Question Captain Smith and the Ice Field

Nagy Gabor

Member
First of all, sorry for my bad english. My question is, did Captain Smith in his long career come across an ice field so large that it blocked the Titanic's path? If so, what was your usual procedure in such a case? It seems that on the Titanic they did not know the extent of the ice field, only the icebergs.
 
I second to question that view as well. William Murdoch had served as Olympic's first officer ever since she entered service, and albeit a much smaller ship in gross-tonnage he prevented a serious incident on-board the SS Arabic (II) in 1904 as her second officer. Murdoch also was the only officer on the ship who had passed all three of his examinations for his exams (2nd mate, 1st mate and extra-masters certificate) on his first attempt. I've always expressed the view based on his experience and credentials that the Titanic couldn't have had a better OOW on duty at the time when the iceberg was spotted.
He did his saintly duty as Saturn. He was in full control.
 
Perhaps, but for a very long time I have accepted your opinion that after he heard the bells from the crow's nest Murdoch used a short but finite timeframe, perhaps 15 to 18 seconds, to look at the object himself, identify it as an iceberg in the ship's path and assess his options for actions to take. It was the logical thing to do and a knee-jerk reaction, like the one that 1/O Fox allegedly ordered, could well have gone either way including making matters worse.

As you say, Murdoch might fleetingly had his Arabic experience in mind as the Titanic closed on the iceberg; or it might just have been the outcome of a combination of his personality, training and experience.

Out of interest, I would like to know if there was any fallout afterwards from Murdoch's actions on the Arabic, either from 1/O Fox, the Captain of the ship or anyone else?


I completely agree.


True, but that's all anyone can do, including trained and qualified experts like Wilding at the time. In 1912 there were no recording devices of any kind and reconstruction of events depended almost entirely upon survivor accounts. Even if a single account seemed dubious, comparison with other related statements often gave a reasonable, if not necessarily accurate picture of what happened with a particular event with regard to the Titanic. With that kind of collation and analysis, some statements naturally appear more reliable than others as being closer to actual events and the post-disaster investigators had no other option but to go by them. For example, to most of us statements by Lookout Fleet, QM Hichens and QM Olliver, despite subtle differences between them, appear far more likely to match up with what could have been the actual sequence of events after the berg was spotted than those made by 4/O Boxhall. But at the end of the day, even the likes of Wilding had to rely upon what they learned from survivor accounts about the location and nature of the flooding pattern that were reported as seen at various times and places.
He knew exactly what he was doing...and a 12 foot gash was all that was needed to bring in seawater to get to the bunker wall...then boom!
 
I believe that Smith had enough confidence in the abilities of his senior officers to make decisions such that he was only needed for the “big picture“ strategic decisions.
What big picture strategic decisions? Like:
-Should I divert to a more southern route?
-Should I increase the number and repositioning of lookouts?
-Should I have the engine room on standby?
 
no apparent way to convince anyone to even partially exonerate Captain Smith
That was done by the Wreck Commissioner, Lord Mersey: "He made a mistake, a very grievous mistake, but one in which, in face of the practice and of past experience, negligence cannot he said to have had any part; and in the absence of negligence it is, in my opinion, impossible to fix Captain Smith with blame."

I'm not all that sure that the same conclusion would have been made if Smith had survived and was able to be questioned rigorously at the inquiry? For what its worth, during the Hawke trial, Smith came across as being a bit lax in his decision making. Smith was directly watching the cruiser from Olympic's starboard bridge wing and mentioned to Bowyer that he didn't think the cruiser could get behind them. Bowyer than said to him, “If she is going to strike let me know in time to put our helm hard-aport.” Smith did not reply immediately, and a few seconds later Bowyer was forced to ask, “Is she going to strike us or not, sir?” Smith then said, “Yes Bowyer, she is going to strike us in the stern.” Too late.
 
