Question Captain Smith and the Ice Field

[Nagy Gabor]

First of all, sorry for my bad english. My question is, did Captain Smith in his long career come across an ice field so large that it blocked the Titanic's path? If so, what was your usual procedure in such a case? It seems that on the Titanic they did not know the extent of the ice field, only the icebergs.

 

[Georges Guay]

Hi Mike, The OOW is the chief when it comes to collision avoidance as it is a time limited event. The Captain could be anywhere on the ship and so has entrusted the OOW to make decisions on his/her behalf.

Sorry but, the master of a brand new ocean liner carrying thousands of passengers and crew members, should not be anywhere else than on the «bridge» during a pitch dark moonless night and dead calm seas, when his vessel is approaching at full pace of 22½ knots toward a known arctic field ice infested by icebergs and growlers.

Standing Orders example notes:

BASIC PRINCIPLES TO BE OBSERVED IN KEEPING A NAVIGATIONAL WATCH

The master of every ship is bound to ensure that watchkeeping arrangements are adequate for maintaining a safe navigational watch.

Watch arrangements:

(a) The composition of the watch shall at all times be adequate and appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions and shall take into account the need for maintaining a proper lookout.
(ii) weather conditions, visibility and whether there is daylight or darkness;
(iii) proximity of navigational hazards which may make it necessary for the officer in charge of the watch to carry out additional navigational duties;

Navigational duties and responsibilities:

(a) The officer in charge of the watch shall:
(i) keep his watch on the bridge which he shall in no circumstances leave until properly relieved;
(iii) notify the master when in any doubt as to what action to take in the interest of safety;
(b) On taking over the watch the relieving officer shall satisfy himself as to the ship’s estimated or true position and confirm its intended track, course and speed and shall note any dangers to navigation expected to be encountered during his watch.

RECOMMENDATION ON OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE FOR OFFICERS IN CHARGE OF A NAVIGATIONAL WATCH

3. It is of special importance that at all times the officer of the watch ensures that an efficient look-out is maintained.
4. The officer of the watch should bear in mind that the engines are at his disposal and he should not hesitate to use them in case of need. However, timely notice of intended variations of engine speed should be given where possible. He should also know the handling characteristics of his ship, including its stopping distance, and should appreciate that other ships may have different handling characteristics.

TAKING OVER THE NAVIGATIONAL WATCH

7. The relieving officer should not take over the watch until his vision is fully adjusted to the light conditions and he has personally satisfied himself regarding:
(a) standing orders and other special instructions of the master relating to navigation of the ship;
(c) prevailing and predicted tides, currents, weather, visibility and the effect of these factors upon course and speed;
(d) navigational situation, including but not limited to the following:
(iv) conditions and hazards likely to be encountered during his watch;

CALLING THE MASTER 24.

The officer of the watch should notify the master immediately in the following circumstances:
(a) if restricted visibility is encountered or expected; (darkness)
(h) if the ship meets any hazard to navigation, such as ice or derelicts; (expected)
(i) in any other emergency or situation in which he is in any doubt.

Despite the requirement to notify the master immediately in the foregoing circumstances, the officer of the watch should in addition not hesitate to take immediate action for the safety of the ship, where circumstances so require.

 

[Georges Guay]

Let me put the question to you. What was Murdoch doing during the period of time between the 3 bells struck by Fleet, Fleet's going to the phone box behind Lee to get to the phone, the ringing and answering of the phone from the nest by Moody, and Moody's repeating of Fleet's word to him on the phone to Murdoch?

Test two..

Let’s have a look to this allision sequence;

• Three loud bell clapper from the nest,
• Phone ring in the wheelhouse,
• Murdoch order «Hard-a-starboard»,
• Fleet «Answer the phone you bastards!»
• Moody / Hichens repeat «Hard-a-starboard», Moody verify that the wheel is turned in the proper direction,
• Moody answer the phone,
• Murdoch double-ring the Starboard EOT followed by Emergency EOT to STOP,
• Moody advise «Iceberg Right Ahead»,
• Moody / Hichens confirm «Helm Hard-a-starboard»,
• Allision against the iceberg!
• Murdoch close the WT doors,
• Murdoch order «Hard-a-Port», Olliver witness the Hard-a-Port order,
• Moody / Hichens repeat «Hard-a-Port»,
• Moody / Hichens Moody confirm «Helm Hard-a-Port»,
• Hichens see the captain entering the Wheelhouse from his quarters and stepping out onto the bridge,
• Boxhall arrive on the bridge to meet Smith, the Murdoch and Moody by the wheelhouse. He hear Smith; «What have we struck?» Murdoch reply; «We have struck an iceberg. The watertight doors are closed. I put her hard-a-starboard and run the engines full astern, but it was too close; she hit it. I intended to port around it».

