most controvertial aspect of the sinking?

[Richard C Elliott]

Titanic had internal subdivision which was inferior to that of Great Eastern, built more than fifty years prior. The only real good safety measure against an allision of the type endured by Titanic is to extend a double hull to the waterline. This had been done in the past, was known, and would be absolutely effective.

Yes, but it was abandoned as unnecessary overkill and (with some exceptions) it hasn't been reintroduced since. Modern cruise ships have double bottoms (as had Titanic) but not double hulls to the waterline.

There are compromises to be made based on event probability. The probability of a sideswipe allision opening more than 4 compartments is very low. Nobody designed for that event either then or since.

 

[marina_irc]

Yes, but it was abandoned as unnecessary overkill and (with some exceptions) it hasn't been reintroduced since. Modern cruise ships have double bottoms (as had Titanic) but not double hulls to the waterline.

There are compromises to be made based on event probability. The probability of a sideswipe allision opening more than 4 compartments is very low. Nobody designed for that event either then or since.

It would have been a better safety regulation to implement than the increase in lifeboat capacity.

 

[Richard C Elliott]

It would have been a better safety regulation to implement than the increase in lifeboat capacity.

Yes, I tend to agree. In general terms the Board of Trade did think that structural safety features, such as compartmentalisation, were more important than lifeboat capacity. That is why the lifeboat regulations fell far behind the increase in ship size while the watertight subdivision rules in 1912 were already well advanced.

You might have noticed that in successive sets of BoT lifeboat regulations there were concessions allowing reduced lifeboat capacity in return for subdivision to a 'two compartment' standard. I have been looking at the transcripts of various parliamentary questions and debates from that era. The BoT seem to have had a strong feeling that they wouldn't be able to get legislation on both improved compartmentalisation and increased lifeboat capacity through parliament, so they deliberately prioritised the former at the expense of the latter.

It is all very well to criticise that view in a moralistic tone, but I think their assessment was correct. A government regulatory body is powerless to introduce regulations if they can't get support from the legislature, and the parliaments of the era were very heavily dominated by business interests so they had to compromise.

 

[marina_irc]

Yes, I tend to agree. In general terms the Board of Trade did think that structural safety features, such as compartmentalisation, were more important than lifeboat capacity. That is why the lifeboat regulations fell far behind the increase in ship size while the watertight subdivision rules in 1912 were already well advanced.

You might have noticed that in successive sets of BoT lifeboat regulations there were concessions allowing reduced lifeboat capacity in return for subdivision to a 'two compartment' standard. I have been looking at the transcripts of various parliamentary questions and debates from that era. The BoT seem to have had a strong feeling that they wouldn't be able to get legislation on both improved compartmentalisation and increased lifeboat capacity through parliament, so they deliberately prioritised the former at the expense of the latter.

It is all very well to criticise that view in a moralistic tone, but I think their assessment was correct. A government regulatory body is powerless to introduce regulations if they can't get support from the legislature, and the parliaments of the era were very heavily dominated by business interests so they had to compromise.

My perspective is that before the invention of the stabilised, self-deploying liferaft, carrying additional boats has a dubious if any impact on safety, while the subdivision has clear and considerable benefits in many scenarios in whch launching lifeboats off davits would do nothing except get women and children crushed by a seaway--as happened on many occasions. The "anomaly" of Titanic, if you will, had a structural remedy that was far more generally applicable than lifeboats.

 

[Thomas Krom]

The compartmentalization of the Olympic class liners (when the class was first introduced prior to the any configurations as a response on the sinking of the Titanic, with the extended bulkheads and such) was the equivalent of the watertight subdivision of a passenger liner from the 1920s and 1930s. The extend of the damage the Titanic received during the collision, in both absolute length and percentage of length between the perpendiculars, was something that would have sunk every post-First World War liners that had their floodable length curves published in the modern area. The ships that wouldn’t survive the damage includes the SS America (1939), the SS Europa (1928), SS Normandie (1935) and the SS Rex (1931). The watertight subdivision of the Olympic class liners in 1911 was nearly 10 years it’s time ahead.


