Prelude To An Allision - Titanic's Fatal Encounter Revisited

[Arun Vajpey]

If Murdoch was such a fine Officer why didn't he call for extra lookouts in the front of the bow, and ensure he didn't have a second pair of an Officer's eyes with him on the bridge?

It is easy to judge with hindsight. IMO Murdoch was by some distance the best officer on board the Titanic, counting even Captain Smith. But he was also a human being and like rest of our species, not infalliable. Like others, Murdoch might have felt that with 2 lookouts in the Crow' Nest and himself on the bridge on such a clear, starlit night with a calm sea, he did not need another pair of eyes.

Moody was on Bridge Duty too and that would have given Murdoch an additional sense of security in that the Sixth Officer could be called-on if necessary. But things happened too quickly and unexpectedly, beyond the ability of the Officers and crew on duty to do anything that would have averted impact with the iceberg once the realization came.

Furthermore, if Murdoch was so 'with it' on his own on lookout, why did he not see this dark black mass of an iceberg below the horizon before Fleet saw it? And no mention of Fleet apparently not knowing what he saw initially?

I might be wrong, but Sam might not be convinced that Fleet (and probably Lee) saw 'something' in the horizon some 20 to 30 seconds before he realized that it was a dark mass in the ship's path and rang the bell. The Lookouts' testimony - sometimes contradicting each other - has created confusion over the years. I personally believe that Fleet (and probably Lee) saw a small localized spot in the horizon obscured and the mental message that Fleet got at the time was that it was some sort of 'haze'. It was something that he struggled to express properly during his testimonies; having used the word 'haze', Fleet - a man of limited vocabulary - mentally latched on to it and described everything that came after in relation to it. But IMO there was no haze of any kind; what Fleet (and perhaps Lee) first saw as that localized obscurity on the horizon was in fact the earliest sighting of the iceberg but it took Fleet some 20 to 30 seconds to realize that it was a dark object directly ahead in the speeding ship's path. Then he rang the 3 bells.

It might be impossible to say whether Murdoch saw the iceberg before - or even at the same time - as the Lookouts. While Fleet and Lee's job was to keep a sharp lookout ahead all the time - period, Murdoch would have had other tasks to keep track of on the bridge. IMO, if Murdoch happened to be scanning the ocean ahead starting a few moments before Fleet saw something, then there is a chance that Murdoch did see the iceberg at least at the same time as Fleet and if so, verified what he was seeing with his binoculars. If that had happened, then we can be excused for assuming that Murdoch identified the iceberg a few seconds before the lookouts. But if he was checking or monitoring something else at the crucial moment, then his alert would have come only when Fleet rang the bells.

I agree completely with Sam that having seen and identified the iceberg ahead, Murdoch spent a short but finite amount of time to determine his best course of action. He had to - with such a big ship and its known turning characteristics, his decision would be crucial. But I do not believe that Murdoch decided that collision was inevitable right at the moment of his identification of the iceberg. No matter what his skill and experience were, human visual acuity and depth perception are simply not that good, especially in the dark. Therefore, I believe that when Murdoch gave that first "Hard-a-Starboard!" order, he still had hopes that an impact could be avoided. But somewhere along the next 10 to 15 seconds he realized that it was too late to avoid impact per se and went into a damage limitation mode. He knew that he had already given the helm order and it was too late to do anything about it but his first act in trying to mitigate damage was to yank the Engine Telegraph to STOP. Murdoch might have thought - correctly IMO - that while Engine Telegraph would not slow the ship enough to affect the bow's continued turn to port, it could just be enough to reduce speed a little before the actual (now inevitable) impact occurred, thus reducing the extent of damage. To his credit, he almost pulled it off.

If Murdoch was such a fine Officer, why did he not have something to say about his navigation expert Boxhall pottering around and in his cabin rather than Boxhall being with him at this vital time or swapping places with Moody?

Boxhall was not on Bridge duty at the time and was performing navigational tasks in the Chart Room; Did that mean that he was on "stand-by" for the bridge? Also, under normal sailing conditions, would Murdoch have had the authority to order Boxhall for additional bridge duty without clearance from Captain Smith?

