Jim Currie
Member
Well I got it 50% right! I belive that's a marginal exam pass!
Well I got it 50% right! I belive that's a marginal exam pass!
David G. Brown
RIP
In his posting above, Jim has outlined in bare simplicity the forces affecting the way big ships react to their rudders. The subject is far more complex and too arcane for a public forum. Suffice to say, he is correct about the various currents affecting the rudder. If he left anything out, it's the hydrodynamic forces which are created on the hull during a turn. In a left turn an area of high pressure is created on the port quarter with a corresponding low pressure off the starboard quarter. These forces can be envisioned as similar to those created by an airplane wing in flight. Then there is the mass of the ship. Once you start some 50-odd thousand tons of metal rotating it tends to want to continue rotating even against the action of the rudder.
Let's discard the lovely opening scene in the book “A Night To Remember” and the iceberg crunching of the Hollywood flick “Titanic.” Instead, let's look at what the people involved described and compare that against reality — what a rudder-steered ship of Titanic's size could possibly have done. And, let's ignore the melodramatic phrases in testimonies such as “hard over.” First, Fourth Officer Boxhall and quartermaster Hitchens both talked about a left turn which in 1912 parlance required starboard helm. Hichens added that this turn was about two compass points, or 22.5 degrees.
Quartermaster Olliver said the only helm command that he heard was “a-port,” meaning a right turn. He said this command came as he first felt Titanic rumble onto the ice. Olliver said that he observed the officer (Sixth Officer Moody) oversee that the quartermaster at the wheel (Hichens) that this right turn helm order was carried out. Olliver also said the helm was not fully over until the berg was “up astern” of the wheelhouse.
Another quartermaster, Rowe, was on the poop deck where he kept watch over the taffrail log. In his testimony Rowe said the iceberg passed close aboard the outer end of the docking bridge, but that no contact was made because Titanic was responding to port helm, or right rudder.
The actions of the officers on the bridge give us a hint as to the direction Titanic turned as it came off the iceberg. The officers quarters deckhouse prevented looking straight astern from the bridge. To see astern it was necessary to walk to either brige wing. If Titanic had steered left (starboard helm) only, the berg would have been off the port quarter and the officers would have gone to the port bridge wing. But, they went the opposite way, to the starboard bridge wing. This indicates Titanic turned right as it was passing the berg, placing the fatal ice off the starboard quarter.
Finally, we have to examine what lookouts Fleet and Lee said about the accident. These two men had grandstand seats to the events, but saw everything in relative motion. Landsmen don't get this aspect of their testimonies. What the lookouts saw was not Titanic approaching the berg. Rather, it was as if they were sitting still and the iceberg came at the ship. Actions of objects around you when viewed in relative motion can appear radically different than if seen from “God's eye” looking down from above. This is why radar operators must learn to plot the approach of other ships. Radar presents a relative motion picture, not real motion as viewed through “God's eye.” The eyeball and brain are easily fooled by relative motion.
One thing the lookouts were adamant about is that the iceberg approached Titanic from dead ahead. There was no discussion of any maneuvers — port or starboard — in their testimonies until things had gone past the point of “in extremis.” That is, they did not see any movement of the bow until the accident was taking place. Then, in relative motion, it appeared the bow was rotating to port which, if true, would have required starboard helm.
Actions Described:
STRAIGHT APPROACH
Fleet & Lee from crow's nest
By implication Boxhall & Hichens
LEFT TURN
Boxhall & Hichens
Fleet & Lee during accident
RIGHT TURN
Olliver heard order & saw it executed
Rowe observed stern swing away from berg
Actions of officer going to starboard bridge wing
To make sense of all this it is necessary to place things in correct chronological order. “Which came first?” is the key question that must be answered. There seems no reason to doubt that Titanic steered a straight course prior to the first helm order under discussion. By implication, Boxhall and Hichens indicate the ship was on a straight course when they describe the “hard a-starboard” action which altered the ship's heading by (per Hichens) two points.
But, is the straight approach to the iceberg actually the first event in this chain. Or, is it the second? This requires an examination of time, specifically the duration between the first warning by the lookouts using their bell and impact on the berg. Conventional wisdom places that duration at under a minute, but this is in direct contradiction to the only recorded estimate by seaman Scarrott. He placed the duration at “five to eight minutes,” and that changes everything.
Jim and I have shown the accident took place at or around 4 minutes after 12 o'clock in April 14th ship's time. That was 11:40 p.m. on clocks used by the crew. This time for the accident places it directly following a required compass check, explaining why Olliver was on the standard compass platform and Boxhall coming out of the officers quarters when they heard the lookouts' bell. The 12 o'clock compass check was also an ideal time for Captain Smith to call for a course change. After all, the officers and men would already be in position doing the compass check, so adding a course change would not have required unnecessary trips to and from the standard compass.
Making the two-point Boxhall/Hichens left turn into the first event of our chronology snaps everything into sharp focus. All of the other events fit into the picture. It would have taken the two men on the compass platform about 45 seconds (per movie director Cameron) to walk from there to the bridge. As the officer, Boxhall would have left first and been followed by Olliver. And, following custom of the day, it is highly probable that Boxhall would have gone forward on the starboard side of the boat deck while Olliver would have returned on the port.
This explains why Boxhall got back to the vicinity of the bridge in time to hear Murdoch ring down engine orders, while Olliver did not. The quartermaster arrived a few seconds later in time to see Murdoch at the watertight door switch and hear him yell “hard a-port.”
This is where the 45 or so seconds between completion of the two-point Boxhall/Hichens left turn and impact become important. It was during this period of time that the lookouts observed Titanic making straight for the iceberg. Fellow researcher George Behe has unearthed a lot of evidence that lookout Fleet was especially upset with the actions of the bridge in response to his warning that night. We can now see why. The lookouts first reported the fatal berg five minutes before Titanic's bow rotated left to once again point straight at doom. Fleet probably said something more blue than the cold night air before he picked up that telephone.
Murdoch felt the ship taking the ice and yelled “hard a-port.” This was the correct — indeed, the only — helm order possible for a ship in contact with an object on its starboard bow. To protect as much of the hull from damage as possible Murdoch needed to swing the stern away, which was the intent of turning right and burying the bow into the iceberg. But, this application of right rudder came up to 15 seconds after the First Officer rang down an engine order. Murdoch knew full well that reversing both engines would rob him of the steering ability he needed so desperately. If he did send an engine order, it would have to have been one that aided in his attempt to mitigate damage.
There is only one logical engine order under the circumstances. That is, Astern Full on the starboard shaft only. Murdoch would have allowed the port shaft to continue in forward to maintain water flow over the rudder. Combining reverse thrust on the starboard side with forward on the port would have caused Titanic to “twist” to starboard just as if it were steering by rudder. Adding in rudder to this would have increased the rotation of the bow and aided greatly in swinging the stern out of danger as Rowe noted. It would also have put the iceberg off the starboard quarter which required the officers to walk to the starboard bridge wing to view it.
Note that the time between completion of the two-point Boxhall/Hichens left turn and impact on the iceberg is about a minute. Quartermaster Hichens said it was about a minute between the right turn and when Captain Smith came through the wheelhouse on his way to the bridge. The captain's motivation would not have been either the sounding of the crow's nest bell or the left turn. Both of these were ordinary events in the life of a ship. But, when Smith heard engine telegraph bells in mid-ocean, he must have dropped everything and made for the open bridge. That was not normal. It meant something was very, very wrong...as indeed it was.
— David G. Brown
PS: for those who absolutely need to know more and are willing to part with a few bucks, you can read my theory in all its boring details in my new book, “Titanic Myths, Titanic Truths,” available from amazon.com. If you want to save money, just keep reading my posts which are based on the research for that book.
Let's discard the lovely opening scene in the book “A Night To Remember” and the iceberg crunching of the Hollywood flick “Titanic.” Instead, let's look at what the people involved described and compare that against reality — what a rudder-steered ship of Titanic's size could possibly have done. And, let's ignore the melodramatic phrases in testimonies such as “hard over.” First, Fourth Officer Boxhall and quartermaster Hitchens both talked about a left turn which in 1912 parlance required starboard helm. Hichens added that this turn was about two compass points, or 22.5 degrees.
Quartermaster Olliver said the only helm command that he heard was “a-port,” meaning a right turn. He said this command came as he first felt Titanic rumble onto the ice. Olliver said that he observed the officer (Sixth Officer Moody) oversee that the quartermaster at the wheel (Hichens) that this right turn helm order was carried out. Olliver also said the helm was not fully over until the berg was “up astern” of the wheelhouse.
Another quartermaster, Rowe, was on the poop deck where he kept watch over the taffrail log. In his testimony Rowe said the iceberg passed close aboard the outer end of the docking bridge, but that no contact was made because Titanic was responding to port helm, or right rudder.
The actions of the officers on the bridge give us a hint as to the direction Titanic turned as it came off the iceberg. The officers quarters deckhouse prevented looking straight astern from the bridge. To see astern it was necessary to walk to either brige wing. If Titanic had steered left (starboard helm) only, the berg would have been off the port quarter and the officers would have gone to the port bridge wing. But, they went the opposite way, to the starboard bridge wing. This indicates Titanic turned right as it was passing the berg, placing the fatal ice off the starboard quarter.
Finally, we have to examine what lookouts Fleet and Lee said about the accident. These two men had grandstand seats to the events, but saw everything in relative motion. Landsmen don't get this aspect of their testimonies. What the lookouts saw was not Titanic approaching the berg. Rather, it was as if they were sitting still and the iceberg came at the ship. Actions of objects around you when viewed in relative motion can appear radically different than if seen from “God's eye” looking down from above. This is why radar operators must learn to plot the approach of other ships. Radar presents a relative motion picture, not real motion as viewed through “God's eye.” The eyeball and brain are easily fooled by relative motion.
One thing the lookouts were adamant about is that the iceberg approached Titanic from dead ahead. There was no discussion of any maneuvers — port or starboard — in their testimonies until things had gone past the point of “in extremis.” That is, they did not see any movement of the bow until the accident was taking place. Then, in relative motion, it appeared the bow was rotating to port which, if true, would have required starboard helm.
Actions Described:
STRAIGHT APPROACH
Fleet & Lee from crow's nest
By implication Boxhall & Hichens
LEFT TURN
Boxhall & Hichens
Fleet & Lee during accident
RIGHT TURN
Olliver heard order & saw it executed
Rowe observed stern swing away from berg
Actions of officer going to starboard bridge wing
To make sense of all this it is necessary to place things in correct chronological order. “Which came first?” is the key question that must be answered. There seems no reason to doubt that Titanic steered a straight course prior to the first helm order under discussion. By implication, Boxhall and Hichens indicate the ship was on a straight course when they describe the “hard a-starboard” action which altered the ship's heading by (per Hichens) two points.
