Lookout eye test

I have a big collection of relevant documents on a CD from the British Archives. They are most inconvenient to use, as they can't be installed on Windows 10. They are images rather than text files, so they can't be searched. There are duplications, scrawly hand-writing and inscrutable signatures. I've managed to ferret out the facts about the eye tests on Fleet and Lee.

Before 1 January 1914, the only test for seamen was a reading of an eye chart, much like those used today, though it evidently had different numbers of letters on its lines. To pass the test, the candidate had to be able to read at least five letters on the eighth line. This amounted to half of normal vision. The wool test was not used.

Fleet passed the test in September 1907. Lee was not tested after he joined the Hants Yeomanry, a military unit, in 1900. There were proposals to test both men after the British inquiry, but I've found no record of this being done. About all we can conclude is that both men had at least reasonable vision. Personally, I think their failure to sight the berg earlier had more to do with the fact that the crows nest was so high above the sea that the relatively small berg fell below their horizon when it was about 1.5 miles away.

I've attached a letter dated 30 May 1912 that sums up the situation as it stood then.

Whoops! I can't attach file for some reason. Maybe it's too big. I'll fiddle!
Clee letter reduced.webp
 
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This amounted to half of normal vision.
Well it is half normal visual acuity, i.e. resolving power - more or less the same as the UK driving requirement. They just wouldn't be able to make out the fine details of what they saw (if they were at the minimum required standard), which I suppose was considered unimportant since they weren't required to identify what they saw.
 
Before 1 January 1914, the only test for seamen was a reading of an eye chart, much like those used today, though it evidently had different numbers.

Fleet passed the test in September 1907.
Thanks for that information.

To me, that means that Fleet, then a 20 year old young man, passed the stipulated eye test as it existed at the time. That does not mean that he had some sort of visual defect which would have been detected by a more sophisticated test. In fact, the law of probabilities suggests that Fleet had normal vision, including normal visual acuity.

As far as is known, he had not developed any medical condition that could have affected his eyesight by April 1912. That would mean that on that Sunday night, assuming that Fleet was alert and not distracted by Jack and Rose kissing, he would have seen the dark object in the ship's path at the same time as any other Lookout with normal vision and rang the bells. That was all he and Lee were required to do; appreciating the fine artistic lines of the iceberg's margins was not part of their job.

While the height of the Titanic's crow's nest might have played its part in the moment that Fleet first saw the object ahead, I don't believe it would have made a difference of more than a few seconds, if that. The other contributory factors like the darkness, the ship's speed and momentum meant that it was already too late.
 
I have a big collection of relevant documents on a CD from the British Archives. They are most inconvenient to use, as they can't be installed on Windows 10. They are images rather than text files, so they can't be searched. There are duplications, scrawly hand-writing and inscrutable signatures. I've managed to ferret out the facts about the eye tests on Fleet and Lee.

Before 1 January 1914, the only test for seamen was a reading of an eye chart, much like those used today, though it evidently had different numbers of letters on its lines. To pass the test, the candidate had to be able to read at least five letters on the eighth line. This amounted to half of normal vision. The wool test was not used.

Fleet passed the test in September 1907. Lee was not tested after he joined the Hants Yeomanry, a military unit, in 1900. There were proposals to test both men after the British inquiry, but I've found no record of this being done. About all we can conclude is that both men had at least reasonable vision. Personally, I think their failure to sight the berg earlier had more to do with the fact that the crows nest was so high above the sea that the relatively small berg fell below their horizon when it was about 1.5 miles away.

I've attached a letter dated 30 May 1912 that sums up the situation as it stood then.

Whoops! I can't attach file for some reason. Maybe it's too big. I'll fiddle!View attachment 117000
If I am not mistaken, this information comes from MT-9-920-C_03, page 27, and is indeed part of a larger collection of pages. These files (also available online) mention several times that Fleet and Lee were supposed to undergo eye tests (Lee even agreed to do so, provided his travel expenses were covered). However, there is no reference to indicate that the tests were actually conducted. Notably, the correspondence regarding the lookouts does not appear to be part of the official inquiry, and, furthermore, this archival correspondence ends on May 31, 1912. Since the British inquiry continued for a little while longer, there is still a possibility that an actual eye test was carried out. It might even have been conducted after the inquiry.

Like most people here, I agree that it is highly likely that Fleet and Lee, or at least Fleet, had normally functioning eyesight. In fact, I am currently preparing a paper on this matter, which will require some additional time. In the meantime, I want to ensure that I have exhausted all possibilities for tracking down any American or British eye test records, if such tests were ever conducted.
 