 

[Samuel Halpern]

Hi Julian,
First of all, I'm glad you enjoyed reading the book. As to some of the points you brought up regarding chapter 13:

Why did he telegraph "stop engines"? When did this take effect? ( not included in the table on pages 127 and 128). (Mentioned in passing subsequently on page 132.)

The stop orders were covered in the table on pp.127-128. Specifically, see times of T= 21 sec and 28 sec when he rang down Stop on the two telegraphs. As to why this was done, it was explained that it was "to reduce the ship’s overall kinetic energy while retaining some rudder effectiveness. If the engines are put full astern, the rudder will soon become ineffective due to the turbulence that is created," as well as his action to achieve a glancing blow rather than a direct impact. In a previous quote (taken out of Knight’s Modern Seamanship 1910) it clearly stated that reversing the engines with full power (as in Boxhall's unsupported scenario) is more likely to cause a collision rather than avoid one.

If Murdoch was such a fine Officer why didn't he call for extra lookouts in the front of the bow, and ensure he didn't have a second pair of an Officer's eyes with him on the bridge?

Why should he? The book covered the standard practice at the time while steaming at night in clear, unobstructed conditions, and what was assumed about how far ahead an iceberg was expected to be seen on a moonless night. When Lightoller was left out on the bridge after his conversation with Smith, he was in the same position as Murdoch was put into after Murdoch came on duty. Perfectly clear conditions with stars seen setting right down to the horizon.

Furthermore, if Murdoch was so 'with it' on his own on lookout, why did he not see this dark black mass of an iceberg below the horizon before Fleet saw it? And no mention of Fleet apparently not knowing what he saw initially?

We have no idea if what Murdoch saw or did not see in the seconds before Fleet rang the bell. Was he looking directly ahead or to one side or the other at that moment? We don't know, and I was not about to add any speculation on this matter. What we know from the evidence is that the lookout bells rang out, followed by a phone call from the nest, and that was followed by Murdoch's initial helm order. The question about the ship turning before Fleet actually left the phone was covered back in Ch 7.

No mention that in the Ryan trial Lee appeared as a witness for the Plaintiff whereas as Fleet et al appeared for the Defendant.

I didn't think that tidbit was important. What was was important is what he had to say.

If Murdoch was such a fine Officer, why did he not have something to say about his navigation expert Boxhall pottering around and in his cabin rather than Boxhall being with him at this vital time or swapping places with Moody?

Or simply Murdoch saying to the Captain, "We are up to the ice now, I want you or another Officer with me to keep a look out"?

You are assuming that Murdoch would have, or possibly should have, behaved differently than what Lightoller or Wilde or any other OOW would have done regarding the manning of the bridge or appointing additional lookouts. He knew that Smith was just inside and was to be called if seeing conditions changed, which they didn't. He knew full well that ice was expected, as did all the bridge officers and Smith himself. And he would have known what the standing orders from Smith were that night. So as far as taking or not taking additional precautions, he was no different than any of his colleagues.

What Ch 13 was focused on was Murdoch's actions taken from the moment the iceberg was spotted, what he was trying to accomplish by the actions that he took, and how that compares to what is in the modern day textbook.

Cheers.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

One of things this book covers in some detail is what would have happened if the hard-starboard order would have come several seconds earlier or several seconds later than when it did. In particular, you find in many other books claims that if only the order was given 5 or even 10 seconds sooner, the iceberg could have been avoided. What I show is that claims such as those are simply not true because, as chapter 12 states, ships don't turn like motor cars, and that is something that any experienced ship handler would know.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

There is one thing that I'd like to add Sam, if that's okay. As I have said many times before with reference to several different things, there is a limit to the extent by which even the most highly skilled, trained and experienced human being can stretch his or her physical capabilities. Night vision, more specifically visual acuity and depth perception at night, is one of the more significant ones. When Murdoch first spotted the iceberg (it is immaterial whether it was before, at the same time or after Fleet), it would not have been possible for him to estimate, even with a moderate degree of accuracy, how far away it really was from the bow. With hindsight we know that it was a moderate sized berg about 1500 feet away when Murdoch first saw it, but a very large berg about 2500 feet or more away would have appeared exactly the same way at that first sighting under those conditions. But in the next 10 to 15 seconds - let us say 10 seconds for the purpose of discussion - the iceberg would have closed by almost 400 feet and that would have given Murdoch a much better mental picture of the size of the berg and more importantly, the closing distance. He would not have needed to think too deeply about it because that's where his experience would have kicked in; by seeing it at point X and monitored its closure to a position Y 10 seconds later, he would have got all the information he needed to make his decision.

