Was speed to blame?

[Jim Currie]

Obviously speed was not the cause of the accident but a contributing factor to it. Regardless of whether the obstruction was ice or a derelict; the only part speed played was that it could be reasonably argued that had the vessel been travelling at a lesser speed, as she might have been during restricted visibility, any such obstruction could have been avoided. I agree with Sam; you can only act according to the special circumstances of the case if you are in no doubt as to what these circumstances are. It seems there was doubt as to the knowledge of special circumstances i.e irrefutable evidence that Captain Smith knowingly and irresponsibly headed his vessel into an ice field. It follows that if he's innocent of irresponsibility then he was not guilty of driving his vessel at excessive speed. I suggest the speed could only be excessive if Smith would, in normal circumstances, have been unable to avoid any of the every day or night obstacles he could reasonably have been expected to be confronted with. A bit like all of us driving within our own capabilities.
I'm a bit worried about the telegramme ice warning evidence not reaching a responsible person. There's verbal evidence that those on the various watches were told to keep a sharp lookout for ice in particular and pass it on to succeeding watches. Apparently it was most unusual to sight ice in such low latitudes at that time of year so why were people told to specifically look for it if those in the know had not received prior warning? There's also another 'what if'. What if Captain Smith - believing his vessel was travelling at sub-22.0 knots because he was using engine revs to assess speed - agreed with Murdoch to let her run an extra 10 minutes past The Corner' on the last great circle course before turning onto his final rhumb line course? If he did, this might suggest he was making sure he would be well south of the ice reported to be to the west of him. In fact, he was probably travelling faster than he thought. This might just explain why the wreck was found so far south of the planned 266T track.
As for mersey's statement - a bit of a waffle I think. Big ship, Big Politicians and big names like Shackleton. What he was there for I've no idea. His fame was found in the Antarctic - a completely different area with no similarities to N. Atlantic temperate latitudes.
Unlimited fun -this!

 

[Michael H. Standart]

>>As for mersey's statement - a bit of a waffle I think. Big ship, Big Politicians and big names like Shackleton. What he was there for I've no idea.<<

The fact that he had experience in actual ice navigation may have had something to do with it. If nothing else, it lends the whole whitewash investigation the aura of some authority whether it was entirely deserved or not.

 

[Dave Gittins]

Jim makes a good point about Shackleton. His ice experience was not relevant to the inquiry because virtually all of it was in high southern latitudes in summer, when it is never dark. Sir Robert Finlay had a shot at him. Here's a bit from a certain book.

"Sir Robert was well aware of the importance of Titanic’s speed and the lookouts’ failure to sight the iceberg in time to prevent disaster. Having proved to his own satisfaction that Titanic’s course had been adroitly chosen, he turned to the questions of speed and lookouts.

It was easy to show that it was normal for liners to maintain full speed as long as visibility was considered good. Sir Robert’s well-chosen captains had been unanimous on this point, and Charles Lightoller had said that it was the practice of ‘...practically every commander and every ship crossing the Atlantic Ocean.' He took exception to Shackleton’s remarks on commanders being motivated by their employers’ desires for fast passages. ‘Sir Ernest was out of his element,’ he said. ‘Towards the South Pole he is supreme, but when he gets into the North Atlantic he is no better than any ordinary man.’ Evidence from Captains Rostron and Moore of their willingness to change course on receiving ice warnings was quietly overlooked."

 

[Matthew Farr]

I believe that Sir James Bisset said it best in his book 'Tramps and Ladies' on page 318.

"...this disaster is too tremendous to be explained away by finding one scapegoat, or two, or three, to bear the brunt of the blame. It could be explained as a fatal culmination of a long and complicated sequence of interrelated causes which lay deep in human nature itself- the errors of judgement made by many fallible men, in greater and lesser degrees of responsibility. "

 

[Samuel Halpern]

But there is something in human nature that wants to know why something so terrible happened. To say it was a culmination of a long and complicated sequence of interrelated causes is saying nothing. If there were errors in judgement, what were they? If there were interrelated causes, how were they related? Maybe someone else may learn from all that.

 

[Matthew Farr]

Samuel,

>>To say it was a culmination of a long and complicated sequence of interrelated causes is saying nothing. <<

I would agree that it is a very broad generalization but it states very eloquently the fact that no one person or action was directly responsible for the sinking, a point that I agree with.

>> If there were errors in judgement, what were they? If there were interrelated causes, how were they related? Maybe someone else may learn from all that.<<

I too want to know more about those people and actions, what errors were made and how did they affect the outcome etc...

