Question Captain Smith and the Ice Field

Nagy Gabor

Member
First of all, sorry for my bad english. My question is, did Captain Smith in his long career come across an ice field so large that it blocked the Titanic's path? If so, what was your usual procedure in such a case? It seems that on the Titanic they did not know the extent of the ice field, only the icebergs.
 
while snoozing in the navigation room settee!
Ok, now your proof? Those who want to pile on Captain Smith have to decide whether he was sleeping or on the toilet. Both are just gratuitous shots which do nothing to strengthen the case against him. I suppose he was drunk too? These kind of unfounded attacks are supposed to be the remedy to a weak argument. They aren’t.
 
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What I can deduce from the facts that we think we might know but still doubting about …is that a 15 seconds reaction time is just inconceivable. The wheel (rudder) was also kept too long to port. Lastly, I also doubt that the liner turned on her wheel alone up to two points to port. A shiphandler would never have taken such a time response nor kept the wheel that long and possibly not even Murdoch himself! Regardless, that no second-chance evasive maneuver should have been executed by Smith himself, the most experienced on board. I would give him the benefit that if he had been or called on the bridge under such a dark night, he would have communing with nature and ringed the engines half ahead. At that pace, hitting or nor would have save the adventure.
 
Making these sorts of tests in the middle of the night would not have been the idea of the century;
They were NOT testing anything that night. Those boilers were first lit up that Sunday morning. It takes about 12 hours from the time they are first lit for them to be connected on line. This is all in the available evidence. The effect of them being hooked up on Sunday night would be to allow the stoking rate needed to maintain the rpms at 75 to be eased up. The maximum speed for the ship was rated around 78 rpms. The available evidence that we have is that there was a max speed test planned for Monday if the weather conditions allowed. That of course never came to be.
 
They were NOT testing anything that night. Those boilers were first lit up that Sunday morning. It takes about 12 hours from the time they are first lit for them to be connected on line. This is all in the available evidence. The effect of them being hooked up on Sunday night would be to allow the stoking rate needed to maintain the rpms at 75 to be eased up. The maximum speed for the ship was rated around 78 rpms. The available evidence that we have is that there was a max speed test planned for Monday if the weather conditions allowed. That of course never came to be.
That’s the test I’m talking about: increasing the revs from 75 to say 78. How do you think the engines would’ve reacted? That’s the question Bell was asking himself! Therefore, better be around, during day time, in case of some wrong goings, don’t you think?

As far as I know, when there are some or any changes to the regime of such gigantic engines, the Chief is down below, not in his bed!
 
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In the First it is said that the Captain Smith had already started a south deviation of the ship road,
and in the Second one they're talking of a mesure with sextant made by Lightoller on that sunday at 19h30/ 7:30 p.m.
with mistakes due to his own, or some seconds late from the needle watch, that making a different location of the ship.
Watching documentaries is not a recommended source for obtaining facts. They are usually made with lots of sensationalism to attract viewer ratings.

The story behind the myth that Smith delayed turning for NY but took his ship further south to avoid ice started during the British inquiry with the testimonies of 3/O Pitman and 4/O Boxhall. Those two claimed that if Capt. Smith intended to turn the vessel at the Corner turning point (42°N, 47°W), he should have ordered the turn earlier than what he actually did. This all came about because of the wrong SOS position that 4/O Boxhall worked out, which has been proved to be about 13 miles too far west of where the ship really sank. Boxhall and all the other surviving officers did not realize that a mistake was make in his SOS calculations. If you assume the SOS position was correct, then by working the problem backward you would have come to the conclusion that the ship had turned well beyond the Corner point for it to get to the SOS location. But if you look at where the ship was at noontime that Sunday, about 126 miles from the Corner point, you would immediately see that turning for NY should indeed have taken place around the time that Smith ordered it, which would be within a couple of miles of the Corner point, depending on what the actual current was from noon until the turning time of 5:50pm.