The point that I am trying to make here is that Murdoch could not have known that a collision was inevitable at the moment that he first saw the iceberg because he would not have known that it was really a medium sized berg about 1500 feet away from the bow and not a large one 2500 feet away. About 10 seconds later he would have a better idea of the size and closing distance/time but still with a degree of uncertainty; but at the same time, he wound have had a very good idea of which side it was better to turn the bow to try and avoid a collision or to mitigate damage if collision was inevitable. This would be because in those 10 seconds he would have been able to monitor the position of the Titanic's pointed bow relative to the mass of the closing berg; that sort of lateral perception works much better even at night than assessing closing distance through depth perception in the same direction as the ship's forward movement. Therefore, there would have been a moment when Murdoch was still uncertain if a collision was inevitable but at the same time certain that turning the bow to port offered him the best chance. THAT was when he would have given that first Hard-a-Starboard order, still hoping to avoid an impact; but in the next 10 to 12 (further) seconds, he would have known that impact could not be avoided and that was when he put the Engine telegraph to STOP.

 

[Dan E. Parkes]

I was going to respond to some of Julian's points about Mudoch, but so glad I didn't, as Sam's response, while broadly similar to what I would have written, is far better!

I am very much looking forward to reading your book Sam.

 

[Julian Atkins]

Perhaps I need to re-read chapter 13 again. I think I absorbed all the points Sam made after his extensive research and analysis.

I am trying to make certain comments without a 'spoiler'.

You will have to buy Sam's new "Allision" book for yourselves!

As I don't want to add a 'spoiler', I think that Arun is very off the mark here as to chapter 13. We had probably best continue this via PM or email, as Sam's conclusion is for those who buy this excellent book to judge and then comment upon!

The fact that the conclusion is already a matter of debate is a very good reason to buy Sam's new book!

There is so much that is so carefully analysed that has never been done before in print.

Cheers, Julian

 

[Julian Atkins]

When Murdoch first spotted the iceberg (it is immaterial whether it was before, at the same time or after Fleet)

I strongly disagree with Arun in this respect. It is highly relevant. Not immaterial. But I will leave it at that for tonight. And I may be ahead of Arun in finishing Sam's new book!

 

[Arun Vajpey]

I strongly disagree with Arun in this respect. It is highly relevant. Not immaterial.

You have got me wrong there Julian. It is very relevant only as far as the bigger picture is concerned yes, but not to draw an "action-over-time" picture from the moment Murdoch spotted the iceberg to the moment he pulled the Engine Telegraph to STOP.

Fleet was a lookout and no more. All he had to do was to spot something, ring the bell and if necessary, phone the bridge. He was not in any position to decide what actions could and would be taken; that was entirely up to Murdoch. And Murdoch - while responding to the warning from the Crow's Nest - decided what action to take depending entirely on his own observations and computations. In other words, he reacted to the warning from Fleet but decided based only on his own observations.That was what I meant.

If you note Sam's "Specific Events" timeline, he allows 10 seconds between the moment Murdoch spotted the berg and his Hard-a-starboard helm order, which is precisely what I said above. But where I would like to differ is the time between the helm order and pulling of the Engine Telegraph to STOP; Sam allows just 6 seconds for this, which is virtually the time Murdoch needed to reach the main Engine Telegraph device on the starboard side. That would make the entire action one single calculated action, with Murdoch deciding about that within the first 10-second timeframe mentioned above. IMO, given limitations of human vision at night, he could not have managed it; I think that at the moment he gave the helm order Murdoch still hoped to avid a collision while also preparing for an impact. But some 10 further seconds later, with the iceberg closing all the time, he knew the worst.

