Specific commands given by Murdoch prior to collision with iceberg

[Titanicmaster]

Would appreciate some clarification on the specific actions of Murdoch before the collision with the iceberg.

Based on my 30 years experience with the facts reported on Titanic, and then reading both inquiries, I have determined that Murdoch as one of the actions taken upon notification of the iceberg dead ahead, did in fact, give the order to reverse the port engine.

I have been corrected on this platform that neither outboard propellers or engines were reversed prior or post collision with the iceberg.

My basis for this critical piece of information is that I feel, if reversed, and the turbine center prop was stopped directly in front of the rudder…turning capability would be severely reduced.

Again, there were comments on previous threads. That wished to clarify to me that the engines were never reversed prior or post collision.

I am re-listening Boxhall’s BBC, 1962 BBC interview in which and I played it three times. Boxhall specifically says he walked into the wheel house, just about the same time as Captain Smith, and heard the captain ask Murdock what actions he took. According to what Boxhall says on the recording. Murdoch told the captain we have struck an iceberg Sir” “I am going full speed astern on the port engine.” Boxhall further states that Titanic was “on the swing” and that is what left her starboard side open.

Now, it could be countered that this interview 50 years later was not as accurate as his testimony at both inquiries.

Any clarification on exactly what commands Murdoch did execute from moment of crews best contacted the bridge would be most appreciated.

 

[Dan E. Parkes]

The simple answer is that Murdoch did not give the full astern order, as popularly shown in cinematic portrayals. Boxhall later said Murdoch ran "the engines full astern" (US Inquiry) "reversed the engines" (British Inquiry) and "Full Speed Astern, Sir, on the Port Engine" (BBC interview October 1962). But his evidence is questionable because he wasn't actually on the bridge at the time the order was given.

Quartermaster Robert Hichens was at the wheel and only heard the order "hard-a-starboard" when he testified at both inquiries. Quartermaster Alfred Olliver (only questioned at the US Inquiry) only heard "hard a port" as he arrived on the bridge. Frederick Barrett, Leading stoker working in boiler room 6 only reported 'the red-light signal to stop' (US Inquiry). Trimmer Thomas Dillon in the engine room reported the engines were "stopped" after the collision and then "half a minute" later "they went slow astern." (British Inquiry). Greaser Frederick Scott testified that at "about 20 minutes to 12... four telegraphs rang... two emergency ones... I noticed "Stop" first"... on the main engines."" (British Inquiry). First class passenger C.E. Henry Stengel, who as a travelling businessman was no stranger to transatlantic travel reported: "I heard a slight crash. I paid no attention to it until I heard the engines stop."

Reasons that most likely Boxhall's "full speed astern" did not happen:

1. No first-hand eyewitness testimony to the order being given (from those in the bridge/engine room/boiler rooms)

2. No eye-witness testimony to the effects of full astern (there would be noticeable movement) e.g. Lightoller does not believe the ship was ever ordered "full astern" notably saying that "I cannot say I remember feeling the engines going full speed astern." (British Inquiry)

3. The only 'witness' to this order - Fourth officer Boxhall - was not on the bridge at the time the order would have been given and also does not report hearing it, only "hard-a-starboard". He only mentions "full astern" when he puts the words in Murdoch's mouth during the conversation with Captain Smith. And later in 1962 changes this to "full speed astern on the port engine." so it is unreliable.

4. Mechanically, there was not enough time for the engines to be able to reverse in time.

5. Reversing the engines would reduce Titanic's ability to turn (Murdoch was very experienced and would know that).

One important factor to note is that Boxhall was not in the bridge area at the time the orders were given so any information he provides is second-hand. As Hichens reported "from what I am given to understand, Mr. Boxhall was approaching the bridge" (British Inquiry). And Boxhall himself said "I was almost on the bridge when she struck." (British Inquiry).