But, is the straight approach to the iceberg actually the first event in this chain. Or, is it the second? This requires an examination of time, specifically the duration between the first warning by the lookouts using their bell and impact on the berg. Conventional wisdom places that duration at under a minute, but this is in direct contradiction to the only recorded estimate by seaman Scarrott. He placed the duration at “five to eight minutes,” and that changes everything.
Jim and I have shown the accident took place at or around 4 minutes after 12 o'clock in April 14th ship's time. That was 11:40 p.m. on clocks used by the crew. This time for the accident places it directly following a required compass check, explaining why Olliver was on the standard compass platform and Boxhall coming out of the officers quarters when they heard the lookouts' bell. The 12 o'clock compass check was also an ideal time for Captain Smith to call for a course change. After all, the officers and men would already be in position doing the compass check, so adding a course change would not have required unnecessary trips to and from the standard compass.
Making the two-point Boxhall/Hichens left turn into the first event of our chronology snaps everything into sharp focus. All of the other events fit into the picture. It would have taken the two men on the compass platform about 45 seconds (per movie director Cameron) to walk from there to the bridge. As the officer, Boxhall would have left first and been followed by Olliver. And, following custom of the day, it is highly probable that Boxhall would have gone forward on the starboard side of the boat deck while Olliver would have returned on the port.
This explains why Boxhall got back to the vicinity of the bridge in time to hear Murdoch ring down engine orders, while Olliver did not. The quartermaster arrived a few seconds later in time to see Murdoch at the watertight door switch and hear him yell “hard a-port.”
This is where the 45 or so seconds between completion of the two-point Boxhall/Hichens left turn and impact become important. It was during this period of time that the lookouts observed Titanic making straight for the iceberg. Fellow researcher George Behe has unearthed a lot of evidence that lookout Fleet was especially upset with the actions of the bridge in response to his warning that night. We can now see why. The lookouts first reported the fatal berg five minutes before Titanic's bow rotated left to once again point straight at doom. Fleet probably said something more blue than the cold night air before he picked up that telephone.
Murdoch felt the ship taking the ice and yelled “hard a-port.” This was the correct — indeed, the only — helm order possible for a ship in contact with an object on its starboard bow. To protect as much of the hull from damage as possible Murdoch needed to swing the stern away, which was the intent of turning right and burying the bow into the iceberg. But, this application of right rudder came up to 15 seconds after the First Officer rang down an engine order. Murdoch knew full well that reversing both engines would rob him of the steering ability he needed so desperately. If he did send an engine order, it would have to have been one that aided in his attempt to mitigate damage.
There is only one logical engine order under the circumstances. That is, Astern Full on the starboard shaft only. Murdoch would have allowed the port shaft to continue in forward to maintain water flow over the rudder. Combining reverse thrust on the starboard side with forward on the port would have caused Titanic to “twist” to starboard just as if it were steering by rudder. Adding in rudder to this would have increased the rotation of the bow and aided greatly in swinging the stern out of danger as Rowe noted. It would also have put the iceberg off the starboard quarter which required the officers to walk to the starboard bridge wing to view it.
Note that the time between completion of the two-point Boxhall/Hichens left turn and impact on the iceberg is about a minute. Quartermaster Hichens said it was about a minute between the right turn and when Captain Smith came through the wheelhouse on his way to the bridge. The captain's motivation would not have been either the sounding of the crow's nest bell or the left turn. Both of these were ordinary events in the life of a ship. But, when Smith heard engine telegraph bells in mid-ocean, he must have dropped everything and made for the open bridge. That was not normal. It meant something was very, very wrong...as indeed it was.
— David G. Brown
PS: for those who absolutely need to know more and are willing to part with a few bucks, you can read my theory in all its boring details in my new book, “Titanic Myths, Titanic Truths,” available from amazon.com. If you want to save money, just keep reading my posts which are based on the research for that book.
Jim Currie
Member
David,
We two agree on quite a few things but I think the reason we do not have total consensus is because we are not reading from the same hymn sheet.
First your interpretation of the evidence of QM Olliver:
"He said this command came as he first felt Titanic rumble onto the ice. Olliver said that he observed the officer (Sixth Officer Moody) oversee that the quartermaster at the wheel (Hichens) that this right turn helm order was carried out. Olliver also said the helm was not fully over until the berg was “up astern” of the wheelhouse."
I think you are mixing things up a bit?
Hichens received and carried out the first helm order and barely completed it when the ship hit the ice.
Olliver did not hear the second helm order "as he first felt Titanic rumble onto the ice". He heard it as you point out when "The iceberg was away up stern". This to any trained seafarer is a typo. It should really read "when the iceberg was way up[a]stern".
David, we cannot rely on the evidence of QM Olliver any more than that of AB Scarrott.
If Olliver arrived at the bridge on the port side, how was he able to see the iceberg passing down the starboard side?
Think about it! He said the iceberg was about as high as the boat deck and that he saw the 'tip-top' of it as it passed by. Bear in mind that he said that he saw it after the noise of contact had finished and after it was past the bridge. The iceberg lost contact with the ship's side at about frame number +58. That means that Olliver had to be standing between Lifeboats 3 and 5 to see the iceberg passing silently .
That puts Olliver at about 63 feet from the bridge 7 seconds after impact and 153 feet from the bridge at impact. More to the point, At impact, he would be 63 feet from the Standard Compass Platform.
Apart from the foregoing: If QM Olliver arrived on the pridge at the port side, he would go directly to his station. He was trained to do so without any order. Olliver would go directly to a position behind Hichens. On his way, he, like Boxhall, would see Murdoch at the WT Door. What he would not do, was to wander over to the other side of th bridge deck and mingle with the Captain and officers..' Say guys! What's all the fuss about? Geez! Did any of you see that ruddy great icberg tip passing by?
Don't think so David!
"Another quartermaster, Rowe, was on the poop deck where he kept watch over the taffrail log. In his testimony Rowe said the iceberg passed close aboard the outer end of the docking bridge, but that no contact was made because Titanic was responding to port helm, or right rudder."
Rowe certainly did see the icberg close to his station at the stern.
He did not say: 'no contact was made because Titanic was responding to port helm, or right rudder'. He did tell Senator Burton that he could not say[didn't know] if the ship's helm was hard over as they passed the iceberg.
In reality, he in fact described the stern closing with the iceberg. You may ask how I know this?
As I pointed-out earlier, the iceberg must have been clear of the energency boat so it must hace been at least 7 feet out from the ship's side, when the bridge area pasr it. That was at the broadest part of the ship. That means it was 55 feet off the ship's centerline at that time.
Rowed said he was standing by the ship's side rail of the poop deck when the ship passed the ice. He said he was standing at the side rail at the port side of the poop deck. He told Senator Burton ;"It was so near that I thought it was going to strike the bridge."
This was the starboard outer end of the docking bridge and means that the iceberg was within 36 feet of the ship's centerline. In other words, the ship' stern had swung about 19feet (55 minus 36) toward the iceberg. It would not have done so if Titanic was acting under hard-a-port (hard right) helm!
There is also a problem with Rowe's 'heading north' evidence. It takes no account of what others said about the light seen from Titanic.
The ship seen by Boxhall was seen almost right ahead at least 20 minutes after impact.. at about the time the CQD was being transmitted. The lookouts did not report seeing it before then which they most certainly would have done if it was there all the time. Boxhall said it was approaching Titanic and moving from right to left at the same time. In other words it was getting closer and it's bearing was changing. He confirms Rowe's observation that it changed from almost ahead to 2 points on the port bow. So Rowe as describing a moving vessel, not a swing of Titanic's bow. The only way Rowe could have been certain of how Titanic was heading would have been by looking at a compass. There is no evidence that he did so.
What is absolutely certain is the fact that the second helm order was given after Titanic had passed the iceberg and was therefore not part of the iceberg avoidance manoeuvre. It was given for another reason and given by experts who would only give such an order if they knew for certain it would be effective. We are discussing an energency stop or astern movement here. All the accompanying turbulence at the rudder this would cause, together with a rapidly reducing speed, would ensure that a rudder was as useful as a chocolate fire guard!
There is absolutely no way the helm would have been effective in turning the ship in any direction by that time.
Scarrott's evidence, like Titanic does not hold water. You wrote:
[I]"but this is in direct contradiction to the only recorded estimate by seaman Scarrott. He placed the duration at “five to eight minutes,” and that changes everything."[/I]
Not true! AB Frank Osman was waiting for one bell to sound when he heard the 3 bells.
"Mr. OSMAN.
I was waiting for one bell, which they strike, one bell just before the quarter of the hour, before the four hours, when you get a call to relieve; and I heard three bells strike, and I thought there was a ship ahead. Just after that I heard the collision,"
That had to be 15 -20 minutes before Midnight on an adjusted clock.
You confirmed this when you wrote:
"Jim and I have shown the accident took place at or around 4 minutes after 12 o'clock in April 14th ship's time. That was 11:40 p.m. on clocks used by the crew"
This fact hammers another nail into the coffin of Scarrott's evidence.
If Scarrott heard the 3 bells about 11-30pm then it was 11-30pm April 14th time. If the impact came 10 minute later, then it came at 11-40pm April 14 time.
But we agree that the clocks were set back 24 minutes later, at midnight April 14 and impact came shortly after that.. about 4 minutes. It follows that if Scarrott heard the 3 bells at 11-30pm April 14, then the impact must have been either 10 minutes later at 11-40pm April 14 time or 34 minutes later at April 14 time.
In which case, the lookouts saw the iceberg 2.5 or 8.6 miles away.. Take your pick. Whatever you chose, it means that the Titanic lookouts saw the ice either 5 times or 17 times further away than anyone else that night.
Again, I don't think so!
"The actions of the officers on the bridge give us a hint as to the direction Titanic turned as it came off the iceberg..... This indicates Titanic turned right as it was passing the berg, placing the fatal ice off the starboard quarter."
No it does not David! It merely tell us that Titanic was to the left of her original course. How she got there is easy to explain.
need to get the old 'drawing board' out again David!
Jim C.
We two agree on quite a few things but I think the reason we do not have total consensus is because we are not reading from the same hymn sheet.