So, I feel that the time between the helm order and main engine room telegraph order was a bit more than 6 seconds - more like 10 to 11 seconds.

I may be ahead of Arun in finishing Sam's new book!

You probably will be and are welcome to it; it is not a race. As I have mentioned before, I don't read Sam's books like a novel; I read them slowly, digesting the contents and trying to form a mental image. Also correlate text to his graphs and illustrations, sometimes drawing (very) crude sketches of my own. With this book, I also went to Appendices A & C to get a clearer picture. The graph on Fig A-06 showing ship's velocity over time in a hypothetical head-on collision is very educational.

The question is, did Murdoch know that the ship would survive a head-on collision? And if he did - and determined that a collision was unavoidable during those first 10 seconds after he saw the iceberg, would he have given that hard-a-starboard helm order? Or would he have held course but ordered the engines stopped or even reversed? Apart from the fact that it would have been very difficult for even a well-trained human mind to think of all eventualities in such a short time span, there is this built-in reflex action that causes one to instinctively duck or sway from an oncoming blow even when it is hopeless. If Muhammad Ali had thrown a punch at me, there would be a micro-second of comprehension when I would know for certain that I could not avoid the blow in a million years but it still won't stop me from at least starting to sway away.

 

[Julian Atkins]

Sorry, Arun, but the issue is if why Murdoch was so alert and attentive, he didn't see the ice berg before Fleet. And that Murdoch did not react before Fleet and order 'hard a' starboard' before Fleet rang the bell 3 times then made his call on the loudspeaker 'phone.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Sorry, Arun, but the issue is if why Murdoch was so alert and attentive, he didn't see the ice berg before Fleet. And that Murdoch did not react before Fleet and order 'hard a' starboard' before Fleet rang the bell 3 times then made his call on the loudspeaker 'phone

I believe that has already been answered. Fleet was a lookout and that was his (and Lee's) only duty. So, between them they were expected to keep scanning the ocean ahead all the time and ring the warning bell if one or both of them saw something ahead in the ship's path. That could be then augmented by a phone call to the bridge. All of that actually happened but after that, Fleet's reponsibility ended for that encounter.

Murdoch on the other hand, was the senior duty officer on the bridge. A major part of that responsibility certainly would have been scanning the ocean ahead with naked eyes and then using the binoculars if he thought necessary. Had Murdoch been doing just that at 11:40 pm, he may well have seen the iceberg seconds before Fleet and reacted accordingly. But if Murdoch was performing some other task as part of his duties but one that required him to momentarily take his eyes off the ocean ahead at the crucial moment, then Fleet's bells would be his first warning that something was ahead.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

But some 10 further seconds later, with the iceberg closing all the time, he knew the worst. So, I feel that the time between the helm order and main engine room telegraph order was a bit more than 6 seconds - more like 10 to 11 seconds.

Your reasoning seems interesting Arun, but the evidence says he decided to turn and stop the engines at the same time. From Hichens:
>>I heard Mr. Murdoch rush to the telegraph and give the order, “Hard-a-starboard.<<
Hichens could not see Murdoch from the enclosed wheelhouse but he could hear what was going on. It was rushing to the engine telegraphs and giving the helm order.
As far as judgement is concerned, its not like trying to determine a specific distance, but more like deciding if there is room enough to clear the obstruction that was looming ahead based on what was observed. Basketball players don't try to figure out the distance to the basket when they take a shot. They look, jump and shoot in what appears as one motion in a matter of just a second or two. Could Murdoch have spotted the berg before the lookouts? Was he already looking at the berg when the 3 bells were stuck? That is certainly possible, but we have no way of knowing. What we do know is that things seemed to happen very quickly with little time to decide what to do, and that the decision came some finite time after the 3-bells were heard.
As to when did fleet spot the berg and how long after did he strike the warning bell? I quoted what Fleet told Leslie Reade about the encounter that night in the Prologue:

“It was the beautifullest night I ever seen. The stars were like
lamps. I saw this black thing looming up; I didn’t know what it
was. I asked Lee if he knew what it was. He couldn’t say. I
thought I better ring the bell. I rang it three times.”