One can create any scenario they wish based on their imagination of what took place that night. But imagination cannot replace reality. The reality of what happened can only come from those who were there and lived to tell about it. From those who were there and lived to tell their stories (Fleet, Lee, Hichens, Olliver, Barrett), we are told:

0. Fleet sees this mass ahead. Tells Lee, "That's ice," and reaches up and strikes the bell 3 times.
1. Olliver on the compass platform amidships hears those 3 bells.
2. Hichens hears the phone ring in the wheelhouse a few seconds after the 3 bells, Moody answers with, "Yes. What do you see?"
3. Fleet's responds with: "Iceberg right ahead," to which Moody replied, "Thank you." This was followed by Moody calling out, "Iceberg right ahead," to Murdoch who immediately issued the order, "Hard-astarboard."
4. Hichens turns the wheel hard over while hearing the EOTs ringing down orders.
5. Lee sees the ship starting to turn to port and tells Fleet who was returning to his position on the port side of the nest.
6. Barrett hears bells ring, sees the BR telegraph go to STOP and calls out "Shut the dampers."
7. The ship turns from1 to 2 points before iceberg contact happens.
8. Olliver enters the bridge just as the ship strikes, notices Murdoch by the WTD switch, and seas the peak of the berg pass aft the bridge wing.

Timing it all out, the key is the amount of time it would have taken Olliver to go down from the platform amidships to the bridge, a known distance. Within that time is the time it took Murdoch to issue his helm order plus the time it took the ship to turn between 1 and 2 points.


According to both Fleet and Hichens there was very little delay in Moody answering the phone.

If you like to change the narrative, then you have to provide some good supportive evidence. That iceberg just didn't pop up in front of the ship like some deer or moose jumping out in front of an automobile. It became noticed when it was about 1/2 to 1/3 mile in front of the vessel.

That iceberg just didn't pop up in front of the ship like some deer or moose jumping out in front of an automobile.
Neither was Murdoch frozen like a kangaroo blinded by the headlights of an incoming off-road vehicle! :)

Collision sequence:
  • Fleet sighted a rather small black mass right ahead, strikes the bell 3 times and as requested in case of danger, phoned straight away the bridge,
  • Lee perceived that dark mass through the haze and as she moved away from it, there was just a white fringe along the top,
  • Olliver left the compass platform, after making sure the lamps were burning properly and secured,
  • Murdoch made out the berg dead ahead, within second(s) rushed toward the wheelhouse door and shouted Hard-a-Starboard,
  • The telephone rang in the wheelhouse,
  • Hichens acknowledged back the helm order,
  • Moody making sure the wheel was turned in the proper direction, answered the phone,
  • Murdoch rang the EOTs to Stop,
  • Moody advised Iceberg Right Ahead,
  • Hichens confirmed the helm hard over,
  • Collision,
  • Murdoch activated the WT Doors,
  • Murdoch rushed back on the starboard wing, observed the berg and ordered back the Helm from Hard-a-Starboard to Hard-a-Port,
  • Olliver on his way to the bridge, felt the shock, perceived grinding noise. Heard the order Hard-a-Port. Observed the berg without grinding noise, almost alongside of the boat and quit his location,
  • A minute after the collision, Smith rushed out of his room to the bridge,
  • Boxhall came into view,
  • The engines came to a Stop a minute and a half after the shock, the liner is swinging to starboard under a port helm,
Notes:
  • Fleet; «Well, she started to go to port while I was on the telephone».
  • Lee, who was then keeping lookout in the centre of the nest, said; As soon as the reply ‘Thank you’ came in, the helm must have been (already)* put hard-a-starboard or very close to it, since she was «veering» to port and seemed almost as if she might have cleared the berg, but I suppose there was ice under water».
* It would have taken at least 6 to 8 seconds if not more «after» the helm order was given for a lookout that high, so close to the bow and with such lacking of points of reference, to even notice a significant change of heading. Thus, Murdoch order must have then been given at about the same moment if not before the bell warning. Fleet or Lee would not have heard about the helm order.

The ship turns from 1 to 2 points before iceberg contact happens.

That fabrication comes from Hichens who got mixed up and said everything and it’s opposite. He was almost imploring the attorneys to tell him what they wanted to hear. Probably instructed by the WSL counselors, their objectives was to make us believing that since they were keeping a good lookout and that the OOW was attentive to his duty, the liner altered course well in advance to avoid that gigantic iceberg in their own way.

