Dave Gittins
Member
We must all be grateful to David H for taking such trouble to share his experience with us. I'm sure we now have a greater understanding of the problems faced by the crew. To add to the difficulties mentioned by David, it's a matter of record that people stood on the tails of the falls while the seamen were trying to work with them. A big help!
In 1912, it was realised that there were problems with the training of seamen. There was no formal training outside of the Royal Navy and certain training ships, such as Conway. Even RN training did not necessarily transfer to the merchant service, because the RN often relied on having large numbers of ratings on hand. For instance, the RN routinely hoisted its seaboats on board by the use of simple two-part purchases and numerous ratings, who tailed on the falls. An old RN man told me of rigging huge stern awnings on battleships in a matter of a few minutes, using a hundred or so ratings. Obviously this did not happen on merchant ships.
In 1912, the rating of Able Seaman was obtained by three years of satisfactory service as an Ordinary Seaman. As Ordinary Seamen tended to spend their time scrubbing decks or painting, it was possible to become an Able Seaman with very limited skills.
The Board of Trade was aware of problems. In 1910, a Board of Trade advisory committee noted "the failure on the part of certain shipping companies to carry out the recommendations of the Advisory Committee respecting the crews engaged in the deck department on British vessels, and this Committee recommends that, in future, all seamen engaged for the deck department be qualified seamen and prove such qualification, either by producing three years' certificates of discharge, or, failing this, by proving that they have knowledge of the compass, can steer, do ordinary splices of wire and hemp rope, tie ordinary knots, and have a knowledge of the marks and deeps of the lead-line."
Officers of the Board of Trade also were critical. Captain Alfred Young told Mersey's court of seeing "methods of putting out boats which were a disgrace to the service". Captain Maurice Clarke was not questioned in court about crew competency, but on 12 May he had strongly condemned the general standard of seamen in a memorandum to Sir Walter Howell, though he made an exception for Titanic's crew. (Sir Walter Howell was in charge of the Marine Department of the Board of Trade).
The problems extended to officers. At Mersey's inquiry, counsel for the Imperial Merchant Service Guild told the court, "The certainty is that none of those officers had ever before had to lower a boat full of people, and I do not suppose there are a dozen officers in the merchant service who have ever had practical experience of lowering a boat from a ship's side full of people."
Before 1912, proposals for improved training of seamen came to nothing. Officials of the Board of Trade could see only practical difficulties in testing seamen. They didn't want to hold up ships and annoy the owners. Captain Maurice Clarke, who inspected Titanic at Southampton, wrote that he often found "ABs wholly incompetent to row in even moderate weather and sea." It was Clarke's custom to turn a Nelsonian eye to such men, because to reject them would have "annoyed the shipowner and perhaps led to litigation."
Sir Walter Howell considered the Board of Trade could do little without new legislation. He told Mersey's court---
"The proposal to test and certify the efficiency of seamen beforehand is also not free from difficulty from the administrative point of view. The present practice, as stated above, is to require that the members of the minimum effective watches shall all be efficient seamen, and if there is any doubt the men are examined on board by one of the nautical Surveyors. This ensures a practical test of the men at the commencement of the voyage, and it has been carried out without difficulty or delay. To test and certify the efficiency of the men beforehand might possibly obviate the necessity for a visit by the Surveyor, but the tests, if they are to be of real value to masters and men, would have to be systematised and standardised and protected from impersonation and fraud. Apart from the practical difficulties which this would entail, the Board feel great hesitation in attempting to inaugurate such a system by departmental instructions without express statutory authority."
The Titanic disaster inspired the first SOLAS convention, which commenced on 12 November 1913 in London, chaired by Lord Mersey. Other than Australia and New Zealand, the only participants were the main European users of the North Atlantic.
The Convention recognised the need to train many members of ships' crews, whether seamen or not, in lifeboat work. Article 54 required the participating nations to issue certificates to persons qualified by training in lifeboat operation. Article 56 required crews to be informed of their emergency stations and duties before sailing. Article XLVII prescribed the number of certificated lifeboat crew to be carried. The new regulations were to come into force on 1 July 1915.
World War I prevented the Convention from coming into force. However, many of its recommendations were implemented piecemeal by ocean-going nations and the standard of crew training was improved. Women began to participate and a few attained positions as lifeboat coxswains. The second SOLAS Convention of 1929 was the first to be formally adopted by the participating nations, though it was not fully ratified until 1936. Many nations were still not signatories to SOLAS and their ships were not bound by its regulations.
The current SOLAS regulations are far too extensive to be quoted here. They place a heavy emphasis on crew training. A new crewmember must receive training in emergency procedures within two weeks of joining a ship. This must include first aid, fire-fighting, liferaft operation and emergency operations in heavy weather.
Passengers are now included in emergency training, a procedure ridiculed by Lord Mersey in 1912. They must assemble at emergency stations within 24 hours of sailing.
Emergency drills involving only the crew are prescribed. The procedures are intended to ensure that emergency boats and lifeboats are always serviceable. It must be possible for two crewmembers to prepare a lifeboat for lowering in less than five minutes. The evacuation of all passengers and crew must take less than 30 minutes.
Whether all ships meet these requirements is another thing. In many nations, formal training of deck crew is available but this is not universal. Serious deficiencies in crew training are still commonly seen on freighters, particularly those flying flags of convenience. Ship detention lists frequently mention seamen ignorant of emergency procedures. This extends to officers, who sometimes do not know how to operate the modern satellite-based emergency communication equipment. Officers have even been detected using forged certificates. There is still much to be done before the 80,000 ships crossing the world's oceans are all expertly officered and crewed.