You can assign whatever time interval to this that you think fits. Did Murdoch notice what Fleet did at the same time? The crow's nest is only about 20 ft higher up than the bridge and only a few seconds closer to the object.

 

[Julian Atkins]

I will make a further attempt to try and make my point that if Murdoch was so alert and focused he ought to have seen the berg before Fleet rang the bell 3 times etc.

My other point is that Murdoch should not at that time have been the only Officer on lookout on the bridge.

We have ample evidence from Captain Lord and Groves and Captain Rostron and others that the bridge Officers would see and react before the lookout/s reacted. That may be self serving evidence, but on oath their testimony wasn't challenged, so was a matter of record in an Inquiry.

On Titanic, on the record also, Murdoch did not apparently react before Fleet did or Lee. So the hypothesis that Murdoch was 'with it' and reacted with a heightened degree of alertness is not surported by the evidence.

I should imagine that Murdoch was extremely cold and looking forward to the change of watch in 20 + 27 or so minutes. He was on his own despite Moody's timing of them getting into the ice having occurred.

Do very cold conditions of exposure delay reaction times or the mental ability to respond?

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Thanks for the above post Sam. I see what you mean. I'll try to describe the reasong behind my conjecture but I warn you that it might be a bit long.

Hichens could not see Murdoch from the enclosed wheelhouse but he could hear what was going on. It was rushing to the engine telegraphs and giving the helm order.

I accept that Hichens' "I heard Mr Murdoch rush to the telegraph and give the order, “Hard-a-starboard"" makes it appear as though the First Officer was rushing to the telegraph as he gave the helm order. I concede that it might have happened that way but since Hichens could not actually see what was happening on the bridge, it would be difficult for him to visualize it later. The most obvious thing that Hichens could have heard other than voices would have been hurried footsteps; so, how could he have known that they were Murdoch's? Where was Moody in the seconds before Murdoch gave the helm order?

My opinion that it might have taken Murdoch slightly longer than 6 seconds between the helm order and yanking the Engine lever to STOP assumes that Murdoch was first alerted by the three bells; we will discuss the other possibility below but if it was indeed the bell, Muroch would have immediately start scanning the ocean ahead with his naked eyes. At the same time, he probably moved to an optimal position on the bridge, at the centre line, thus using up a few seconds - I agree with your 5 seconds there. His very first sighting, verified with the binoculars, would have confirmed to Murdoch that it was an iceberg directly ahead; but he would have to wait for perhaps 9 to 10 seconds before determining the berg's position relative to the bow along the lateral axis (port to starboard) and the reamaining distance from the bow. Those 10 seconds would have given Murdoch a fairly good idea about the former (because the foremast was there as a second reference point) but IMO only partially about the latter, which had to be computed depending on the increase in the berg's size due to the closing distance as seen by him (the so-called blossom effect) and for which he had only the iceberg itself as the reference point.

Let us assume that Murdoch himself first saw the iceberg when it was 1500 feet from the bow - we cannot be far wrong whether it was before or after Fleet. In the next 10 seconds it would have closed by some 380 feet, at the same time "growing larger" in his vision. Since we now believe that it was a medium-sized iceberg, those 10 seconds would have been enough for Murdoch to see that it appeared to have a greater mass to the starboard side of his reference points (the foremast and the point of the bow) and hence the ship itself. I believe that is why he gave that hard-a-starboard order - I think we both agree up to this point. But where I have a difference of opinion is the next step; IMO the 'blossom effect' caused by a medium sized iceberg (based on your own chart of iceberg sizes) due to 'growing' while closing from 1500 feet to about 1100 feet would not have been enough to accurately gauge the distance from the bow because in that timeframe Murdoch did not yet know that it was a medium sized berg and not a very large one. I believe that he would have needed additional 5 to 6 seconds for that, during which time the berg would have closed by another 200 feet or so.

(What I would like to know is whether evidence suggests that Murdoch bawled the order while remaining in his optimal visual position or ran to the entrance of the wheelhouse to do so. If the latter, then that would explain the footsteps that Hichens heard just before the helm order came).