Hichens:
  • The helm is Hard-a- starboard, sir. But, during the time, she was crushing the ice or we could hear the grinding noise along the ship's bottom.
  • Just as she struck I had the order Hard-a-starboard, when she struck.
  • We had the order Hard-a-starboard and she just swung about two points when she struck.
  • Not immediately as she struck; the ship was swinging. We had the order Hard-a-starboard and she just swung about two points when she struck.
  • Had you time to get the helm hard a starboard before she struck? No, she was crashing then.
  • Yes, the helm was barely over when she struck. The ship had swung about two points.
  • How long was the bell warning before the order came Hard-a-starboard? Well, as near as I can tell you, about half a minute.
  • Did any one of the Officers see you carry out the order? Yes, Mr. Moody and also the Quartermaster on my left. (Olliver was just there at all!)
  • The Commissioner: She did not move anymore, because, as I understand, the crash came?
The Attorney-General: «Exactly; that is the story»
The Attorney-General: «So that Moody had reported and then it was after that that she strikes, is that right? She struck almost at the same time».
«Was that the only order you had as to the helm? Yes»
«She never was under a port helm? She did not come on the port helm, sir - (only) on the starboard helm.»

How did they manage to stop the liner swinging after 2 points, on a steady hard-a-starboard helm for 37 seconds like in the Olympic test? If the helm had been kept hard over, the berg would have grinded all the way down to the stern. The Commissioner: «She did not move anymore, because, as I understand, the crash came»!!!

Olliver:
  • I heard three bells rung up in the crow's nest, I left the standard compass platform, came forward and I was just entering on the bridge just as the shock came.
  • I know the orders I heard when I was on the bridge. It was after we had struck the iceberg that I heard hard-a-port.
  • The iceberg was away up the stern when the helm was shifted.
  • I was just abaft the bridge when I saw the iceberg.
  • The grinding sound was before I saw the iceberg. The grinding sound was not when I saw the iceberg.
  • It did not rub behind where I was; it was before.
  • It was almost alongside of the boat, sir. The top did not touch the side of the boat, but it was almost alongside of the boat.
  • The iceberg got away from the boat before the place I was just abaft the bridge.
  • Whilst I was on the bridge, she went half speed ahead after she struck!
How on earth did Olliver felt the shock just as he was entering the bridge, as when he was doing so, the helm had already been shifted Hard-a-port and at that moment, the berg was already away up the stern? He rather already heard, not visually sighted, the helm ordered hard-a-port when he was on the bridge and well after he felt the shock and heard the grinding noise. At the time the helm was shifted the berg was already away up the stern!

How did he know that the helm was shifted since he was on the compass platform when the first helm order hard-a-starboard was given?

«The grinding sound was before he saw the iceberg. The grinding sound was not when he saw the iceberg. It did not rub behind where he was; it was before. The iceberg got away from the boat before the place he was abaft the bridge».

If I know my lesson well, the berg grinded all the way past WT Bulkhead E, amid BR No.6 and No.5, which lined ups between Lifeboat 3 and 5.
Would a seaman take a chance to squeeze himself between lifeboats to observe an iceberg, so to witness fine details as the iceberg was almost alongside of the boat? One false step and he would have joined the berg over the side! The only safe place he could come up with his acute observations was from behind lifeboat No.7. These observations did also take time.

Olliver did not felt the shock just as he was entering the bridge but way behind. He felt the shock or grinding noise before he saw the berg. The berg even got away from the ship’s side forward of the place he was standing, aft of the WT Bulkhead E which lined ups between Lifeboat 3 and 5. He heard the helm ordered hard-a-port prior entering the bridge and clearly after he felt the shock. At that time the berg was already away up the stern. The safest place he could observe the berg so accurately was from the Boat Deck behind lifeboat 7, not between Lifeboat 3 and 5.

Olliver could not be at two places in the same time; sighting the berg getting away from the ship’s side forward of the place he was standing and feeling the shock just as he was entering the bridge, as at that time the berg was already all the way up to the stern.

