Port Engine Going Full Speed Astern

If I would have to stop or more realistically to reduce the speed till a complete stop on a black out vessel going at 6 knots, I would let go both anchors! I can tell you that a 50,000 tons vessel proceeding at 6 knots will run quite a long distance before being stop and surprise the most skeptics. Speed will reduce slowly at first and more rapidly from 2-3 knots down.
 
The SOLAS requirements for steering gears have been established for ships having a traditional propulsion system and one rudder. For ships fitted with alternative propulsion and steering arrangements, such as but not limited to azimuthing propulsors or water jet propulsion systems, SOLAS Regulations II-1/29.1, 29.2.1, 29.3, 29.4, 29.6.1, 29.14, 28.2 and 28.3 are to be interpreted as follows, except 29.14, which is limited to the steering systems having a certain steering capability due to vessel speed also in case propulsion power has failed; Regulation

Regulation 29.3 29.3

The main steering gear and rudder stock shall be:

.2 capable of putting the rudder over from 35° on one side to 35° on the other side with the ship at its deepest seagoing draught and running ahead at maximum ahead service speed and under the same conditions, from 35° on either side to 30° on the other side in not more than 28 s.

«instantaneous» ... never !
We are not talking about the same thing. I am talking about the helm, not the tiller head on the rudder.
I am talking about response to the application of helm or any other method of manually steering the ship. The time to apply the helm hard over to hard over in the old days was no more than 9 seconds. The time for the rudder to respond was minimal. Nowadays, since we are using much more efficient transmission systems, the rudder responds more or less instantaneously. The SOLAS rules you quote are minimum acceptable performance times. Can you imagine a course recorder chart printout from a ship that responds as lowly as the minimum requirements?
 
If I would have to stop or more realistically to reduce the speed till a complete stop on a black out vessel going at 6 knots, I would let go both anchors! I can tell you that a 50,000 tons vessel proceeding at 6 knots will run quite a long distance before being stop and surprise the most skeptics. Speed will reduce slowly at first and more rapidly from 2-3 knots down.
I am very much aware of what happens to a super tanker when it goes 'black' as you call it or when a tug breaks down towing a dead ship.
 
The wheelman has no responsibility whatsoever unless he his grossly negligent. When you have the conn of such a vessel, it is the responsibility of the master, the OOW or the pilot to make sure and at all times that the wheel is turn on the proper ordered side. If the wheelsman turns the wheel on the wrong side by mistake for 2 seconds, it has absolutely no consequence at all.

Jim, a vessel the size of the Costa Concordia is maneuver most of the time by instruments and especially at night. The most trust in instrument of all is without any doubt the ECDIS. With such a navigation instrument, if the vessel is certified ECDIS (no paper chart on board) and it is operated in a DGPS or WAAS region, you could at the limit close all the curtains of the navigation bridge windows and you would see the reef as big has you wish on the PPI. You would also see all the COG / HDG Vectors, CPA, TCPA, Bearings & Distances that you like. If you know how to operate an ECDIS, you can set all the alarms possible. Therefore, you must be totally out of your mind to drive such a vessel into an island at 16 knots in perfect visibility!!! There was no haze reported….
 
The SOLAS rules you quote are minimum acceptable performance times. Can you imagine a course recorder chart printout from a ship that responds as lowly as the minimum requirements?

Like it or not, all the merchant vessels of the planet ocean go by the Solas very minimum requirements and sometimes under those very minimum. Rarely higher $$$
 
Jim, a vessel the size of the Costa Concordia is maneuver most of the time by instruments and especially at night.

Yes, Georges, I know that. The words most of the time are relevant in this case.

The most trust in instrument of all is without any doubt the ECDIS.

Yes Georges, I know that too.

With such a navigation instrument, if the vessel is certified ECDIS (no paper chart on board) and it is operated in a DGPS or WAAS region
you could at the limit close all the curtains of the navigation bridge windows and you would see the reef as big has you wish on the PPI.