First your interpretation of the evidence of QM Olliver:
"He said this command came as he first felt Titanic rumble onto the ice. Olliver said that he observed the officer (Sixth Officer Moody) oversee that the quartermaster at the wheel (Hichens) that this right turn helm order was carried out. Olliver also said the helm was not fully over until the berg was “up astern” of the wheelhouse."
I think you are mixing things up a bit?
Hichens received and carried out the first helm order and barely completed it when the ship hit the ice.
Olliver did not hear the second helm order "as he first felt Titanic rumble onto the ice". He heard it as you point out when "The iceberg was away up stern". This to any trained seafarer is a typo. It should really read "when the iceberg was way up[a]stern".
David, we cannot rely on the evidence of QM Olliver any more than that of AB Scarrott.
If Olliver arrived at the bridge on the port side, how was he able to see the iceberg passing down the starboard side?
Think about it! He said the iceberg was about as high as the boat deck and that he saw the 'tip-top' of it as it passed by. Bear in mind that he said that he saw it after the noise of contact had finished and after it was past the bridge. The iceberg lost contact with the ship's side at about frame number +58. That means that Olliver had to be standing between Lifeboats 3 and 5 to see the iceberg passing silently .
That puts Olliver at about 63 feet from the bridge 7 seconds after impact and 153 feet from the bridge at impact. More to the point, At impact, he would be 63 feet from the Standard Compass Platform.
Apart from the foregoing: If QM Olliver arrived on the pridge at the port side, he would go directly to his station. He was trained to do so without any order. Olliver would go directly to a position behind Hichens. On his way, he, like Boxhall, would see Murdoch at the WT Door. What he would not do, was to wander over to the other side of th bridge deck and mingle with the Captain and officers..' Say guys! What's all the fuss about? Geez! Did any of you see that ruddy great icberg tip passing by?
Don't think so David!
"Another quartermaster, Rowe, was on the poop deck where he kept watch over the taffrail log. In his testimony Rowe said the iceberg passed close aboard the outer end of the docking bridge, but that no contact was made because Titanic was responding to port helm, or right rudder."
Rowe certainly did see the icberg close to his station at the stern.
He did not say: 'no contact was made because Titanic was responding to port helm, or right rudder'. He did tell Senator Burton that he could not say[didn't know] if the ship's helm was hard over as they passed the iceberg.
In reality, he in fact described the stern closing with the iceberg. You may ask how I know this?
As I pointed-out earlier, the iceberg must have been clear of the energency boat so it must hace been at least 7 feet out from the ship's side, when the bridge area pasr it. That was at the broadest part of the ship. That means it was 55 feet off the ship's centerline at that time.
Rowed said he was standing by the ship's side rail of the poop deck when the ship passed the ice. He said he was standing at the side rail at the port side of the poop deck. He told Senator Burton ;"It was so near that I thought it was going to strike the bridge."
This was the starboard outer end of the docking bridge and means that the iceberg was within 36 feet of the ship's centerline. In other words, the ship' stern had swung about 19feet (55 minus 36) toward the iceberg. It would not have done so if Titanic was acting under hard-a-port (hard right) helm!
There is also a problem with Rowe's 'heading north' evidence. It takes no account of what others said about the light seen from Titanic.
The ship seen by Boxhall was seen almost right ahead at least 20 minutes after impact.. at about the time the CQD was being transmitted. The lookouts did not report seeing it before then which they most certainly would have done if it was there all the time. Boxhall said it was approaching Titanic and moving from right to left at the same time. In other words it was getting closer and it's bearing was changing. He confirms Rowe's observation that it changed from almost ahead to 2 points on the port bow. So Rowe as describing a moving vessel, not a swing of Titanic's bow. The only way Rowe could have been certain of how Titanic was heading would have been by looking at a compass. There is no evidence that he did so.
What is absolutely certain is the fact that the second helm order was given after Titanic had passed the iceberg and was therefore not part of the iceberg avoidance manoeuvre. It was given for another reason and given by experts who would only give such an order if they knew for certain it would be effective. We are discussing an energency stop or astern movement here. All the accompanying turbulence at the rudder this would cause, together with a rapidly reducing speed, would ensure that a rudder was as useful as a chocolate fire guard!
There is absolutely no way the helm would have been effective in turning the ship in any direction by that time.
Scarrott's evidence, like Titanic does not hold water. You wrote:
[I]"but this is in direct contradiction to the only recorded estimate by seaman Scarrott. He placed the duration at “five to eight minutes,” and that changes everything."[/I]
Not true! AB Frank Osman was waiting for one bell to sound when he heard the 3 bells.
"Mr. OSMAN.
I was waiting for one bell, which they strike, one bell just before the quarter of the hour, before the four hours, when you get a call to relieve; and I heard three bells strike, and I thought there was a ship ahead. Just after that I heard the collision,"
That had to be 15 -20 minutes before Midnight on an adjusted clock.
You confirmed this when you wrote:
"Jim and I have shown the accident took place at or around 4 minutes after 12 o'clock in April 14th ship's time. That was 11:40 p.m. on clocks used by the crew"
This fact hammers another nail into the coffin of Scarrott's evidence.
If Scarrott heard the 3 bells about 11-30pm then it was 11-30pm April 14th time. If the impact came 10 minute later, then it came at 11-40pm April 14 time.
But we agree that the clocks were set back 24 minutes later, at midnight April 14 and impact came shortly after that.. about 4 minutes. It follows that if Scarrott heard the 3 bells at 11-30pm April 14, then the impact must have been either 10 minutes later at 11-40pm April 14 time or 34 minutes later at April 14 time.
In which case, the lookouts saw the iceberg 2.5 or 8.6 miles away.. Take your pick. Whatever you chose, it means that the Titanic lookouts saw the ice either 5 times or 17 times further away than anyone else that night.
Again, I don't think so!
"The actions of the officers on the bridge give us a hint as to the direction Titanic turned as it came off the iceberg..... This indicates Titanic turned right as it was passing the berg, placing the fatal ice off the starboard quarter."
No it does not David! It merely tell us that Titanic was to the left of her original course. How she got there is easy to explain.
need to get the old 'drawing board' out again David!
Jim C.
Scott Mills
Member
Jim,
If this were the case, doesn't stand to reason that the aft end of the ship would also have made contact with the underwater spar of the berg? It seems to me that if, as you say, a-port-around wasn't attempted (I'm agnostic on David's theory) that you would have had damage down the entire length of the ship.
The other things that comes to mind, is that you can't really trust Rowe's recollections either, particularly since we can't ask him questions. There are things you need to know to get a good handle of his observations. Where was he--exactly--when he say the berg? What angle did he see it at? Is it something he noticed immediately or saw looming in the corner of his eye--surprising him--before he gets a good look? How much time, exactly, was he in view of the iceberg?
All these questions are really important. As you've no doubt seen doing research on Titanic, stories about seeing the iceberg are often inconsistent and appear to be exaggerated. Some of the stories are probably completely made up, sure, but I imagine a lot of the stories and memories get amplified by the sheer terror of the rest of the night.
So it is easy for me to believe Rowe could be working at his post, not really paying attention, when he suddenly sees an iceberg shoot past him. He may have even been afraid that it would hit the platform then, even though it wasn't anywhere close. Depending on when he sees it, and how long he gets to look at it, his perception of perspective and distance might have just been inaccurate.
I'm not saying you cannot use his evidence to support yourself, or theories about the collision, just that in and of itself, it doesn't necessarily negate David's theory.
David G. Brown
RIP
Scott -- If I understand Jim's comment correctly, he's really talking about the distance from Titanic's centerline to the iceberg. As he noted, the amount of swing implied by a literal interpretation of Rowe's comments appears too small for what I suggest. As with so much of the Titanic story, the statements by surviving witnesses often appear to be contradictory. Sometimes all we can to is agree to disagree and ask the barmaid for another round.
One thing I've noted throughout my life is that big moving objects which appear suddenly and unexpectedly out of the dark usually seem a lot closer than they actually are. Perception is not always in tune with reality, but our brains live in the world they perceive. Hence the old saying, "perception is reality." I have trouble believing that Rowe's distance estimate was accurate. Not that I can disprove what he said, I am just basing my conclusion on life experience.
Secondly, Olliver was quite clear that the rudder was not fully "hard a-port" until the iceberg was well astern of his location on the bridge. We don't know how far astern, just behind Titanic's control center. Even so, from Olliver's statement we can safely conclude that the rudder was not hard over long enough to have had full effect. The stern was probably just starting to swing away from the iceberg. This supposition is supported by what appears to be a second impact on the iceberg in way of boiler room #4 and passengers noting ice particles in port holes and on deck possibly as far aft as the Cafe.
I do object to Jim's drawing on historical grounds. He would be right that had the ship turned left to dodge the berg, then resumed its course, the fatal ice would have been off the starboard quarter. However, what we have in the record is a left turn sometime prior to contact followed by a hard-over right turn during and continuing through and after contact with the iceberg. The historical record would create the need for the officers to go to the starboard bridge wing to see the iceberg. And, it explains why Titanic was facing generally north as it sank and that the bow is still facing just a bit east of north on the bottom.
And, Jim and I do not see eye-to-eye on the timing of the ship's bells. The reason for altering the crew clocks was to make the so-called "midnight" change of watch come halfway through the extra 47 minutes added to that Sunday by the ship's westward motion. This is why 12:04 o'clock in April 14th time was 11:40 o'clock for the crew. Logic would have that the striking of ship's bells was adjusted in sequence with the retarding of the crew clocks. So, when Scarrott heard 7 bells ring, it was 11:30 on the crew clocks but 11:54 o'clock in April 14th ship's time. The striking of the rouse out bell came 15 minutes before change of watch, which would have been 11:45 o'clock on the crew's clocks, or 12:09 o'clock in April 14th time. Five minutes earlier when the ship struck it was 11:40 on the crew clocks, or 12:04 o'clock in April 14th hours.
-- David G. Brown
One thing I've noted throughout my life is that big moving objects which appear suddenly and unexpectedly out of the dark usually seem a lot closer than they actually are. Perception is not always in tune with reality, but our brains live in the world they perceive. Hence the old saying, "perception is reality." I have trouble believing that Rowe's distance estimate was accurate. Not that I can disprove what he said, I am just basing my conclusion on life experience.
Secondly, Olliver was quite clear that the rudder was not fully "hard a-port" until the iceberg was well astern of his location on the bridge. We don't know how far astern, just behind Titanic's control center. Even so, from Olliver's statement we can safely conclude that the rudder was not hard over long enough to have had full effect. The stern was probably just starting to swing away from the iceberg. This supposition is supported by what appears to be a second impact on the iceberg in way of boiler room #4 and passengers noting ice particles in port holes and on deck possibly as far aft as the Cafe.