There was a book written last year on the subject of the lookouts failure to spot the iceberg and answers many of the questions asked in this forum. The book is entitled 'One Starry Night'.
 
There was a book written last year on the subject of the lookouts failure to spot the iceberg
The problem with that book is precisely that it is based on that highlighted phrase. The fact is that the lookouts didn't fail to spot the iceberg. They spotted it at about the distance one would expect them to spot it on a dark moonless night with no wind and a smooth sea.

The book criticises the lack of training or special selection procedures for lookouts, for which it blames the Board of Trade, and it criticises Lord Mersey and the British Inquiry for failing to investigate more thoroughly the role of the lookouts in the accident. It does contain information on the selection and testing of lookouts but that is somewhat incidental to a very unbalanced account based on a false premise.
 
The problem with that book is precisely that it is based on that highlighted phrase. The fact is that the lookouts didn't fail to spot the iceberg. They spotted it at about the distance one would expect them to spot it on a dark moonless night with no wind and a smooth sea.

The book criticises the lack of training or special selection procedures for lookouts, for which it blames the Board of Trade, and it criticises Lord Mersey and the British Inquiry for failing to investigate more thoroughly the role of the lookouts in the accident. It does contain information on the selection and testing of lookouts but that is somewhat incidental to a very unbalanced account based on a false premise.
Thank you for your review, I appreciate! I will read the book and find out if it contains any interesting information.
 
The problem with that book is precisely that it is based on that highlighted phrase. The fact is that the lookouts didn't fail to spot the iceberg. They spotted it at about the distance one would expect them to spot it on a dark moonless night with no wind and a smooth sea.
Absolutely well put and completely correct. Unless I am mistaken the author of One Starry Night, Ian Donaldson, was briefly a member of ET not too long ago and seemed rather fixated on this topic and his beliefs.

Fleet and Lee spotted the iceberg - as a dark object on the horizon in the ship's path - at a time when just about any trained human being could have done in that same position on the crow's nest and Fleet rang the bells. Nobody could have spotted the berg any earlier on that dark and moonless night and so that means that the Titanic's lookouts did NOT fail to spot the iceberg. But given the darkness, the ship's speed and momentum, it was already too late to avoid impact; Murdoch did his best but given the situation, mitigating damage was just about the "best" that he - or anyone else - could have done. Unfortunately, that was not sufficient to save the ship or 1496 lives.

Fleet had more than adequate vision to spot the object ahead and the timing of his previous eye test was completely irrelevant to the accident.

A far more realistic presentation of what the OOW and lookouts had to do - and did - is presented in these papers by @Samuel Halpern on his Titanicology site. While Iceberg Right Ahead explains about iceberg sizes, seeing distances, speed etc, During the night of April 14th 1912, Captain E has excellent serial diagrams about what the iceberg would have looked like as the bow of the Titanic closed in on it and started to turn to port. In particular, the latter demonstrates the exaggerated 'blossom effect' at night on human vision, with what appears to be a 'distant' object at first and for several seconds afterwards suddenly is 'upon' the observer.
 
I think the terminology used in the book was intended as a rhetorical statement to invite curiosity and serves the books narrative to enforce the argument that many ships captains, in the age of steam, were woefully unprepared for the rapid passage through waters compared to their earlier sail and paddle-powered experience.

This is supported by statements made during the British Inquiry;

"The difficulty one has and which has confronted the Court from the first, is how is it they failed to detect it until it was so close upon them?"
(Sir Rufus Isaacs, Attorney-General, British Wreck Commissioners Inquiry, Day 36. Final Arguments)

Lightoller stated, that he was confident that he would see "any ice that was large enough to damage the ship." He then went on to say in reply;
"I judged that I could see a growler at a mile and a half, more probably two miles."
(Brit Inq 13567)

"How far would you see one of these dark bergs on a clear night, assuming it to be 60 to 80 feet high? Shackleton replied – "It might be only three miles, depending on the night and depending almost entirely on the condition of the sea at the time.
(Brit Inq 25040-42)

In my opinion, the book draws on the evidence given by these statements and others, and elaborates on many factors that may have answered, to a large extent, the question posed by the Attorney-General at the time; i.e. " . . . how is it they failed to detect it until it was so close upon them?"
Furthermore, the book is not based on that one statement, far from it.
 
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Fleet had more than adequate vision to spot the object ahead and the timing of his previous eye test was completely irrelevant to the accident.
I believe everyone on this forum (and outside of it) will agree that Fleet's vision was not an issue when it came to spotting the iceberg. Nevertheless, the starting point of this thread was to explore where, if conducted, Fleet's (and Lee's) eye tests might still be found, assuming they still exist. This question remains highly relevant to me.