In 1912, it was realised that there were problems with the training of seamen. There was no formal training outside of the Royal Navy and certain training ships, such as Conway. Even RN training did not necessarily transfer to the merchant service, because the RN often relied on having large numbers of ratings on hand. For instance, the RN routinely hoisted its seaboats on board by the use of simple two-part purchases and numerous ratings, who tailed on the falls. An old RN man told me of rigging huge stern awnings on battleships in a matter of a few minutes, using a hundred or so ratings. Obviously this did not happen on merchant ships.
In 1912, the rating of Able Seaman was obtained by three years of satisfactory service as an Ordinary Seaman. As Ordinary Seamen tended to spend their time scrubbing decks or painting, it was possible to become an Able Seaman with very limited skills.
The Board of Trade was aware of problems. In 1910, a Board of Trade advisory committee noted "the failure on the part of certain shipping companies to carry out the recommendations of the Advisory Committee respecting the crews engaged in the deck department on British vessels, and this Committee recommends that, in future, all seamen engaged for the deck department be qualified seamen and prove such qualification, either by producing three years' certificates of discharge, or, failing this, by proving that they have knowledge of the compass, can steer, do ordinary splices of wire and hemp rope, tie ordinary knots, and have a knowledge of the marks and deeps of the lead-line."
Officers of the Board of Trade also were critical. Captain Alfred Young told Mersey's court of seeing "methods of putting out boats which were a disgrace to the service". Captain Maurice Clarke was not questioned in court about crew competency, but on 12 May he had strongly condemned the general standard of seamen in a memorandum to Sir Walter Howell, though he made an exception for Titanic's crew. (Sir Walter Howell was in charge of the Marine Department of the Board of Trade).
The problems extended to officers. At Mersey's inquiry, counsel for the Imperial Merchant Service Guild told the court, "The certainty is that none of those officers had ever before had to lower a boat full of people, and I do not suppose there are a dozen officers in the merchant service who have ever had practical experience of lowering a boat from a ship's side full of people."
Before 1912, proposals for improved training of seamen came to nothing. Officials of the Board of Trade could see only practical difficulties in testing seamen. They didn't want to hold up ships and annoy the owners. Captain Maurice Clarke, who inspected Titanic at Southampton, wrote that he often found "ABs wholly incompetent to row in even moderate weather and sea." It was Clarke's custom to turn a Nelsonian eye to such men, because to reject them would have "annoyed the shipowner and perhaps led to litigation."
Sir Walter Howell considered the Board of Trade could do little without new legislation. He told Mersey's court---
"The proposal to test and certify the efficiency of seamen beforehand is also not free from difficulty from the administrative point of view. The present practice, as stated above, is to require that the members of the minimum effective watches shall all be efficient seamen, and if there is any doubt the men are examined on board by one of the nautical Surveyors. This ensures a practical test of the men at the commencement of the voyage, and it has been carried out without difficulty or delay. To test and certify the efficiency of the men beforehand might possibly obviate the necessity for a visit by the Surveyor, but the tests, if they are to be of real value to masters and men, would have to be systematised and standardised and protected from impersonation and fraud. Apart from the practical difficulties which this would entail, the Board feel great hesitation in attempting to inaugurate such a system by departmental instructions without express statutory authority."
The Titanic disaster inspired the first SOLAS convention, which commenced on 12 November 1913 in London, chaired by Lord Mersey. Other than Australia and New Zealand, the only participants were the main European users of the North Atlantic.
The Convention recognised the need to train many members of ships' crews, whether seamen or not, in lifeboat work. Article 54 required the participating nations to issue certificates to persons qualified by training in lifeboat operation. Article 56 required crews to be informed of their emergency stations and duties before sailing. Article XLVII prescribed the number of certificated lifeboat crew to be carried. The new regulations were to come into force on 1 July 1915.
World War I prevented the Convention from coming into force. However, many of its recommendations were implemented piecemeal by ocean-going nations and the standard of crew training was improved. Women began to participate and a few attained positions as lifeboat coxswains. The second SOLAS Convention of 1929 was the first to be formally adopted by the participating nations, though it was not fully ratified until 1936. Many nations were still not signatories to SOLAS and their ships were not bound by its regulations.
The current SOLAS regulations are far too extensive to be quoted here. They place a heavy emphasis on crew training. A new crewmember must receive training in emergency procedures within two weeks of joining a ship. This must include first aid, fire-fighting, liferaft operation and emergency operations in heavy weather.
Passengers are now included in emergency training, a procedure ridiculed by Lord Mersey in 1912. They must assemble at emergency stations within 24 hours of sailing.
Emergency drills involving only the crew are prescribed. The procedures are intended to ensure that emergency boats and lifeboats are always serviceable. It must be possible for two crewmembers to prepare a lifeboat for lowering in less than five minutes. The evacuation of all passengers and crew must take less than 30 minutes.
Whether all ships meet these requirements is another thing. In many nations, formal training of deck crew is available but this is not universal. Serious deficiencies in crew training are still commonly seen on freighters, particularly those flying flags of convenience. Ship detention lists frequently mention seamen ignorant of emergency procedures. This extends to officers, who sometimes do not know how to operate the modern satellite-based emergency communication equipment. Officers have even been detected using forged certificates. There is still much to be done before the 80,000 ships crossing the world's oceans are all expertly officered and crewed.