 

[Dave Gittins]

Matthew, my book spends quite a bit of space on people in the background who contributed to the disaster. Some of them, such as Sir Alfred Chalmers, are known only to a few fans, but they must share the blame with Captain Smith and the rest. The disaster had been brewing for years.

Read my chapters on the British inquiry and you'll get what I mean.

 

[Jim Currie]

As I see it, nothing much has really changed. The final outcome was that he who wears the four bars on his sleeve bears the brunt of the blame - even if he was in bed at the time! As the man said 'if you can't stand the heat, keep out of the kitchen'. It's the relatives of those who really suffer when the finger of blame is pointed. Learning something from a tragedy is the most important outcome and there certainly were loads of things which were 'put right' after the event However,again I say; nothing has changed - the leader (even more so nowadays) has to delegate. Unfortunately his or her delegated orders are not always carried out in accordance with exact wishes.
Bisset was another 'badwaggoner'. His pontifications, while no doubt enhanced by experience, are much the same as what we produce in this forum. His main advantage was that he was able to talk to survivors. However, like us, he was also able to choose who he believed. Being wise after the event(but soon after it)can be - as has been shown - productive. However it can also be hurtful to the innocent.

 

[Dave Gittins]

If anything, some things are worse today. At least White Star had offices in Liverpool and elsewhere and a perfectly plain ownership structure. She flew a British ensign and was registered in Liverpool. Try tracking down the real owners of a ship today when things go wrong. You'll find a chain of companies spread around the world, all hiding behind a flag of convenience. Study the US Qualship 21 program to see what the authorities are up against.

Bisset was indeed wise after the event and often a bit too wise. He wrote years later and with a ghost writer. He gets basic facts wrong and should be read with little salt handy.

 

[Steven Hall]

"Bisset was indeed wise after the event and often a bit too wise. He wrote years later and with a ghost writer. He gets basic facts wrong and should be read with little salt handy."
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I totally agree with you there Dave.

 

[Lee Lance]

I suppose any sailor can answer this question...
What if Titanic had been proceeding at half speed, not full speed, when the iceberg was sighted? Would she have been able to evade it? Or just not hit it as hard?
How does maneuverability of a large ship change as speed changes?
The only thing I can think of is that the ship would have been a little further from the iceberg when the rudder started to move.

 

[Aaron_2016]

At a slower speed they would have more time to act once the iceberg had been spotted, but the witnesses could not state with any degree of accuracy how far the iceberg was. 2nd officer Lightoller was asked if the reduction of speed would give them more time to turn away. During the official Inquiry they asked him.


Q - If the vessel had been running at a lower rate of speed would not the chances of avoiding that iceberg have been increased?
A - When a vessel is running at a low rate of speed, she is slower on the helm so the conditions would be totally different.
Q - That does not answer my question, quite. (The question was repeated).
A - That I can not say. I merely state that the ship would be slower of helm, which means that she would take longer to swing on her helm in proportion to her reduced speed.
Q - She would have had more time in which to swing, would she not?
A - She would have had more time in which to swing.

During the British Inquiry the members discussed how fast it would take to turn the ship away 2 points. At 22 knots it would take 37 seconds, but at 11 knots (half speed) it would take 74 seconds to turn away. They also said - "The reduction of speed is important, nay, essential for two reasons: in the first place, what you have to rely on under those circumstances is mainly the reversing of your engines, and at the slower speed you give your reversed engines a chance; at the higher speed in the distance at which this object was seen and at which such objects may be seen in future, your reversed engines have little or no chance at all."


.

 

[Mike Spooner]

Was Smith going to fast for the condition ahead? Of course he was. There was plenty of warning not just ice bergs and large icefield ahead. If haven't clipped the ice berg he was heading straight into a heavy pack ice field in the pitch dark! He gave no orders to slow the ship down. For a lower officers Murdoch to override the captain decision is not the smartness move. Then that rather cryptic remark given to the lookout men in the crow nest keep you eyes skinned for ice ahead! Failing to understand the condition the lookout men had to face. A huge drop in air temperature down to freezing point then when included the wind chill factor at 22 knots that's -12 c been blasted into your face with NO windscreen! As the officers on the bridge had the luxury of a windows and heating. Those poor guys in the crow nest must be more concerned in keeping warm. If cold air hits a warm eye ball your eyes will become watery just further restricting your eye sight in distance. To me it no surprise the lookout men could not see the ice berg any earlier in the pitch dark! Sorry to say this is just poor seaman ship orders given from the officers.
What made it worse for them another captain facing the same problem approaching the ice ahead did it Tec book correct! Captain Stanley Lord of the California. His ship speed 11 knots and place extras lookout men. At his speed confronted with the ice field stopping in time. Been a much lighter ship 6,200 tons you can stop at a much shorter distance that a ship at 46,300 tons! I am not sea man but the match the stopping distance between two ship at different weights. I would of thought Titanic speed been around 3 knots to 11 knots to California for stopping distance? I don't know if there is a ship calculation speed against weight for stopping distance?
Mike.