The damage the Titanic received by the iceberg was considered during her design process as statistically unlikely and unaffordable to implement to the extend that the Safety of Life at Sea (or SOLAS) 1929 conference ships were compartmented no better than the Titanic. The biggest threat during her designing phase were ship-to-ship collisions which were far more common than collisions with icebergs. If you like I can make a detailed and chronological timeline of White Star Liners which suffered ship-to-ship collisions before the Titanic went down to show you how common it was.


According to Phillips Sims from the Transactions of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers (SNAME) the watertight subdivision of the Titanic even greatly exceeded the Safety of Life at Sea regulations back in 2003. Not to mention there is no proof that higher bulkheads were suggested, the collision bulkhead was even extended in height on advice of Board of Trade surveyor Francis Carruthers in April 1910.

As for the double hull, it must be noted that the double hull on other vessels (The Olympic and Britannic included) extended from the forward boiler rooms to the aft-most engine room (This case the electric engine room). If this design was on the Titanic, cargo hold number 1, 2 and 3 would have still attributed to the flooding and possibly, albeit debatable, the double hull at boiler room number 6 and 5 would have caused the list the Titanic had in the first 5-10 minutes to increase even further.

 

[marina_irc]

The compartmentalization of the Olympic class liners (when the class was first introduced prior to the any configurations as a response on the sinking of the Titanic, with the extended bulkheads and such) was the equivalent of the watertight subdivision of a passenger liner from the 1920s and 1930s. The extend of the damage the Titanic received during the collision, in both absolute length and percentage of length between the perpendiculars, was something that would have sunk every post-First World War liners that had their floodable length curves published in the modern area. The ships that wouldn’t survive the damage includes the SS America (1939), the SS Europa (1928), SS Normandie (1935) and the SS Rex (1931). The watertight subdivision of the Olympic class liners in 1911 was nearly 10 years it’s time ahead.


The damage the Titanic received by the iceberg was considered during her design process as statistically unlikely and unaffordable to implement to the extend that the Safety of Life at Sea (or SOLAS) 1929 conference ships were compartmented no better than the Titanic. The biggest threat during her designing phase were ship-to-ship collisions which were far more common than collisions with icebergs. If you like I can make a detailed and chronological timeline of White Star Liners which suffered ship-to-ship collisions before the Titanic went down to show you how common it was.


According to Phillips Sims from the Transactions of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers (SNAME) the watertight subdivision of the Titanic even greatly exceeded the Safety of Life at Sea regulations back in 2003. Not to mention there is no proof that higher bulkheads were suggested, the collision bulkhead was even extended in height on advice of Board of Trade surveyor Francis Carruthers in April 1910.

As for the double hull, it must be noted that the double hull on other vessels (The Olympic and Britannic included) extended from the forward boiler rooms to the aft-most engine room (This case the electric engine room). If this design was on the Titanic, cargo hold number 1, 2 and 3 would have still attributed to the flooding and possibly, albeit debatable, the double hull at boiler room number 6 and 5 would have caused the list the Titanic had in the first 5-10 minutes to increase even further.

There is no question that the list would be greater, this is a fault of double hulls; I recall a very "cute" book by an indignant naval architect called A Tankship Tromedy that was protesting against their mandatory implementation for tankers. Nonetheless in this particular situation they are very useful.

I acknowledge, and apologize for, a certain hyperbole in my advocacy. But the point remains the loss of life in Titanic could have been prevented without slowing down, or altering course, or adding lifeboats; all that was required was to avoid relaxing the standard Brunel had set in the 1850s.

 

[Richard C Elliott]

The damage the Titanic received by the iceberg was considered during her design process as statistically unlikely and unaffordable to implement to the extend that the Safety of Life at Sea (or SOLAS) 1929 conference ships were compartmented no better than the Titanic.

Yes indeed. Most of the wording on compartmentalisation in SOLAS 1929 is taken verbatim from SOLAS 1914 which, in turn, is very largely based on the BoT Bulkheads Committee report of 1891. Sir Edward Harland (MP for Belfast North and owner of the shipyard) was one of the major figures on that committee.

