Prelude To An Allision - Titanic's Fatal Encounter Revisited

[Samuel Halpern]

This is Rostron's explanation as to why he was able to sight a berg before the lookout men.
25437. How was it neither of the look-out men saw it or reported it to you? Why did not they see it before you? - Well, of course, they had all had warning about keeping a look-out for growlers and icebergs, previous to going on the look-out, and on the look-out also. You must understand, unless you know what you are looking for, if you see some very dim indistinct shape of some kind, anyone could take that as nothing at all - merely some shadow upon the water, or something of that kind; but people with experience of ice know what to look for, and can at once distinguish that it is a separate object on the water, and it must be only one thing, and that is ice.
25438. So that what it really comes to is this, if I follow you correctly, that it requires a man with some knowledge of icebergs, some experience of picking them up before he can detect them at night? - Precisely.

 

[Julian Atkins]

Wasn't it a bit 'rash' of Murdoch to assume that being alone he could see ice bergs for himself? And clearly he didn't before Fleet saw some dark mass ahead and rang the bell 3 times.

Other ships did not have just one Officer on watch on the bridge. Groves was not alone on the bridge of The Californian as he had Captain Lord with him. Bisset had with him on Carpathia's bridge Captain Rostron with him. At the time they were in a lower latitude to avoid the ice. (We don't know about the Parisian and the Mesaba who were ahead of The Californian).

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Anyway, the timing in that the table of my book does not depend on what I or anyone else wants to assign to speculative estimates such as when exactly did so and so see something, or how long they would have taken to think things out before taking a specific action.

Understood and accepted, Sam. Thanks.

As for Chapter 11, though I read it earlier, I have gone back to it to try to collate the points after reading the next 2 chapters. I can see the points that you are making.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

Wasn't it a bit 'rash' of Murdoch to assume that being alone he could see ice bergs for himself?

If the accepted view at the time was that an iceberg could be sighted 2 miles ahead on a clear, dark, moonless night, then I don't consider it rash, especially with 2 other people on lookout. According to Lord, it was the first time that he was navigating in ice infested waters, so that may have been his reasoning for being on watch with his 3rd officer. Also, he might not have trusted Groves, who had but 6 years at sea as a career despite holding a second mate's certificate. In Rostron's case, he was headed on a rescue mission, and like Capt. Moore, was on the bridge the entire time after their ships were turned around.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Wasn't it a bit 'rash' of Murdoch to assume that being alone he could see ice bergs for himself?

How does anyone know that Murdoch assumed that? There were 2 professional Lookouts up in the Crow's Nest whose only task was to keep a sharp lookout for icebergs or any other object in the ship's path and warn the bridge throgh the bell followed by the telephone. So, seen from that perspective, Murdoch himself was a back-up as far as the lookout function was concerned and he was in a position to take action immediately if and when the warning came. I think given the clear and calm conditions, that monitoring function was quite adequate but things came "together" rather too "well" for the accident to happen. Those "things" included the ship's speed, greater momentum and the deceptively calm but very dark night.

As Sam says, it is quite possible that at 11:40 pm Murdoch had been looking ahead himself and spotted the iceberg at the same time as - or even a few seconds before - Fleet or Lee did. But after sighting the iceberg, he needed a finite timeframe to plan his orders and actions, which he did. But those factors mentioned above taken together meant that despite his best efforts there was no way to avert an impact. So Murdoch did his best to mitigate damage but unfortunately that was not enough; that was one of those situations where the best possible human effort was insufficient to avert disaster.

Another thing. Let us suppose Murdoch had another pair of eyes - say Moody - acting as an additional back-up and scanning the ocean ahead. How can we be certain that Moody would have spotted the iceberg earlier than the professional lookouts and/or Murdoch himself? Sometimes, having another person might persuade one to needlessly double-check their own observation or decision with the other, this wasting precious seconds.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Sam, after reading Chaper XII (Ships Don't Turn Like Motor Cars) with its superb illustration of the 5 situations on Fig 12-02 and Appendix C (Sidestepping An Iceberg) with its two situations in Fig C-01 very carefully, I would like to clarify something.

