Engines in reverse

[Samuel Halpern]

>>Olliver said he both saw Murdoch at the watertight door switch and the iceberg passing abaft of the wing cab. The only location where a normal individual with two eyes on his face could have seen both of these things was from the port side of the center section of the covered bridge. <<

David, your logic continues to amaze me.

Nowhere was it ever said that Olliver saw Murdoch and the iceberg at same time. The only place on the forebridge where Olliver could possibly see the peak of the berg aft of bridge was on the starboard side. As he entered the bridge the iceberg was struck. Murdock was in the vicinity of the bridge wheel on the ship's centerline where the WTD switch was located on Titanic. Even if he was on his way to the wheelhouse door, he would be able to notice the 1st officer at that location. Olliver first felt the impact and then heard the grinding sound. To see the berg, he only had to turn around. It would only take about 7 seconds from the moment of impact to when the berg would pass aft of the bridge. We also know he didn't stay there to follow the berg going aft, but went into the wheelhouse where he was to await further orders. Murdoch's hard-aport order came as the berg was going aft of the bridge. At a minimum, I would think he would wait for the berg to pass aft of the bridge to get behind the pivot point, and this appears to be the case from what Olliver was asked.


And as far as bumping into Capt. Smith, Smith came onto the bridge from his quarters through the wheelhouse. We have that in evidence.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

>>Assuming that the ship was veering to port as it bumped along the berg on its starboard side, would it not create an optical illuision to a human obeserver that that the berg had passed further astern that it actually had? <<

Arun,

I don't believe there was any illusion as to what Olliver observed. As he came onto the bridge and headed for the wheelhouse door on the starboard side he would see 1/O Murdoch by the WTD switch as the ship struck. Turning around he would see the peak of the berg pass aft of the bridge. He heard Murdoch order hard-aport and would have heard Moody acknowledge when the helm was over hard. As standby QM, he aslo would have received the order to take the time of collision. My guess is that he also saw Smith come through the wheelhouse going out onto the bridge, as Hichens did, and overhear the conversation between Smith and Murdoch as what took place as he said he did.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Thanks for that Simon. I am working late in my office and have not been able to open the picture in the thumbnail but could open the sketch. It is very interesting but do you mind explaining it to me, please? From Olliver's position (The second red dot), he was entering the bridge from the starboard side could see/hear Murdoch. But which of the two blue lines going seawards on the starboard side indicates Olliver's line of sight to the iceberg? Or is that to indicate that the iceberg was BETWEEN those lines when Olliver saw it?

If the latter, it is more or less what I was thinking. The berg would be more or less in line with the Emergency Lifeboat #1, would it not? Is that how we should read it?

 

[Ioannis Georgiou]

But which of the two blue lines going seawards on the starboard side indicates Olliver's line of sight to the iceberg? Or is that to indicate that the iceberg was BETWEEN those lines when Olliver saw it?

From what I see the two blue lines are the field of view from Olliver. From that position he was still able to see emergency boat 1 and the top of the iceberg as he described during the US inquiry.

Sam, I guess your sketch will be criticise by others who think that the iceberg is too high!

 

[Ioannis Georgiou]

Thanks for that Simon.

I think you mean Samuel, not Simon.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

I think you mean Samuel, not Simon.

Sorry, yes. Sorry Samuel I was at work and under bit of a hassle when I sent that post.

 

[Jim Currie]

Hello Scott!

Now I have time to answer you and the rest.

Sam's experienced shiphandler was quite right. However you will note that the same person also said:

"The engine speed must be increased, if not already at full speed ahead. The instant the bow clears or hits the iceberg, the rudder must be put hard over the other way and the engine speed maintained. This is vital in preventing the hull abaft the pivot point from striking the iceberg.”[/]

Experienced ship handlers know full well that in order to keep control of your ship, you must keep her driving ahead. Sam's not an experienced ship handler but he most certainly knows a thing or three about ships, including the fact that you need lots of positive pressure on your rudder to keep control. So how on earth Did Titanic make that reverse turn?

As to 'Who ever said Olliver arrived on the port side?'

Two that I know of....Dr. Paul Lee...www.paullee.com/titanic/iceberg.html. and David Brown for another.

If Olliver arrived on the starboard side then all the nonsense about a two-part helm order is just that..nonsense! And I'll show you why.

It's about reading QM Olliver's evidence in it's entirety. I remind everyone:

" I had just performed an errand and was entering the bridge when the collision occurred

From that moment, the ice ground its way along ship's side for six seconds before breaking contact just aft of WT Bulkhead 'E'

Then the most important part of Olliver's evidence which has been entirely glossed-over:

"The grinding sound was before I saw the iceberg. The grinding sound was not when I saw the iceberg
Not behind where I was. It did not, to my knowledge, rub behind where I was; it was before.