The bottom line is that Smith intended to turn at the usual Corner point, and had set the time to do so. He did NOT take his ship south on purpose.

As for the sights taken by Lightoller and Pitman at 7:30pm that was used to fix the ship's position at that time. There really is no evidence that any mistake was made at that time, and in all probability, the mistakes were made during the time the distress positions were worked out after the accident happened.
 
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Ok, now your proof? Those who want to pile on Captain Smith have to decide whether he was sleeping or on the toilet. Both are just gratuitous shots which do nothing to strengthen the case against him. I suppose he was drunk too? These kind of unfounded attacks are supposed to be the remedy to a weak argument. They aren’t.
It doesn’t matter if Smith was in bed, on the throne, loaded or having a bath given by Boxhall, the point is that a vigilant commander, knowing what he knew or had to know, his presence was required on the bridge and nowhere else. Bar point. If you need a proof, here’s one …

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... meet it head-on! ;)
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE LOSS OF THE TITANIC (1912).
by Captain Joseph Conrad, Master Mariner, from Notes on life and letters (1921)

I am well aware that those responsible for her short and fatal existence ask us in desolate accents to believe that if she had hit end on she would have survived. Which, by a sort of coy implication, seems to mean that it was all the fault of the officer of the watch for trying to avoid the obstacle.

We shall have presently, in deference to commercial and industrial interests, a new kind of seamanship. A very new and "progressive" kind. If you see anything in the way, by no means try to avoid it; smash at it full tilt. And then and then only, you shall see the triumph of material, of clever contrivances, of the whole box of engineering tricks in fact, and cover with glory a commercial concern of the most unmitigated sort, a great Trust, and a great ship building yard, justly famed for the super-excellence of its material and workmanship. Unsinkable! See? I told you she was unsinkable, if only handled in accordance with the new seamanship.

Everything's in that. And, doubtless, the Board of Trade, if properly approached, would consent to give the needed instructions to its examiners of Masters and Mates. Behold the examination-room of the future. Enter to the grizzled examiner a young man of modest aspect: "Are you well up in modern seamanship?" "I hope so, sir." "H'm, let's see. You are at night on the bridge in charge of a 150,000 tons ship, with a motor track, organ- loft, etc., etc., with a full cargo of passengers, a full crew of 1,500 cafe waiters, two sailors and a boy, three collapsible boats as per Board of Trade regulations, and going at your three-quarter speed of, say, about forty knots. You perceive suddenly right ahead, and close to, something that looks like a large ice-floe. What would you do?" "Put the helm amidships."Very well. Why?" "In order to hit end on." "On what grounds should you endeavour to hit end on?" "Because we are taught by our builders and masters that the heavier the smash, the smaller the damage, and because the requirements of material should be attended to."

Thus my sarcastic prophecy, that such a suggestion was sure to turn up, receives an unexpected fulfillment. You will see yet that in deference to the demands of "progress" the theory of the new seamanship will become established: "Whatever you see in front of you; ram it fair. . ." The new seamanship! Looks simple, doesn't it? But it will be a very exact art indeed. The proper handling of an unsinkable ship, you see, will demand that she should be made to hit the iceberg very accurately with her nose, because should you perchance scrape the bluff of the bow instead, she may, without ceasing to be as unsinkable as before, find her way to the bottom. I congratulate the future transatlantic passengers on the new and vigorous sensations in store for them. They shall go bounding across from iceberg to iceberg at twenty-five knots with precision and safety, and a "cheerful bumpy sound" as the immortal poem has it. It will be a teeth-loosening, exhilarating experience. The decorations will be Louis XV, of course, and the cafe shall remain open all night. But what about the priceless Sevres porcelain and the Venetian glass provided for the service of transatlantic passengers? Well, I am afraid all that will have to be replaced by silver goblets and plates. Nasty, common, cheap silver. But those who will go to sea must be prepared to put up with a certain amount of hardship. ;)
 
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The point being made by Georges is that a more responsible commander would be on the bridge, not just inside his quarters, knowing full well that his ship may encounter ice in its path, let alone taking other measures to reduce the risk of going through an ice region at full speed.
Sam: Your interpretation of what Georges wrote is very generous because yours is a debatable contention without falsehoods. As I responded to him, his case is not made stronger by adding hyperbole. I’m not going to give him the benefit of the doubt about
”what he probably means.” If he’s going to participate in this forum he shouldn’t need an interpreter to minimize his false claims.
 
