Samuel Halpern
Member
All the above is of some interest to some, but I see no connection to any of the events of 1912, and I think it would be dangerous to assume that there was.
Herbert Stone's Disappearance and George Stewart's Obituary from Archive Newspapers.
- Thread starter Harland Duzen
- Start date
Julian Atkins
Member
Hi Sam,
At the very least, errors in Reade and Lee, and omissions in Harrison, ought to be corrected. Especially in Reade, who tore into Captain Lord, but described Groves in a gushing way.
We ought to be able to form some sort of view of Groves' personality given that Robertson Dunlop, in his closing speech for the Leyland Line, described Groves' evidence as being "largely the result of imagination stimulated by vanity", and we ought to be able to take a view on this ourselves. We also ought to be able to take a view on Jim's assessment of Groves that Groves 'had it in for Stone' and took umbrage at not being given his due rank.
I often represented patients for Mental Heath Review Tribunals in the late 1980s and early 1990s. From the legal perspective I gained, yet not being a medical mental health expert, I have not the slightest doubt that Stone had some mental health issues, as evidenced by his mental breakdown in June 1937. It would be quite unusual (in my experience) for this to be a 'one off' isolated incident.
Anyway, that is my own take on the matter.
And if Groves tells 'tall stories' about his internment 1916-1918, then what else did he tell that were 'tall stories'? Schools of porpoises, an empty collapsible A lifeboat, that actually had 3 bodies in it, and seals who might have been survivors on the ice!
"Imagination stimulated by vanity"?
Cheers,
Julian
At the very least, errors in Reade and Lee, and omissions in Harrison, ought to be corrected. Especially in Reade, who tore into Captain Lord, but described Groves in a gushing way.
We ought to be able to form some sort of view of Groves' personality given that Robertson Dunlop, in his closing speech for the Leyland Line, described Groves' evidence as being "largely the result of imagination stimulated by vanity", and we ought to be able to take a view on this ourselves. We also ought to be able to take a view on Jim's assessment of Groves that Groves 'had it in for Stone' and took umbrage at not being given his due rank.
I often represented patients for Mental Heath Review Tribunals in the late 1980s and early 1990s. From the legal perspective I gained, yet not being a medical mental health expert, I have not the slightest doubt that Stone had some mental health issues, as evidenced by his mental breakdown in June 1937. It would be quite unusual (in my experience) for this to be a 'one off' isolated incident.
Anyway, that is my own take on the matter.
And if Groves tells 'tall stories' about his internment 1916-1918, then what else did he tell that were 'tall stories'? Schools of porpoises, an empty collapsible A lifeboat, that actually had 3 bodies in it, and seals who might have been survivors on the ice!
"Imagination stimulated by vanity"?
Cheers,
Julian
Samuel Halpern
Member
Well in the same vane, why not ask questions about Stone and what appears to me to be a willingness to shift the blame onto Lord for not taking any action that night. He seems to me to come across as a very passive individual who was unwilling to decide anything for himself. He also comes across as being overly defensive about his own actions that night, as well as his lack of assertiveness in dealing with his own captain. And what was he doing after Gibson was sent down at one bell, between 3:40 and 4am? How could he not have seen a steamer show up in the south before Stewart arrived?
Jim Currie
Member
Let's analyse Stone' behaviour as an officer that night.
First his duties.
Stone, like every senior Bridge Officer, was tasked with the responsibility of being actively in charge of the bridge during the absence therefrom of for the Master. However, the ultimate responsibility lay with the Master, not the Bridge Officer. As such, his job was to ensure the safety of the ship and oversee the deck crew on duty. Except in the event of an extreme emergency, he was not expected to make any decisions which would involve the change of the ship status as she lay stopped among the ice. Stone's orders were to inform his captain of any changes in the status of the nearby vessel. In addition, standing orders which applied to all three Watch-keeping officers would have been to immediately inform the master of any unusual happening or if in any doubt whatsoever. These were standing orders in all British merchant vessels.
As ordered, Stone reported the sighting of a white light and a rocket in the sky in the direction of the nearby vessel (not from that vessel) which he took to be rockets. That vessel had, like Californian, been stopped near to ice for over an hour and both Stone and the 3rd Officer had tried to communicate with her without success. Stone's next order was to keep trying to find out the reason for the rocket seen. He did as ordered and was unsuccessful. His next report was to update his captain concerning a ship which had subsequently sailed away.