Both of my speculations below are completely theoretical and not suggestions that either could have actually happened.

Considering sidestepping issue first, Murdoch might have given the "hard-a-starboard" order between 5 and 10 seconds after the 3 bells if he had seen the iceberg himself a bit sooner, thus allowing him his 15 seconds to assess the situation. Under that scenario, he might not have touched the Engine Telegraph, like you specify if the impact was to be avoided. But given the conditions, it would have been almost impossible for him or any other human being to give the second helm order - hard-a-port - exactly 22 seconds later, unless he was extremely lucky. You have said pretty much the same thing given the conditions that Murdoch was facing. So, we'll leave that scenario.

But I want to ask about a hypothetical possibility with something similar to Situation A on Fig 12-02 (p115), which shows how an impact could have been avoided if the starboard helm order had come at the instant Fleet sounded the bells with the bow still 67 seconds away from reaching the berg. Unless I have missed it, you have not specified about the Engine Telegraph in this scenario and so I assumed that it is an "all other considerations and actions being the same" situation with Murdoch putting the Engine Telegraph to STOP just like he actually did that night. But of course, it would be unreasonable to expect the OOW to react the instant he heard the bells without assessing the situation over 15 seconds or so like Murdoch actually did. Fair enough.

But what if Fleet had sounded the 3 bells 15 to 20 seconds earlier? I am not going to go into detail as to how this could have happened since it might open another heated discussion elsewhere. But I believe that there was a time lag of 30 to 35 seconds between the moment Fleet saw "something" in the horizon (which he later described as a 'haze', perhaps for lack of a better word in his vocabulary) and the first of the 3 bells. If instead of that sequence of events, Fleet was able to recognize that 'something' as a dark mass directly in the ship's path (even if not actually identifying it as an iceberg) 15 seconds after seeing it for the first time, he could well have rung the bell 15 to 20 seconds before he actually did. Assuming that Murdoch was first alerted by the bells in both scenarios, he could have had his 15 seconds that he needed to assess the situation and given the starboard helm order with the Titanic's bow still 67 seconds away from reaching the longitudinal level of the iceberg; and going by your Situation A, the impact could have been avoided.

As you can see, the only difference in this hypothetical scenario is Fleet ringing the bells some 20 seconds before he did,, thus alerting Murdoch that much earlier. Everything else remains the same.

What do you think?

 

[Samuel Halpern]

As you can see, the only difference in this hypothetical scenario is Fleet ringing the bells some 20 seconds before he did,, thus alerting Murdoch that much earlier. Everything else remains the same.

Upon hearing the bells the OOW would look to pick up what was seen ahead in his glasses and then make a judgement as to what to do. If he thought he could avoid the object by simply turning away, then that would be the order, and probably the only order.

5 situations on Fig 12-02 and Appendix C (Sidestepping An Iceberg) with its two situations in Fig C-01

All of those scenarios assume the engines ran on at full ahead until contact was made or missed. In the actual encounter, the engines did not slow down and stop until after the impact occurred despite what Murdoch did with the telegraphs. The engineers were not on standby, and were caught by surprise when the orders came down to the engine room.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

All of those scenarios assume the engines ran on at full ahead until contact was made or missed.

Thanks for clearing that up. I was sure of that for Appendix C since you mentioned it in the text but less certain for all 5 situations on Chapter XII

 

[marina_irc]

@Samuel Halpern Thank you for writing this. I have read it in full and I agree with the conclusions in the main, though I believe several alternative explanations for Murdoch’s hesitation exist, including simply that in the poor visibility conditions it was not initially possible to discern which direction offered the better chance of evading the berg. If the iceberg lay right ahead, in those poor visibility conditions that might have been a serious issue. Murdoch’s words to the Captain immediately after the allision as reported by others don’t suggest he believed it impossible to avoid, though certainly in a jumble of stress and critical decisions that isn’t definitive.

