Reversing Engines, Unfair Criticism of Officer Murdoch

[Arun Vajpey]

Arun - It was clearly Boxhall's perception that Titanic had indeed been ordered astern as he subsequently puts the words in Murdoch's mouth during the conversation with Captain Smith, saying that he ran "the engines full astern" (US Inquiry) "reversed the engines" (British Inquiry) and "Full Speed Astern, Sir, on the Port Engine" (BBC interview October 1962). So the words were only an assumption based on what Boxhall thought had happened. Until recently authors/researchers (including myself) have subsequently kept to Boxhall's erroneous interpretation of events.

OK, that takes me back to something that I hinted earlier. If Boxhall continued to suggest (if not directly state) that Murdoch had put the telegraph at Full Astern as part of a collision avoidance maneuver and held that stance at the two inquiries, it strikes me as something a bit more than mere "perception". Boxhall was an experienced naval officer and would have known how to interpret and as necessary state such things; but if he effectively "put words into Murdoch's mouth" (to quote you) and was being carefully ambiguous about his testimony, did Boxhall have reason for it?

 

[Jim Currie]

to understand what was going on, you have to know how such engine orders were gkiven on a steamship way back then and even up into the 1950s. I have pointed this out before but water and a ducks back come to mind.
When ringing down an emergency Full Astern from Full Ahead. You did not simply go from one to the other on the telegraphs. You first rang Full Ahead - Full Astern several times before finishing with STOP. This was to make sure the telegraph bells were heard and acted quickly upon. Immediately after that, You went through the same procedure finishing with the levers at FULL ASTERN. An emergency procedure.
There is only one witness from the engine room who actually noted a STOP on the telegraph thereafter he was trapped behind the WT doors in the turbine room. We know the WT doors descended while the ship was still in contact with the bergad the STOP order was given before that. Thre was no witnessess in the engine room t a Fu,ll Astern order...they judged simply by observing the shafts rotating.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Jim, I understand that the procedure of giving engine orders via telegraph was not as simple as some believe and accept your explanation. Also what you said earlier about the Hard-a-port order being given between 90 seconds and 2 minutes after the impact. All that is already accepted and not what I asked above.

2 minutes would have been quite a long time considering the scenario just before, during and after the collision.

What I am asking - or rather wondering about - is the rather ambiguous statements by Boxhall which can be easily misunderstood.

These are excerpts from Boxhall's testimony in the American Inquiry

Senator SMITH.
Where were you when the collision took place?

Mr. BOXHALL.
I was just approaching the bridge.

Senator SMITH.
How far did you go?

Mr. BOXHALL.
At the time of the impact I was just coming along the deck and almost abreast of the captain's quarters, and I heard the report of three bells.

Since Captain Smith's quarters were very close to the bridge, the above translates as if Boxhall claimed that he was almost at the bridge when he heard the 3 bells.

Senator SMITH.
Three bells?

Mr. BOXHALL.
That signifies something has been seen ahead. Almost at the same time I heard the first officer give the order "Hard astarboard," and the engine telegraph rang.

So now, Boxhall is saying that almost immediately after he heard the 3 bells, he heard Murdoch shout "Hard-a-Starboard" and then the sound of the Engine Telegraph's ring. So far so good, right?

Senator SMITH.
Did you proceed to the bridge?

Mr. BOXHALL.
Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Whom did you find there?

Mr. BOXHALL.
I found the sixth officer and the first officer and captain. [Moody, Murdoch and Captain Smith]

Senator SMITH.
The sixth officer, the first officer and the captain?

Mr. BOXHALL.
Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.
All on the bridge together?

Mr. BOXHALL.
Yes, sir.

To my mind, this is where Boxhall's testimony begins to go pear-shaped. If, as it seems above, he had almost reached the bridge when he heard the 3 bells followed by Murdoch's starboard helm order and ring of the telegraph, how could he then proceed to the bridge and see Captain Smith there?

That makes no sense. What about the time that it took for Hichens to carry out Murdoch's order, the ship closing on the berg and the collision itself? Wasn't it after the collision that Smith came to the bridge? This is confirmed by Boxhall himself as below

Senator SMITH.
What, if anything, was said by the captain?