At the British Inquiry he was directly asked: "And you knew the engines were reversed, full speed astern?" But instead of answering yes, he does not directly answer the question but replies: "I heard the bells ring, but I did not know what the movement was until I got to the bridge." (British Inquiry) It was when he arrived on the bridge that he saw the telegraphs showing "full speed astern" (British Inquiry). However, it seems more likely that what he saw were the engine telegraphs set to "slow astern" as reported by Trimmer Tom Dillon in the engine room. Murdoch and /or Captain Smith was likely reducing Titanic's speed to then investigate the damage.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Yes, there have been several posts in different threads to show that Murdoch only put the engines to FULL STOP and not full astern. That piece of non-existent 'evidence' only came from Boxhall and was not corroborated by anyone or anything else; on the contrary, there were several statements by other survivors that indicated that the engines were at FULL STOP only, notably from statements of Helmsman QM Hichens and QM Olliver and those others that Dan mentioned above.

One important factor to note is that Boxhall was not in the bridge area at the time the orders were given so any information he provides is second-hand. As Hichens reported "from what I am given to understand, Mr. Boxhall was approaching the bridge" (British Inquiry). And Boxhall himself said "I was almost on the bridge when she struck." (British Inquiry).

Boxhall was not only NOT on the bridge at the time Murdoch gave his orders, he was not even "approaching it" like he testified. The timeframes do not tally at all; QM Olliver heard the 3 bells from his position on the Compass Platform some 250 feet aft of the bridge and immediately started for it at what is considered as a brisk trot. He did not hear Murdoch's first Hard-a-Starboard helm order because when it was given Olliver was still almost 200 feet from the bridge and unlike the high pitched peal of bells, a voice does not carry that far. It would have taken Olliver between 55 and 58 seconds from the bells to reach the bridge and he was nearly there when he felt the first shock of the collision and upon continuing and entering the bridge, heard the Hard-a-Port order, saw Murdoch at the lever of the WTD doors and saw the top of the iceberg itself as it drifted past the starboard wing. Captain Smith arived on the bridge moments later - about a minute after the first impact according to Hichens but likely 35 to 40 seconds later in reality - found out what had happened from Murdoch and ordered - among other things - for Olliver to find Carpenter Hutchinson and sound the ship. It was only after Olliver had left the bridge to carry out that order that Boxhall finally arrived, which therefore would have been at least 90 seconds after Fleet rang the bells. Therefore, unless he'd been crawling on his belly at a snail's pace, be could not have been alongside the Captain's Quarters when the bells were sounded on the Crow's Nest.

I believe Boxhall lied under oath to disguise his actual whereabouts during the accident and having done so early during the US Inquiry, got caught up in his own fabrication and had no choice but to stick to it subsequently. He was probably doing something that would have been perfectly normal and acceptable had he simply confessed to it - like being in the toilet.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

A little clarification about how these Olympic class ships were handled.

In channel waters, such as the Solent when leaving Southampton, these ships had to negotiate tight turns around several buoys. Here is the sequence of commands taken from the log of Olympic on the day she was struck by HMS Hawke on Sep 20th 1911. In the sequence below, Olympic was running down Thorn Knoll channel at full ahead with turbine connected under reduced steam for channel waters, about 19 knots. (Time recorded given on left.)

12:40 Thorn Knoll buoy abeam; Helm starboard-easy; Slow[ahead] port, Turbine stopped.

12:42 West Bramble buoy abeam; Hard-astarboard; Stop port, Half-astern port, Full-astern port.

12:43 Steady on S59E [magnetic]; Stop port, Full-ahead port.

12:44 Turbine started.

The turbine engine was stopped whenever either reciprocating engine was ran ahead at under 50rpms, or in reverse. The time taken was off the slave clock in the wheelhouse which only showed time to the nearest minute (no seconds). In the above, which described a sharp to to port around the W. Bramble buoy, the starboard engine was kept running at full ahead throughout maneuver.

By the way, the next logbook entry was:

12:46 Struck on starboard quarter by HMS Hawke.

And before anyone asks, the engine room staff on Olympic were all on standby while the ship negotiated these channel waters. That was not the case on Titanic at 11:40pm April 14th 1912.

 

[marina_irc]

As an aside, for anyone reading and curious about this; if you want to get a small experience of what this is like, take the SS Badger from Ludington, MI to Manitowoc, WI on Lake Michigan, and instead of mustering to go down deck, stand as close to the aft docking bridge as they let passengers, for as long as you can. She's a coal-fired steamer with reciprocating engines of a fairly large size, and you can hear the engine order telegraphs ringing as she works her way in, no thrusters, just screws and rudder, up to the dock in Manitowoc, where there's a very tightly confined harbor.

