Iceberg

[Ernie Luck]

David, Samual, Re Roy's transcription

When Capt. Bertholf used the minefield analogy he was referring to use of the northerly route which Titanic was following, irrespective of where it actually struck the iceberg.

He did go on to say that this was "by public demand", "both the public and the steamship people refuse to avoid danger by taking the longer route" which was one of the points David made.

The importance of maintaining the schedules keeps rearing it's ugly head. I did read somewhere that the Irish ferry that sank a few years ago was due to maintaining the mail-run with insufficient attention being paid to the apalling weather conditions.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

Sorry Ernie, the Titanic was not following the northerly route. Captain Commandant E. P. Bertholf didn't know what he was taking about. There were two pairs of routes that steamships took between Europe and North America. The northerly pair was used from the August 24th to January 14th. The southerly pair was used from January 15th to August 23rd. And when I say a pair I mean one route for ships going from Europe to America, and a separate route no more than 60 miles further south for those ships going from America to Europe. The Titanic was on the southerly route from Europe to America. The problem was that the southern pair of routes was not far enough south. This was later changed as a result of the Titanic disaster.

 

[Susan Alby]

>>If anyone is "to blame" for the ship's speed it was the passengers who chose to buy tickets on a fast ship rather than a slow one. There were slower ships available, but few people wanted to extend their ocean voyage beyond 5 days. That's why Titanic had to maintain 21+ knots. It was an economic fact of life brought about by the demands of the ticket-selling marketplace.<<

David- I enjoyed reading your above post, but I have a problem with "blaming" this tragedy on the public ticket holders. They were VICTIMS who I'm positive would have been alright with staying on board a few more days if it meant saving the lives of their loved ones. Your right about the technology moving faster than people or society could invariably handle. I think it was only a matter of time before a tragedy such as Titanic would result.

 

[Michael H. Standart]

>>You suggest that this particular practice is still occurring today<<

It does. Ask any mariner what happens when the owner is aboard and it won't take you long to understand why they want to leave the bloke on the pier.

>>David- I enjoyed reading your above post, but I have a problem with "blaming" this tragedy on the public ticket holders. They were VICTIMS who I'm positive would have been alright with staying on board a few more days if it meant saving the lives of their loved ones.<<

Don't count on it. There was a Lot of pressure to meet schedules and to get from one side to another as quickly as possible. There still is, which is why aircraft rule the roost when it comes to crossing continents and entire oceans. Getting there is not half the fun as far as the customer is concerned. They want to get from point A to point B right now! If one carrier doesn't deliver the goods, they go with another one that will. That quality of impatience has never gone away and if anything, it's a lot worse, and not with just the transport industry either.

Who hasn't taken advantage of one day express delivery for certain goods one orders if it's offered at one time or another? Few people are willing to be all that patient when they can have it or get there immidiately.

 

[Ernie Luck]

Samuel, thanks for the clarification about routes. A little knowledge can be a dangerous thing. I was quoting someone who I thought knew what he was talking about.

 

[David G. Brown]

Susan, I really do not want to argue with you becuse your heart is in the right place. But, I think you are among the multitude who have been tricked by modern nonthink when it comes to facing the risks of life.

Specifically, victimhood has achieved exhaulted status as we enter the 21st century. It is the key to riches in our courts, 10 minutes on TV, and public acclaim.

But, does the word "victim" apply to someone who quite willingly undertakes a risky adventure? Nobody who steps foot on the deck of a ship, into the fusalage of an airplane, or sits on the seat of a train has any logical expectation of 100% avoidance of danger. Human beings do not have the knowledge or skill to design the 100% perfect means of transportation. You can even sprain your ankle walking.

Thus, if a trip in a mechanical conveyance turns out to be the one on which "something" goes wrong, the willing people who rode as passengers are not victims, but volunteers.

This does not negate the concept of responsibility. White Star Line and its employees voluntarily undertook the responsibility for conducting a safe voyge. And, within that context are responsible for any problems (ranging from lost luggage to lost lives) they created for passengers when Titanic sank. The amount of responsibility is limited by certain laws and international treaties, so is too complex an issue for this discussion. But, the responsibility for the accident and its costs belonged to White Star.