Stone saw rockets in the direction of a nearby vessel which changed her bearing and subsequently moved away. He did not recognise what he was seeing as a call fro help and the situation did not convey to him that the nearby ship needed help. If Stone made any mistake at all, it was in disregarding his initial order which was to report if the nearby vessel changed her bearing. This he should have done, the minute it started. If he had done, then Lord would have gone to the bridge and he and Stone would have witnessed the 6 other signals fired by Titanic and without doubt, Lord would have had Sparks called.
First his duties.
Stone, like every senior Bridge Officer, was tasked with the responsibility of being actively in charge of the bridge during the absence therefrom of for the Master. However, the ultimate responsibility lay with the Master, not the Bridge Officer. As such, his job was to ensure the safety of the ship and oversee the deck crew on duty. Except in the event of an extreme emergency, he was not expected to make any decisions which would involve the change of the ship status as she lay stopped among the ice. Stone's orders were to inform his captain of any changes in the status of the nearby vessel. In addition, standing orders which applied to all three Watch-keeping officers would have been to immediately inform the master of any unusual happening or if in any doubt whatsoever. These were standing orders in all British merchant vessels.
As ordered, Stone reported the sighting of a white light and a rocket in the sky in the direction of the nearby vessel (not from that vessel) which he took to be rockets. That vessel had, like Californian, been stopped near to ice for over an hour and both Stone and the 3rd Officer had tried to communicate with her without success. Stone's next order was to keep trying to find out the reason for the rocket seen. He did as ordered and was unsuccessful. His next report was to update his captain concerning a ship which had subsequently sailed away.
Stone saw rockets in the direction of a nearby vessel which changed her bearing and subsequently moved away. He did not recognise what he was seeing as a call fro help and the situation did not convey to him that the nearby ship needed help. If Stone made any mistake at all, it was in disregarding his initial order which was to report if the nearby vessel changed her bearing. This he should have done, the minute it started. If he had done, then Lord would have gone to the bridge and he and Stone would have witnessed the 6 other signals fired by Titanic and without doubt, Lord would have had Sparks called.
Samuel Halpern
Member
According to what Lord said at both inquiries, is that the he was told that steamer was steaming away toward the SW when Stone called down to him the first time.
Seumas
Member
There was a book published a few years ago - "Lost Voices of the Titanic" by Nick Barratt - that actually claimed that as a fact ! Very sloppy research on Mr Barratt's part.
How on earth these "survivors" found the strength to haul themselves up onto the slippery ice, survive for several hours with their clothing completely drenched in freezing cold water and have the energy to jump about and wave their arms for help was of course not explained by the author.
Julian Atkins
Member
Hi Sam and Jim,
My main point was that until Harland posted his newspaper findings, no one previously seems to have ascertained exactly what happened to Stone in June 1937, and Leslie Reade's subjective appraisal and gushing treatment of Groves.
Sort of linking into the 'Interrogation of Stone' thread, there are obviously problems with Stone's actions or inactions. The failure to report to Captain Lord, by Gibson's own account, 3 white rockets fired from Carpathia, is a massive problem in itself.
As for 1.15am we simply don't know for sure (though we can make an educated guess, or apply a legal assessment of the evidence) what Stone reported to Captain Lord of the rockets seen because Stone's evidence at the British Inquiry was contradicted in one vital material respect by Captain Lord.
Captain Lord said he was only told of one white rocket by Stone at 1.15am via Stone's report.
Stone said he reported to Captain Lord plural white rockets (and why no one specifically asked him how many is one of the puzzles of the British Inquiry, except the line of questioning was clear about multiple rockets seen), and the inference I arrive at is that because Stone had then seen first one as a flash but which he also added to the further 4 as 5 white rockets seen by 1.15am, at 1.15am he reported 5 white rockets seen by then (as the line of questioning proposed). Any other conclusion seems to me to be perverse.
The problem is Gibson's evidence, which contradicts Stone as to when Gibson returned to the flying bridge, and what Stone told him he had reported to Captain Lord and when.