That catastrophe happened much faster than we believe. The reason is that the iceberg was of the same type as the one Rostron almost collided with, if it’s not the same but ripped apart from its crest after a previous allision. When I plot everything on a nautical chart, the probability is rather high!

Carpethia, knowing very well she was steaming toward ice to the rescue of a liner actually sinking due to a collision with a berg, was steaming toward her CQD position at 13 to 15 knots. Fully manned on the bridge, in the nest, on the eye and in the engine room, she avoided about 6 icebergs before nearly colliding against the last one. «The shape of the iceberg itself might have accounted for it. It about 30 feet high and the sides were rather precipitous. If it had a greater surface you would have more blink». I have plotted backward the position of that berg on a nautical chart. The probability of that iceberg being the same as the infamous one has to be considered, naturally ripped apart from its crest following a previous allision.

Titanic collided with a rather small pinnacle iceberg, impossible to sight in time due to its shape under the existing visibility and much faster than anyone would believe. Nearly as fast as an old «deer or moose jumping out in front of an automobile» running at 42 km/h. ;)

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Here are some paste & copy testimonies coming from those who were there and lived to tell their stories...

Fleet:

17263. Did you say anything to your mate (Lee) about it?
- Well, I told him there was a slight haze coming.

Senator SMITH.
Was it the size of an ordinary house? Was it as large as this room appears to be?
Mr. FLEET.
No; no. It did not appear very large at all.

Senator SMITH.
Suppose you had had glasses such as you had on the Oceanic, or such as you had between Belfast and Southampton, could you have seen this black object a greater distance?
Mr. FLEET.
We could have seen it a bit sooner.

Senator SMITH.
How much sooner?
Mr. FLEET.
Well, enough to get out of the way.

Lee:

2408. Did you notice this haze which you said extended on the horizon when you first came on the look-out, or did it come later?
My mate (Fleet) happened to pass the remark to me. He said, "Well; if we can see through that we will be lucky." That was when we began to notice there was a haze on the water.

2425. Did you notice what the ship did?
- As soon as the reply came back "Thank you," the helm must have been put either hard-a-starboard or very close to it, because she veered to port, and it seemed almost as if she might clear it, but I suppose there was ice under water.

2441. (The Attorney-General.) I said 60 ft.; I am told it is about 55 feet. (To the Witness.) Can you give us any idea of the breadth? What did it look like? It was something which was above the forecastle?
- It was a dark mass that came through that haze and there was no white appearing until it was just close alongside the ship, and that was just a fringe at the top.

2442. It was a dark mass that appeared, you say?
- Through this haze, and as she moved away from it, there was just a white fringe along the top. That was the only white about it, until she passed by, and then you could see she was white; one side of it seemed to be black, and the other side seemed to be white. When I had a look at it going astern it appeared to be white.

Hichens:

Senator SMITH.
Who gave the first order?
Mr. HICHENS.
Mr. Murdoch, the first officer, sir; the officer in charge. The sixth officer repeated the order, "The helm is Hard-a- starboard, sir." But, during the time, she was crushing the ice, or we could hear the grinding noise along the ship's bottom.

Senator SMITH.
How long after the impact, or collision (the captain showed up to the bridge)?
Mr. HICHENS.
I could hardly tell you, sir. Judging roughly, about 5 minutes; about 5 to 10 minutes.

948. Had you had any instructions before she struck? Had you been told to do anything with your helm before she struck?
- Just as she struck I had the order "Hard-a-starboard" when she struck.

949. Just as she struck, is that what you said?
- Not immediately as she struck; the ship was swinging. We had the order, "Hard-a-starboard," and she just swung about two points when she struck.

951. Had you time to get the helm hard a starboard before she struck?
- No, she was crashing then.

952. Did you begin to get the helm over?
- Yes, the helm was barely over when she struck. The ship had swung about two points.

The Commissioner: She did not move anymore, because, as I understand, the crash came?

959. (The Attorney-General.) Exactly; that is the story. (To the Witness.)