 

[Chris Morrison]

I have been wondering about the hard-to-port order as well. I have read all of the witnesses to the collision events testimony, both American and British as well as several forensic examinations. I may be wrong but the only evidence of the 'hard-aport' I can find being given is from QM Oliver who walked from the compass platform to the bridge as the berg was passing the bridge wing. He then reports the order being given to turn the helm hard-a-port. However the man at the helm, QM Hichens was clear that the helm was only put 'hard-a-starboard'. Is there any other testimony from witnesses to the collision to support this maneuver other than Oliver?

There are other mentions of the intent to port round it but no time, and the berg being seen off the starboard quarter after the impact indicating the ship had swung to port. But I still can not get passed the fact that the man at the helm would certainly remember such a thing. Then the helm officer would have confirmed the order and it having been completed.

The damage sustained is used as evidence of a port helm as well, but it is possible the berg sustained some damage too and the portions that were damaging the ship were broken off so that no other serious damage was sustained down the length of the ship. Hitting at the forepeak tank area and towards the bridge, the hull widens quite a bit, so the ice could have broken off enough that it was unable to inflict anymore damage despite the ship potentially not turning to port.

The last bit of is from the crew of the Californian. They indicated at the time of accident, the ship they were seeing seemed to have its lights go out. This was attributed to a change in heading where the side of the ship was no longer visible and the ship was head on to them. The question was asked, "indicating a turn to port"?. The reply was yes. Assuming the ship had turned to port and then quickly turned back to starboard, this would indicate the lights would go out, but then within seconds seem to come back on again. However the testimony does not show this, only that the lights seemed to go out.

So all of this to say, is there anything I am missing that seems to indicate the ship absolutely performed a hard to port maneuver after initial impact?

 

[Samuel Halpern]

Hichens was very careful when answering the questions put to him regarding helm orders prior to the ship striking the berg. The turn to port order came after the ship struck as the berg was passing aft of the bridge. While on board Carpathia, Hichens was interviewed by Howard Chapin who described what the man at the wheel had told him. In that description, the first order was hard-astarboard. The order hard-aport came after in an attempt to swing the stern away from the iceberg. Chapin's account was fully document in George Behe's book, On Board RMS Titanic.
The other direct evidence that Titanic's helm was ported after striking the iceberg comes from AB Scarrott who came topside immediately after the ship struck and noted:

356. She was acting as if under port helm, her head going to starboard? - That is correct.

 

[Mike Spooner]

Question: Was there a rev counter per engine on the Bridge?

 

[Thomas Krom]

Chapin's account was fully document in George Behe's book, On Board RMS Titanic.

Don't you mean Voices from the Carpathia: Rescuing RMS Titanic Sam?

 

[Georges Guay]

Testimony of Frederick Barrett

1835. Are you a fireman, a leading hand?
- A leading stoker.
1842. Which was the number of your section?
- No.6
1843. Does that correspond to No. 6 boiler room?
- Yes.
1861. You saw this red light?
- Yes.
1862. You knew that was an order to stop the engines?
- It says "stop" - a red piece of glass and an electric light inside.
1866. What was the next thing that happened?
- The crash came before we had them (dampers) all shut.

The bridge EOT order to Stop was corroborated by the red warning lights in the boiler rooms, and the following order to close the dampers to reduce the steam production. If the bridge had ordered the reciprocating machines full astern, the warning lights would have been white, which would have meant to be alert as the machines were about to be maneuver, but still in need to be supplied with steam pressure.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

So all of this to say, is there anything I am missing that seems to indicate the ship absolutely performed a hard to port maneuver after initial impact?

Also, when the Titanic finally came to a stop in response to Murdoch's ENGINES FULL STOP order (before Captain Smith's orders a bit later), the ship's bow was pointing North. That could not have happened unless Murdoch had followed-up with a Hard-a-Port order after the impact with the iceberg.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

Don't you mean Voices from the Carpathia: Rescuing RMS Titanic Sam?

Thanks Thomas. The book I should have referred to was Behe's, The Carpathia and the Titanic: Rescue at Sea. The account starts on p. 35. Sorry for the incorrect reference in my previous post #7.