Leslie Harrison found out all about Gibson's appalling subsequent career in the MN, but omitted to include it in any of his books, only to be re-discovered by Paul Lee. If you take into account Gibson's subsequent MN career, one cannot but help look at Gibson's evidence in 1912 in a different light, even if Gibson was more observant that watch than Stone. You will have to ask Paul Lee what he based his synopsis on, but I am quite clear in my own mind it was notes made by Leslie Harrison in the Liverpool Maritime Museum when Harrison was shown Gibson's MN book by his widow.
Cheers,
Julian
(Edited for typos and to make more sense re Stone's questioning at the British inquiry)
My main point was that until Harland posted his newspaper findings, no one previously seems to have ascertained exactly what happened to Stone in June 1937, and Leslie Reade's subjective appraisal and gushing treatment of Groves.
Sort of linking into the 'Interrogation of Stone' thread, there are obviously problems with Stone's actions or inactions. The failure to report to Captain Lord, by Gibson's own account, 3 white rockets fired from Carpathia, is a massive problem in itself.
As for 1.15am we simply don't know for sure (though we can make an educated guess, or apply a legal assessment of the evidence) what Stone reported to Captain Lord of the rockets seen because Stone's evidence at the British Inquiry was contradicted in one vital material respect by Captain Lord.
Captain Lord said he was only told of one white rocket by Stone at 1.15am via Stone's report.
Stone said he reported to Captain Lord plural white rockets (and why no one specifically asked him how many is one of the puzzles of the British Inquiry, except the line of questioning was clear about multiple rockets seen), and the inference I arrive at is that because Stone had then seen first one as a flash but which he also added to the further 4 as 5 white rockets seen by 1.15am, at 1.15am he reported 5 white rockets seen by then (as the line of questioning proposed). Any other conclusion seems to me to be perverse.
The problem is Gibson's evidence, which contradicts Stone as to when Gibson returned to the flying bridge, and what Stone told him he had reported to Captain Lord and when.
Leslie Harrison found out all about Gibson's appalling subsequent career in the MN, but omitted to include it in any of his books, only to be re-discovered by Paul Lee. If you take into account Gibson's subsequent MN career, one cannot but help look at Gibson's evidence in 1912 in a different light, even if Gibson was more observant that watch than Stone. You will have to ask Paul Lee what he based his synopsis on, but I am quite clear in my own mind it was notes made by Leslie Harrison in the Liverpool Maritime Museum when Harrison was shown Gibson's MN book by his widow.
Cheers,
Julian
(Edited for typos and to make more sense re Stone's questioning at the British inquiry)
Last edited:
Jim Currie
Member
That ties-in with Stone's claim that the bearings began to change almost immediately after or at the same time the first rocket was seen. If that had been the case, then what purpose would there have been in Lord going aloft to the upper bridge?
Seumas
Member
Just out of interest, what misadventures happened to James Gibson in his subsequent career ?
Julian Atkins
Member
Hi Seumas,
It isn't actually "very sloppy" research (though I haven't read Barratt's book) because it was exactly what Groves wrote to Walter Lord in Groves' 'Middle Watch' essay of 1958. Senan Moloney did a 'hatchet job' on the 'Middle Watch' essay by Groves on here some many years ago as a research article
The Middle Watch
Well worth reading or re-reading, though typical Senan! The 'Middle Watch' essay is also quoted by Dave Billnitzer on his website now archived on the wayback site, and was known to some researchers before Senan coped a 'scoop'. And it was known by the recipient Walter Lord since 1958, but he made no use of it.
Cheers,
Julian
Julian Atkins
Member
To see the rockets for himself?! And to get a more detailed report from Stone, given the nonsense about 'company signals' etc
Harland Duzen
Member
According to Paul Lee:
1) When being 3rd Officer of the SS Boniface (1928) of the Booth Line, "Gibson left the company after the master of the Boniface, Captain F.H. Good, gave him an adverse report, Gibson was described as "a positive menace on the bridge", allowing the ship's only chronometer to run down and having "no interest in cargo or stowage and was no assistance to the Chief Officer". Finally, after lying to the Captain (twice) about a miscalculation in the ship's course, which would have resulted in an imminent grounding, Gibson was ordered from the bridge and relieved."
2) When an AB/Q.M. on the Reina del Pacifico (1930), he received a double DR ("Declined to Report", indicating an adverse report), in his discharge book for two misdemeanours: being drunk on duty, and then later, going AWOL in Kingston, Jamaica.
