The mystery of the collision

[Aaron_2016]

It is all very peculiar.

I tried to reconstruct his movements to see what happened.





Boxhall made no mention of hearing the phone ringing or Moody telling Murdoch "Iceberg ahead, sir" and also did not hear the order "hard a-port" afterwards. He also did not realize there was an iceberg in the area until after the collision when he heard Moody say they had struck an iceberg. He also went to the bridge wing and he said Murdoch had to point at the iceberg because he could not see it. He also said he went down to look for damage and saw a man holding a piece of ice and he asked him where he got it from. He clearly had no idea that they had struck an iceberg on the starboard bow, because if he had, then he would have seen the ice all over the forward well deck.

Boxhall also believed the ship was still facing west during the evacuation, so either he did not believe the Titanic had time to turn away before the collision, or swing her stern away after and face northwards after the collision, or quite possibly he was nowhere near the bridge at the time. He was still oddly under the impression that she was still facing west.

Q - Do you know at all whether the Titanic was swinging at this time?
A - No, I do not see how it was possible for the Titanic to be swinging after the engines were stopped. I forget when it was I noticed the engines were stopped, but I did notice it; and there was absolutely nothing to cause the Titanic to swing.

Did he forget about the alleged hard a-starboard order which he testified about, or did he know there wasn't time to carry out that order, and he went below decks before the hard a-port order was given and did not realize the ship was turning northwards towards the Californian?


.

 

[B-rad]

Why does Boxhall have to be the one not telling the truth. There is a lot of unexplainable things in Hichens olliver boxhall's Scott's and dillons testimony.

 

[Thomas C.]

I know this, and this is why his testimony(in my opinion) is the most unreliable.

 

[Thomas C.]

Another very interesting thing is why Murdoch waited so long to take any action. If we accept Olliver's 60 seconds, and Hichens testimony, Murdoch waited 50 seconds to gave a helm order. Is it normal to wait so long? Did he considered what to do such a long time? I think it was so dark that he didn't see exactly iceberg, but only a shape of black mass. He waited for the iceberg to recognise the shape and be sure he would give a safe order. Maybe this lost him, and ship.

 

[David G. Brown]

Widen your scope of inquiry into Boxhall's events. You will find he was the officer of the starboard watch. As such, he had to "go the rounds" of his men every hour. Since the watch started on the hour, then to comply with IMM/White Star Regulations Boxhall would have been required to be OFF THE BRIDGE to go his rounds. In the moments after the accident an officer was seen making his way forward to the forecastle by seaman Scarrott and probably others. As the junior officers did not carry identifying stripes, he was not identified by name, but Boxhall was the only officer both free from other duties and required to be on rounds of the crew. It being Sunday with light duty, he expected to find his men performing routine maintenance on the coffee maker in the crew galley.

Boxhall's own words put him into the third class quarters located beneath the well deck minutes after the accident. This corresponds to the actions of a dutifuly officer on his rounds when either a real or perceived emergency develops. He later reported that he found no problems in the third class berthing areas.

The testimonies of all of the men known to have been on the bridge produce a curious bit of overlooked evidence. Each of the others was identified by at least one other of the bridge team. There is only one man who was not seen and reported on the bridge after impact. That was Boxhall -- who should not have been there.

If the fourth officer was doing his duties as assigned, he would have been returning from the compass platform where he performed the 12:00 o'clock compass check as required by nautical custom; IMM/White Star regulations; and some regulations. From there he would have walked forward along the officers side (starboard) boat deck to the ladder down to A and B decks. That's where he felt the ship give a little nudge under his feet. Boxhall gave an apparently contradictory story about the accident. He claimed not to have seen the ship strike on the berg, before going onto explain in detail how the berg was bumping along the "bluff of the bow." This seems an impossibility, as it would be for someone standing still watching an event. But, the Fourth Officer was in motion going down that ladder. His vision was blocked until he came out on B deck where he had clear view of the "bluff of the bow" and saw the iceberg against the ship and ice tumble into the well deck.

Note the location of the ladder down to A and B decks. It is entered via the companionway located abreast of the captain's quarters. Again the physical location explains more of Boxhall's testimony. Even inside the ladder structure Boxhall would have been "abreast" of the captain's quarters even if he were on different decks (admittedly an odd way to express things, but none-the-less not a lie).