Mr. BOXHALL.
Yes, sir. The captain said, "What have we struck?" Mr. Murdoch, the first officer, said, "We have struck an iceberg."

Senator SMITH.
Then what was said?

Mr. BOXHALL.
He followed on to say - Mr. Murdoch followed on to say, "I put her hard a starboard and run the engines full astern, but it was too close; she hit it."

So above Boxhall is definitely making it sound as though Murdoch put the engine telegraph to full astern as part of his 'porting around' maneuver to try avoid collision. That I do not believe and as Dan says, Boxhall appears to be putting words into Murdoch's mouth. Rather convenient since Murdoch did not survive to defend himself and neither did Smith or Moody to contradict Boxhall.

Senator FLETCHER.
That was before she struck?

Mr. BOXHALL.
No; after.

Again, this is ambiguous. "After" does not explain "how long after" and given the events can be interpreted in different ways.

This was just in the American Inquiry with the British Investigation still to come. Was Boxhall being deliberately ambiguous and if so, why?

 

[Samuel Halpern]

I politely disagree Sam. At the US Inquiry Boxhall reported he "heard the first officer give the order "Hard astarboard," and the engine telegraph rang." No mention of a full astern order. And then at the British Inquiry he reported "I heard the First Officer give the order, “Hard-a-starboard,” and I heard the engine room telegraph bells ringing. " Once again no "full astern" order.

Of course no mention of an astern order because at the time Boxhall heard all that was after coming out of the officer's quarters while on his way to the bridge. Engine orders are not verbal and therefore they are NOT heard. They are transmitted down to the engine by working the engine-order telegraph handles, which as Jim pointed out, ring alerting bells to gain the attention of those around that the telegraph levers are being worked. Boxhall would not know what the engine orders were until he got onto the bridge and could see the position of the telegraph handles, which he said he did. He also claimed that Murdoch told Smith that he (Murdoch) had put the engines to full astern as part of the avoidance maneuver. And, as you pointed out, 50 years later, Boxhall changed his story to say that only the port engine was put astern.

There were two other eyewitness to the conversation between Murdoch and Smith immediately following the collision event, Hichens and Olliver, and both only talked about Murdoch telling Smith that an iceberg was struck and that the watertight doors were already closed. Nothing about what engine orders or helm orders given, or what Murdoch's intentions were.

As far as trimmer Dillon's timings, like all eyewitness reports, his time intervals were only subjective. And one of them is outright ridiculous; i.e., his time for when the WTDs were dropped, which he said was three minutes after the shock. We know Murdoch was at the switch when the ship struck, and it takes about 20 to 30 seconds for these doors to drop from the time the switch is closed to release the clutch.

your article makes the case that a head-on collision would have resulted in a better outcome.

The article was written to simply address the question: "Was Edward Wilding correct in his assessment that Titanic would have remained afloat if she would have taken the blow head-on into the iceberg instead of a glancing blow along her starboard side? Is there a way to actually quantify the resulting damage to the vessel after such a strike?" I cannot control what people say as to what Murdoch should have been done after the fact. But I was very careful to point out that nobody in their right mind would deliberately allow a collision like that to happen. Most people do not know how close Murdoch actually came to pulling off what they would have described as a miracle if he was successful. But that's the topic of another conversation. I was reacting to your wording accusing me of being critical of Murdoch, which I wasn't.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

The article was written to simply address the question: "Was Edward Wilding correct in his assessment that Titanic would have remained afloat if she would have taken the blow head-on into the iceberg instead of a glancing blow along her starboard side? Is there a way to actually quantify the resulting damage to the vessel after such a strike?" I cannot control what people say as to what Murdoch should have been done after the fact. But I was very careful to point out that nobody in their right mind would deliberately allow a collision like that to happen. Most people do not know how close Murdoch actually came to pulling off what they would have described as a miracle if he was successful. But that's the topic of another conversation. I was reacting to your wording accusing me of being critical of Murdoch, which I wasn't.