So Olliver saw the berg at least 6 seconds after impact... when it had stopped making a noise by grinding against the ship's side.

Then the next bit:

"I tell you, sir. I saw the tip top of it.
The iceberg was about the height of the boat deck; if anything, just a little higher. It was almost alongside of the boat, sir. The top did not touch the side of the boat, but it was almost alongside of the boat."

Olliver saw the 'tip top' of the iceberg just above the boat deck shortly after the grinding sound of its contact with the ship's side had ended. Not as illustrated in your article "30 Seconds Lost", Sam. You show the berg tip towering about 12 feet above the boat deck level.(Well spotted Ioannis).

You also show a red line representing the path of Olliver from the Standard Compass Platform.
Olliver could never have seen the iceberg as you display it .
He would have to have been standing on an extension of a line drawn between the forward davit of boat No.1 and the corner of the bulwark seen in the middle ground. That means he would have to have been in the area somewhere forward of the wheel house.

Gentlemen, Olliver saw the tip of the iceberg after the sound of it's passage along the ship's side had stopped.... Therefore he could not have been within the bridge area when that happened.

Sam, you can work-out when the sound ended very easily. It is more than likely that it did so when the ice disengaged from Titanic's hull just abaft WT Bulkhead 'E', in the region of frame number +59. just inside boiler room 5. That being the case, we can also work out where Olliver was when this happened.

Bukhead 'E' was in line with the Captain's Bathroom, 36 feet from the bridge. Frame +59 was in line with Boxhall's wardrobe and 39 feet from the entrance to the bridge. If the sound had stopped when Olliver saw the tip if the iceberg as high as or just above the boat deck level, then he could only have seen it at adistance from the bridge greater than 39 feet , when the underwater part had cleared the forward end of Boiler room 5. And at the same time, the 'tip-top', just above the boat deck level, flashed past. This had to have been between the stern of lifeboat number 3 and the bow of lifeboat number 5. See here:



Because of this, here's how I see Olliver's travels:

3 Bells...Olliver leaves Standard Compass Platform. *
5 seconds later
Olliver at foot of ladder from the Standard Compass deck.
12 seconds later
Murdoch orders hard-a-starboard. Olliver passing the forard door to gymnasium.
2 seconds later
Fleet on the phone top the bridge.
4 seconds later
Impact. Olliver 10 feet behind the bow of boat 7.
4 seconds later
Murdoch activates the WT door gear.
3 seconds later
Olliver at bow of boat 5.. sees tip of iceberg just above the boat deck level as it flashes past between boats 3 and 5.
13 seconds later
Olliver arrives on the bridge and sees Murdoch in the vicinity of the WT Door lever.
10 seconds later
WT Doors in engine room closed.
5 seconds later
Captain Smith arrives on the bridge. Olliver hears Murdoch make his report.
The iceberg is now about 400 feet astern of the ship.
Olliver has not yet heard the hard-a-port helm order. He is told to go find the Carpenter.

* At the sound of the three bells, Murdoch looks toward the horizon ahead of the ship. He is looking for a ship's lights. He cannot see any lights so raises his binoculars and studies the area ahead of the ship. He see a dark shape directly in the ship's path. The obstacle seems more to the right than the left. He immediately orders hard-a- starboard. That took a total of about 17 seconds from the last of the three bells.
To suggest that he could have acted sooner is absurd to say the least!

Olliver's evidence is reasonable except for his opening statement.." entering the bridge when the collision occurred". How was that possible?

Summary:

Olliver said he saw Murdoch 'about the WT Door lever. Not actually operating it but knew it had been operated.. he heard Murdoch say so.
Olliver did not say he heard the hard-a-port helm order when he arrived on the bridge. He merely said he heard it when he was on the bridge. He was off and on the bridge running messages so could have heard that order at any time after the ship passed the berg. It might well have been when he arrived back there after finding the Carpenter. There is evidence to suggest this might have happened about 10 minutes after impact.. when the engines were once more ordered ahead. (See Dillon).
/U]Because he said he saw the iceberg after the sound of it's passage had ceased, Olliver could not have been entering the bridge at the moment of impact AND seen Murdoch at the levers at the same time. Because of the sound factor, he could not even have been NEAR to the bridge at the time of impact.

"I don’t think that was the case, and certainly getting the ship back on course for NY was not the immediate priority."