I do object to Jim's drawing on historical grounds. He would be right that had the ship turned left to dodge the berg, then resumed its course, the fatal ice would have been off the starboard quarter. However, what we have in the record is a left turn sometime prior to contact followed by a hard-over right turn during and continuing through and after contact with the iceberg. The historical record would create the need for the officers to go to the starboard bridge wing to see the iceberg. And, it explains why Titanic was facing generally north as it sank and that the bow is still facing just a bit east of north on the bottom.
And, Jim and I do not see eye-to-eye on the timing of the ship's bells. The reason for altering the crew clocks was to make the so-called "midnight" change of watch come halfway through the extra 47 minutes added to that Sunday by the ship's westward motion. This is why 12:04 o'clock in April 14th time was 11:40 o'clock for the crew. Logic would have that the striking of ship's bells was adjusted in sequence with the retarding of the crew clocks. So, when Scarrott heard 7 bells ring, it was 11:30 on the crew clocks but 11:54 o'clock in April 14th ship's time. The striking of the rouse out bell came 15 minutes before change of watch, which would have been 11:45 o'clock on the crew's clocks, or 12:09 o'clock in April 14th time. Five minutes earlier when the ship struck it was 11:40 on the crew clocks, or 12:04 o'clock in April 14th hours.
-- David G. Brown
Scott Mills
Member
This is why I shouldn't involve myself in conversations about engineering!
It seemed to me as I read it, that Jim was saying that the iceberg had missed the emergency boat, the farthest protruding bit of Titanic, but at the time of Rowe's observation, the berg was actually closer in and thus putting the platform Rowe was standing on in jeopardy of being struck. I agree with this in principle, which is why I brought it up. The problem is, of course, all we have to go on are things reported by witnesses of an event a hundred years ago, who are 60 years dead. We cannot go back to the source and inquire further unfortunately.
Generally, again, this seems to make sense. I wonder though, if as you say in your book (and I agree with) that Titanic began making way again on a course, how would this maneuver have had an impact on the final resting place of the ship? And also, of course, you have to factor in drift, which I know nothing about, but seems important.
Jim Currie
Member
Hello David!
That is the most peculiar ship's bells sequence I've ever heard of. Perhaps that's how it's done in America?
This is how it was on every British ship I ever sailed on:
Let's use the run-up from 10 pm when Murdoch took over from Lightoller.
10-00. 4 bells. Murdoch on Watch. Hichens relieves olliver on the wheel.
10-30pm. 5 bells.
11-00pm. 6 bells.
11-30pm. 7 bells. No clock changes on the ship. No Lookout Bell repetition. It's April 14 for everyone on board.
Midnight April 14: Watch Keeper's clocks retarded 24 minutes. Public clocks retarded 47 minutes. No bells rung at this time
11-45 pm on the 8 to 12 Watch: 1 bell .. 15 minute warning for Watchkeepers.
Midnight. 8 Bells. Change of Watches. 12 to 4 Watch on deck.
David, ship's bells are rung for one purpose only and that is to tell those on Watch and those coming on Watch what time it is. On a ship, people with different working hours have different times on their personal time pieces. The same goes for passengers who may or may not alter their clocks and watches before going to bed. The only people who are effected by the bells are those on Watch and those about to go on Watch.
We know from the evidence of Fleet and Lee that 8 bells were sounded 20 minutes after the impact.
Mr. FLEET.
I remained in the crow's nest until I got relief.
How long did you stay there?
Mr. FLEET.
About a quarter of an hour to 20 minutes after
17318. Then did you remain on the crow's-nest?
- Yes.
17319. Until eight bells?
- Till eight bells went.
17320. At eight bells, in the ordinary course, you were relieved?- Yes.
I don't think it can get any plainer than that. Do you?
Olliver's evidence is very clear concerning when he witnessed the hard-a-port order. He heard it when the iceberg was way past the bridge.. way down astern of the ship. Surely that is clear?
You and others really must carefully read his replies. When asked if the hard-a-port order had been given as part of the emergency avoidance manoeuvre, he replied:
"What I know about the wheel - I was stand-by to run messages, but what I knew about the helm is, hard aport.
That is different from his saying "What I know about the wheel at that time, was that it was hard-a-port".
This is the interpretation you an others have put on his answer and it completely contradicts the answer by the man who was actually on the wheel at the time. Hichens who very clearly stated:
"Senator SMITH.
Is that the only order [hard-a-starboard] you received before the collision, or impact?
Mr. HICHENS.
That is all, sir. Then the first officer told the other quartermaster standing by to take the time, and told one of the junior officers to make a note of that in the logbook. That was at 20 minutes of 12; sir."
Hichens is describing the text book response to an emergency helm order. The second part about recording the incident and Olliver taking the time puts Olliver in the Wheelhouse just after the impact. It all fits perfectly. Olliver would have returned to his post behind Hichens to await further orders. His first one was to take the time and record it.. probably in the Movement Book. At the same time, it would be copied to the Scrap Log. Wish I had a pound for every time I did that!
"However, what we have in the record is a left turn sometime prior to contact followed by a hard-over right turn during and continuing through and after contact with the iceberg."
No we don't David. That is yours and others interpretation of Olliver's evidence and is contrary to the hard evidence available as I have shown above.
As for the ship facing north:
I have seen Major Peuchin's evidence of seeing the Northern lights put forward as proof. Utter rubbish! The man was in the same boat as Hichens and Lee. They left Titanic on the port side. This is his 'take':
"Maj. PEUCHEN.
No; we started right off from the port side of the boat directly straight off from her about amidship, on the port side, right directly north, I think it would be, because the northern lights appeared where this light we had been looking at in that direction appeared shortly afterwards."
Now that's plain daft! because if they rowed directly out from the ship's port side and were heading North then the ship was heading east, not north. And thr mystery vesel was ENE of Titanic.
In any case David, How on earth did Titanic make such a reverse turn while loosing speed rapidly and with all that turbulence round her rudder?
That last 'jag' ahead was to do what Titanic could not have done previously... use her rudder. And it was the last bit of effective steering she did after trying to avoid the ice.
Jim C.
That is the most peculiar ship's bells sequence I've ever heard of. Perhaps that's how it's done in America?
This is how it was on every British ship I ever sailed on:
Let's use the run-up from 10 pm when Murdoch took over from Lightoller.
10-00. 4 bells. Murdoch on Watch. Hichens relieves olliver on the wheel.
10-30pm. 5 bells.
11-00pm. 6 bells.
11-30pm. 7 bells. No clock changes on the ship. No Lookout Bell repetition. It's April 14 for everyone on board.
Midnight April 14: Watch Keeper's clocks retarded 24 minutes. Public clocks retarded 47 minutes. No bells rung at this time
11-45 pm on the 8 to 12 Watch: 1 bell .. 15 minute warning for Watchkeepers.
Midnight. 8 Bells. Change of Watches. 12 to 4 Watch on deck.
David, ship's bells are rung for one purpose only and that is to tell those on Watch and those coming on Watch what time it is. On a ship, people with different working hours have different times on their personal time pieces. The same goes for passengers who may or may not alter their clocks and watches before going to bed. The only people who are effected by the bells are those on Watch and those about to go on Watch.
We know from the evidence of Fleet and Lee that 8 bells were sounded 20 minutes after the impact.
Mr. FLEET.
I remained in the crow's nest until I got relief.
How long did you stay there?
Mr. FLEET.
About a quarter of an hour to 20 minutes after
17318. Then did you remain on the crow's-nest?
- Yes.
17319. Until eight bells?
- Till eight bells went.
17320. At eight bells, in the ordinary course, you were relieved?- Yes.
I don't think it can get any plainer than that. Do you?
Olliver's evidence is very clear concerning when he witnessed the hard-a-port order. He heard it when the iceberg was way past the bridge.. way down astern of the ship. Surely that is clear?
You and others really must carefully read his replies. When asked if the hard-a-port order had been given as part of the emergency avoidance manoeuvre, he replied:
"What I know about the wheel - I was stand-by to run messages, but what I knew about the helm is, hard aport.
That is different from his saying "What I know about the wheel at that time, was that it was hard-a-port".
This is the interpretation you an others have put on his answer and it completely contradicts the answer by the man who was actually on the wheel at the time. Hichens who very clearly stated:
"Senator SMITH.
Is that the only order [hard-a-starboard] you received before the collision, or impact?
Mr. HICHENS.
That is all, sir. Then the first officer told the other quartermaster standing by to take the time, and told one of the junior officers to make a note of that in the logbook. That was at 20 minutes of 12; sir."
Hichens is describing the text book response to an emergency helm order. The second part about recording the incident and Olliver taking the time puts Olliver in the Wheelhouse just after the impact. It all fits perfectly. Olliver would have returned to his post behind Hichens to await further orders. His first one was to take the time and record it.. probably in the Movement Book. At the same time, it would be copied to the Scrap Log. Wish I had a pound for every time I did that!
"However, what we have in the record is a left turn sometime prior to contact followed by a hard-over right turn during and continuing through and after contact with the iceberg."
No we don't David. That is yours and others interpretation of Olliver's evidence and is contrary to the hard evidence available as I have shown above.
As for the ship facing north:
I have seen Major Peuchin's evidence of seeing the Northern lights put forward as proof. Utter rubbish! The man was in the same boat as Hichens and Lee. They left Titanic on the port side. This is his 'take':
"Maj. PEUCHEN.
No; we started right off from the port side of the boat directly straight off from her about amidship, on the port side, right directly north, I think it would be, because the northern lights appeared where this light we had been looking at in that direction appeared shortly afterwards."
Now that's plain daft! because if they rowed directly out from the ship's port side and were heading North then the ship was heading east, not north. And thr mystery vesel was ENE of Titanic.
In any case David, How on earth did Titanic make such a reverse turn while loosing speed rapidly and with all that turbulence round her rudder?
That last 'jag' ahead was to do what Titanic could not have done previously... use her rudder. And it was the last bit of effective steering she did after trying to avoid the ice.
Jim C.
Scott Mills
Member
Jim,
Forgive me, I don't understand the seaman's parlance, but are you saying that the ship was not ordered hard-over to port until after the iceberg was well behind the ship, and not just the bridge?