Precisely. As I pointed out before, reflex actions (even 'partial' ones) are controlled by a part of the brain that won't logically assess the situation, calculate the odds and then act. In emergency situations such built-in reflexes can and will override even best training and experience BUT the latter can contribute, albeit without detailed conscious thought, to the actual action being taken. That partly explains Murdoch's decision to try and dodge the berg rather than hit it head on.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

This was just in the American Inquiry with the British Investigation still to come. Was Boxhall being deliberately ambiguous and if so, why?

Boxhall was the only surviving officer who was on duty when the accident happened. His word had higher weight over others, as did that of the other officers. His testimony, as far as I'm concerned, was highly problematic, and not just in the case of the collision scenario, but that is for other topics. People here tend to concentrate of his testimony at the two inquiries. A year later he also testified at the Ryan trial. This is what was reported about what he had to say concerning the encounter (from The Prècis Law Report):

"He [the 4th officer] remembered the collision at 11.40. The weather was then perfectly clear all round, with no sign of haze or fog. He was between the officers’ quarters and the bridge at the time of the collision. He saw the engine room telegraph. It pointed to full speed astern. He heard the captain ask Mr Murdoch what they had struck after the collision. Murdoch said they had struck an iceberg and that he had signalled full speed astern, and had tried to go to starboard, but had not had time. He looked over the side and thought he saw a dark mass with no light about it."

 

[Samuel Halpern]

That partly explains Murdoch's decision to try and dodge the berg rather than hit it head on.

Arun, I believe that Murdoch's actions were more calculated than reflex. There just was too much time between those 3 bells and when he gave the order. My guess is that he he soon decided that the ship was going to hit and that it was too late to actually successfully avoid. So the question then becomes, how best to take the blow and minimize overall damage. He almost got away with it by giving the orders that he did. As Fleet, or was it Lee, that said, "It looked like a close shave." The big problem would have been judging distance accurately to the obstacle in the dark, and of course not knowing the underwater extent of the berg.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Arun, I believe that Murdoch's actions were more calculated than reflex. There just was too much time between those 3 bells and when he gave the order. My guess is that he he soon decided that the ship was going to hit and that it was too late to actually successfully avoid. So the question then becomes, how best to take the blow and minimize overall damage. He almost got away with it by giving the orders that he did. As Fleet, or was it Lee, that said, "It looked like a close shave." The big problem would have been judging distance accurately to the obstacle in the dark, and of course not knowing the underwater extent of the berg.

OK, but even so there would have been some reflex thinking involved IMO. His instinct was to try and avoid the iceberg and IMO the option of hitting it head-on would not have entered his calculations.

 

[Dan E. Parkes]

Boxhall's testimony is certainly problematic on many different levels. It could well be (and this is pure speculation on my part) to do with him going "missing" on his "rounds" at 10pm. By 11.40pm where exactly was he, when the "rounds" would normally have taken no more than half an hour? We did not know until the May 1959 edition of the Nautical Magazine in which Boxhall explained, during a talk at the Christchurch Red House Museum, that he "had just looked into his cabin when he heard the lookout sound three bells". Later in 1962 he even went further to describe what he was doing in his cabin, when in his BBC radio interview he explained:

"At the time when the iceberg was reported from the Crow's Nest, when they struck the bells... I was sitting in my cabin having a cup of tea, and immediately got up … And walked along to the bridge about sixty feet away on the same deck. I was about half way between the Officer's Quarters, the entrance of the Officer's Quarters and the Bridge when the crash came" (BBC interview October 1962)

I think the lack of accurate and specific detail about what happened on the bridge is primarily due to him making assumptions, to cover for the fact he was not there. He simply should have been on duty on the bridge.

In doing so he started a myth that ultimately made Murdoch look a fool.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

I think the lack of accurate and specific detail about what happened on the bridge is primarily due to him making assumptions, to cover for the fact he was not there.

You may be right.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Mr. BOXHALL.

At the time of the impact I was just coming along the deck and almost abreast of the captain's quarters, and I heard the report of three bells.