973. How long was that before the order came "Hard-a-starboard"?
- Well, as near as I can tell you, about half a minute.

1009. (The Attorney-General.) It is a mere question of taking the indication of course. (To the Witness.) Did any one of the Officers see you carry out the order?
- Yes.

1010. Who?
- Mr. Moody, and also the Quartermaster on my left. He was told to take the time of the collision.

1015. (The Attorney-General.) It is only because you cannot fix the time except by seeing exactly what happened. That is the point of it. The estimate of time is of very little value, but if you can get what happened you can form an estimate. So that he had reported, and then it was after that that she strikes, is that right?
- She struck almost at the same time.

1016. Almost as he reported it?
- Yes.

The Commissioner:
Wait a minute. A minute after the collision, Captain Smith rushed out of his room and on to the bridge do you mean?
- Yes, Sir; he passed through the wheelhouse on to the bridge.

1027. He rushed out of his room through the wheelhouse on to the bridge?
- Yes.

1044. And were those all the orders you heard until you were relieved from the wheel?
- Yes.

1315. Was that the only order you had as to the helm?
- Yes.

1316. (Mr. Holmes.) It is Question 354. (To the Witness.) She never was under a port helm?
- She did not come on the port helm, sir - on the starboard helm.

Olliver:

Senator BURTON.
Where were you when the collision occurred?
Mr. OLLIVER.
I was not right on the bridge; I was just entering the bridge. I had just performed an errand and was entering the bridge when the collision occurred.

Senator BURTON.
Just state what happened?
Mr. OLLIVER.
I heard three bells rung up in the crow's nest, which I knew that it was something ahead. I happened to be looking at the lights in the standing compass at the time. When I heard the report, I looked, but could not see anything, and I left that and came and was just entering on the bridge just as the shock came.

Senator BURTON.
Describe it.
Mr. OLLIVER.
The iceberg was about the height of the boat deck; if anything, just a little higher. It was almost alongside of the boat, sir. The top did not touch the side of the boat, but it was almost alongside of the boat.

Senator BURTON.
Where was the iceberg when you saw it, abeam or abaft?
Mr. OLLIVER.
Just abaft the bridge when I saw it.

Senator BURTON.
That is when the order "Hard-a-port" was given?
Mr. OLLIVER.
That is when the order "Hard-a-port" was given; yes, sir.

Senator BURTON.
Do you mean hard-a-port or hard-a-starboard?
Mr. OLLIVER.
I know the orders I heard when I was on the bridge was after we had struck the iceberg. I heard hard-a-port, and there was the man at the wheel and the officer. The officer was seeing it was carried out right.

Senator BURTON.
Where was the iceberg, do you think, when the helm was shifted?
Mr. OLLIVER.
The iceberg was away up stern.

Senator BURTON.
Were the engines reversed; was she backed?
Mr. OLLIVER.
Not whilst I was on the bridge; but whilst on the bridge she went ahead, after she struck; she went half speed ahead.

Senator BURTON.
The engines went half speed ahead, or the ship?
Mr. OLLIVER.
Half speed ahead, after she hit the ice.

Dillon:

3716. And shortly before that (shock) had the telegraph rung?
- Yes.

3717. Can you say at all how long before she struck that was?
- Two seconds.

3720. Was anything done to the engines? Did they stop or did they go on?
- They stopped.

3721. Was that immediately after you felt the shock or some little time after?
- About a minute and a half.

3722. Did they continue stopped or did they go on again after that?
- They went slow astern.

  • engines brought to stop 1½ minute after impact
  • engines stop for ½ minute
  • engines brought to Slow Astern for 2 minutes
  • engines stop
  • engines brought Ahead for 2 minutes
  • engines Stop for good!
 
Captain Patrick R.M. Toomey,

Captain Patrick R.M. Toomey spent 16 years in the British Merchant Navy as a navigating officer on cargo vessels in worldwide trade prior joining the Canadian Coast Guard. He served as Chief Officer aboard the icebreaker CCGS N.B. Mclean from 1968 to 1969, having completed his first Arctic voyage aboard in 1968. That was his first of 43 subsequent Arctic Summers odysseys, the last of which was in 2016 as Ice pilot of the 51-metre on the westbound super-yacht Rosehearty.

