Wilde after Lifeboat #2

[Arun Vajpey]

Are there any specific survivor accounts of Chief Officer Wilde's whereabouts and actions after 01:45 am which was when he supervised lowering of Lifeboat #2? After #2 was lowered, Collapsible D was fitted into the same davits unless I am mistaken. Meanwhile, Lightoller was lowering Lifeboat #4 from A-deck and then presumably came-up to the boat deck to work on #D. But if Wilde, who lowered #2 some 5 minutes before Lightoller launched #4, was already attending to Collapsible D when Lightoller arrived (which appears to be the case), then that would have given the latter an opportunity to briefly pop across to the starboard side where Collapsible C was being loaded. That could have been when Lightoller met the doctors as had been discussed in another thread.

But what has confused me is that in many Lifeboat launch timing tables - including Bill Wormstedt's revised one - Wilde is also mentioned as working with Murdoch on Collapsible C. That to me seems unlikely for a few reasons: first, both Wilde and Lightoller would not have gone across to the starboard side leaving Collapsible D unattended. Next, McElroy was almost certainly assisting Murdoch with #C and so there would have been no point in Wilde joining them when he had his hands full with #D.

So, if we assume that Wilde remained on the port side after launching #2 and worked on Collapsible D....and Lightoller joined him after a very brief visit to the starboard side, what did the Chief officer do after Collapsible D was lowered at 02:05 am? Did he remain on the port side and help with Collapsible B or cross over to help with #A?

 

[William Oakes]

I read somewhere that Wilde was last seen smoking a cigarette on the bridge, and that when Lightoller was about to make his jump after the bow dipped for the last time, that Wilde waived goodbye to him.
I'll try to find the source.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Thanks but if true, that would have been at the very end. That same source might have information on what Wilde actually did after 01:45 am at which time he lowered Lifeboat #2. The natural progression would have been for him to start preparing Collapsible D since he was closer to it than Lightoller, who was still completing loading of Lifeboat #4 on A-deck below (That was lowered at 01:50 am). But Wormstedt's table shows Wilde helping Murdoch with Collapsible C across on the starboard side which I find rather odd because Murdoch had Moody and McElroy with him at the time. My own feeling is that after lowering #2, Wilde started overseeing work on Collapsible D and Lightoller joined him after lowering #4 and perhaps a quick visit to the starboard side (where he met McElroy and the doctors).

 

[Michael Hinz]

Actually, I think Wilde did not oversaw the lowering of boat D. If Lightoller was telling the truth and Wilde was indeed at Boat D, then he probably went to boat C before the lowering of boat D. Since boat C was most likely lowered some minutes before boat D, I do not see any other way that Wilde was present at both boats. Unless boat C was launched 20 minutes before boat D, as Quartermaster Arthur Bright testified. As with all other questions there are again many contradictory accounts, which makes it difficult to find the truth.


I do not know if Wilde was really at boat D, but I am convinced that Wilde was at boat C. This was confirmed by Quartermaster George Rowe.

In addition, I came across an interesting article by Dr. Paul Lee a few months ago in which he quotes a passage from the book "The Ismay Line". In this passage it is said that Wilde himself "ordered" Ismay into boat C, which supports the story of Barber Augustus Weikman.

"Unfortunately, apart from the official inquiries, very few people know the exact circumstances in which Bruce Ismay left the Titanic, as afterwards, rightly or wrongly his wife took the attitude that it was best forgotten, that it was bad for him to talk about it and she would never allow the subject to be discussed. There was one occasion, however, when he began to talk to his sister-in-law about his escape. He told her that one of the officers had urged him to get into the boat. There were no other passengers near, the boat was actually being lowered away and the officer had told him that he must go, as his captain would need his evidence at the inquiry which was bound to follow. That officer was Chief Officer Wilde who lost his life that night, and whose evidence if he had lived would have been or great value to Ismay. Bruce Ismay did not tell this story at the inquiries, however. Possibly he felt it would sound as thought he were trying to make excuses for his escape. This story is borne out by the affidavit of Weikmann, the barber in which he says he heard Chief Officer Wilde order Mr. Ismay to get in." (www.paullee.com/titanic/ismaysescape.html)

 

[Michael Hinz]

I read somewhere that Wilde was last seen smoking a cigarette on the bridge, and that when Lightoller was about to make his jump after the bow dipped for the last time, that Wilde waived goodbye to him.
I'll try to find the source.

I think you are looking for the portrush letter.