I am well aware that those responsible for her short and fatal existence ask us in desolate accents to believe that if she had hit end on she would have survived. Which, by a sort of coy implication, seems to mean that it was all the fault of the officer of the watch for trying to avoid the obstacle.
Just for the record Georges, I have never believed in that nonsense about how Murdoch should have allowed the ship to collide head-on. That sort of view is both non-analytical and plain stupid.

By the way, I was merely wondering how you were going to handle the sort of pithy flak that is now coming your way.

You are the one who claimed Smith was sleeping! Since you have no proof, you now claim it doesn’t matter what he was doing. Why make false claims? You are worse than you try to make Smith out to be. I urge you not to keep spreading your libelous claims in this forum.
And how do you know that he was wide awake and alert? What proof do you have to your claims to the contrary? In fact the circumstantial evidence available from 2 survivor witnesses - QM Hichens and QM Olliver suggests that Georges has a good point; it was at least 40 seconds after the first impact (In fact, Hichens thought that it was about a minute) that Smith hurried onto the bridge. That suggests that he was alerted by the jarring impact and had not heard the bells, shouted orders, ringing of the engine telegraph etc that took place before the collision occurred. The most logical assumption then would be that Smith was dozing on the settee at the time, unless someone wants to make out that he was coming out of a Yoga trance or something.
 
And how do you know that he was wide awake and alert? What proof do you have to your claims to the contrary?
I don’t have any proof that Smith was doing or not doing anything. The burden of proof is not on me to prove anything for which there is no evidence. When speculation is elevated to the level of fact as it so often is done here, then anything that fits one’s narrative is promoted as “the most logical assumption”. You may assume anything you want but without evidence it stays a speculative assumption. Georges didn’t qualify that his statement was a speculative assumption. You even warned him of the blowback he was likely to get. Theories and assumptions are the coin of the realm here at ET. That’s fine. But you‘ve crossed a bright line when your theories and assumptions are presented as if they have magically moved to the realm of demonstrable fact. What is so wrong with just saying we don’t have any details of what Captain Smith was doing? I suppose it is intended to heap greater guilt on him to suggest otherwise. Would someone with an airtight case regarding either Smith’s actions or inactions need to bolster his case? There seems to be a suggestion that Smith himself was negligent for not standing a dusk to dawn watch alongside his OOW’s. Is that really what is being suggested? You might as well lay all your cards on the table at this point.
 
We have been though this "evidence" (or the lack of it) that Captain Smith had dozed off at the time his ship encountered the iceberg. Tell me, how is anyone supposed to provide evidence that he was either asleep or sitting in his chair wide-eyed waiting for something to happen? It is not as though anyone was knocking on his door every so often to check what he was doing and then lived to tell the tale. But the fact remains that it was well over a minute after the bells in the Crow's Nest rang that he arrived on the bridge and the logical conclusion therefore is that he must have been asleep and did not hear either the bell or the commotion that followed till the ship actually hit the iceberg. Just because you and some others don't like that probability does not alter the likelihood of it.

But the point here is that even if Smith had fallen asleep, that in itself was not anything to blame in my book. In fact, it would have made no difference whether he was dozing or sitting-up in the chart room because by the time the bells rang, it was already too late. Where Sam, Georges and many others are critical of Captain Smith was his definite lackadaisical attitude that night that contributed to the disaster. His handling of the Baltic message alone was more than sufficient to consider him negligent, let alone not slackening speed, not changing to a more southerly course or being present himself on the bridge till they had safely negotiated the ice field. There are no two ways about it.
 
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