Also, if this is what you are saying, how did the ship avoid damage to her entire starboard side? One last bit, and I'll have to look at the transcripts of the enquirers myself when I have time, but is there substance in your mind to David's claim that the officers went to the opposite bridge wing immediately after the collision? If so, why would they do this?
Or maybe I am just mixing everything up! Always a possibility.
Forgive me, I don't understand the seaman's parlance, but are you saying that the ship was not ordered hard-over to port until after the iceberg was well behind the ship, and not just the bridge?
Also, if this is what you are saying, how did the ship avoid damage to her entire starboard side? One last bit, and I'll have to look at the transcripts of the enquirers myself when I have time, but is there substance in your mind to David's claim that the officers went to the opposite bridge wing immediately after the collision? If so, why would they do this?
Or maybe I am just mixing everything up! Always a possibility.
David G. Brown
RIP
Timekeeping is at the heart of all misunderstandings about how Titanic came to face off against an iceberg. I'll address this aspect of the story in this post. Later, I'll respond to questions about how it affects maneuvers around the iceberg. In between, I have to put the bottom back in a 60-year-old wooden yacht.
The underlying reason for time confusion was the need to add 47 minutes to Sunday, April 14th in order to account for the ship's westward course. The ship was “chasing the sun,” so its speed resulted in a longer day than the usual 24 hours. There is no way to express these extra minutes in the conventional “a.m.” and “p.m.” reckoning of time. So, most historians have simply brushed off the method of retarding Titanic's clocks by saying, “it hadn't been done that night.” If it were only true things would be so much simpler, but in fact the clock by which impact on the iceberg was measured had been turned back by 24 minutes.
To make things easier to understand, I'll use the 24-hour system of timekeeping which does allow for a longer day. You can express time as “2447 hours April 14th” without confusion.
We know from numerous crew testimonies that the on-duty Starboard Watch was to serve half of the extra 47 minutes. I make this to be 24 minutes. The watch below, the Port Watch, was to serve the remaining extra 23 minutes. Not mentioned in either inquiry was that all of those extra minutes had to be contained within the calendar day of April 14th. None of the extra 47 minutes could be held over into Monday. Midnight marking the start of April 15th should have occurred at 2447 hours April 14th which would have been the same as 0000 hours Monday.
This means that the so-called “midnight” change of watch for the crew had to take place at 2424 hours of April 14th. The 24 minutes from 2400 to 2424 represented the extra time served by the Starboard Watch. This explains things like quartermaster Hichens' testimony that he was relieved at 12:23 o'clock – he was in straight April 14th hours. Of course, that was the equivalent of 11:59 on crew clocks set back 24 minutes. It is usual for sailors to come on duty before their time in order to learn the situation before taking over. At 12:24 o'clock (2424 hours) in unaltered April 14th ship's time ... “midnight” for the crew ... the Port Watch would have begun serving its extra minutes before starting its full 4-hour watch at 2447 hours April 14th which was also 0000 hours April 15th. To accommodate this procedure crew clocks would have been retarded to be correct for noon the next day as required by IMM/WSL rules. It was this second retarding that was not performed because of the iceberg emergency that night.
Jim and I agree that crew testimony puts impact on the iceberg at 20 minutes before the midnight change of watch. That makes the time of impact 2404 hours in April 14th ship's time.
Jim and I disagree on how the crew clocks were set back. He puts the retarding late, almost in conjunction with the accident. This cannot be the way it was done. Examination of the officers' watch schedule shows that one senior officer would have been unfairly burdened with serving all the extra time had the setback come at or near to the crew change of watch. If that had been the case, then all 47 extra minutes would have been added to First Officer Murdoch's shift. While not an unbearable burden, it is obvious from the crew's equal sharing of the extra minutes that White Star and Captain Smith did not intend such an unfair burden on anyone, let alone a senior officer.
However, if the crew clocks were retarded by 24 minutes at four bells (10 p.m. or 2200 hours in April 14th ship's time), then the on-duty Second Officer Lightoller would have served those extra minutes during his watch. At 10 p.m. on crew clocks (2224 hours April 14th) he would have turned the deck over to the First Officer. Murdoch would then have served his extra 23 minutes with the Port Watch after it came on duty. Chief Officer Wild, as befitting his exalted office, would have been exempt from serving any extra time.
What I'm proposing was specifically authorized in the IMM/White Star Line rule book. Paragraph 259 states, “Ship's Time – The Officer of the Watch will see that the ship's time is changed between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., the clocks to be set for Noon before 6 a.m.”
The choice of 10 p.m. as the earliest time for resetting ship's clocks was not by chance. It reflected the need to share the extra time created during a westward passage between two senior officers as well as the two crew Watches. The same rule book required that compass checks be done every half hour. No options were permitted for changing the 30-minute intervals of these evolutions. As a result, after 10 p.m. (2200 hours) in April 14th time the compass checks would no longer take place on the “up” and down”, on the hour and half hour. Rather, the 10:30 p.m. (2230 hours) comparison occurred at 10:06 o'clock for the crew. This is one reason why one of the two clocks in the wheelhouse had to show April 14th hours while the other displayed crew time.
As Fourth Officer, Boxhall was responsible for making these compass checks during his watch. He would work with Sixth Officer Moody and the on-duty quartermaster to make sure the course on the steering compass still corresponded to the reading of the standard compass. Boxhall would have made trips to the standard compass platform at 10:06, 10:36, 11:06, and 11:36 o'clock on the crew's timepiece. During the hours of darkness the runner quartermaster would have preceded him to the platform to make sure the oil lamps were burning brightly. Without those lamps it would have been impossible for Boxhall to read the compass and perform his duties.
This explains why quartermaster Olliver was on the compass platform and Boxhall was coming out of the officers quarters when lookout Fleet struck his bell three time. That would have happened about 11:33 o'clock in crew time, or a few minutes prior to the required compass evolution. And, that exactly corresponds to testimony from seaman Scarrott who said he heard those three strikes about five the eight minutes before impact on the iceberg.
– David G. Brown
The underlying reason for time confusion was the need to add 47 minutes to Sunday, April 14th in order to account for the ship's westward course. The ship was “chasing the sun,” so its speed resulted in a longer day than the usual 24 hours. There is no way to express these extra minutes in the conventional “a.m.” and “p.m.” reckoning of time. So, most historians have simply brushed off the method of retarding Titanic's clocks by saying, “it hadn't been done that night.” If it were only true things would be so much simpler, but in fact the clock by which impact on the iceberg was measured had been turned back by 24 minutes.
To make things easier to understand, I'll use the 24-hour system of timekeeping which does allow for a longer day. You can express time as “2447 hours April 14th” without confusion.
We know from numerous crew testimonies that the on-duty Starboard Watch was to serve half of the extra 47 minutes. I make this to be 24 minutes. The watch below, the Port Watch, was to serve the remaining extra 23 minutes. Not mentioned in either inquiry was that all of those extra minutes had to be contained within the calendar day of April 14th. None of the extra 47 minutes could be held over into Monday. Midnight marking the start of April 15th should have occurred at 2447 hours April 14th which would have been the same as 0000 hours Monday.
This means that the so-called “midnight” change of watch for the crew had to take place at 2424 hours of April 14th. The 24 minutes from 2400 to 2424 represented the extra time served by the Starboard Watch. This explains things like quartermaster Hichens' testimony that he was relieved at 12:23 o'clock – he was in straight April 14th hours. Of course, that was the equivalent of 11:59 on crew clocks set back 24 minutes. It is usual for sailors to come on duty before their time in order to learn the situation before taking over. At 12:24 o'clock (2424 hours) in unaltered April 14th ship's time ... “midnight” for the crew ... the Port Watch would have begun serving its extra minutes before starting its full 4-hour watch at 2447 hours April 14th which was also 0000 hours April 15th. To accommodate this procedure crew clocks would have been retarded to be correct for noon the next day as required by IMM/WSL rules. It was this second retarding that was not performed because of the iceberg emergency that night.
Jim and I agree that crew testimony puts impact on the iceberg at 20 minutes before the midnight change of watch. That makes the time of impact 2404 hours in April 14th ship's time.
Jim and I disagree on how the crew clocks were set back. He puts the retarding late, almost in conjunction with the accident. This cannot be the way it was done. Examination of the officers' watch schedule shows that one senior officer would have been unfairly burdened with serving all the extra time had the setback come at or near to the crew change of watch. If that had been the case, then all 47 extra minutes would have been added to First Officer Murdoch's shift. While not an unbearable burden, it is obvious from the crew's equal sharing of the extra minutes that White Star and Captain Smith did not intend such an unfair burden on anyone, let alone a senior officer.
However, if the crew clocks were retarded by 24 minutes at four bells (10 p.m. or 2200 hours in April 14th ship's time), then the on-duty Second Officer Lightoller would have served those extra minutes during his watch. At 10 p.m. on crew clocks (2224 hours April 14th) he would have turned the deck over to the First Officer. Murdoch would then have served his extra 23 minutes with the Port Watch after it came on duty. Chief Officer Wild, as befitting his exalted office, would have been exempt from serving any extra time.
What I'm proposing was specifically authorized in the IMM/White Star Line rule book. Paragraph 259 states, “Ship's Time – The Officer of the Watch will see that the ship's time is changed between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., the clocks to be set for Noon before 6 a.m.”
The choice of 10 p.m. as the earliest time for resetting ship's clocks was not by chance. It reflected the need to share the extra time created during a westward passage between two senior officers as well as the two crew Watches. The same rule book required that compass checks be done every half hour. No options were permitted for changing the 30-minute intervals of these evolutions. As a result, after 10 p.m. (2200 hours) in April 14th time the compass checks would no longer take place on the “up” and down”, on the hour and half hour. Rather, the 10:30 p.m. (2230 hours) comparison occurred at 10:06 o'clock for the crew. This is one reason why one of the two clocks in the wheelhouse had to show April 14th hours while the other displayed crew time.
As Fourth Officer, Boxhall was responsible for making these compass checks during his watch. He would work with Sixth Officer Moody and the on-duty quartermaster to make sure the course on the steering compass still corresponded to the reading of the standard compass. Boxhall would have made trips to the standard compass platform at 10:06, 10:36, 11:06, and 11:36 o'clock on the crew's timepiece. During the hours of darkness the runner quartermaster would have preceded him to the platform to make sure the oil lamps were burning brightly. Without those lamps it would have been impossible for Boxhall to read the compass and perform his duties.