3) When an AB on the Whaling vessel Powell (1950), he was discharged from duty after being found twice in a coma, attributed to epilepsy (which he claimed was caused by him falling on a pipe onboard a ship called the Port Huron.)
4) He was discharged from the MN Neothuma (1946) for misconduct in 1954.
In my opinion, not the best `'post Californian" track record!
Seumas
Member
Thanks Harland.
From deck officer to an AB in just two years. What a humiliation !
Did he have his certificates revoked as a result of his carry on aboard the Boniface and had to resort to being an AB ?
Hi Seumas,
It isn't actually "very sloppy" research (though I haven't read Barratt's book) because it was exactly what Groves wrote to Walter Lord in Groves' 'Middle Watch' essay of 1958. Senan Moloney did a 'hatchet job' on the 'Middle Watch' essay by Groves on here some many years ago as a research article
The Middle Watch
www.encyclopedia-titanica.org
Well worth reading or re-reading, though typical Senan! The 'Middle Watch' essay is also quoted by Dave Billnitzer on his website now archived on the wayback site, and was known to some researchers before Senan coped a 'scoop'. And it was known by the recipient Walter Lord since 1958, but he made no use of it.
Cheers,
Julian
Ah, thank you Julian. I wasn't aware of that.
I should have said that Barratt should have looked more objectively at Stone's outlandish claims rather just than accepting them without question.
Julian Atkins
Member
Hi Seamus,
Did you mean to refer to 'GROVE'S' outlandish claims rather than 'Stone' in Barratt's book?
Gibson seems to have risen not very high by 1928, after 16 years, to 3rd Officer, then as you rightly note gets a rapid demotion.
... ___ .... ___ ....
There is a telling remark in one of Stanley Tutton Lord's letters to Edward Kamuda of 13th June 1964...
"My father could, when he felt like it, be very severe and intimidating"
From son about his father.
This stuff is all post 1912, as is Captain Lord's 1959 affidavit and the transcripts of the taped recorded interviews of Captain Lord in 1961.
To extend Sam's contention to it's logical conclusion, where does the cut off in time occur in considering the evidence? After Captain Lord's 'Savannah Morning News' article in 1914? Or his 1959 Affidavit? Or Mrs P Gibson showing Leslie Harrison her late husband's MN discharge book in 1963? Or Reade eventually getting a letter out of Stone's son John dated 31st August 1965? Or the late 1990s when researchers became aware of Groves' correspondence with Walter Lord in 1955 to the late 1950s plus a personal interview? I could go on.
I do not accept that what 'The Californian Incident' players did after 1912 is of no relevance, as Sam contends!
Cheers,
Julian
Did you mean to refer to 'GROVE'S' outlandish claims rather than 'Stone' in Barratt's book?
Gibson seems to have risen not very high by 1928, after 16 years, to 3rd Officer, then as you rightly note gets a rapid demotion.
... ___ .... ___ ....
There is a telling remark in one of Stanley Tutton Lord's letters to Edward Kamuda of 13th June 1964...
"My father could, when he felt like it, be very severe and intimidating"
From son about his father.
This stuff is all post 1912, as is Captain Lord's 1959 affidavit and the transcripts of the taped recorded interviews of Captain Lord in 1961.
To extend Sam's contention to it's logical conclusion, where does the cut off in time occur in considering the evidence? After Captain Lord's 'Savannah Morning News' article in 1914? Or his 1959 Affidavit? Or Mrs P Gibson showing Leslie Harrison her late husband's MN discharge book in 1963? Or Reade eventually getting a letter out of Stone's son John dated 31st August 1965? Or the late 1990s when researchers became aware of Groves' correspondence with Walter Lord in 1955 to the late 1950s plus a personal interview? I could go on.
I do not accept that what 'The Californian Incident' players did after 1912 is of no relevance, as Sam contends!
Cheers,
Julian
Seumas
Member
Groves, aye
On the whole problem of "the ship that stood still" I find the discussions around it here on ET very interesting but I don't fall in with either side. I of course accept that there was indeed a ship seen from the Titanic which did not answer any of her distress signals or make any effort to join the rescue effort. However as I am completely ignorant of navigation, the ocean's currents, ice on the North Atlantic, the stars, ship handling and so forth I refrain from making any judgement on the identity of the ship and respect both sides of the argument on this topic.
(I think I can hear someone in the back shouting "get off the fence !")
Similar threads