He commanded the CCGS N.B. Mclean from 1975 to 1976, but did not take her north. In 1978 he took command of the CCGS Pierre Radisson, a new prototype of a latest CCG icebreaker class. That maiden voyage was a truly memorable trip; taking her through the Northwest Passage as her first experience in ice of any kind, was a bold move which came close to a destruction test in the Victoria Strait. That was his first transit of the NWP, not knowing that he would eventually complete 14 more of them over the next 38 years, seven on board Russian icebreakers, one on a 50,000 ton condo-ship and four others on super-yachts, sometimes eastbound, sometimes westbound, via a total of 9 different variations of Amundsen main route.

After retirement from the CCG, Captain Toomey made 33 trips to Antarctica, sailed in six different Russian icebreakers, made six trips to the North Pole aboard nuclear powered icebreakers. He also completed one eastbound transit of the Siberian Northern Sea route from Kirkenes, Norway to Provideniya on the Bering Strait. February 2010 saw him completed his 31st voyage into Antarctic waters. Of his recent Antarctic sojourns, one has been a circumnavigation on a Russian icebreaker of the Antarctic continent and 21 been made as Ice Pilot on the Holland America Line Rotterdam,‘Amsterda’, Veendam and Prinsendam cruise vessels

Captain Toomey had his name given to a dangerous strait of the Antarctic Peninsula after his service to Antarctic navigation and for his significant contributions to ‘The Ice Navigation Manual’ published by Witherby Seamanship in 2010. The Toomey Strait passes between Wiencke Island and Fridtjof Island on the western side of the southern end of the Gerlache Strait in Lat: 64° 53’S & Long 63° 24’W. The Toomey Strait is not considered to be navigable as it has never been examined or sounded. Captain Toomey commented that he has always passed well offshore from it and, thankfully, never been aground on any of its many shoals. The strait is generally filled by grounded icebergs. He advises mariners to stay away from Toomey Strait as he cannot guarantee its safety!

The 440 page book balances the considerations for the different ice types that ships officers may encounter, whether first year or multi-year ice, and the different ice types in the Arctic, Antarctic, Great Lakes or the Baltic. As trade in ice covered waters continues to grow and increasingly, operators looking for future flexibility are building ships classed for operations in ice. The premise of the book was to provide a technical manual that was a reliable source for learning and reference relating to all aspects of Seafaring in Ice.

Here is the resume of a chat that I had with captain Toomey, which I happen to know.

Very unlikely that a large iceberg could be so covered in dirt that it would not be visible at night, with or without moonlight.

It has always been my opinion that Titanic did NOT hit a large iceberg, but she probably hit a bergy bit or much smaller berg calved from a larger one. A dangerous chunk of ice which she DID NOT see, in the darkness and the sea state of the open ocean.

At high speed a ship does not have to hit a very large piece of glacial (old) ice to do catastrophic damage, especially to a riveted ship whose seams would open in parts of the hull far removed from the impact zone. This is my theory, which has been backed by others, some of whom have written books about the subject. Having spent a lifetime dodging icebergs in both Polar Regions, I remain convinced that the Titanic lookouts spotted all of the large icebergs they encountered along their track, but forgot about the large amount of ice debris surrounding many of them, which could easily be mistaken for breaking waves in the darkness.

I just cannot believe that experienced navigating officers and deck crew, who had sailed those waters for years, could fail to see a berg at least 30 feet high though it is easy for anyone to miss sighting a growler.

You will probably have noted than many of those witnesses were either passengers, or crew members in the other departments such as Engine and Catering who would have no navigational experience, whose interpretations of what they remembered they saw may have been erroneous, mistaken or possibly fabricated to make a better story.