"At the time when the iceberg was reported from the Crow's Nest, when they struck the bells... I was sitting in my cabin having a cup of tea,

The above are both quotes by Boxhall about his whereabouts when he heard the 3 bells. Clearly, he was a man with the ability to be in two different places at the same time.

 

[Aly Jones]

We all lie at some-time in our lifetime. Of cause we know Boxhall told a lie when he stating the truth in 1960 but so did lightoller in regards to titanic not breaking in half. Difference is that Boxhall admitted the truth later on.

Not only Murdoch were preceived as the officer that made the wrong decision,he was perceived as being the one that killed men and committing suicide. Not only that, people made up rumours of "was Murdoch drunk that night? This poor man. Capt. Smith took some brunt but not as much as Murdoch, and Wilde didn't come any back lash. The surviving officers came out of it alright, although lightoller and boxhall coped some back lash recent years on internet forums. The other two pittman and more didn't cope any of it. Out of all the officers, Murdoch coped most of the back lash. For some reason, Murdoch has a target on his back. If you read up on him, you would know Murdoch was a genuine kind harted man and doesn't really deserve this. Deserves to be respected really.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Murdoch coped most of the back lash. For some reason, Murdoch has a target on his back. If you read up on him, you would know Murdoch was a genuine kind harted man and doesn't really deserve this. Deserves to be respected really.

Murdoch was not just a "good, kind-hearted family man" but an excellent ship's officer, the best of the lot on board the Titanic, including Captain Smith. But he had 2 things going against him that night; first, he was the senior officer on watch on the bridge when the collision occurred and second, he did not survive. That allowed several people concerned, passengers, crew and brother officers, probably subconsciously for the most part (if not entirely) to blame Murdoch for any event that could not be easily explained. And from corporate point of view, neither White Star nor any other body questioned those impressions too closely because it suited their interests. After all, Lightoller, Boxhall, Lowe etc were alive and could talk while Murdoch was not and so not in any position to defend himself. The old adage that "Dead Men Tell No Tales" is very true.

Therefore, IMO there was the general tendency to push the blame for the few controversial issues on Murdoch rather than challenge the statements of surviving officers who might inadvertently say something that would be corporately embarrassing.

 

[Ioannis Georgiou]

Boxhall did not told the "truth" years later. It's more likely he got things mixed up in his later version.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

IMO, if there is any blame it should be on Capt. EJ Smith's hands, not 1/O Murdoch or anyone else. Smith knew that his ship would enter a region of ice. He expected it and he and Lightoller talked about it. But did he station any extra lookouts? No. Did he station the engineers on standby in case he needed to slow down or stop quickly? No. Did he himself remain on the navigating bridge knowing he was coming up tot the expected ice? No. Did he divert the course of his ship further southward early enough to completely avoid the area of reportedice? No.
Instead, it was full speed ahead, stay on the planned track, and hope that his OOW and the two lookouts in the nest would be able to see and avoid any kind of danger in time.

What would have been the cost to continue going southwestward instead of turning westward near the corner at 5:50pm? The distance from the corner point at 42°N, 47°W, to the Nantucket Shoals Lightship off the coast of the US was about 1023 nautical miles on a heading of about 265°T, close to due west. Before reaching the corner, his ship was on a heading of about 242°T, which was mostly southwestward. If instead of putting his ship on a course for the Nantucket lightship when he altered course at 5:50pm, and instead continued southwestward to make 41°N, 50°W, by taking a course heading 246°T, only a 4 degree change, he would have cleared all reported ice. Then upon reaching 41°N, 50°W, he could set a course for the Nantucket lightship by heading about 268°T (almost due west), he would have arrived at the lightship about 45 minutes later that if he stayed on his original course and speed assuming there was no ice to begin with. (The distance from the corner (42°N, 47°W) to a turning point at 41°N, 50°W is almost 148 nautical miles, and the distance from that turning point to the Nantucket lightship is about 891 nautical miles. The total distance would have been about 1039 nautical miles on this extended route, while the the direct route from the corner to the lightship was about 1023 nautical miles. The difference is only 16 miles! At 22 knots, that's less that 45 minutes, and they still would have probably beat Olympic's maiden voyage crossing performance barring unforeseen weather or other major events.