The Portrush Letter (encyclopedia-titanica.org)

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Actually, I think Wilde did not oversaw the lowering of boat D. If Lightoller was telling the truth and Wilde was indeed at Boat D, then he probably went to boat C before the lowering of boat D.

It is possible, but the way I look at is - Wilde lowered Lifeboat #2 at 01:45 am from the boat deck level (#2 was already swing out, of course), at which time Lightoller was still completing loading of Lifeboat #4 on A-deck. Collapsible D was due to be fitted to the davits of #2 and so it seems natural that Wilde, who was right there, would have ordered the crew to do so especially as there was no other authoritative crew member on the port side. On the other hand, on the starboard side there were Murdoch, Moody and McElroy and so there would have been no need for Wilde to go there.

I do not know if Wilde was really at boat D, but I am convinced that Wilde was at boat C. This was confirmed by Quartermaster George Rowe.

As above. Of course, it is possible that after giving his crew orders to prepare Collapsible D, Wilde might have briefly popped across to the starboard side to check the situation. If so, that would have been just before 01:50 am and Collapsible C was still nearly 10 minutes away from being lowered. Even if Wilde had gone to see the situation, I don't think he would have remained there for more than a couple of minutes at most. But in that situation, 2 minutes can be a very long and eventful period.

This story is borne out by the affidavit of Weikmann, the barber in which he says he heard Chief Officer Wilde order Mr. Ismay to get in."

I doubt Weikmann's words. As a ship's barber, could he have made a mistake with the officer's identity? Also, most witnesses had Ismay get into Collapsible C just before it was lowered and when there were no more women and children in the vicinity. I think he did that of his own volition and no one 'ordered him in'.

The fact that there was a significant port list at the time may explain the 20 minute difference between launches of Lifeboat #2 and Collapsible D from the port side forward. That might have given both Wilde and Lightoller opportunities to pay brief but separate visits to the starboard side while the crew were working on D before loading started. If so, each visit would only have been for a minute or two but in that space of time each officer would have been seen by other surviving crew members.

But I find it very hard to believe that Wilde actually did any work on Collapsible C with so many others to help there, while there was just Lightoller and himself in charge on the port side. Of course, Captain Smith might have been around too, which is probably why Wilde and Lightoller were able to go across to the starboard side very briefly.

 

[Dan E. Parkes]

But I find it very hard to believe that Wilde actually did any work on Collapsible C with so many others to help there, while there was just Lightoller and himself in charge on the port side.

According to Lightoller "I was on the port side, and Mr. Murdoch was on the starboard side, and the chief officer was superintending generally, and lowered one or two boats himself." So if Wilde was indeed "superintending generally" then he would most definitely have visited the starboard side as part of his responsibility at various stages of the evacuation. In the case of the forward collapsibles, it was simply a short walk through the navigating bridge to go from port-to-starboard.

We also have verification from Bruce Ismay, Second officer Lightoller, Quartermaster Rowe and barber August Weikman that Wilde was at collapsible C, so I don't have any doubt he was there. I have tried to piece together Wilde's movements during the evacuation and contrary to popular opinion I believe he was very active, right from the get-go: Titanic's Officers - RMS Titanic - Chief Officer Henry Wilde

 

[Arun Vajpey]

According to Lightoller "I was on the port side, and Mr. Murdoch was on the starboard side, and the chief officer was superintending generally, and lowered one or two boats himself." So if Wilde was indeed "superintending generally" then he would most definitely have visited the starboard side as part of his responsibility at various stages of the evacuation. In the case of the forward collapsibles, it was simply a short walk through the navigating bridge to go from port-to-starboard.

I can accept that. Please understand that I am merely trying to picture Wilde's movements after 01:45 am when he lowered Collapsible #2. At that time Lightoller was still on A-deck completing loading of Lifeboat #4, which was lowered at 01:50 am. After that, we have to assume that Lightoller made his way to the boat deck, probably via the forward promenade staircase which would have brought him to the vicinity of where Collapsible D was being loaded.

But I don't believe that Wilde would have left that spot immediately after lowering Lifeboat #2. In the 5 or 6 minutes between that and Lightoller's arrival, he would have supervised preparation of Collapsible D. But after that, he may well have popped across to the starboard side where Murdoch was in charge with McElroy helping with Collapsible C. Moody probably was on the roof of the Officers' Quarters by then to supervise unlashing of Collapsible A.

I firmly believe Jack Thayer's testimony about seeing McElroy during loading of Collapsible C. As a 17-year old first Class passenger, Thayer Jr would have been very familiar with the Chief Purser, who interacted far more with the passengers (mainly First Class) than the officers.