Boxhall's own testimonies when compared to those of other members of the bridge team, the IMM/WSL regulations, and the physical layout of the ship all prove the Fourth Officer all show he was not on the bridge after the accident. Boxhall did not over hear a single word that may have passed between Murdoch and Captain Smith. His testimony about what Murdoch said is at best a concoction and at worst a downright lie. I'm rather inclined to believe the latter, but that's an opinion. The facts show that Boxhall's story about what Murdoch said was nothing but a sea story writ large.

-- David G. Brown

PS -- for the chronologically uninformed, ship's time of the accident was 12:04 o'clock April 14th. However, the crew clocks had already been set back the 24 minutes reflecting half of the extra 47 minutes earned that day by Titanic's westward passage. Call that half 24 minutes and subtract it from ship's time to get 11:40 crew time.

 

[Aaron_2016]

Spoke to my cousin earlier today (retired seaman from blue funnel). I discussed Boxhall's actions (drinking tea in his cabin) and why he withheld this information from the Inquiry. He said you would never admit your faults in public, especially if instructed not to, and certainly not at an official Inquiry which is looking for blame. It would mean the end of his career. He was the only surviving officer on duty at the time of the collision. Admitting that he was taking the weight off his feet for 5 minutes (after touring the decks) and drinking tea when the crew were supposed to be alert and on their toes as they fast approached a region of reported ice would be greatly embarrassing. Having a break in his cabin would be the last thing he would dare admit to because his actions represented the actions of the company and they did not want to appear negligent, even if he was officially not supposed to be on the bridge. It just did not look good for the company in the eyes of the media and the company.

My cousin also spent time at the wheel. I asked if it was common for the helmsman to enter a trance and doze off while at the wheel. He said it was more common than you think. He also said you could let go of the wheel for a few moments and she will stay on course, and other times she will veer off course and you have to instinctively correct her course.

Hichens was in a dark wheelhouse with little to occupy his mind. The lookouts said the collision had caused the helm to shift. I wonder if Hichens was dozing off when he felt the collision under his feet which woke him up with a bang and he looked at his compass and panicked when he saw the ship had veered off 2 points. Try explaining that to your superior or the official Inquiry! He did not know the iceberg had shunted the ship over to port and I think that is why he yelled out in the lifeboat and asked if anyone knew which officer was on duty because they would point the finger at him.

Without realizing that the iceberg had pushed her over and veered her off course, he may have thought he accidently let her wonder off course and may have instinctively tried to pull her back. Moody was standing behind him when the order 'hard a-port' was given after the collision, but I doubt he was there for the entire time before the collision. Murdoch likely needed him on the bridge wing on the port side to keep watch. Moody didn't answer the phone, so we know he was not behind Hichens before the collision. I wonder if Hichens had nodded off for a second and mistakenly believed his own actions had caused the disaster without knowing that the iceberg had caused the ship to veer off 2 points to port.


Regarding the Captain. He would have entered the bridge immediately after he heard the bell ring and the engine telegraphs ring. If Moody had yelled "iceberg ahead, sir" and if Murdoch had yelled "hard a-starboard" then the captain would have entered the wheel house with a bang because he was in the room right next door. Yet he did not swing into action and enter until after the collision. I think he heard the bell ring and felt the collision immediately afterwards. He then opened the door to the wheelhouse and asked "what was that?"


Hichens gave his personal account before he testified at the official Inquiry. You will notice his account is practically word for word what he told the Inquiry, except for one thing. He mentions no helm orders before the collision!

Another paper had this additional piece from Hichens.

He did, except the 'hard a-starboard' order was later added and both Hichens and Boxhall went along with it in order to show they did everything possible to avoid the collision before it happened so that the company could not be accused of negligence. They also threw in the full astern order for good measure. Also notice that Hichens said the lookout telephoned the bridge about the iceberg, but he never mentioned receiving a reply. He was in the same lifeboat as Fleet and heard him say that nobody answered the phone. Fleet was overheard on the Carpathia by the passengers and they heard him say that he warned the bridge and officers did not respond to his warning. Perhaps Fleet wanted to know why nobody answered his warning and that is why Hichens called out to another lifeboat and asked them if they knew which officers were on duty at the time of the collision. They were both puzzled and did not want to be held responsible for the disaster.


.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

Aaron you really need to read what Hichens told Harold Chapin when he was interviewed on Carpathia.

 

[Daniel A. Soto]

I do have a question about the avoidance maneuver. If the ship was put "Hard a starboard" wouldn't someone have noticed the ship heeling over as she turned? I'm not knowledgeable enough to know if this would be noticeable.