Only if the reef has above surface profile. If it was under water, you need side-scan sonar. Don't think CC had that.

You would also see all the COG / HDG Vectors, CPA, TCPA, Bearings & Distances that you like. If you know how to operate an ECDIS, you can set all the alarms possible. Therefore, you must be totally out of your mind to drive such a vessel into an island at 16 knots in perfect visibility!!


Yes Georges, I know that too. However, the Captain of the CC did not drive his ship deliberately into a reef or an island. He did what many modern Masters and bridge officers do, relied too much on electronics and showed off by reverting to steam navigation.
As a Marine Accident Investigator working for Lloyds and US Underwriters for over 25 years recent (10 years ago) experience, I have seen that happen all too often. I have even investigated an incident where the bridge Watch fell asleep and the ship ran into an anchored Semi-submersible. The ship was aptly names the "Alert".
You may also be interested to know that I was involved from the very beginning in experimentation with 'hands free' navgation whereby we linked computer managed propulsion to auto pilot, IGPS, radar, depth recorders, side scan sonar and electronic charts. One of our tasks was to exit a Fjiord hands free and sail blind for 300 miles and attempt to hit a target the size of a rowing boat in mid ocean over a distance of 300 miles. We hit it spot on. The equipment you describe today, evolved from such experiments.
 
Just a thought. How did the rock miss the stabaliser?

Because at the time of the allision, the vessel was not «sliding» on a Port Wheel along the reef but was turning «Hard to Stb’d», the rate of turn was probably well over 30 degrees per minute to Stb'd, a vessel is turning by the stern as the peripatetic pivot point is located at approx ¼ length from the forward perpendicular, the gash is well aft of the stabilizer on the port quarter and so on…

Here is a cheap S57 Vector Chart that shows «clearly» the reef. To avoid it, you don’t need to see it! Equipped like she was, you could make that Salute in dense fog with no problem whatsoever. If the captain wanted to beat the record of the closest Giglio Salute, he succeeded! But he got 16 years jail medal…

costac10.jpg
 
Titanic's stern was never in danger, by that time the New York was alongside at her after part she was already going astern and the New York was under control of the tugs.
For the benefit of those not familiar with the incident, there were two steamers moored at berth 38 down by the lower Test quays near the juncture of the Test and Itchen rivers when Titanic left from Ocean Dock berth 44. The larger of the two moored steamers, the SS Oceanic, was moored against the quay while the smaller of the two, the SS New York, was moored abreast and outboard of the Oceanic. The adverse reaction leading to the incident with the SS New York was magnified because of the shallowness of the restricted waters that separated Titanic from the two moored vessels. As Titanic’s bow approached the sterns of the two vessels, a small repulsive force was set up between Titanic and the two smaller moored vessels pushing them both up against the quay. Soon the hydrodynamic force turned from one of repulsion to one of attraction as a low pressure area was set up between the advancing Titanic and the two smaller steamers. With the attractive force came an induced turning moment that acted to swing the stern of the two moored vessels outward toward the passing Titanic. As Titanic approached abreast of them, the forces became too great for the mooring lines of New York to bear, and her mooring lines suddenly snapped.

"As the bows of our ship came about level with those of the New York, there came a series of reports like those of a revolver, and on the quay side of the New York snaky coils of thick rope flung themselves high in the air and fell backwards among the crowd, which retreated in alarm to escape the flying ropes. We hoped that no one was struck by the ropes, but a sailor next to me was certain he saw a woman carried away to receive attention. And then, to our amazement the New York crept towards us, slowly and stealthily, as if drawn by some invisible force which she was powerless to withstand…On the New York there was shouting of orders, sailors running to and fro, paying out ropes and putting mats over the side where it seemed likely we should collide; the tug which had a few moments before cast off from the bows of the Titanic came up around our stern and passed to the quay side of the New York’s stern, made fast to her and started to haul her back with all the force her engines were capable of; but it did not seem that the tug made much impression on the New York. ... At first all appearance showed that the sterns of the two vessels would collide; but from the stern bridge of the Titanic an officer directing operations stopped us dead, the suction ceased, and the New York with her tug trailing behind moved obliquely down the dock, her stern gliding along the side of the Titanic some few yards away. It gave an extraordinary impression of the absolute helplessness of a big liner in the absence of any motive power to guide her.” -- L. Beesley

The tugs Neptune and Vulcan caught New York and pulled her back toward the quay while Titanic, stopped dead in her tracts by reversing her engines for a short time, was slowly drifting backward. But controlling the New York was no easy task.