I do have one particular comment. From page 110 you bring in as evidence that the engines were never ordered full astern that the stokehold telegraphs were put to stop. However, “Titanic” was firing at least 80% and probably closer to 90% of her maximum underway steam production. This is far in excess of what full astern requires in terms of steam supply; “Titanic”’s astern speed was simply not comparable to that of ahead in terms of energy demand. I suspect White Star Engineers were expected to try and manage the engines to avoid venting steam because of the commotion that would cause in passenger spaces, so it’s possible that the engineering staff ordered “STOP” on the stokehold telegraphs even if they received “full astern” from the bridge, to lay off steam production temporarily to avoid over pressure, the expectation being that in a few minutes the stokehold telegraph would then be set to some lower firing rate suited for the commanded astern speed.

However, I don’t believe this actually invalidates the OTHER evidence which is sufficient by itself to suggest only “STOP” was ordered on the bridge, so your assessment is still correct, just a bit less evidence solidly for it.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

I believe several alternative explanations for Murdoch’s hesitation exist, including simply that in the poor visibility conditions it was not initially possible to discern which direction offered the better chance of evading the berg.

There were no "poor visibilty conditions" as such; it was very clear but also very dark. Under those conditions, human visual acuity is severly reduced but we don't often realize it proportionately. In other words, visibility was actually normal for the prevailing conditions but far less than what those on board believed. This would have been especialy the case if you consider the Titanic's greater speed and longer stopping distance as far as a potential allison was concerned.

It is my belief that if they were on another ship - say the Carpathia - with its slower speed and lesser momentum but everything else remaining the same, Murdoch might just have succeeded in avoiding the iceberg. Sam Halpern might disagree, I don't know.

 

[marina_irc]

There were no "poor visibilty conditions" as such; it was very clear but also very dark. Under those conditions, human visual acuity is severly reduced but we don't often realize it proportionately. In other words, visibility was actually normal for the prevailing conditions but far less than what those on board believed. This would have been especialy the case if you consider the Titanic's greater speed and longer stopping distance as far as a potential allison was concerned.

It is my belief that if they were on another ship - say the Carpathia - with its slower speed and lesser momentum but everything else remaining the same, Murdoch might just have succeeded in avoiding the iceberg. Sam Halpern might disagree, I don't know.

Darkness is a poor visibility condition, especially when it blurs the horizon. So, that’s what I was referring to, using the terminology I’d use professionally. Remember that rigorous training for specially selected lookouts yields material gains, and darkness is simply bad enough to require NVG/radar in the modern day, so any situation in which special measures are required is degraded visibility. I bet the specially trained and selected Imperial Japanese Navy night lookouts who made their long lance attacks so effective in early WW2 would have given alarm in time for a ship at that speed and tactical radius to evade the berg… The British merchant marine’s approach to lookouts seems very indifferent even acknowledging it will just never be on par with a military.

So what I’m saying specifically is the observed blending of sky with water at the horizon so they were indistinct, and simply generally moonless night normal visibility conditions.

Anyway, at least one Captain at the British inquiry testified that his line’s policy was to man a second lookout position on the forepeak in ice conditions and I do wonder if that would have been of material benefit as the blending of the horizon was apparently not present when observing from a lower height like a lifeboat; but the forepeak might not be low enough for it to matter.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

It is my belief that if they were on another ship - say the Carpathia - with its slower speed and lesser momentum but everything else remaining the same, Murdoch might just have succeeded in avoiding the iceberg.