 

[B-rad]

Modern seamanship:"Austin+Melvin+Knight"&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiUg-aV7pfZAhUS7Z8KHTdxAKsQ6AEIJTAB#v=onepage&q=Heeling&f=false

With the limited skills of my not so smart phone thus is what I found. Search Heeling or go to page 236.

 

[Michael H. Standart]

I do have a question about the avoidance maneuver. If the ship was put "Hard a starboard" wouldn't someone have noticed the ship heeling over as she turned? I'm not knowledgeable enough to know if this would be noticeable.

At full speed, it would be very noticeable. If you're wondering why nobody commented on it, I think you'll find that most people were asleep at the time of the accident. The sailors who were awake would have been aware of it but I don't think they would see it as anything remarkable.

There are some things about the way a ship handles that to a sailor would be so taken for granted that the absence of something that should have happened or should have been there would raise eyebrows.

 

[Daniel A. Soto]

I suppose that's true. To those who were still awake I'm sure they were in areas in the ship that would make it hard to notice anyway.

 

[Aaron_2016]

If the order was actually given then the lookouts high up in the crows nest would have noticed the ship listing or heeling over to starboard immediately and would probably hold on tight. Problem is, they did not feel it. They did however feel the affects of the 'hard a-port' as the ship quickly turned right and listed over to port just after the collision.

Frederick Fleet

Q - Did it strike the bow or just back of the bow?
A - Just about in front of the foremast.
Q - Did it tilt the ship to any extent?
A - She listed to port right afterwards.
Q - To what extent?
A - I could not say; a slight list.
Q - Just immediately on striking the berg?
A - Just afterwards.


.

 

[Michael H. Standart]

I suppose that's true. To those who were still awake I'm sure they were in areas in the ship that would make it hard to notice anyway.

It wouldn't be hard to notice. Trust me on that! A ship in a hard turn at high speed heels over VERY noticeably. It's just that to a sailor or even a well seasoned traveler who was crossing the ocean all the time, it just wouldn't be considered to be remarkable.

Over time, you get used to things on a ship: the assorted noises of ventilation, machinery, the assorted creaks and groans of the hull working in a seaway, the pounding of waves and so on.

You just don't think about it.

I'll tell you what does get a sailors attention real quick: It's the absence of something which should be there but suddenly isn't. I learned to sleep through just about anything, including the bangs and thuds of planes being recovered to or launched from the flight deck of an aircraft carrier. It was things suddenly got quiet for no good reason whatsoever that I was awakened out of a sound sleep!

 

[Aaron_2016]

It wouldn't be hard to notice. Trust me on that! A ship in a hard turn at high speed heels over VERY noticeably. It's just that to a sailor or even a well seasoned traveler who was crossing the ocean all the time, it just wouldn't be considered to be remarkable.

Here are survivor accounts of the ship heeling over to port during or immediately after the collision. Was this caused by the "hard a-port" order, or was the ship sliding over the spur of the iceberg?


Mr. Sloper - "The boat seemed to shiver and keel over to port."

Mr. Hyman - "There came a tearing sound and the boat listed a little to one side."

Lookout Lee - "The ship seemed to heel slightly over to port as she struck the berg."

Lookout Fleet - "She listed to port right afterwards."

Major Peuchen - "I felt as though a heavy wave had struck our ship. She quivered under it somewhat."

Mrs. Hippach - "The gigantic liner seemed to quiver and shake as though alive and uncertain of its course."

Mr. Taylor - "I felt the boat rise and it seemed to me that it was riding over the ice."

Mrs. Harris - "The door of the clothes closet had been left open and I noticed my clothes swaying to a marked degree."




.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

Bear in mind that Titanic was carrying a slight list to port all afternoon according to several sources. In hard left turn at 22 knots the ship should heeled to starboard about 5 degrees. If anything it would have straightened out more during that turn. Going in the opposite direction in a hard turn to the right the heel to port would have seemed more exaggerated because of the slight list to port that was carried.

I had pleasure of being on the USS Saipan on family day when we were taken out in the ops area outside Norfolk, VA. One of the maneuvers held before heading back was a hard turn to port while at flank speed. I mentioned to my son that you can really notice the ship heeling over, and his reply to me was, "Yeh, I guess you could," as if this was first time he actually took notice of it. He lived on that vessel a number years. This was just before the Gulf war.