"Someone sang out to me to get up and push the New York back, but such a thing was impossible. Had I got between the two ships we would almost certainly have been jammed. Instead, I turned the Vulcan around and got a wire rope on the port quarter of the New York. Unfortunately, that rope parted, but our men immediately got a second wire on board, and we got hold of the New York when she was within four feet of Titanic. Our movements were all the more trying because the broken mooring ropes from New York were lying in the water, and we stood a good chance of fouling our own propeller. Every rope on the New York snapped, the stern lines being the first to go..." – Captain Gale, tugboat Vulcan.

From photographs it could be seen that Titanic had started to drift backward after her engines were finally stopped, having been first reversed. My guess is that the anchor was dropped to keep her from drifting further backward. The entire incident caused about an hour's delay in leaving Southampton.

Ioannis, I would not say that Titanic was never in danger with New York coming as close as 4 feet before she was taken under control by the tugs.
Incident at Southampton.gif
 
According to the voice recordings, at the moment of impact, the helm was hard a port, not hard a starboard. This suggests an attempt to swing away from possible contact.
Unfortunately, I do not have a plan view of the vessels but the angle between the tip of the stabaliser and the first point of contact on then hull suggests that at the time of impact, the ship was pointing way to the north. north eastward., not 350 True as declared in the narrative. That being the case, then she turned when almost due south of the rocks, not where her master said she did. See here:
costa concordia ong.10.jpg
 
Both vessels altered their bow «away» from the danger but their stern, which had much more leverage momentum, was thrown «toward» the hazard. Similar hull damage and both ship were lost. The logic of trying to escape an inevitable hazard was far more dangerous than to attempt to minimize the damage.

concor10.png

Confirmation bias, also called confirmatory bias or myside bias, is the tendency to search for, interpret, favor, and recall information in a way that confirms one's preexisting beliefs or hypotheses, while giving disproportionately less consideration to alternative possibilities. It is a type of cognitive bias and a systematic error of inductive reasoning. People display this bias when they gather or remember information selectively, or when they interpret it in a biased way. People also tend to interpret ambiguous evidence as supporting their existing position.

Decision making in a threatening context; the psychological stress and anxiety may induce a rigid cognitive response on the part of individuals. People tend to draw upon deeply ingrained mental models of the environment that served them well in the past. Individuals also constrict their information gathering efforts, and they revert to the comfort of well learned practices and routines. This cognitive rigidity impairs a leader’s ability to surface and agree to a wide range of dissenting views.
 
According to the voice recordings, at the moment of impact, the helm was hard a port, not hard a starboard. This suggests an attempt to swing away from possible contact.

Jim, if you put the wheel Hard Over to Stb’d on a twin rudder and wait just a little until the Rate of Turn Indicator shows like 30 degrees per minute, even if you redirect the wheel Hard to Port in 28 seconds, you will have to wait until your face turn yellow-green before she starts to swing to Port. Costa Concordia had a 50,000 metric tons displacement (quite the same as the Titanic). At 16 knots, the momentum reach like 1,500,000 tons-m/s. Ounce that momentum is directed and accelerates in the wrong direction, unless you’re in open water, your king is checkmated!
 
Titanic was heading down river. As far as I can remember, the tide would have turned and together with the outflow of the river Test, there would have been a small seaward-setting current. Apart from tidal and river currents, when a big ship like that stops suddenly, the wake current continues to push her ahead until the reversing engines overcome the forward motion. Don't think an anchor would have been of any use during the New York incident.
 
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