 

[David G. Brown]

We’ve been over the speed thing a number of times. The ultimate premise on which the “speeding” argument is based is faulty because it derives from highways and not from experience at sea.

No doubt, it sounds logical – slow down and avoid the accident – but that assumes the ship has to stick to a paved lane where it has nowhere to go when danger appears ahead. If a car swerves left, it risks head-on impact with oncoming traffic. Swerving right will collect an assortment of fire plugs, sign posts and perhaps the odd lady walking her dog. Things are radically different at sea where ther are no paved lanes, no painted white or yellow lines, no signposts and darned few dogwalkers.

Vessels in open water are free to go in whatever direction their captains deem prudent.

Bluntly, Captain Smith put Titanic into the wrong patch of water at the wrong time. In retrospect his choice was not prudent. But, speed per se had nothing to do with that decision. He had thousands of square miles of open water free of ice into which he could have taken his vessel, but he chose one identified with the possibility of ice danger.

At 22 knots, Titanic made 2.2 miles every 6 minutes. Had he delayed turning “The Corner,” an hour his ship would have been about 20 miles south of the latitude of the fatal berg. AT that point he would not have been required to steer a course straight for New York. He could have steered more southwest to gain additional distance from the ice while still retaining a respectable amount of westing overnight. In the morning a rhumb line for NYC could have then been adopted. Titanic would have arrived a few hours later than its earliest possible arrival time, but it almost certainly would have arrived.

The concept of steering away from or around danger is implicit in Rule 6 of The International Rules Of The Road:

Rule 6
Action By Give-Way Vessel​

Every vessel which is directed to keep out of the way of another vessel shall, so far as possible, take early and substantial action to keep well clear.


Note that nothing is said in Rule 6 about altering speed. The words are, “keep well clear.” The master of the give-way vessel is free to do whatever he deems prudent under the circumstances of the situation. The intent of the rule is to avoid any close-quarters situation by steering away from the other vessel. Other Rules lay out what is the best alternative (turn right, slow, then stop only if necessary), but they don’t apply to icebergs. However, the concept of driving the ship into safer water (“keep well clear”) implied by Rule 6 does apply to avoiding icebergs, as Captain Smith found to his chagrin.

As far as lookout goes, the deliberately overlooked evidence of seaman Scarrott was that six to eight minutes took place between the first ring of the lookouts warning bell and impact on the iceberg. At 22 knots that puts the berg at 2.2 to perhaps 3 miles ahead of Titanic. Good spotting by any standards and in plenty of time to avoid a close quarters situation. Later, during the inquiries, Fleet had to dodge the issue by saying he couldn’t tell the passage of 6 minutes against that of an hour. Huh? Whether he lied or just obfuscated on behalf of his employer is immaterial. He had good eyes that night and he used them well.

– David G. Brown

 

[Jim Currie]

Speed must be considered in conjunction with the range of visibility. If you can't detect something ahead of your ship in sufficient time to avoid it then you are going too fast. That is simple logic.

For anyone to be able to competently judge retrospectively regarding the speed of a vessel, they must have a clear indication of how far those on that vessel could see in relation to the efficiency of her steering gear.

In the case of Titanic, her speed was excessive because the prevailing conditions were too perfect. Her captain knew that although it was a Christal clear night; because of the absence of sea or swell, small bergs would have no motion to cause tell-tale wash around them. Also, and by the same token, there would not be any wave action against them.

In my opinion, the act of maintaining such speed in conditions which reduced or removed the possibility of early detection of ice when in a an area where ice was to be expected, was verging on the criminal.
Smith did the same thing that we are warned against... he assumed.
He assumed that the ice would act as it had always done...that the ice reported to him previously, would be long gone to the northeast of his intended track. After all, that was why he was following that track at that time of year...why it had been laid down in the first place...to avoid ice.