A far more realistic presentation of what the OOW and lookouts had to do - and did - is presented in these papers by @Samuel Halpern on his Titanicology site. While Iceberg Right Ahead explains about iceberg sizes, seeing distances, speed etc, During the night of April 14th 1912, Captain E has excellent serial diagrams about what the iceberg would have looked like as the bow of the Titanic closed in on it and started to turn to port. In particular, the latter demonstrates the exaggerated 'blossom effect' at night on human vision, with what appears to be a 'distant' object at first and for several seconds afterwards suddenly is 'upon' the observer.
Thank you for highlighting these two very interesting articles by Sam Halpern, whose contributions are always cleverly written and well-argued. I also greatly appreciate the passion evident in your enthusiastic and engaging responses, as well thought out.
 
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I think the terminology used in the book was intended as a rhetorical statement to invite curiosity and serves the books narrative to enforce the argument that many ships captains, in the age of steam, were woefully unprepared for the rapid passage through waters compared to their earlier sail and paddle-powered experience.

This is supported by statements made during the British Inquiry;

"The difficulty one has and which has confronted the Court from the first, is how is it they failed to detect it until it was so close upon them?"
(Sir Rufus Isaacs, Attorney-General, British Wreck Commissioners Inquiry, Day 36. Final Arguments)

Lightoller stated, that he was confident that he would see "any ice that was large enough to damage the ship." He then went on to say in reply;
"I judged that I could see a growler at a mile and a half, more probably two miles."
(Brit Inq 13567)

"How far would you see one of these dark bergs on a clear night, assuming it to be 60 to 80 feet high? Shackleton replied – "It might be only three miles, depending on the night and depending almost entirely on the condition of the sea at the time.
(Brit Inq 25040-42)

In my opinion, the book draws on the evidence given by these statements and others, and elaborates on many factors that may have answered, to a large extent, the question posed by the Attorney-General at the time; i.e. " . . . how is it they failed to detect it until it was so close upon them?"
Furthermore, the book is not based on that one statement, far from it.
That is the greatest challenge of all: reconciling the opinions of contemporaries, including those who were actually present, with our more modern interpretations of what happened and what might have been.

However, those who were actually there could have had completely different motivations that we are unaware of. For example, Lightoller may have preferred the lookouts to take the blame rather than a fellow officer, which could explain his statement that icebergs could have been spotted at a greater distance. Similarly, Ernest Shackleton may have had motivations we cannot fully understand.

Although I believe both men spoke honestly, my point is that we must also consider less obvious possibilities, including the chance that the witnesses were correct and the iceberg could indeed have been spotted earlier by the lookouts than it actually was.

For the record, I believe the lookouts did their very best up there in the crow's nest and do not deserve to be blamed.
 
I believe everyone on this forum (and outside of it) will agree that Fleet's vision was not an issue when it came to spotting the iceberg. Nevertheless, the starting point of this thread was to explore where, if conducted, Fleet's (and Lee's) eye tests might still be found, assuming they still exist. This question remains highly relevant to me.


Thank you for highlighting these two very interesting articles by Sam Halpern, whose contributions are always cleverly written and well-argued. I also greatly appreciate the passion evident in your enthusiastic and engaging responses.
At some point, it is conceivable that a decision was made not to subject the lookouts to further testing. The reason for this was possibly due to the concern that the 'new' eyesight test, being more rigorous, held even the remotest chance, that either of the two lookouts could fail, which would bring further problems. As it stood, the Attorney-General was satisfied that there was no violation of current regulations, the Press had remained indifferent to any negative stories following their testimony during the Inquiry and the seamen's unions would not create a situation whereby two of its members were exposed to blame for the foundering and Thomas Scanlan, their counsel during the Inquiry, who had pursued the question relentlessly must have seen the implications for his members and that no good would come out of it.
This is borne out by a note, in the few existing documents, from the 'solicitor' which added;
"The Attorney-General told me today that he had read those papers & decided to take no further action."
Further on another note from the Marine Department dated 4th June 1912, read;
"Both men are at Southampton & if the Board doesn't want them detained any longer, I will telegraph to the Receiver of Wrecks to discharge them."
A series of margin notes followed;
"Presumably, these men need not be detained any longer."
(Initialed A.S.K. 5/6)
Mr Baker; "I agree."
(Initialed H.B.)
Finally, The Solicitor noted;
"I have telegraphed to Southampton to discharge Lee & Fleet."
(MT9/920C. M15637)
This is my own take on the re-testing issue and I doubt if there exists any more substantive evidence that could have came back on the findings of Lord Mersey. Hope this helps.
 
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