So, I believe that at that moment Murdoch gave the first helm order, he still had hopes that they could just avoid an impact with the berg, but also considered that the maneuver might not succeed. But as long as he had that hope, it would make no sense to put the engine telegraph to stop. But 5 or 6 seconds later he would have realized that an impact was inevitable and do tried to mitigate damage by trying to slow the ship down, even if just a little, before it came.

Could Murdoch have spotted the berg before the lookouts? Was he already looking at the berg when the 3 bells were stuck? That is certainly possible, but we have no way of knowing.

Yes, we have no way of knowing but if Murdoch happened to be scanning the sea ahead a few seconds before Fleet saw a localized obscurity in the horizon, then yes Murdoch could have seen the iceberg fractionally before Fleet. If so, I would have no disagreements with that table on p127 of your book PTAA.

As to when did fleet spot the berg and how long after did he strike the warning bell? I quoted what Fleet told Leslie Reade about the encounter that night in the Prologue:

“It was the beautifullest night I ever seen. The stars were like
lamps. I saw this black thing looming up; I didn’t know what it
was. I asked Lee if he knew what it was. He couldn’t say. I
thought I better ring the bell. I rang it three times.”

If things really had happened the way Fleet told Reade, then I estimate close to 30 seconds for that exchange between Fleet & Lee. Fleet said that he did not know what the mass was, which meant that he peered at it for some seconds (he says that it was 'looming up') before turning to Lee. Lee must have done likewise for him to tell Fleet that he too could not recognize the object. Fleet than decided that the he must be the one who rang the bell and did so.

The crow's nest is only about 20 ft higher up than the bridge and only a few seconds closer to the object.

Yes. That is why I was hoping that you would present serial sketches of the bow and iceberg as the distance closed like you did in that superb "Encounter in the Night" article on your site. Only this time it could have been from the perspective of the central line of the bridge rather than the crow's nest, with the foremast and bow showing.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

My other point is that Murdoch should not at that time have been the only Officer on lookout on the bridge.

To clarify his time on watch. Murdoch came on as OOW at 10:00pm. He was to go off duty at 2:00am, which because of the expected clock change that night, would have been 4 hours and 47 minutes after he came on duty. As far as the only lookout on the bridge, because of the clarity of the night, Murdoch fully expected to be able to spot any danger to his ship in time to avoid it, whether it be an iceberg or some other obstacle such as another ship crossing his path or even a derelict vessel. If the visibility had been reduced, however, that would have been a different story, As I said above, we have no way of knowing exactly when Murdoch actually saw the iceberg. We only know that his helm order came some time after the 3-bells were struct in the nest.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

If things really had happened the way Fleet told Reade, then I estimate close to 30 seconds for that exchange between Fleet & Lee. Fleet said that he did not know what the mass was, which meant that he peered at it for some seconds (he says that it was 'looming up') before turning to Lee. Lee must have done likewise for him to tell Fleet that he too could not recognize the object. Fleet than decided that the he must be the one who rang the bell and did so.

That is purely subjective Arun. My own take, assuming Fleet told the truth to Reade, is that the totality of time from first sighting to bells being struck would have been no more than 10-15 seconds, max.

Anyway, the timing in that the table of my book does not depend on what I or anyone else wants to assign to speculative estimates such as when exactly did so and so see something, or how long they would have taken to think things out before taking a specific action. There were two events that I focused on to develop the timeline. First, is how long would it take Olliver to go from the compass platform to the navigating bridge, which was based on a pedestrian intersection walking model and his direct testimony of his actions. The second event was the time for the vessel to turn so that it struck a medium sized berg on the starboard side in the vicinity of the peak tank, which was based on a derived turning model for an Olympic-class vessel from the data of Wilding starting at 22.5 knots. The differences between the first and the second time durations becomes the time from 3-bells to when the helm order was given. In no way does it speculate as to when Murdoch, or Fleet for that matter, actually first sighted the berg, or what thoughts may have crossed their minds. Everything else is an exercise in fitting all the other event pieces into the puzzle based on those key driving event points. I was hoping that this was made clear in the chapters beginning with Ch 11.