 

[David Allison]

Sorry but, the master of a brand new ocean liner carrying thousands of passengers and crew members, should not be anywhere else than on the «bridge» during a pitch dark moonless night and dead calm seas, when his vessel is approaching at full pace of 22½ knots toward a known arctic field ice infested by icebergs and growlers.

Standing Orders example notes:

BASIC PRINCIPLES TO BE OBSERVED IN KEEPING A NAVIGATIONAL WATCH

The master of every ship is bound to ensure that watchkeeping arrangements are adequate for maintaining a safe navigational watch.

Watch arrangements:

(a) The composition of the watch shall at all times be adequate and appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions and shall take into account the need for maintaining a proper lookout.
(ii) weather conditions, visibility and whether there is daylight or darkness;
(iii) proximity of navigational hazards which may make it necessary for the officer in charge of the watch to carry out additional navigational duties;

Navigational duties and responsibilities:

(a) The officer in charge of the watch shall:
(i) keep his watch on the bridge which he shall in no circumstances leave until properly relieved;
(iii) notify the master when in any doubt as to what action to take in the interest of safety;
(b) On taking over the watch the relieving officer shall satisfy himself as to the ship’s estimated or true position and confirm its intended track, course and speed and shall note any dangers to navigation expected to be encountered during his watch.

RECOMMENDATION ON OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE FOR OFFICERS IN CHARGE OF A NAVIGATIONAL WATCH

3. It is of special importance that at all times the officer of the watch ensures that an efficient look-out is maintained.
4. The officer of the watch should bear in mind that the engines are at his disposal and he should not hesitate to use them in case of need. However, timely notice of intended variations of engine speed should be given where possible. He should also know the handling characteristics of his ship, including its stopping distance, and should appreciate that other ships may have different handling characteristics.

TAKING OVER THE NAVIGATIONAL WATCH

7. The relieving officer should not take over the watch until his vision is fully adjusted to the light conditions and he has personally satisfied himself regarding:
(a) standing orders and other special instructions of the master relating to navigation of the ship;
(c) prevailing and predicted tides, currents, weather, visibility and the effect of these factors upon course and speed;
(d) navigational situation, including but not limited to the following:
(iv) conditions and hazards likely to be encountered during his watch;

CALLING THE MASTER 24.

The officer of the watch should notify the master immediately in the following circumstances:
(a) if restricted visibility is encountered or expected; (darkness)
(h) if the ship meets any hazard to navigation, such as ice or derelicts; (expected)
(i) in any other emergency or situation in which he is in any doubt.

Despite the requirement to notify the master immediately in the foregoing circumstances, the officer of the watch should in addition not hesitate to take immediate action for the safety of the ship, where circumstances so require.

Thank you George,

That’s a very good directive, full of common sense. I may have missed it but where specifically does it say the Captain must be on the bridge. Also, when was that published?

I would be curious to learn about your experience as a pilot. Are you handling the helm and the power? If so, how about in a collision avoidance situation? You and the Captain regarding liability? I know, too many questions!

 

[Mike Spooner]

Captain Smith made it quite clear to OOW if there is any changes in the weather reported to me IMMEDIATELY and I will be just inside my quarters.
Therefore he cannot be any wear else on the ship. Murdoch has also slip up by being the only one on the bridge and the wing to at the time. He had two junior officers for his assistant but where they? 4th officer Boxhall in his quarter which must of got permission to do so. I have to question 6th officer Moody whereabout to as Fleet on the phone said are you there. As if Moody was the wheelhouse why any delay in answering the phone.