If Wilde was "generally superintending" between 01:50 am and 02:05 am, he might well have been on the starboard side during launching of Collapsible C in between, but it also means that the main work was done by Murdoch (starboard) and Lightoller (port). As I said before, under those frenetic circumstances, time tends to 'stretch' and a single minute can see a lot of activity.

In fact, after I posted the OP of this thread I recalled something and managed to find some old notes from over 25 years ago. In the early 1990s I was researching about scullion John Collins who survived in the last minutes; I have spoken to his daughter. Collins and another steward were holding a child each (very likely two of Anna Palsson's 4 children) and trying to reach Collapsible A at around 02:15 am. But Collins lost his grip on the child when the 'wave' hit and was himself unable to reach that lifeboat. But I noted from my conversation with Mary McKee (Collins' daughter) that he saw both Murdoch and Wilde (the latter described as the 'officer next to the Captain. Nearly an hour earlier, Collins had helped in loading of Lifeboat #16 and had hoped to be allowed in but was refused by Wilde who felt that the boat already had enough crew members.) on the starboard side when the wave hit. Collins himself was eventually pulled on board the overturned Collapsible B.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Titanic's Officers - RMS Titanic - Chief Officer Henry Wilde

A website devoted to collating information on Titanic's officers, as well as the officers involved in the disaster such as the Carpathia and Californian.

titanicofficers.com

That's a good link. The only item that I would question in Wilde's timeline there is the mention that after lowering Lifeboat #2 he went aft to where Murdoch was completing loading of #10 before going diagonally across to #C. While it is possible, IMO it is unlikely.

The sighting of Wilde near Lifeboat #10 is based, one assumes, largely on testimony of Chief Baker Joughin. Joughin worked only around Lifeboat #10 but by his own admission made a few 'fortifying' trips below. I do believe that he saw Wilde near #10 but IMO that was earlier when the boat was still being prepared for loading. Wilde worked with Moody in loading Lifeboat #16, probably also supervised #14; he then supervised loading and lowering of #12 by himself. At that time #10 was only just being attached to its davits and Wilde would have passed it on his way to Lifeboat #2. He probably issued some instructions at #10 and that would have been when Joughin saw him.

 

[Dan E. Parkes]

Thanks Arun. I am glad you like it. I agree that the timings should not be taken literally. The evacuation was no doubt quite organic with many events taking place concurrently and overlapping along with some element of confusion, repetition and disorganisation (especially on the port side) so any timings we come up with are estimates at best.

The key point is placing Wilde at specific locations and I too believe based on the available testimony that Wilde was at no.10 and collapsible C and overall actively involved. I certainly don't believe he was an "enigma" as Walter Lord once portrayed him.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

I certainly don't believe he was an "enigma" as Walter Lord once portrayed him.

Same here. In fact, for many years I wondered about Wilde's 'inactivity' myself. About the only event that was mentioned about him was his meeting Hemming and Foley as they were returning from inspection of the forepeak about 10 minutes after the collision, where they went to investigate the hissing noise.

I think what happened was that Wilde spent a lot of time on the port side that night and since this was looked mainly as 'Lightoller's side', Wilde's name did not figure prominently in early works like ANTR. It now seems like he was involved with loading and lowering of #8, #2, #16 (with Moody), #14 (with Lowe), #12 and Collapsible D (with Lightoller). In addition, he almost certainly would have issued instructions about #10 and, as you have pointed out above, in the vicinity of Collapsible C.

 

[Dan E. Parkes]

I think what happened was that Wilde spent a lot of time on the port side that night and since this was looked mainly as 'Lightoller's side', Wilde's name did not figure prominently in early works like ANTR.

Exactly! Completely agree. Because Lightoller was the senior surviving officer, we are somewhat "hamstrung" by his accounts. I've often wondered if someone more senior (Murdoch, Wilde or Smith) had survived how much clarification we would have of what really transpired. Lightoller, by his own admission, didn't really know what was going on and was always sketchy with details.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

I've often wondered if someone more senior (Murdoch, Wilde or Smith) had survived how much clarification we would have of what really transpired. Lightoller, by his own admission, didn't really know what was going on and was always sketchy with details.

That's a good point. Lightoller's knowledge of what happened on the starboard side is very limited. Pitman left early on #5, Lowe was only involved with the forward starboard boats before crossing to port aft and eventually leaving on #14. Murdoch, Moody and McElroy, who mainly supervised work on the starboard side, all died.