Saying that White Star was responsible for its actions, however, is a far cry from saying that the passengers were "victims." Remember, Titanic's passengers voluntarily went aboard a means of travel that faced the greatest number of dangers known to mankind in 1912. To my knowledge no one was forced to cross the gangplank at gunpoint. Every passenger had the opportunity of not paying for a ticket, not boarding, and not facing the risks of wind, wave, iceberg, etc.

Now, the term "victim" might apply to an innocent person strolling on a public sidewalk. If Titanic had roared into port, jumped the quay and slid across the street to squish said saunterer, that person certainly would have qualified as a "victim." He did not volunteer or agree in any way to grease the keel of an ocean liner.

But, when you buy a ticket and step off the solid earth to go where human beings were not designed to live, you voluntarily place yourself in harms way. To look at it any other way is illogical.

It is also self-deception to think that pointing the finger of blame at someone does anything but vent your personal spleen. There isn't a airline pilot or ship's captain today who will level with the investigative agencies charged with improving public safety. The reason is simple. Telling the truth so that nobody else has to repeat your mistake just opens the doors to unlimited litigation. So, if anything goes wrong as a licensed operator you clam up...or, in Lightoller's vernacular, you apply whitewash with a brush.

--David G. Brown

 

[monica e. hall]

I agree, David - particularly with your last paragraph, which is irony exemplified.

The other odd thing, of course, is that humans court risk. Even if they do claim victimhood afterwards. Research has proven that seatbelts just make people drive faster and with less regard. They think they are safer, and so adjust their risk assessment accordingly. If you really wanted to make roads safer, you would remove the driver's seatbelt and mount a large spike on the steering wheel boss - that would do the trick. But we wouldn't, of course!

 

[Michael H. Standart]

Kind of reminds me of George Carlin's little skit on the idea of getting a Volvo because "It's a safe car! As if that relieves somebody of the responsibility of learning how to drive the ####ing thing!"

>> If you really wanted to make roads safer, you would remove the driver's seatbelt and mount a large spike on the steering wheel boss - that would do the trick. But we wouldn't, of course!<<

A pity as that *would* give people an incentive! Drive safely or end up a shish kabob!

 

[David G. Brown]

Re-reading what I wrote earlier, I realised that I may have offended Susan--which was not my intention. So, if I have offended you, Susan, please accept my apology. I should not have dragged you so directly into my comments.

-- David G. Brown

 

[malcolm john cheape]

I have spent the last few days reading the papers Michael and Erik suggested,the reading was the easy part, understanding I'm not so sure about!!
Great papers, I would like to take the time to thank all those who wrote and researched them. I know it can't be easy to write and be understood by those like myself who lack nautical knowledge. I can say that I do have better understanding of what is wrong with the picture and for that I thank you. That said I do have a question about the grounding/allision ,the ice under the hull,the point of impact so to speak,as it moves down the ship,and the ships stern moves away,does the point of grounding gradually move away from the keel, and would it as it approached boiler room six, do more damage as it moves up the side before the ship is free? or have I got it all wrong?
regards Malcolm

 

[Erik Wood]

Let me add some things here:

First: I apologie in advance for the blunt nature of this post.

Safety at sea is never a sure thing. The maritime industry just like all others is ruled by money. Captains and crew get promoted, demoted and fired based off runs and cargo load and third is safety. If the ship doesn't make money, there is no ship.

As has been stated several times here before the job most people think a Captain has is not even a small fraction of the reality of what it is. There is a built in catch 22. You are required to get your ship and cargo (whether that be passengers or general cargo) from point A to point B in the quickest and safest manner possible. Here is the catch 22, the quick and safe NEVER jive. You have to give up fractions of one to get the other, that is the nature of life. You CAN NOT have both. With speed comes danger in any situation. If the shipping company doesn't keep it's schedule, there will be no shipping company. There is a cascade of events after that.

Those of you familiar with Great Lakes shipping will understand this (and if you own property along the St. Clair river I apologize) but sometimes you have to run 10 to 12 knots down the St. Clair/Detroit river system to make the schedule. It isn't always safe, but it is a calculated risk. It has been done for a hundred years and will continue to be done for a hundred more. Every and I do mean every captain that I have ever sailed for or with would agree. It is a calculated risk, we all make them, and it could come down to what track you take, and when you decide to eat dinner EVERY decision a master or OOW makes is a calculated risk. You are in a environment which can not be controlled, yet you have need get to point A to point B as quick and safe as possible.