 

[Georges Guay]

Thank you George,

That’s a very good directive, full of common sense. I may have missed it but where specifically does it say the Captain must be on the bridge. Also, when was that published?

I would be curious to learn about your experience as a pilot. Are you handling the helm and the power? If so, how about in a collision avoidance situation? You and the Captain regarding liability? I know, too many questions!

You’re welcome David,

You are perfectly right. Maritime Legislators kept a reserve from dictating when a master has to be or not on the bridge. There would be just too many different circumstances to depict. What they came up with is this; «The master of a vessel shall be on duty as required by the ordinary practice of seamen». Ordinary practice of seamen is nothing more and nothing less than Common Sense, and is usually defined as a result of a behavior which can be expected from an average good master or seafarer. In our case, I consider as an average good master that since due regard shall be had to the special circumstances of the situation and to all dangers of navigation, that the precautions required by the ordinary practice demanded that the master should not have been anywhere else than on the «bridge». In other words, a master is responsible for doing everything necessary to avoid the dangers of navigation and its inherent risk of collision.

As a pilot, you give helm orders or course to steer and command engine settings without touching anything. The ship’s crew must comply entirely but are required to interrogate in case of doubts and to extreme limits, taking the conduct over the pilot. Good luck! The pilot is accountable to protect his license, which means doing everything necessary to avoid the dangers of navigation and its inherent risk of collision and groundings. If a pilot is found having made a wrong doing or worst, something that his peers would not have done in the same circumstances, he risks losing his licence.

The captain is the owner representative and remains the ultimate responsible. The owner insurance covers incident bills due to simple negligence. Pilots civil liability was in my case quite low. Increasing civil liability would mean increasing pilotage fare. Nevertheless, shipping companies would still have to pay insurance premiums as accident risks are too high in narrow channels and harbors.

 

[Georges Guay]

As if Moody was the wheelhouse why any delay in answering the phone.

To my humble opinion, the delay in answering the phone was due to the fact that at about the same moment, Moody received Murdoch urgent order to starboard the helm. Responding to that helm order had priority over answering the phone.

Murdoch has also slip up by being the only one on the bridge and the wing to at the time.

I can not agree more on that!

 

[Samuel Halpern]

One can create any scenario they wish based on their imagination of what took place that night. But imagination cannot replace reality. The reality of what happened can only come from those who were there and lived to tell about it. From those who were there and lived to tell their stories (Fleet, Lee, Hichens, Olliver, Barrett), we are told:

0. Fleet sees this mass ahead. Tells Lee, "That's ice," and reaches up and strikes the bell 3 times.
1. Olliver on the compass platform amidships hears those 3 bells.
2. Hichens hears the phone ring in the wheelhouse a few seconds after the 3 bells, Moody answers with, "Yes. What do you see?"
3. Fleet's responds with: "Iceberg right ahead," to which Moody replied, "Thank you." This was followed by Moody calling out, "Iceberg right ahead," to Murdoch who immediately issued the order, "Hard-astarboard."
4. Hichens turns the wheel hard over while hearing the EOTs ringing down orders.
5. Lee sees the ship starting to turn to port and tells Fleet who was returning to his position on the port side of the nest.
6. Barrett hears bells ring, sees the BR telegraph go to STOP and calls out "Shut the dampers."
7. The ship turns from1 to 2 points before iceberg contact happens.
8. Olliver enters the bridge just as the ship strikes, notices Murdoch by the WTD switch, and seas the peak of the berg pass aft the bridge wing.

Timing it all out, the key is the amount of time it would have taken Olliver to go down from the platform amidships to the bridge, a known distance. Within that time is the time it took Murdoch to issue his helm order plus the time it took the ship to turn between 1 and 2 points.

To my humble opinion, the delay in answering the phone was due to the fact that at about the same moment, Moody received Murdoch urgent order to starboard the helm. Responding to that helm order had priority over answering the phone.

According to both Fleet and Hichens there was very little delay in Moody answering the phone.

