under this concept, each vessel is assessed a percentage of the "blame" rather than it all being foisted off on one vessel or captain. Comparative damages recognizes the real world, but it's hardly a perfect solution--just better than with automobiles where one person is always judged "to blame" no matter what the other driver may have done.

Captain Smith was not negligent on the night of April 14-15, 1912. He would have been negligent if he had sunk Olympic in the same manner on the night of April 15-16, 1912. The reason is that on the day prior he was acting as an ordinary seaman would have acted at the time and under the conditions. On the next night, an ordinary seaman knowing what happened to Titanic would be expected to act differently.

But, this still does not relieve Captain Smith of the responsibility for the accident. He wore the four stripes, so he was responsible for the conduct of himself, his crew, and the ship. Even loss of situational awareness does not absolve him of responsibility.

But, responsibility is not blame. Blame is a word that should not even be in the dictionary when it comes to transportation accidents. And, looking for a single cause of the accident is just another way of trying to pin "blame" on someone.

As to Captain Lord...I agree he was lucky. His first encounter with the ice was far less dramatic and the consequences far less deadly than what happened to Captain Smith. But, prior to running into the ice neither captain was really "on top" of the situation.

-- David G. Brown

 

[Michael H. Standart]

>>Sam-- I have clear cut proof of the loss of situational awareness. It lies in unequivocal fact, but the explanation takes more words than is polite to put on this forum.<<

Perhaps an article for publication here on ET would be just the tonic for that, even an updated version of the one you wrote for Professional Mariner a few years ago.

For whatever it's worth, situational awareness is something that's rather easy to lose even if you have all the necessery information at your fingertips to act on, and all it takes is the smallest of distractions to do it. Think of that L-1011 which crashed in the Everglades because the crew became obsessive-compulsive over a single burned out lightbulb in the control panel.

Yes, it was an important bulb in that it would indicate whether or not the nose gear was down and locked, but they became so fixated on it that they forgot to fly the bloody plane.

It wouldn't have taken much more then something equally minor to produce much the same result on a ship. Unfortunately, the available evidence by way of the transcripts might not be useful for identifying that all too easily. The evidence is there to make the case...David has shown that much, even if whether or not he's right is debatable...but the catch is that in 1912, "Situational Awareness" in the sense that we understand was not a concept that they were all that familier with. I don't think the term even existed back then and you'll find it nowhere in the transcripts.

 

[Will C. White]

Mike-Just a quick aside. In regards to the L-1011 crash, are thinking of the Valu-Jet crash? They reported smoke in the cockpit, and then tried to return to the airport with a burning plane. Talk about not being aware! Sure, some may die if you pancake in the swamp, but as it was, all died. We saw the same thing again here in CA. Pilot had poor control due to tail failure. He was nose on to a long military runway and some five minutes out, but he decided to go back to LAX-all died when part of the tail came apart some 20 minutes later because he wasn't aware-my point is, gather all the facts and process them-don't just do what the book says.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

I like Michael's idea of an article on SA particularly if it can show how that directly contributed to the accident. I'm sure most of the readers would like to see that.

I too can point to some clear cut proof of a situational awareness failure, but it was not on part of the bridge team. What I'm not sure about is what real difference the missing information would have made if known by the bridge team, so I am unwilling to say it was a contributory cause of the accident.

I also agree that seldom is there a single cause of an accident. I do believe there are primary causes as well as secondary causes. I don't think anyone is trying to place blame on any single individual. What we are trying to understand here is how could this accident have happened.

I also fully agree with you that Captain Smith was not negligent on the night of April 14, assuming that there was no doubt as to their ability to see and avoid in light of the discussion he had with Lightoller regarding sea state and viewing conditions. I do remember from my jury serving days that it is not enough just to prove there was negligence, but one must also show how that negligence contributed to the accident.

I believe the same is true here. In my opinion it is not enough to show a loss or lack of SA, but to show the extent to which it contributed to the accident.

Dave, you said "prior to running into the ice neither captain was really 'on top' of the situation." Care to expand on this, and what in your opinion would it have taken for them to be on top?

 

[Michael H. Standart]

>>In regards to the L-1011 crash, are thinking of the Valu-Jet crash? They reported smoke in the cockpit, and then tried to return to the airport with a burning plane.<<

Nope, I'm talking about the fiasco with the Eastern Airlines L-1011 which crashed in the Everglades a few years after the type entered service. The Valuejet screwup was an entirely different animal. They were all too aware of the fact that they had a problem and were focused on getting back since they couldn't possibly identify the source of the smoke.

The L-1011 was a case of "Controlled Flight Into The Ground." and the only thing that was cooked was that damned light bulb!

In regards Titanic, all I can really say is that David's observations about the layout of the bridge are the key to understanding what he's trying to say. We saw them in his old article and he spelled it out at the 2004 MMA symposium.

We have Boxhall and Olliver on the compass platform 150 feet back aft with no way to communicate with the wheelhouse save by bell pulls, we have Murdoch out on the bridge wing trying to keep a watch forward with no way to communicate with the wheelhouse save by shouting (And he can't hear what's going on in there.) and Moody keeping a watch on the helm with no way of communicating with either except by the bell pulls and shouting, and he's not on the other side looking forward. As a setup virtually gauranteed to cause a communications breakdown, this was practically made to order. People who needed to be in one place in close proximity to each other were scattered all over the place!

 

[Samuel Halpern]

I am familiar with the scenario described in your last paragraph Michael, and if that were the situation when the iceberg was first seen then there may be something to seriously discuss here. But the existing evidence does not support the bridge team being involved in a course check or course change when the iceberg was first sighted. If a compass check was done (I know about IMM 253) it would have been about 10 minutes before. I also reject speculation that Murdoch would have been distracted during any of those compass checks from performing his duty of maintaining the lookout and more importantly, taking immediate action if danger was seen ahead. He was only a shout away from the helmsman and few seconds run from the engine order telegraphs.

 

[Julie Goebel]

I'm not sure why people say Lightoller tried to "cover" for himself at the inquiry. If that were true he would have said "I told Murdoch we would see ice and to keep a diligent look out, why he did not is beyond me" After all Murdoch was dead and no one could dispute it. He really could have thrown his fellow officer under the bus and many would have but he didn't. His story really didn't change all that much between the two inquiries and when they did I justified it coming from a man who was grieving, tired and fed up.

 

[Michael H. Standart]

>>I'm not sure why people say Lightoller tried to "cover" for himself at the inquiry.<<

it's not quite as simple as that. I think it's more along the lines of spin and evade so as to disclose as little as possible. Whwen you know that your every word is going to be a matter of the written record, and could be held against you, you tend to be very, very, very careful about what you say.

>>He really could have thrown his fellow officer under the bus and many would have but he didn't.<<

And I don't think he would have even to save his own skin. What he was doing in this instance would be protecting a fellow mariner who could no longer speak for himself.

 

[Roy Kristiansen]

>>What he was doing in this instance would be protecting a fellow mariner who could no longer speak for himself.

Yes, he proved that in a number of ways - along with scrupulously following the WSL's directives to officers as to how they should handle matters if they ever found themselves tied up in a legal action.

This next may sound as if it's coming out of left field, but it isn't really. Does anyone have the stats on how many voyages between Britain and the US Smith had made between, say, mid-December, 1911 and April 10, 1912? How about the various officers? And wouldn't Smith have been required to sign off on the most current British hydrographic charts before leaving Southampton?

Roy