That means when I order 12 knots down the Detroit river I am very aware of what that means should something go wrong (or the Coast Guard catch me doing it). However if I don't do it, I won't have a job, the ship won't make money, the product won't get where it needs to be on time, which will cause a logistics nightmare. That also means that if I choose to cruise at my cruising speed in dense fog with a extra lookouts, that that is a risk that I understand. To imply that masters disregard safety to "get the job done" without thought to consquence or to imply safety is never discussed or thought of when decisions are made, shows an extreme lack of maritime knowledge, and to suggest that Smith and company was reckless because of his use of speed in 1912 is offense to me as a brother sailor, a collegue of Smiths, and a fellow master mariner I am not saying anyone said that, just in general). If you are going to speak about keeping a schedule when it comes to shipping you better have some practical knowledge of what you are discussing.

Comparing being a bus driver with school children and being a master of a vessel with 2200 lives is a far stretch of reality. The differences are far to many to note.

I have spent some time on the investagtion side of the maritime industry and what Dave says is the truth and is well understood, yet the lessons still get learned. I wonder how that is??

 

[Mark Robert Hopkins]

>>To imply that masters disregard safety to "get the job done" without thought to consequence or to imply safety is never discussed or thought of when decisions are made, shows an extreme lack of maritime knowledge, and to suggest that Smith and company was reckless because of his use of speed in 1912 is offense to me as a brother sailor<<

Erik,

As you should know by now, I never mean to offend you. I was just responding to my impression of what Michael had said about "getting the job done." I wasn't as much saying that captains are reckless for such a purpose of "getting the job done" as I was feeling for further feedback on what Michael had said. Since then, David and you have responded on that with further insight. That's all I wanted. Thank you.

As for lacking maritime knowledge, I've stated plenty of times that I am not a mariner nor ever have been. Should you expect me to have that kind of knowledge? No, that's why I seek insight from you and many others. I don't proceed to attack; I proceed to gain the knowledge and understanding which you've claimed I lack. Is that such a bad venture?

And, no, I never claimed or inferred that Captain Smith was reckless. He did everything to the letter and did well for the situation in which he was trapped. It just seemed as if the cards were stacked against him. No matter how good you are, you're not going to win every hand. I was referring to practices in present-day, modern times. May point was this: If, as Michael said, we learned lessons from the Titanic tragedy, then why do we still use the same practices today? It had nothing to do with Captain Smith, but somehow I was interpreted as "nailing Smith to the wall." My comments were in reference to practices being carried over time, not people.

 

[Michael H. Standart]

>>It just seemed as if the cards were stacked against him. No matter how good you are, you're not going to win every hand. <<

Quite right. You won't. And therein lies the Catch-22 that Erik spoke to. The master is expected to beat the odds...to win...every single time even though ultimately he of all people knows better then that. Despite that, he's expected to keep to that schedule because ultimately, it's the customer who demands it. If that shipping company doesn't pull it off, the customer goes to somebody who will.

Yet it's that same customer and by extension, the shipping lines who expects everything to go according to plan with zero defects and no surprises. If it doesn't work out that way, the Captain is the one who, more often then not, get's his hide nailed to the barn. That Zero Defects is not possible, and that the sea is full of some often deadly surprises is something that gets missed and the only winners are the lawyers who move in after the fact.

>>the ice under the hull,the point of impact so to speak,as it moves down the ship,and the ships stern moves away,does the point of grounding gradually move away from the keel, and would it as it approached boiler room six, do more damage as it moves up the side before the ship is free? or have I got it all wrong?<<

It would appear that this is exactly what happened. It would tend to explain why the damage abruptly stopped at Boiler Room Six. That's about all I can say in a nutshell and David may well be able to explain it better then I can.

A lot depends on not only how the hull is moving, but how deep it is in relation to the obstacle it's running over as well as the nature of the obstacle itself. Hard rock won't tend to give much or break away, whereas ice will. And yet, one is also running over an irregularly shaped object with hills, crevices, ridges, and valleys. All these are factors to consider.