This explains why quartermaster Olliver was on the compass platform and Boxhall was coming out of the officers quarters when lookout Fleet struck his bell three time. That would have happened about 11:33 o'clock in crew time, or a few minutes prior to the required compass evolution. And, that exactly corresponds to testimony from seaman Scarrott who said he heard those three strikes about five the eight minutes before impact on the iceberg.
– David G. Brown
Jim Currie
Member
Hell Scott!
You wrote:
"Forgive me, I don't understand the seaman's parlance, but are you saying that the ship was not ordered hard-over to port until after the iceberg was well behind the ship, and not just the bridge?"
That's exactly what I'm saying and what Olliver told his questioner.
It is very plain in the evidence.
Olliver said three very important things:
1.. The iceberg was, and I quote: "The iceberg was away up stern.[when the helm was put hard-a-port]
2...If the second helm order was given as Olliver describes, then he, Olliver, must have seen the iceberg before that and before he went to the wheelhouse.
3.. Olliver saw the iceberg after the sound of it touching the ship's side had ended. Threfore he must have seen it when it was 30 feet past the bridge
Irgo: If Olliver saw the iceberg when it was 30 feet past the bridge and before he returned to the wheelhouse then it must have been way up stern when he heard that second order given.
Here's a wee sketch to try and explain:
Then you ask
"Also, if this is what you are saying, how did the ship avoid damage to her entire starboard side? "
Every one assumes that Titanic's stern would swing toard the iceberg when her wheel was put hard left.
An they are right but for one thing they completely forget in their anxiety to prove themsleves correct. They foreget the obvious.. the iceberg!
Even those who did the Olympic tests to prove the 2 point turn, failed to factor-in that most obvious ingredient.
Without the iceberg's effect, Titanic's stern would indeed have swung to the northward.. toward the iceberg. And you are right, the iceberg would have stuck close to the ship's side all the way aft.
The reason it did not do so was because of the sudden southward push it gave to Titanics bow when she hit it. This had a double effect. It dispalced her bow left but more important, it caused her to momentarily behave in a contrary way.. the bow actually tried to swing back to the north as it pased the iceberg and while the latter was pushing on the ship's side. Eventually the rudder and part of the ship which had passed the iceberg prevailed and the bow resumed it's left turn under the influence of the rudder. However, it was too late for the stern to cuddle-up to the iceberg again and the entire ship had left it behind.
I hope you can see this. David knows as I do that a ship moving at speed and hitting a relatively imoveable object will virtually reel away fronm the object.
David's claim that the officers would have to have gone to the starboard bridge wing is based on his belief that the iceberg was left astern or on the port quarter of Titanic when she stopped.
It certainly would have been if there had not been Olliver's hard-a-port helm order. I'm not claiming that such an order was not given.. just that it was not given immediately following the first helm order and that it was not part of Murdoch's attempt to miss the iceberg and save his stern.
Hope I have answered your questions OK!
Jim C.
You wrote:
"Forgive me, I don't understand the seaman's parlance, but are you saying that the ship was not ordered hard-over to port until after the iceberg was well behind the ship, and not just the bridge?"
That's exactly what I'm saying and what Olliver told his questioner.
It is very plain in the evidence.
Olliver said three very important things:
1.. The iceberg was, and I quote: "The iceberg was away up stern.[when the helm was put hard-a-port]
2...If the second helm order was given as Olliver describes, then he, Olliver, must have seen the iceberg before that and before he went to the wheelhouse.
3.. Olliver saw the iceberg after the sound of it touching the ship's side had ended. Threfore he must have seen it when it was 30 feet past the bridge
Irgo: If Olliver saw the iceberg when it was 30 feet past the bridge and before he returned to the wheelhouse then it must have been way up stern when he heard that second order given.
Here's a wee sketch to try and explain:
Then you ask
"Also, if this is what you are saying, how did the ship avoid damage to her entire starboard side? "
Every one assumes that Titanic's stern would swing toard the iceberg when her wheel was put hard left.
An they are right but for one thing they completely forget in their anxiety to prove themsleves correct. They foreget the obvious.. the iceberg!
Even those who did the Olympic tests to prove the 2 point turn, failed to factor-in that most obvious ingredient.
Without the iceberg's effect, Titanic's stern would indeed have swung to the northward.. toward the iceberg. And you are right, the iceberg would have stuck close to the ship's side all the way aft.
The reason it did not do so was because of the sudden southward push it gave to Titanics bow when she hit it. This had a double effect. It dispalced her bow left but more important, it caused her to momentarily behave in a contrary way.. the bow actually tried to swing back to the north as it pased the iceberg and while the latter was pushing on the ship's side. Eventually the rudder and part of the ship which had passed the iceberg prevailed and the bow resumed it's left turn under the influence of the rudder. However, it was too late for the stern to cuddle-up to the iceberg again and the entire ship had left it behind.
I hope you can see this. David knows as I do that a ship moving at speed and hitting a relatively imoveable object will virtually reel away fronm the object.
David's claim that the officers would have to have gone to the starboard bridge wing is based on his belief that the iceberg was left astern or on the port quarter of Titanic when she stopped.
It certainly would have been if there had not been Olliver's hard-a-port helm order. I'm not claiming that such an order was not given.. just that it was not given immediately following the first helm order and that it was not part of Murdoch's attempt to miss the iceberg and save his stern.
Hope I have answered your questions OK!
Jim C.
Scott Mills
Member
Jim,
Most of that makes sense to me, although I do have some difficulty picturing things spacially at times. i guess I would have two follow up questions:
1. What would be the instinctual thing to do in this situation for Murdoch? Particularly after he knows the bow has struck? Would you have expected him to immediately throw the helm hard over--or as close to immediately as you could get--to try and limit the contact or would what you are suggesting be normal operating procedure--i.e. wait until contact with the object has ceased?
2. If the hard-a-port order was not inteded to swing the stern away from the berg, then what was Murdoch's intention with that order? Rather, what would you guess his intention was?
Most of that makes sense to me, although I do have some difficulty picturing things spacially at times. i guess I would have two follow up questions:
1. What would be the instinctual thing to do in this situation for Murdoch? Particularly after he knows the bow has struck? Would you have expected him to immediately throw the helm hard over--or as close to immediately as you could get--to try and limit the contact or would what you are suggesting be normal operating procedure--i.e. wait until contact with the object has ceased?
2. If the hard-a-port order was not inteded to swing the stern away from the berg, then what was Murdoch's intention with that order? Rather, what would you guess his intention was?
Jim Currie
Member
David,
"all of those extra minutes had to be contained within the calendar day of April 14th."
Where is this rule written? It is an exact contradiction to anything I have ever witnessed in British Passenger ships. I cannot understand your thought process.
If the clocks were set back in two parts.. 10pm and midnight.. yes, you are right, Lightoller would not get off with having to work an extra 24 minutes. And Murdoch would have worked the reminder of the set-back.
However by this reckoning, all of the rest of the 8 to 12 Watch.. the starboard Watch, plus the three Quartermaster... those who came on duty at 8 pm that night and normally had to work 4 hours would have to work the total extra 47 minutes. But we know that's not true because Hichens and Fleet told us that the Watches were to be split and that they were to get extra minutes to work.
The engine room Watches matched the deck Watches. Dillon pointed this out.
I don't think something like 17 men would be required to work an extra 23 minutes just to make sure 1 officer got his fair share.
There were two clocks in the wheelhouse. How do you know that it was not the WSL practice that senior officers shared the ship time chages in the same way as did Captain Smith?
I.e. they used April 14 time during their time on duty and either enjoyed the full 47 minutes extra bunk time as did Smith or lost the same amount on the way back as did Smith.
Pitman and Lowe went off at 8pm and were not due back on duty until midnight. Do you really believe they would have enjoyed the same privileges as Smith and Wilde?
Jim C.
"all of those extra minutes had to be contained within the calendar day of April 14th."
Where is this rule written? It is an exact contradiction to anything I have ever witnessed in British Passenger ships. I cannot understand your thought process.
If the clocks were set back in two parts.. 10pm and midnight.. yes, you are right, Lightoller would not get off with having to work an extra 24 minutes. And Murdoch would have worked the reminder of the set-back.
However by this reckoning, all of the rest of the 8 to 12 Watch.. the starboard Watch, plus the three Quartermaster... those who came on duty at 8 pm that night and normally had to work 4 hours would have to work the total extra 47 minutes. But we know that's not true because Hichens and Fleet told us that the Watches were to be split and that they were to get extra minutes to work.
The engine room Watches matched the deck Watches. Dillon pointed this out.
I don't think something like 17 men would be required to work an extra 23 minutes just to make sure 1 officer got his fair share.
There were two clocks in the wheelhouse. How do you know that it was not the WSL practice that senior officers shared the ship time chages in the same way as did Captain Smith?
I.e. they used April 14 time during their time on duty and either enjoyed the full 47 minutes extra bunk time as did Smith or lost the same amount on the way back as did Smith.
Pitman and Lowe went off at 8pm and were not due back on duty until midnight. Do you really believe they would have enjoyed the same privileges as Smith and Wilde?
Jim C.
Samuel Halpern
Member
Scott: In answer to your first question, an experienced ship handler once wrote, “To avoid or minimize contact damage should an iceberg, for example, be encountered unexpectedly at close quarters, the rudder must be put hard over away from the iceberg. The engine speed must be increased, if not already at full speed ahead. The instant the bow clears or hits the iceberg, the rudder must be put hard over the other way and the engine speed maintained. This is vital in preventing the hull abaft the pivot point from striking the iceberg.” I’m sure Jim will have something quite different to say.
Now to address a few other things that were said:
>>If Olliver arrived at the bridge on the port side, how was he able to see the iceberg passing down the starboard side? <<
Who ever said Olliver arrived on the port side? Not Olliver or anyone else for that matter. He did say he was at the compass platform amidships when he first heard the 3 bells from the nest. He also said he was entering the bridge just as the ship struck and heard the grinding sound that then took place. He also noticed Murdoch at the WTD switch at that time. When he looked around he saw the very top of the berg ‘just abaft the bridge’. He did not follow it as it went aft, but he did hear Murdoch give the order ‘hard-aport’ after it had gone by, and Moody confirm that the order was carried out. He did say ‘The iceberg was away up stern’ when the order was given, but how far away up stern is open to interpretation because he did not quantify that because he did not follow the berg after he saw it pass aft of the bridge.
>>And you are right, the iceberg would have stuck close to the ship's side all the way aft.