 

[Georges Guay]

Poor Mate Murdoch,

He faced a totally impossible and dramatic situation. What if the Night Order Book had mentioned to call the Master if any ice was encountered during the watch? Did Smith only advised C/E Bell that is was possible to encounter ice during the night hours? If so, I don’t think that the 2nd Eng Senior and Junior would have been knocking about all the way forward in the boiler rooms! Etc. As there was no haze, Murdoch had no other choice but to keep racing full through the darkest moonless night of the worst iceberg month. It is more than probable that he even sighted a few icebergs before he collided with that fatal one. He then most likely felt comfortable with the situation. Did he have other choices? That’s the way you have to go if you wish to be promoted…

I believe that he most probably sighted the iceberg before the lookouts. That gave him some extra seconds to make up his mind. For a small pinnacle iceberg sighted right ahead, he decided to alter course to port; the shortest turning radius for that twin clockwise turning propellers. He double ringed the engines to Stop as recommended. He then observed the bow to slowly swinging to port, praying that she would avoid. But regrettably, the vessel glanced blow the berg. Skillfully, he then ordered the rudder to starboard. The drowsy captain rushed in the bridge, Murdoch explained briefly the events, and Smith took over the conduct. As the rudder was hard to starboard, the vessel stern was swinging clear the berg spectre. Once Smith was sure that all was clear, he probably ordered back the wheel amidships, the engines became to a stop. The vessel kept swinging to starboard insidiously toward the north up until she finally stopped, 25 to 30 minutes after the collision and 4 to 5 miles away from the berg. Scott, Dillon, witnessed that the engines were clutched ahead and astern a few times, which was a very bad idea, but had no real consequence on the inertia stopping distance.

Murdoch was standing his watch on the starboard wing. He was therefore affected by an optic illusion called the Bridge Parallax Effect. From his stand point on the starboard wing, the vessel might have given the impression to glanced blow the berg, thus avoidable. From the center of the bridge, the vessel might have given the impression to hit the berg, most likely unavoidable. But from the port bridge wing, the impression would certainly have been to hit the berg hard, no matter what. The more the bridge is wide and forward, the more is the parallax effect.

So if Murdoch had rushed inside the bridge centerline, maybe he would have realized that the collision was most likely unavoidable! Facing such an unachievable squaring of the circle was not giving him many options other than trying to minimize the damages. If he felt he had time, he could have try by eyesight alone and doing nothing else, to bring the stem close to the outer side of the berg, with a rudder hard to starboard near that clearing heading;

- rudder hard to port and just maintained for a few seconds (vessel starts heeling slightly to port on centripetal force),
- counter back the rudder hard over to starboard (vessel stops heeling to port and seems to starts heeling to starboard on centrifugal force),
- allision,
- double ring the engines to Stop for the records,
- close down the watertight doors.

The idea would’ve been to try to reduce the shock of a direct blow and hoping to have a turning lever to starboard (that would bring the drifting angles away from the berg) on contact and thus, hoping to minimize the damages engendered the hull pressure against the ice. Feeling, Timing and Luck are keywords.

«When collision is considered inevitable, the foremost concern of the officer must be to maneuver his ship so as to reduce the effect of collision as much as possible. The consequences are likely to be most serious if one vessel strikes at a large angle. The engines and the helm should be used so as to achieve a glancing blow rather than a direct impact. The damage would probably be the least serious if the impact is taken forward of the collision bulkhead.» CAPTAIN ALFRED NORMAN COCKCROFT Extra Master, M.Phil., FRIN, FNI.

Faced with a peril at sea, no one can be held responsible for an action posed if the expected outcome is not the one obtained. After the ship has sunk, everyone knows how she might have been saved…

 

[Samuel Halpern]

It seems Georges that you are about to give away the premise behind Ch. XIII (A Calculated Action?") of my most recent book, Prelude to an Allision, Prelude, with that quote from Cockcroft.

 

[Georges Guay]

Samuel, I started not to read but to study Cockcroft, the Colregs articles having to be learned by hart, from 1979 up until 1993. In 1997, I had to take that book out of the dust again for an additional cross examination! I can’t figure out how many times I read that essential novel from cover to cover...