 

[Aurélien WOLFF]

The context for the compartment is important, I don't think the harland & wolff designers did a bad job there, reading description of the ship, it did had a bunch of safety features that coudl've allowed him to stay afloat with less damage. On the lifeboat, I'd say it's more of a "what if" in the case of titanic having more lifeboats than it did, there'snog arantee the evacuation would've gone smoother or worst than it did in real life. I've seen authors being more positive when it come to titanic safety too, it's interesting to have multiple interpretation on that aspect.

 

[Thomas Krom]

adding lifeboats; all that was required was to avoid relaxing the standard Brunel had set in the 1850s.

As for the lifeboats, I'll quote an old post of mine:

My views on the matter are somewhat in-between of this debate as I believe factors would come into play that were either nonexistent on the Titanic or actions that would depend on orders given out as well if certain situations would come to play or not if there were lifeboats for everyone on-board. This includes:

1 The rousing of the passengers in all three classes. Both in terms of speed, how effective it’s being done as well as offering directions. Passengers on the Titanic, unlike on ships after the disaster, didn’t had any emergency stations assigned and since there was no passenger lifeboat drill (the one often cited of being canceled was only for crewmembers) directions would have been important. As shown with the occupants of lifeboat number 4 some directions were quite vague that fateful night.

2 The behavior and willingness of the passengers to board a lifeboat in the middle of the North Atlantic on a cold night instead of staying on a safe, warm, well lit vessel were even the band is still playing cheerful tunes. Especially with the first lifeboats in first class there seemed to be a lot of indifference in to board a lifeboat at the early stages of the evacuation.

3 The training of the deck crew. Practice makes perfect after all, on the Titanic the order to uncover the lifeboats was given shortly before midnight, with chief officer Wilde ordering quatermaster Olliver to tell boatswain Nichols to start uncovering the lifeboats with the order to swing them out given slightly over 15 minutes later when captain Smith returned from his second damage inspection (based on some evidence it isn’t out of the question that he already knew the chance was likely the ship wouldn’t survive the night, he only didn’t knew for how long). Imagine 32, 48 or 64 lifeboats being prepared in the alternative timeline with a deck crew of 66 men, 36 of them being seamen (34 able bodied, 2 ordinary seamen).

4 How the officers would have filled the lifeboats. Most of Titanic’s lifeboats were lowered without filling them to their certificated maximum capacity, however there are of-course reasons behind this. From orders to fill the lifeboats from gangway doors to the fear that if a lifeboat is filled to their maximum capacity that the Welin Quadrant davits might failed them during the lowering, potentially killing all occupants (three of the four surviving officers, these being Lightoller, Pitman and Lowe, expressed that the lowering capacity wasn’t the same as the certificated floating capacity). As Bob wrote in an excellent article their fears weren’t misplaced, and in March 1913 some of the arms of a Welin quadrant davit did fail on the Olympic under Board Of Trade supervision (by the same surveyor who oversaw the construction of the Titanic, Francis Charruters). With this in mind I believe that filled the lifeboats to their proper capacity in this scenario would be unlikely.

5 The timing when the rules and regulations, and with that the training of the deck crew to work with the number of lifeboat, would be implemented on the Olympic class liners and other White Star Liners as well as if this training by the Board Of Trade is provided on all ships on which the deck crew previously server.

 

[Wayne (Notso) Keen]

The compartmentalization of the Olympic class liners (when the class was first introduced prior to the any configurations as a response on the sinking of the Titanic, with the extended bulkheads and such) was the equivalent of the watertight subdivision of a passenger liner from the 1920s and 1930s. The extend of the damage the Titanic received during the collision, in both absolute length and percentage of length between the perpendiculars, was something that would have sunk every post-First World War liners that had their floodable length curves published in the modern area. The ships that wouldn’t survive the damage includes the SS America (1939), the SS Europa (1928), SS Normandie (1935) and the SS Rex (1931). The watertight subdivision of the Olympic class liners in 1911 was nearly 10 years it’s time ahead.