The reason it did not do so was because of the sudden southward push it gave to Titanics bow when she hit it. <<
That push was not enough to keep the ship away from the berg. The ship made a series of contacts with the berg which cause a series of split seams extending from the peak tank to aft of bulkhead E, and possibly some minor damage aft of bulkhead F between the tank top and stokehold plates. It stayed close enough for ice to come in through several open ports down on E deck, and leave the windowns wet on the Cafe Parisien, high up on B deck in the vicinity of the 4th funnel. The visible part of the berg was very close to the ship’s rail at the level of the poop deck when passed aft of that point. The argument about the berg not taking out emergency boat No. 1 is bogus. That argument assumes that the side of the berg extended upward from the waterline like a vertical wall. Any small inward slope to the side would have easily cleared the boat. The peak of the berg went only a little higher than the boat deck itself.
Jim believes that the ‘hard-aport’ order came after Smith arrived on the bridge to put the ship back on her course for NY, when Smith telegraphed down ½ ahead to the engine room. I don’t think that was the case, and certainly getting the ship back on course for NY was not the immediate priority. When Smith came out onto the bridge the first thing he asked was what was struck, and Murdoch informed him that it was an iceberg. Then Smith ordered the WTDs closed, and Murdoch reported that they were closed. Both Hichens and Olliver agree to that. Boxhall indicated more was said, but we don’t have confirmation from either Olliver or Hichens as to Boxhall’s claims of what he heard Murdoch tell Smith about engine orders given or Murdoch’s intent to port around the berg. We do know that Olliver was ordered to find the carpenter to sound the ship. Once Smith arrived on the bridge he would assume command. Any order to shift the helm for the purpose of putting the ship back on its course for NY at that point would have come from Smith, not Murdoch. Yet we know from Olliver that the order to shift the helm was given by Murdoch. Olliver never mentioned Smith ordering Murdoch to order the helm be put hard-aport. And Hichen never talked about helm orders that were given after the ship struck:
Senator SMITH. Is that the only order [hard-a-starboard] you received before the collision, or impact?
Mr. HICHENS. That is all, sir. Then the first officer told the other quartermaster standing by to take the time, and told one of the junior officers to make a note of that in the logbook. That was at 20 minutes of 12; sir.
Hichens was being asked about helm orders received BEFORE the collision. On board Carpathia, Hichens spoke openly to Howard Chapin about what happened, and in the account that Chapin wrote, it was told to him that the 1st officer ordered her helm hard-astarboard to clear the ship's bow and then ordered hard-aport to clear her stern, but the berg extended too far out under water to avoid being hit. All this before anyone was called to testify before any inquiry.
As far of time goes:
>>This is how it was on every British ship I ever sailed on:
Let's use the run-up from 10 pm when Murdoch took over from Lightoller.
10-00. 4 bells. Murdoch on Watch. Hichens relieves Olliver on the wheel.
10-30pm. 5 bells.
11-00pm. 6 bells.
11-30pm. 7 bells. No clock changes on the ship. No Lookout Bell repetition. It's April 14 for everyone on board.
Midnight April 14: Watch Keeper's clocks retarded 24 minutes. Public clocks retarded 47 minutes. No bells rung at this time.
11-45 pm on the 8 to 12 Watch: 1 bell .. 15 minute warning for Watchkeepers.
Midnight. 8 Bells. Change of Watches. 12 to 4 Watch on deck.<<
I have no problem with this sequence as written except that the lookouts were required to repeat bells all the time (as well as report lights burning brightly at night).
The accident happened about ten minutes after seven bells were rung, not 34 minutes after:
2420. Then what was the first thing you did report? - The first thing that was reported was after seven bells struck; it was some minutes, it might have been nine or ten minutes afterwards. Three bells were struck by Fleet, warning “Right ahead,” and immediately he rung the telephone up to the bridge, “Iceberg right ahead.” The reply came back from the bridge, “Thank you.”
The clock changes at midnight referred to in the sequence above never happened. Once the ship came to a stop, there was no need to put the clock back since the ship was not going to reach her noontime position for Apr 15. The time of collision was noted by Eleanor Cassebeer on her wrist-watch as 11:44. Her watch was set at dinner to ship’s time by purser McElroy. Others such as A. H. Barkworth were in the smoking room waiting for the midnight clock change so they could accurately set their personal timepiece to the new time. The accident happened before that took place. There were no clock changes that night.
>>Not mentioned in either inquiry was that all of those extra minutes had to be contained within the calendar day of April 14th. <<
David, as Jim asked, where in the world is that written?
>>However, if the crew clocks were retarded by 24 minutes at four bells (10 p.m. or 2200 hours in April 14th ship's time), then the on-duty Second Officer Lightoller would have served those extra minutes during his watch. <<
But Lightoller was very clear about not having extra time put into his watch which lasted from 6 to 10. When asked if 4/O Boxhall would have had two hours remaining after he, Lightoller, went off duty, Lightoller said that Boxhall would have had more than two hours remaining because of the clock change. If they had put the clock back at 10pm by 24 minutes extending Lightoller’s time on duty by that amount, then Boxhall would have had only two hours remaining at the time Lightoller went off duty. Also, Fleet and Lee, who came on when Lightoller went off duty at 4 bells, would have had just 2 hours to spend up in the nest. As you well know, Fleet said they expected to get about 20 minutes more than 2 hours, which means the expected clock change was to take place after he and Lee came on duty, not before.
>>No options were permitted for changing the 30-minute intervals of these evolutions. As a result, after 10 p.m. (2200 hours) in April 14th time the compass checks would no longer take place on the “up” and down”, on the hour and half hour.<<
This is pure nonsense. If that were strictly true, then these 30 minute compass evolutions, as you call them, would have been out of sync with the on-the-hour and on-the-half-hour clock times once the very first clock adjustment took place on the very first night out of the voyage.
>>This is one reason why one of the two clocks in the wheelhouse had to show April 14th hours while the other displayed crew time.<<
Pure speculation. One clock in the wheelhouse would show bridge time that was used by the deck crew. The other clock in the wheelhouse, if anything, would probably show GMT. The requirement for any logbook entry, as you know from the IMM rule book, was to record the event time in both ship’s time and GMT.
But folks, we’ve been through all this before.
Now to address a few other things that were said:
>>If Olliver arrived at the bridge on the port side, how was he able to see the iceberg passing down the starboard side? <<
Who ever said Olliver arrived on the port side? Not Olliver or anyone else for that matter. He did say he was at the compass platform amidships when he first heard the 3 bells from the nest. He also said he was entering the bridge just as the ship struck and heard the grinding sound that then took place. He also noticed Murdoch at the WTD switch at that time. When he looked around he saw the very top of the berg ‘just abaft the bridge’. He did not follow it as it went aft, but he did hear Murdoch give the order ‘hard-aport’ after it had gone by, and Moody confirm that the order was carried out. He did say ‘The iceberg was away up stern’ when the order was given, but how far away up stern is open to interpretation because he did not quantify that because he did not follow the berg after he saw it pass aft of the bridge.
>>And you are right, the iceberg would have stuck close to the ship's side all the way aft.
The reason it did not do so was because of the sudden southward push it gave to Titanics bow when she hit it. <<
That push was not enough to keep the ship away from the berg. The ship made a series of contacts with the berg which cause a series of split seams extending from the peak tank to aft of bulkhead E, and possibly some minor damage aft of bulkhead F between the tank top and stokehold plates. It stayed close enough for ice to come in through several open ports down on E deck, and leave the windowns wet on the Cafe Parisien, high up on B deck in the vicinity of the 4th funnel. The visible part of the berg was very close to the ship’s rail at the level of the poop deck when passed aft of that point. The argument about the berg not taking out emergency boat No. 1 is bogus. That argument assumes that the side of the berg extended upward from the waterline like a vertical wall. Any small inward slope to the side would have easily cleared the boat. The peak of the berg went only a little higher than the boat deck itself.
Jim believes that the ‘hard-aport’ order came after Smith arrived on the bridge to put the ship back on her course for NY, when Smith telegraphed down ½ ahead to the engine room. I don’t think that was the case, and certainly getting the ship back on course for NY was not the immediate priority. When Smith came out onto the bridge the first thing he asked was what was struck, and Murdoch informed him that it was an iceberg. Then Smith ordered the WTDs closed, and Murdoch reported that they were closed. Both Hichens and Olliver agree to that. Boxhall indicated more was said, but we don’t have confirmation from either Olliver or Hichens as to Boxhall’s claims of what he heard Murdoch tell Smith about engine orders given or Murdoch’s intent to port around the berg. We do know that Olliver was ordered to find the carpenter to sound the ship. Once Smith arrived on the bridge he would assume command. Any order to shift the helm for the purpose of putting the ship back on its course for NY at that point would have come from Smith, not Murdoch. Yet we know from Olliver that the order to shift the helm was given by Murdoch. Olliver never mentioned Smith ordering Murdoch to order the helm be put hard-aport. And Hichen never talked about helm orders that were given after the ship struck:
Senator SMITH. Is that the only order [hard-a-starboard] you received before the collision, or impact?
Mr. HICHENS. That is all, sir. Then the first officer told the other quartermaster standing by to take the time, and told one of the junior officers to make a note of that in the logbook. That was at 20 minutes of 12; sir.
Hichens was being asked about helm orders received BEFORE the collision. On board Carpathia, Hichens spoke openly to Howard Chapin about what happened, and in the account that Chapin wrote, it was told to him that the 1st officer ordered her helm hard-astarboard to clear the ship's bow and then ordered hard-aport to clear her stern, but the berg extended too far out under water to avoid being hit. All this before anyone was called to testify before any inquiry.
As far of time goes:
>>This is how it was on every British ship I ever sailed on:
Let's use the run-up from 10 pm when Murdoch took over from Lightoller.
10-00. 4 bells. Murdoch on Watch. Hichens relieves Olliver on the wheel.
10-30pm. 5 bells.
11-00pm. 6 bells.
11-30pm. 7 bells. No clock changes on the ship. No Lookout Bell repetition. It's April 14 for everyone on board.
Midnight April 14: Watch Keeper's clocks retarded 24 minutes. Public clocks retarded 47 minutes. No bells rung at this time.
11-45 pm on the 8 to 12 Watch: 1 bell .. 15 minute warning for Watchkeepers.
Midnight. 8 Bells. Change of Watches. 12 to 4 Watch on deck.<<
I have no problem with this sequence as written except that the lookouts were required to repeat bells all the time (as well as report lights burning brightly at night).