 

[Roy Kristiansen]

>>The article, which is very l-o-n-g, describes at length the types of charts [Knapp's] office provided. Unfortunately, I didn't transcribe that part last night. Sorry about that . . .

Hi, Michael!

Here are those missing paragraphs. Knapp isn't the speaker in them, but it seems clear the reporter did some serious interviewing to get his information.

Roy

***************
THE BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE
Sunday, April 21, 1912, p. 2 (extracts):

Unusual Ice Fields In Steamship Lanes

Washington, April 20.

. . .In the United States, the Hydrographic office of the Navy Department is the clearing house for information as to ice conditions in the North Atlantic. Its service in this respect is as complete as modern science will permit. Furthermore, this service is [at] the disposal of every mariner who chooses to seek it. The Hydrographic Office not only supplies information free to the merchant marine, and issues charts at a nominal cost, but it also encourages and urges mariners to avail themselves of it. It issues three publications which are of direct interest to the commanders of Trans-Atlantic vessels.

Weekly Bulletin Contains Latest Advices of Conditions.

One is a monthly chart, upon which is indicated late information as to winds, currents, ice, derelicts, and other features of ocean travel. Then there is a weekly bulletin, containing even more recent data, from which a ship's captain can correct his monthly chart. Supplementing this is a daily bulletin. This contains reports as fresh as those in a daily newspaper. It is available to mariners at the Hydrographic offices and maritime exchanges in every port where large ships clear.

Furthermore, a large chart which is corrected daily and hourly is kept at each of the hydrographic offices. Thus, at the Maritime Exchange in New York, a captain whose vessel is about to put to sea can go to the office and find on the chart the very latest information as to ice and other condition along the course he is to follow. The Hydrographic Office invites him to do so, and if he does not avail himself of the opportunity it is his own fault.

The information which the Hydrographic Office utilizes for the preparation of this data, so far as it covers the North Atlantic steamship routes, is largely obtained from merchant vessels, because there are seldom any naval ships in that vicinity. A vessel at sea will, for instance, transmit by wireless the information that it has sighted icebergs or field ice at a certain point of longitude and latitude. This wireless message may either be received directly ashore or be relayed by other vessels. When it comes ashore the Hydrographic Office in Washington receives an immediate bulletin. This bulletin is included in its daily memorandum. It is also telegraphed in turn to all ports where ships may clear. Thus, if Boston receives a report of ice at sea, the Hydrographic Office will at once be notified and within a short time the information will be available for mariners at New York, Philadelphia and other points. It will also be recorded on the charts which are kept at all ports. Supplementing this wireless service, are bulletins brought in by vessels when they arrive at port. Their information is often several days old, but is sometimes very valuable, nevertheless.

Wireless Covers Every Part of Ocean in Danger Zone.

The use of wireless telegraphy leaves very few conditions in the North Atlantic steamship lanes unknown for as long a period as twenty-four hours. Not only does the Hydrographic Office supply actual information, but it also furnishes charts and data which indicate with a good deal of accuracy what the mariner may expect to find during certain months of the year, even in the absence of actual reports. The science of hydrography has become exact. English and German charts of the North Atlantic tally very closely with those issued by the United States. With regard to the indications of ice conditions, however, there is one difference. The American charts show only ice that has been actually reported during the month previous to their publication. The English and German charts indicate the average extent of the ice fields for that particular month, without reference to the most recent data.

While it now looks as though the North Atlantic steamship routes would be filled with fields of ice and bergs for the next two or three months, such conditions may, of course, change with very little warning. Changes, however, will be kept track of by the Hydrographic office and no captain can have any excuse for leaving the port of New York or other ports without full information concerning them. . . .

****************

(And there's a lot more where that came from. Ouch! My fingers are burning! . . . --R.)

 

[Roy Kristiansen]

Hi, Sam!

>>Sorry Ernie, the Titanic was not following the northerly route. Captain Commandant E. P. Bertholf didn't know what he was taking about.

I was wondering if anybody would pick up on that. Thanks!

It could have just been a misunderstanding on Bertholf's part. But I agree, it does weaken his specific case, although his criticism on the whole remains valid. The ocean was just filthy with ice, it had been that way since mid-December, those conditions had been well-publicized, and anyone thinking about making a crossing during that time should had received ample warning of what to expect.

Roy