The damage the Titanic received by the iceberg was considered during her design process as statistically unlikely and unaffordable to implement to the extend that the Safety of Life at Sea (or SOLAS) 1929 conference ships were compartmented no better than the Titanic. The biggest threat during her designing phase were ship-to-ship collisions which were far more common than collisions with icebergs. If you like I can make a detailed and chronological timeline of White Star Liners which suffered ship-to-ship collisions before the Titanic went down to show you how common it was.


According to Phillips Sims from the Transactions of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers (SNAME) the watertight subdivision of the Titanic even greatly exceeded the Safety of Life at Sea regulations back in 2003. Not to mention there is no proof that higher bulkheads were suggested, the collision bulkhead was even extended in height on advice of Board of Trade surveyor Francis Carruthers in April 1910.

As for the double hull, it must be noted that the double hull on other vessels (The Olympic and Britannic included) extended from the forward boiler rooms to the aft-most engine room (This case the electric engine room). If this design was on the Titanic, cargo hold number 1, 2 and 3 would have still attributed to the flooding and possibly, albeit debatable, the double hull at boiler room number 6 and 5 would have caused the list the Titanic had in the first 5-10 minutes to increase even further.

I remember seeing several discussions many years ago about whether having both longitudinal and transverse bulkheads would either have helped in the case of Titanic's damage, or led to more rapid capsizing. I never saw a definitive answer, but the bulk of the argument seemed to favor the later.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

As for the double hull, it must be noted that the double hull on other vessels (The Olympic and Britannic included) extended from the forward boiler rooms to the aft-most engine room (This case the electric engine room). If this design was on the Titanic, cargo hold number 1, 2 and 3 would have still attributed to the flooding and possibly, albeit debatable, the double hull at boiler room number 6 and 5 would have caused the list the Titanic had in the first 5-10 minutes to increase even further.

FYI, see: Modifications_To_Olympic.

 

[Thomas Krom]

FYI, see: Modifications_To_Olympic.

One correction then, it only went as far aft as the turbine engine room.

 

[Aurélien WOLFF]

I do wonder if the double skin would be visible in 1/700 scale (not a 100% sure if hobby boss took that in account for their olympic). I do think even with more safety feature, there's no a 100% garantee the ship would be unsinkable, if britannic took too much damage,even with improvement, it'd still sink and with more lifeboat, it feels more like a what if because there's still the scenario of the evacuation either going worst or better (and in both scenario, one still need the passenger to be willing to embark).

 

[marina_irc]

The context for the compartment is important, I don't think the harland & wolff designers did a bad job there, reading description of the ship, it did had a bunch of safety features that coudl've allowed him to stay afloat with less damage. On the lifeboat, I'd say it's more of a "what if" in the case of titanic having more lifeboats than it did, there'snog arantee the evacuation would've gone smoother or worst than it did in real life. I've seen authors being more positive when it come to titanic safety too, it's interesting to have multiple interpretation on that aspect.

The main thing is that if "the ship is its own lifeboat" then a single damage mode shouldn't be able to compromise that.

I do wonder if the double skin would be visible in 1/700 scale (not a 100% sure if hobby boss took that in account for their olympic). I do think even with more safety feature, there's no a 100% garantee the ship would be unsinkable, if britannic took too much damage,even with improvement, it'd still sink and with more lifeboat, it feels more like a what if because there's still the scenario of the evacuation either going worst or better (and in both scenario, one still need the passenger to be willing to embark).

Brittanic suffered shock damage. That is radically different from impact damage because of how it propagates through the hull. I recommend reading a history of the evolution of torpedo defence systems on warships.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Hello, by curiosity, what would you consider the most contrversial aspect of the tragedy? I'd go for the californian affair, the salvage debate and the crew suicide .

Reading your OP subject again and the examples you mentioned therein Aurelian, it seemed to me that you were implying more about the events that happened after the Titanic collided with the iceberg. Therefore, this discussion about the pre-existing conditions like whether the double bottom should have extended to the sides or indeed my own example of the number of lifeboats carried seem a bit out of place.

Is that how you were thinking?