Even on the port side, I believe that Lightoller spent a bit too much time around #4 and so missed a few key events. I believe that contrary to some early beliefs based on Lightoller's testimony, Boatswain Nichols and his men did NOT die while attempting to open any port gangway door. In fact neither Lifeboat #6 lowered at 01:10 am nor any other port boat reported seeing an open gangway door during the sinking AFAIK. I believe that Nichols and his men (whose identities only he would have known) returned to the boat deck around 01:25 am at which time Lightoller was down on A-deck struggling with Lifeboat #4. Nichols was seen soon afterwards by James Johnstone in the vicinity of Lifeboat #2 and the boatswain gave him the 'star tip'. About 10 to 12 minutes later, Leading Fireman Barrett, arriving at Lifeboat #13 just before it was lowered, saw Nichols who told him to get into the boat and 'pull an oar'.

 

[Stirlingsays]

That's a good point. Lightoller's knowledge of what happened on the starboard side is very limited. Pitman left early on #5, Lowe was only involved with the forward starboard boats before crossing to port aft and eventually leaving on #14. Murdoch, Moody and McElroy, who mainly supervised work on the starboard side, all died.

Even on the port side, I believe that Lightoller spent a bit too much time around #4 and so missed a few key events. I believe that contrary to some early beliefs based on Lightoller's testimony, Boatswain Nichols and his men did NOT die while attempting to open any port gangway door. In fact neither Lifeboat #6 lowered at 01:10 am nor any other port boat reported seeing an open gangway door during the sinking AFAIK. I believe that Nichols and his men (whose identities only he would have known) returned to the boat deck around 01:25 am at which time Lightoller was down on A-deck struggling with Lifeboat #4. Nichols was seen soon afterwards by James Johnstone in the vicinity of Lifeboat #2 and the boatswain gave him the 'star tip'. About 10 to 12 minutes later, Leading Fireman Barrett, arriving at Lifeboat #13 just before it was lowered, saw Nichols who told him to get into the boat and 'pull an I

I suspect, like many, that Lightoller covered for his misinterpretation of Smith's 'women and children first' order resulting in boats leaving under filled with this gangway contention. Something which Boxall only adds to his account decades later. I believe Lightoller made this up. I'm of the view that Lightoller suffered guilt and I note that he was buried at sea at Titanic's assumed sinking location., He and others must have fought off many a desperate person trying to get aboard that upturned collapsible and been around the worst of the post sinking.

This said I view Lightoller favourably as I do much of the Titanic crew and officers. He and they were forced into an incredibly stressful situation. However, I tend to the view that the very best that night didn't survive......though I view Lowe and Boxall highly.

 

[Thomas Krom]

I suspect, like many, that Lightoller covered for his misinterpretation of Smith's 'women and children first' order resulting in boats leaving under filled with this gangway contention.

I always found this claim quite strange, despite it slowly being more often claimed as a fact. Lightoller gave a few versions of what was told to him by captain Smith. Firstly we have this in his first testimony on the 19th of April 1912:

Senator Smith	What were the last orders you heard him give?
Second officer Lightoller	When I asked him, "Shall I put the women and children in the boats?" he replied, "Yes; and lower away." Those were the last orders he gave.

Secondly we have his testimony on the 12th day of the British Board of Trade Inquiry on the 21st of May 1912:

13871.	Sir Isaac Rufus	Who gave it, and when was it given?
	Second officer Lightoller	- The Captain gave it to me.
13872.	Sir Isaac Rufus	What was the order?
	Second officer Lightoller	- After I had swung out No. 4 boat I asked the Chief Officer should we put the women and children in, and he said "No." I left the men to go ahead with their work and found the Commander, or I met him and I asked him should we put the women and children in, and the Commander said "Yes, put the women and children in and lower away." That was the last order I received on the ship.

In his 1935 memoirs he told:

Having got the boats swung out, I made for the Captain and happened to meet him near by on the boat deck. Drawing him into a corner, and cupping both my hands over my mouth and his ear, I yelled at the top of my voice, “Hadn’t we better get the women and children into the boats, sir?” He heard me, and nodded reply.

In his 1936 radio interview to the BBC he told:

Just a little while before they were ready to swing out, I happened to meet the captain and I asked him, by cupping my hands over his ear and yelling at the top of my voice, "Shall I get the women and children away sir?" He just nodded. So, I started to fill the first boat.

As you can read through the testimonies it appears captain Smith wasn't specific about if men were allowed in or not. Unlike what the 1997 movie showcases. Lightoller his reasoning why so many lifeboats were filled under the certificated 65 capacity was also based on the opinion, which third officer Pitman and fifth officer Lowe shared, that the floating capacity wasn't the lowering capacity.
Second officer Lightoller at the first day of the American Senate Inquiry mentioned the following:

Senator SMITH.
You say there were about 25 in this first lifeboat?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
About that.