Slower speed means more time to react. Rostron avoided a 30 ft high berg while going to pick up the 1st lifeboat. But he probably was not at his full ahead speed at the time. He thought it was 1/4 mile ahead when sighted, but range estimation is unreliable at night.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

However, “Titanic” was firing at least 80% and probably closer to 90% of her maximum underway steam production. This is far in excess of what full astern requires in terms of steam supply;

If the call was for full astern I would think you would want as much power from the steam supply as you can get during that short lived emergency maneuver. It's not like you will be maintaining full astern for very long. Remember also that you loose about 1/3 of your available power because the turbine is disconnected and that power is dumped into the condensers directly. During an emergency backing event, I would not expect someone would worry much about the safety valves blowing off. More worried about putting all available power into the the reversal. Just my opinion.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Slower speed means more time to react. Rostron avoided a 30 ft high berg while going to pick up the 1st lifeboat. But he probably was not at his full ahead speed at the time. He thought it was 1/4 mile ahead when sighted, but range estimation is unreliable at night.

Very much so. Human night vision is mediocre at best and acclimatization only helps slightly. But for someone looking ahead in the dark while on a vessel moving in the same direction, like the lookout or OOW of a ship, there is another factor that adds itself to the equation - depth perception - which also drops sharply at night. An additional problem is that humans don't instinctively realize how much their visual acuity is affected at night, particularly in assessment of a closing object. Since that is mainly due to physiological limitations, no amount of training or experience can improve it beyond a very small degree. So, for Fleet/Lee and Murdoch, cisualization and then range estimation of the closing iceberg that night would have been quite difficult.

 

[marina_irc]

If the call was for full astern I would think you would want as much power from the steam supply as you can get during that short lived emergency maneuver. It's not like you will be maintaining full astern for very long. Remember also that you loose about 1/3 of your available power because the turbine is disconnected and that power is dumped into the condensers directly. During an emergency backing event, I would not expect someone would worry much about the safety valves blowing off. More worried about putting all available power into the the reversal. Just my opinion.

No, I understand the logic. I don’t have the operating orders for WSL engineers, so it’s just speculation, however, as J.E. Church provides in the Proceedings of the Merchant Marine Council:

“No marine machinery can be reversed immediately from full rpm ahead to full rpm astern for a number of reasons. In the first place the maximum engine power installed in any ship will not drive the propeller at full revolutions astern whilst the ship is either going ahead or stationary, even though maximum steam or fuel is applied, and maximum revolutions astern cannot result until the ship is actually going astern at considerable speed. In effect, therefore, with any appreciable headway on the ship the application of full power astern as soon as possible will in fact only result in slow revolutions astern for at least a minute or two, after which the revolutions will slowly build up after 6 to 10 minutes to about 60 percent of full ahead revolutions.”

What I do note is that the reversing gear on “Titanic” had adjustment to operate at any cutoff point for the cylinders (as per “The Shipbuilder” on the Olympic class—I finally found my copy of the facsimile). This implies that the full firing rate can be supplied astern, though I am not sure that a reciprocating engine running astern was as bad as an astern turbine in ships so equipped where for any given RPM aft the firing rate was about 140% of that ahead because of all the inherent inefficiencies.

However, the February 27 1914 engineering article on “Britannic” observes that at full power steam consumption for the three screw hybrid plant was 11.5 lbs per indicated horsepower per hour. At half power the engines were less efficient, about 15 lbs per indicated horsepower per hour; this corresponds with the point where the LP turbine was engaged so it’s reasonable to calculate full astern (and it IS explicit that full horsepower on both VTEs is available astern in that article!) as demanding 480,000 lbs of steam per hour while full ahead demands 575,000 lbs of steam per hour, so I would argue that for sustained astern running the firing rate must be reduced.

The question then becomes how rapidly “Titanic” would lose steam production if her firemen lay off firing. This can be calculated but I haven’t done it. You are probably right in that they’d rather have full steam available for an emergency rather than reduce firing, except I can’t help but feel blowing steam off is also a severe distraction in an emergency. The other counter-argument is that you simply can’t use something like 17% of your steam supply when running astern or manoeuvring no matter whether or not you want to.