It certainly was not. Smith acted in the normal manner in such instances.
When Olliver arrived on the bridge, he was immediately sent to find the Carpenter and tell the man to sound-round. At that time, Smith would have no reason to believe that his ship had had nothing more than a 'close encounter'. He would believe this until the Carpenter and Boxhall brought him some hard facts. That was about 15- 20 minutes after impact. This being the case, why on earth would he waste his time doing nothing?
I'd bet my bottom dollar that Smith, being the efficient creature he was, would make all initial preparations for resuming passage. His first act in that direction would be to bring the ship back to her original heading then wait for developments. To do this he would order the engines half a head and the helm hard a starboard. As soon as the Quartermaster told him the ships head was starting to move right, he would order a stop on the engines.
Threafter,he would get the QM to steady the ship on her original heading. During this time, he would be looking over the side to see if she was making headway. if she was, he would order a short astern movement. When the prop wash was seen to blossom at the stern, he would stop engines and them wait for the reports.
Many witnesses.. some of whom you use Sam, were of the opinion that it was indeed a near miss. Our friend Beasley to mention but one!

Lookouts and time bells:

The lookouts did not sound the bells for 11-30pm.. Fleet confirmed that:[B]."We never, generally, ring bells up in the crow's nest every half hour; we generally miss it".[/B]

[Wheellhouse Clocks:

" The other clock in the wheelhouse, if anything, would probably show GMT. The requirement for any logbook entry, as you know from the IMM rule book, was to record the event time in both ship’s time and GMT." [/COLOR]

Highly unlikely Sam! There were two chronometers on the bridge, both showing GMT. In addition, the junior Watch Officers had GMT on their personal time pieces. If they needed local mean time, they made a mental adjustment or looked at the chartroom clock which would show ship time for the date up until the last portion of adjustment was made then it would be fully set back.

I'm pretty sure one of the wheelhouse clocks would certainly have Watch time and the other would have April 14 time ship. One would be fully retarded at midnight so that it would show April 15 time and the other partially retarded. There's no reason not to believe that Wilde, Murdoch and Boxhall kept the same
clock regime as Captain Smith. i.e. they did not share any adjustments but always worked exactly 4 hour shifts
. The Log Book changed to the next day at midnight. It was in 4 hour sections so would be filled-in with 2 times... GMT and April 15 time as you say but only specific events would be recorded in GMT.

As for your time remarks.. I'll address there elsewhere. They need an update!

Jim C.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

No need for formality. Sam is just fine.

>>Sam, I guess your sketch will be criticise by others who think that the iceberg is too high! <<

Hi Ioannis, I tend agree. What else are forums for? .

Seriously, Olliver did say that he saw only the peak of the berg from where he was, and that is what I sketched onto that portion of a photo taken from Olympic's bridge. Lookout Reginald Lee at the Ryan trial in 1913 said, "It was as high as the boat deck." He was looking down at it from the crow's nest. AB Scarrott also thought the berg was as high as the boat deck as he saw Titanic's stern swing away from the berg as the ship was acting "Under port helm" [right rudder]. Rowe said he thought the berg was 100 ft high, which would be higher than the crow's nest. But people do tend to be somewhat inaccurate when it comes to estimating distances and sizes of objects, especially at night. That's why comparative measures are better to rely on.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Aside from the ongoing debate, may I ask Sam (I got it right this time!) a related question? In that picture with your iceberg top showing, the "corridor" in front of us must be the starboard wing of the bridge, right? In that case, which is the lifeboat that is just visible on the other side? My guess is that it is Collapsible C relating to the sketch and Lifeboat #1, swung further out and slightly below, is closer to the berg but not visible from that angle.

Is that right?

 

[Samuel Halpern]

So many items to deal with. OK, let's take them one at a time.

Arun, the corridor running straight out from the bridge is the bridge wing. The wing cab is at the very end. You can see the Morse signaling lamp on top of it. The boat seen in that photo is emergency lifeboat No. 1. It is swung out. You can see this by the angle presented by the davit in the photo. Collapsible C cannot be seen in that photo because it lays on the deck, and the small bulwark running fore/aft that you see in the photo is hiding it from view.

Jim, I not surprised that you feel the need to change Olliver's story so that it fits your concept of what had happened. Olliver saying that the grinding sound ended before he saw the peak of the iceberg does NOT mean that he was not entering the bridge when the ship first struck. David Brown has used the same argument to "prove" that Barrett was not in the place that he claimed to be, stokehold 10 in BR 6, when the collision happened, but had to be in the empty bunker space ahead of bulkhead D. Bulkhead D was just about under the bridge, and bulkhead E was about 50 feet further aft, directly under the 1st funnel. The mistake you both make is that you assume that the underwater part of the iceberg that was making contact with the hull and causing the damage to the ship was directly alongside the visible peak of the iceberg. Both of you do not take into account that the underwater part of the berg in contact with the ship may have been ahead of the visible peak (in the direction toward the ship) like that shown in the attached drawing. This would easily explain why the sound of contact ended before the peak of the berg passed aft of bulkhead D and the bridge wing, and why Olliver thought that contact ended before the berg was seen aft of the bridge. There is no need to change where Olliver or Barrett said they were at the moment of impact.