Senator SMITH.
And that it was loaded under your orders?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
Under my orders.

Senator SMITH.
What happened to that lifeboat, the first one loaded?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
It was loaded and sent away from the ship.

Senator SMITH.
Did it not return to the ship because it was only half loaded?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator SMITH.
As a matter of fact it was not much more than half loaded, was it?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
You mean its floating capacity?

Senator SMITH.
Yes.

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
Floating capacity; no.

Senator SMITH.
How did it happen you did not put more people into that boat?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
Because I did not consider it safe.

Senator SMITH.
In a great emergency like that, where there were limited facilities, could you not have afforded to try to put more people into that boat?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
I did not know it was urgent then. I had no idea it was urgent.

Senator SMITH.
You did not know it was urgent.

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
Nothing like it.

Senator SMITH.
Supposing you had known it was urgent, what would you have done?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
I would have acted to the best of my judgment then.

Senator SMITH.
Tell me what you would have thought wise.

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
I would have taken more risks. I should not have considered it wise to put more in, but I might have taken risks.

Senator SMITH.
As a matter of fact are not these lifeboats so constructed as to accommodate 40 people?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
Sixty-five in the water, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Sixty-five in the water, and about 40 as they are being put into the water?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
No, sir.

Senator SMITH.
How?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
No, sir; it all depends on your gears, sir. If it were an old ship, you would barely dare to put 25 in.

Senator SMITH.
But this was a new one?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
And therefore I took chances with her afterwards.

Senator SMITH.
You put 25 in?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
In the first.

Senator SMITH.
In that situation you were quite sure that they were filled to their capacity?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
Yes, sir. I don't say to their floating capacity, I don't say 65.

Senator SMITH.
But about the same number of persons were in each boat?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
I should say 35 or 40.

On day four he gave the following information:

Senator SMITH.
What was the capacity of that boat - water capacity and lowering capacity?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
The cubical capacity was 665 feet.

Senator SMITH.
How many people would that accommodate?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
In absolutely smooth water, under the most favorable conditions, the board of trade allows 10 feet to each person.

Senator SMITH.
How many persons would that be?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
That is 65 1/2.

Senator SMITH.
That was a clear night, was it not?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
Perfectly clear, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Everything was favorable for the lifeboat if it had its maximum capacity so far as you know?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
When they were in the water, so far as I could see from the deck.

Senator SMITH.
How much difference do you make between the safe capacity of the lifeboat in the water, and up at the boat deck, hanging at the davits?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
Well, with a brand new ship, and all brand new gear, brand new boats, and everything in the pink of condition, a boat might be safely lowered - you can not guarantee it - she might go down safely with perhaps 20 to 25 in her.

Senator SMITH.
But If the boat happened to be a boat that had been across the sea enough times to impair her as a lifeboat on such a vessel, how many people would such a boat hold?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
I could not say, sir.

Senator SMITH.
But, in your judgment, in order to hold 25 people safely while being lowered into the water, everything would have to be new and in the pink [peak] of condition?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
Precisely.

At the British Board Of Trade inquiry, as questioned by solicitor-general John Simon on the twelfth day he gave the following information:

14231. Is that a better means of putting people into a lifeboat - a safer means I mean - than having the boat filled on the boat deck 70 feet above the water and then lowered down?
- Do you mean filled to her utmost capacity?

14232. Yes.
- Yes, it is far better to get the boat water borne.

14233. If a boat is filled to its utmost capacity on the boat deck there is a possibility of two dangers, either the falls may prove insufficient or the boat may buckle and break. I think that is the effect of your evidence?
- That is right.

14234. Is it a practicable way of filling a lifeboat in any kind of sea and weather conditions to lower her into the water practically empty and then fill her from those gangway doors?
- Oh yes.

14235. You do not see any greater difficulty in filling her from those gangways doors in rough weather than in lowering her from the boat deck?
- In rough weather I am afraid that boating altogether is a pretty big problem, More than we could discuss here. There are so many things before that to be taken into consideration.

14236. I know, but it is just because of your vast experience - you hold a Master's certificate and an extra Master's certificate, and I recognise your knowledge and experience - that I want you to give us the benefit of your experience. In rough weather would it be safer to fill the boats from the lower part of the ship than from the boat deck?
- You have put a very difficult question before me, you know, and it has nothing to do with this.

I believe Lightoller made this up.

What do you believe Lightoller made up?