If you like to change the narrative, then you have to provide some good supportive evidence. That iceberg just didn't pop up in front of the ship like some deer or moose jumping out in front of an automobile. It became noticed when it was about 1/2 to 1/3 mile in front of the vessel.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

…or during some 15 seconds!!! I will tell you my learned friend that I have not a single idea whatsoever. I would understand 5 seconds at the most, but not 15. There’s something here that does not add up in a shiphandler mind!

Perhaps Murdoch realized within those initial 5 seconds that the ship was going to strike because it was just too close. What then? Let it strike head on, or try and minimize the impact by striking it along the bluff of the bow? Quoting from our friend
Extra Master Mariner A. N. Cockcroft (A Guide To The Collision Avoidance Rules):

“The engines should be stopped, and the helm should be used so as to achieve a glancing blow rather than a direct impact. The damage would probably be the least serious if the impact is taken forward of the collision bulkhead.”

 

[Mike Spooner]

If Hitchens, Moody, Murdoch, and Oliver heard the 3 bells, why didn't Smith heard the 3 bells to?

 

[Samuel Halpern]

If Hitchens, Moody, Murdoch, and Oliver heard the 3 bells, why didn't Smith heard the 3 bells to?

If you think hard enough I'm sure you can figure it out.

 

[Bob Read]

Since there seems to be a perceived requirement for Smith to be physically on the bridge before the the crow's nest bell is struck for the third time, maybe someone can clear up a few misconceptions I might be harboring. Is it not true that the purpose of the crow's nest bell is to signal the OOW that there is a potential hazard to navigation and to signal its location by either one bell for port, two bells for starboard or three bells for directly ahead? Is it not true that the ringing of the crow's nest bell does not indicate the magnitude of the hazard or how imminent the danger? Is it possible that the ringing of the crow's nest bell might signal something other than an imminent collision? Might it be used for a stopped vessel ahead? The Captain told the watch that he wanted to be notified if conditions changed. Would the Captain hearing a crow's nest bell necessarily require him to come bounding on the bridge or could there be any situation that the OOW could handle under his own authority?

 

[Samuel Halpern]

Would the Captain hearing a crow's nest bell necessarily require him to come bounding on the bridge or could there be any situation that the OOW could handle under his own authority?

Considering the fact that Smith and his officers expected to come up to the ice region sometime that night, I would think that hearing 3 bells from the nest around the expected time window would get the skipper out on deck in less than 30 seconds if he was just inside and awake if not otherwise indisposed.

 

[Bob Read]

Considering the fact that Smith and his officers expected to come up to the ice region sometime that night, I would think that hearing 3 bells from the nest around the expected time window would get the skipper out on deck in less than 30 seconds if he was just inside and awake if not otherwise indisposed.

But he knew they would report any change in conditions per his orders. “Otherwise indisposed”: translated passed out drunk on the toilet? The lookouts might sight random float ice and/or growlers which they could report with the bell which would require the OOW to send the junior officer on watch to go to Smith‘s quarters to inform him of a change in conditions.

 

[Mike Spooner]

When Lightoller wasvq
13635. The Captain left you about 20 or 25 past 9, you say. Did he say where he was going to, or where he had been, and so on? - Yes. The Captain said, “If it becomes at all doubtful” - I think those are his words - “If it becomes at all doubtful let me know at once; I will be just inside.”
13636. (The Commissioner.) If what becomes doubtful? - The general conditions, my Lord, I suppose he would mean - if it were at all doubtful about the distance I could see, principally.
13639. Now tell me again what this observation of the Captain meant, because I do not understand it. - With regard to the word “doubtful”?
13640. Yes; what did he mean? - It is rather difficult to define. It means to say if I had any doubt at all in my mind.
13641. What about? - About the weather, about the distance I could see - principally those two conditions it would refer to. If there were the slightest degree of haze to arise, the slightest haze whatever, if that were to any degree noticeable, to immediately notify him.
13642. (The Solicitor-General.) I will take what you have just said. You said if the slightest degree of haze was to arise - that would be what was meant - you were to notify him? -Immediately; yes.

 

[Mike Spooner]

Sorry my computer jump the gun before replying. When Lightoller was question in the British inquiry he made quite clear Smith order was as above.
Was the the captain quarter sound prove of the crow nest bell? Very much doubt it. But when you are in the ice region 3 Bells can only mean one thing ahead.