A small pinnacle iceberg (high enough to have fall broken ice on the liner Well Deck), drifting ghostly alone under a pitch dark moonless night and dead calm sea, that did not really have any flat surface to blink any light collided at 22½ knots solid. The rivets countersunk heads just popped up at the strakes seams and opened up the hull to the sea just about the size of an ordinary closet room door or 12 ft². Captain Toomey: «An iceberg such as you have described would not show up very well on most radars either, especially in sea-clutter, so they still present an extreme danger to shipping
 
That fabrication comes from Hichens who got mixed up and said everything and it’s opposite. He was almost imploring the attorneys to tell him what they wanted to hear. Probably instructed by the WSL counselors, their objectives was to make us believing that since they were keeping a good lookout and that the OOW was attentive to his duty, the liner altered course well in advance to avoid that gigantic iceberg in their own way.
If that was a fabrication about the ship turning to port before the collision, then Fleet was in on it:

Fleet, AI 361-362:
Senator FLETCHER. How long were you at the telephone?
Mr. FLEET. I suppose half a minute.

Senator FLETCHER. When you turned from the telephone and observed the course of the ship, you saw she had turned to port?
Mr. FLEET. Yes, sir.
Senator FLETCHER. Did she turn immediately and suddenly, or gradually, to port?
Mr. FLEET. Just started to go as I looked up.
Senator FLETCHER. Just started to go to port?
Mr. FLEET. Yes, sir.
Senator FLETCHER. To what extent did she change her course from the direct line?
Mr. FLEET. You mean how far did she go?
Senator FLETCHER. Yes.
Mr. FLEET. A little over a point, or two points.

Senator FLETCHER. Did she seem to respond readily to the wheel?
Mr. FLEET. Well, we do not know that. We only know she went.
Senator FLETCHER. You could see she was going?
Mr. FLEET. Yes, sir.
Senator FLETCHER. And did she continue to bear to port?
Mr. FLEET. Until the iceberg was alongside of her.


But earlier, on p. 320-321:

Senator SMITH. She started to go to port?
Mr. FLEET. Yes; the wheel was put to starboard.
Senator SMITH. How do you know that?
Mr. FLEET. My mate [Lee] saw it and told me. He [Lee] told me he could see the bow coming around.
Senator SMITH. They swung the ship's bow away from the object?
Mr. FLEET. Yes; because we were making straight for it.

Senator SMITH. But you saw the course altered? And the iceberg struck the ship at what point?
Mr. FLEET. On the starboard bow, just before the foremast.

It was Lee who first noticed the ship swinging to port and informed Fleet of that after Fleet got off the phone.
 
You seem to dismiss Olliver's, "and was just entering on the bridge just as the shock came" all too easily. If he was only around boat #7, he would not have been near Hichens when the hard-aport order came. Also if what they struck was only 30 ft above the water, it couldn't be seen from the boat deck. At the Ryan trial, Lee said: "It was as high as the boat deck." That would match Olliver's description of seeing only the peak of the berg pass by.
 
It was Lee who first noticed the ship swinging to port and informed Fleet of that after Fleet got off the phone.
Agreed and I believe that is a rather important and often ignored point, even though it might not seem to be directly related to the OP of this thread. From the moment Fleet saw the object ahead and struck the bells, a lot of people - Lee, Murdoch, Moody, Hichens, Olliver - were alerted and what they did next depended on their role at the time. In describing the following events, a lot of people do not seem to consider the fact that they happened along parallel timelines and not strictly one after another. In other words, immediately after Fleet rang the bells in the Crow's Nest:
  • IMO Murdoch immediately started scanning the ocean ahead and spotted the object even before Fleet moved to the telephone.
  • At the same time Olliver, having also heard the bells from his station at the compass platform, was getting off it to go to the bridge.
  • Fleet identified the object ahead as an iceberg before moving to the phone (going by what he said about it). By then Murdoch, using his binoculars, had also identified it as an iceberg (what he had first seen with the naked eye) directly in the ship's path.
  • As Fleet picked-up the loud-speaking phone for it to ring, Murdoch had completed his rapid assessment of the situation and decided on his first helm order.
  • During the timeframe that the phone rang in the bridge, Moody went to answer it and was having the exchange with Fleet, Murdoch gave the first "Hard-a-starboard!" order. I believe that happened seconds before Moody repeated what he'd heard from Fleet.
  • Olliver was meanwhile hurrying towards the bridge but still some distance from it and did not hear Murdoch's order.
  • Within the wheelhouse QM Hichens, already alerted by the bells, immediately repeated the order and acted upon it. I have read and understood that it would have taken him about 6 seconds to get the helm hard over.
  • During that time, in the Crow's Nest Fleet replaced the telephone and returned to his position alongside Lee. The latter, who meanwhile had been observing the closing iceberg, was the first to notice the slow port-ward movement of the Titanic's bow as soon as it started.
 