The accident happened about ten minutes after seven bells were rung, not 34 minutes after:
2420. Then what was the first thing you did report? - The first thing that was reported was after seven bells struck; it was some minutes, it might have been nine or ten minutes afterwards. Three bells were struck by Fleet, warning “Right ahead,” and immediately he rung the telephone up to the bridge, “Iceberg right ahead.” The reply came back from the bridge, “Thank you.”
The clock changes at midnight referred to in the sequence above never happened. Once the ship came to a stop, there was no need to put the clock back since the ship was not going to reach her noontime position for Apr 15. The time of collision was noted by Eleanor Cassebeer on her wrist-watch as 11:44. Her watch was set at dinner to ship’s time by purser McElroy. Others such as A. H. Barkworth were in the smoking room waiting for the midnight clock change so they could accurately set their personal timepiece to the new time. The accident happened before that took place. There were no clock changes that night.
>>Not mentioned in either inquiry was that all of those extra minutes had to be contained within the calendar day of April 14th. <<
David, as Jim asked, where in the world is that written?
>>However, if the crew clocks were retarded by 24 minutes at four bells (10 p.m. or 2200 hours in April 14th ship's time), then the on-duty Second Officer Lightoller would have served those extra minutes during his watch. <<
But Lightoller was very clear about not having extra time put into his watch which lasted from 6 to 10. When asked if 4/O Boxhall would have had two hours remaining after he, Lightoller, went off duty, Lightoller said that Boxhall would have had more than two hours remaining because of the clock change. If they had put the clock back at 10pm by 24 minutes extending Lightoller’s time on duty by that amount, then Boxhall would have had only two hours remaining at the time Lightoller went off duty. Also, Fleet and Lee, who came on when Lightoller went off duty at 4 bells, would have had just 2 hours to spend up in the nest. As you well know, Fleet said they expected to get about 20 minutes more than 2 hours, which means the expected clock change was to take place after he and Lee came on duty, not before.
>>No options were permitted for changing the 30-minute intervals of these evolutions. As a result, after 10 p.m. (2200 hours) in April 14th time the compass checks would no longer take place on the “up” and down”, on the hour and half hour.<<
This is pure nonsense. If that were strictly true, then these 30 minute compass evolutions, as you call them, would have been out of sync with the on-the-hour and on-the-half-hour clock times once the very first clock adjustment took place on the very first night out of the voyage.
>>This is one reason why one of the two clocks in the wheelhouse had to show April 14th hours while the other displayed crew time.<<
Pure speculation. One clock in the wheelhouse would show bridge time that was used by the deck crew. The other clock in the wheelhouse, if anything, would probably show GMT. The requirement for any logbook entry, as you know from the IMM rule book, was to record the event time in both ship’s time and GMT.
But folks, we’ve been through all this before.
Arun Vajpey
Member
I have always thought about Olliver's vantage point when he made those observations and how his perceptions would have been affected by the still forward moving but port-turning ship against a practically stationary icerberg. Assuming that the ship was veering to port as it bumped along the berg on its starboard side, would it not create an optical illuision to a human obeserver that that the berg had passed further astern that it actually had? If Olliver saw the iceberg "just abaft of the bridge" as he entered it soon after the collision and the ship was still turning to port, might it have been further away from the stern (along the ship's long axis) than Olliver imagined? And if he said that the berg was "away up stern" - without following it - when Murdoch gave the Hard-a-Port order, the berg could still be passing amidships but created the illuision of being further astern.
Is that possible?
David G. Brown
RIP
Let's examine what quartermaster Olliver told Senator Burton with particular emphasis on the order of events.
First, he said that after he completed his work on the compass platform he returned to the bridge. He said, “I left that and came was just entering on the bridge just as the shock came. I knew we had touched something.” This statement does not tell us which side of the bridge he entered. To learn that we have to look deeper into his testimony and compare different answers.
As is usual in hearings, the questioning was not done in linear fashion, but jumped from topic to topic. To find the second thing that happened we have to skip over a few questions about lifeboats to get back to Olliver's testimony about events on the bridge. Senator Burton asked if the watertight doors were open or closed. Olliver said they were closed and explained how he got that knowledge. “Because Mr. Murdoch reported, and as I entered the bridge I saw him about the lever,” Olliver stated.
The implication is that as Olliver entered the bridge he saw Murdoch closing the watertight doors. From fireman Barrett we know the doors were closing as he saw water come through the side of the ship during impact on the iceberg. Combining Barrett's experience with Olliver's testimony forces the conclusion that the second thing the quartermaster saw as he returned from the compass platform was Murdoch closing the doors.
Next, Olliver saw the iceberg passing between the starboard bridge cab and the starboard cutter. This is obvious from his testimony. “Just abaft the bridge when I saw it,” was the way the quartermaster described his vision. The only visual opening not cluttered with lifeboats, davits, or structures the few feet aft of the wing cab. Knowing this we now have enough information to place Olliver on the bridge.
Olliver said he both saw Murdoch at the watertight door switch and the iceberg passing abaft of the wing cab. The only location where a normal individual with two eyes on his face could have seen both of these things was from the port side of the center section of the covered bridge. For him to have seen both things that happened so quickly from the starboard side, Olliver would have needed eyes fore 'n aft on his head, which is not standard construction of human beings.
Alternatively, Olliver was trying to give himself whiplash by swinging his head around like a whirlygig.
Purely anecdotal support that Olliver came forward on the port side can be found in sailor accounts of the time. In windwagons the officers took the wind'rd side and the sailors the lee to avoid getting in each other's way. After the adoption of the Rules of the Road in the 1860s, it became the custom for officers in steam to have the starboard side so they could keep watch over the “danger zone” to their ship's right. (A power-driven vessel must give way to any other power-driven vessel crossing from dead ahead to two points abaft the starboard beam.)
This custom became steel and wood in Titanic with the placement of the Captain's cabin on the starboard side. Had Olliver entered from the starboard boat deck, he would have bumped into Captain Smith coming out of his cabin to go on deck. No such interference with the master would occur if ratings entered the bridge and the wheelhouse from port.
Olliver heard Murdoch yell, “hard a-port.” Unfortunately for history, he was never asked to specify where he was standing when he heard Murdoch's helm order. The quartermaster may have been inside the wheelhouse after the iceberg passed astern. If so, that makes the order almost an afterthought by the First Officer. This doesn't square with what we know of Murdoch's ability to handle emergency situations.
To me, the logical solution to this puzzle is that Murdoch ordered “hard a-port” after the ship began to touch the ice and before it came clear. Olliver heard the order, then saw the iceberg pass aft of the bridge wing cab. He stepped inside the wheelhouse to witness the next act in the unfolding drama.
Although we cannot tell exactly where the quartermaster was when this order was given, his testimony about what transpired from that helm order are unequivocal. “The iceberg was 'way up astern,” Olliver stated. And, that is as it should be. The helm is not considered as “shifted” when the order is given, nor when the quartermaster (in this case Hichens) starts to turn the wheel. Rather, it is “shifted” in the context of Olliver's words only when the rudder has reached the desired angle. And, that did not occur until the berg was behind the bridge as Olliver described.
– David G. Brown
First, he said that after he completed his work on the compass platform he returned to the bridge. He said, “I left that and came was just entering on the bridge just as the shock came. I knew we had touched something.” This statement does not tell us which side of the bridge he entered. To learn that we have to look deeper into his testimony and compare different answers.
As is usual in hearings, the questioning was not done in linear fashion, but jumped from topic to topic. To find the second thing that happened we have to skip over a few questions about lifeboats to get back to Olliver's testimony about events on the bridge. Senator Burton asked if the watertight doors were open or closed. Olliver said they were closed and explained how he got that knowledge. “Because Mr. Murdoch reported, and as I entered the bridge I saw him about the lever,” Olliver stated.
The implication is that as Olliver entered the bridge he saw Murdoch closing the watertight doors. From fireman Barrett we know the doors were closing as he saw water come through the side of the ship during impact on the iceberg. Combining Barrett's experience with Olliver's testimony forces the conclusion that the second thing the quartermaster saw as he returned from the compass platform was Murdoch closing the doors.
Next, Olliver saw the iceberg passing between the starboard bridge cab and the starboard cutter. This is obvious from his testimony. “Just abaft the bridge when I saw it,” was the way the quartermaster described his vision. The only visual opening not cluttered with lifeboats, davits, or structures the few feet aft of the wing cab. Knowing this we now have enough information to place Olliver on the bridge.
Olliver said he both saw Murdoch at the watertight door switch and the iceberg passing abaft of the wing cab. The only location where a normal individual with two eyes on his face could have seen both of these things was from the port side of the center section of the covered bridge. For him to have seen both things that happened so quickly from the starboard side, Olliver would have needed eyes fore 'n aft on his head, which is not standard construction of human beings.
Alternatively, Olliver was trying to give himself whiplash by swinging his head around like a whirlygig.
Purely anecdotal support that Olliver came forward on the port side can be found in sailor accounts of the time. In windwagons the officers took the wind'rd side and the sailors the lee to avoid getting in each other's way. After the adoption of the Rules of the Road in the 1860s, it became the custom for officers in steam to have the starboard side so they could keep watch over the “danger zone” to their ship's right. (A power-driven vessel must give way to any other power-driven vessel crossing from dead ahead to two points abaft the starboard beam.)
This custom became steel and wood in Titanic with the placement of the Captain's cabin on the starboard side. Had Olliver entered from the starboard boat deck, he would have bumped into Captain Smith coming out of his cabin to go on deck. No such interference with the master would occur if ratings entered the bridge and the wheelhouse from port.
Olliver heard Murdoch yell, “hard a-port.” Unfortunately for history, he was never asked to specify where he was standing when he heard Murdoch's helm order. The quartermaster may have been inside the wheelhouse after the iceberg passed astern. If so, that makes the order almost an afterthought by the First Officer. This doesn't square with what we know of Murdoch's ability to handle emergency situations.
To me, the logical solution to this puzzle is that Murdoch ordered “hard a-port” after the ship began to touch the ice and before it came clear. Olliver heard the order, then saw the iceberg pass aft of the bridge wing cab. He stepped inside the wheelhouse to witness the next act in the unfolding drama.
Although we cannot tell exactly where the quartermaster was when this order was given, his testimony about what transpired from that helm order are unequivocal. “The iceberg was 'way up astern,” Olliver stated. And, that is as it should be. The helm is not considered as “shifted” when the order is given, nor when the quartermaster (in this case Hichens) starts to turn the wheel. Rather, it is “shifted” in the context of Olliver's words only when the rudder has reached the desired angle. And, that did not occur until the berg was behind the bridge as Olliver described.
– David G. Brown
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