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If that was a fabrication about the ship turning to port before the collision, then Fleet was in on it:

Fleet, AI 361-362:
Senator FLETCHER. How long were you at the telephone?
Mr. FLEET. I suppose half a minute.

Senator FLETCHER. When you turned from the telephone and observed the course of the ship, you saw she had turned to port?
Mr. FLEET. Yes, sir.
Senator FLETCHER. Did she turn immediately and suddenly, or gradually, to port?
Mr. FLEET. Just started to go as I looked up.
Senator FLETCHER. Just started to go to port?
Mr. FLEET. Yes, sir.
Senator FLETCHER. To what extent did she change her course from the direct line?
Mr. FLEET. You mean how far did she go?
Senator FLETCHER. Yes.
Mr. FLEET. A little over a point, or two points.

Senator FLETCHER. Did she seem to respond readily to the wheel?
Mr. FLEET. Well, we do not know that. We only know she went.
Senator FLETCHER. You could see she was going?
Mr. FLEET. Yes, sir.
Senator FLETCHER. And did she continue to bear to port?
Mr. FLEET. Until the iceberg was alongside of her.


But earlier, on p. 320-321:

Senator SMITH. She started to go to port?
Mr. FLEET. Yes; the wheel was put to starboard.
Senator SMITH. How do you know that?
Mr. FLEET. My mate [Lee] saw it and told me. He [Lee] told me he could see the bow coming around.
Senator SMITH. They swung the ship's bow away from the object?
Mr. FLEET. Yes; because we were making straight for it.

Senator SMITH. But you saw the course altered? And the iceberg struck the ship at what point?
Mr. FLEET. On the starboard bow, just before the foremast.

It was Lee who first noticed the ship swinging to port and informed Fleet of that after Fleet got off the phone.

«Senator FLETCHER. How long were you at the telephone?
Mr. FLEET. I suppose half a minute».
Mr. FLEET.
I struck three bells first. Then I went straight to the telephone and rang them up on the bridge.

Senator SMITH.
Did you get anyone on the bridge?
Mr. FLEET.
I got an answer straight away;

Senator SMITH.
Did you get a prompt response?
Mr. FLEET.
I did. He just asked me what did I see. I told him an iceberg right ahead.

"What did you see?"
"Iceberg Right Ahead"
"Thank You"

I would be very surprised that the phone call lasted for half a minute!

«Senator FLETCHER. To what extent did she change her course from the direct line?
Mr. FLEET. You mean how far did she go?
Senator FLETCHER. Yes.
Mr. FLEET. A little over a point, or two points».

2425. Did you notice what the ship did?
Lee: As soon as the reply came back "Thank you" the helm must have been put either hard-a-starboard or very close to it, because she veered to port, and it seemed almost as if she might clear it...

Fleet who could not give any distances at all whatsoever; neither an estimated distance of the berg at first sight except that the berg appeared «very small», nor its approximate dimensions even when it was rubbing against the side just below the nest, could suddenly estimate a change of heading as being a little over a point to two points! He even admitted he had no judgment and his vision not tested since.

Questions (again): How a lookout that high in a crow’s nest so close to the bow, with virtually no point of reference on the horizon, with little or no steering experience, under a pitch dark night, could then suddenly quantify that alteration of heading?

Senator FLETCHER. And did she continue to bear to port?
Mr. FLEET. Until the iceberg was alongside of her.

Question (again) : How did they manage to stop the liner swinging after 2 points, on a steady hard-a-starboard helm for 37 seconds like in the Olympic test?
Tentative answer: (The Commissioner) «She did not move anymore, because, as I understand, the crash came»!!! o_O

If the helm had been kept hard over, the berg would have grinded all the way down to the stern.
 
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