Just an aside. I tend to agree with you about the time it would take Murdoch to assess the situation once the 3-bell warning came. I won't quibble about the exact number of seconds involved since neither of us was there to witness things, but I don’t believe he immediately ordered the helm hard-astarboard as soon as the 3-bells were struck. According to Hichens, Murdoch’s order came after Moody came off the phone and repeated to Murdoch what lookout told him. But you do realize that if your 17 seconds is correct, it completely kills Boxhall's storyline as to what he heard coming out of the officer’s quarters and where he was when ship struck the berg.

As far as Smith putting his ship back on course for NY, I would think that the prudent thing to do, even in a glancing blow situation, would be to bring the ship to a complete stop first, wait to see what if any damage occurred to the ship, and then worry about putting the ship back on its course for NY if no damage was reported. Smith was informed that the ship was taking in water about 10 minutes after the collision when the carpenter came up to the bridge after meeting Boxhall going down the ladder, and reported flooding in holds 1, 2, and 3.

As far as lookout bells go, I'm fully aware of what Frederick Fleet said, and found it to be a very strange response on his part because the IMM rules in effect at that time were very clear about answering ship’s bells:

254. Look-Out.- A most careful and vigilant look-out is to be kept at all times by seamen, both by night and day; the bell is to be struck every half hour, and answered by the Look-Outs, and the lights reported to be burning brightly. In steamers provided with crow’s nests, at least one man must at all times be stationed therein. The Officer going on Watch is to satisfy himself that the Look-Outs are properly placed before he relieves the Officer on the Bridge, ...He [the OOW] will see that the look-out men report to the Bridge when relieved, and that the name of the relief is given. The look-out men’s names are to be entered in the Log-Book.

You can be sure that if bells were not responded to from the nest, the OOW would call them up and ask what hell was going on up there. I do not believe Fleet was giving a truthful answer to Burton’s question. He just wasn’t too sure if the accident happened before or after 7 bells when he answered the way he did. Reginald Lee, on the other hand, was quite clear that the accident happened about 9 or 10 minutes after 7 bells. When all hands were called out about 20 minutes after the collision to uncover the boats, Fleet and Lee would have seen all the men coming up from below. We know from lookout Symons that as he was walking out to the boat deck after the boatswain called all hands he heard them strike 8 bells up in the nest. Did Fleet and Lee think they missed hearing 8 bells when they saw all these men come up from below, and then strike the bells thinking that it was just a normal change of watch? This might also explain why Fleet answered the way he did.

>>I'm pretty sure one of the wheelhouse clocks would certainly have Watch time and the other would have April 14 time ship. One would be fully retarded at midnight so that it would show April 15 time and the other partially retarded. <<

As far as there being a second clock in the wheelhouse, that comes from a question that was asked of Hichens. It is interesting to note that only one clock can be seen in a photograph taken of the interior of Olympic’s wheelhouse. And we know there were two chronometers keeping precise GMT, but they were kept in the chartroom along with the two master clocks that ran the various slave clocks located throughout the ship. Jim, as you once said, the only time that mattered on the bridge was the time kept by the watchkeepers, and GMT used by the officers for navigation. What you call Watch time was called Bridge Time in the IMM rule book, and was also the time kept down in the machinery spaces for the engine department crew. In fact, the rules required the OOW see to it that the wheelhouse clock and engine rooms clocks agreed at all times. On these ships, both of these clocks would be controlled by one of the master clocks in the chartroom which made that easy. These slave clocks showed time to the nearest minute only, and jumped by one whole minute on the minute. There were no seconds shown. It is interesting that on IMM vessels, the 2/O served from 6 to 10, the 1/O served from 10 to 2, and the C/O served from 2 to 6, 4 hrs on then 8 off, twice each day. On other lines such as Cunard, the 2/O served from 8 to 12, the 1/O from 12 to 4, and the C/O from 4 to 8, also 4 hrs on and 8 hrs off. As you know, the OOW on duty would serve more than 4 hours whenever the wheelhouse clock was set back on westbound voyages, and less than 4 hours on eastbound voyages whenever it was put forward. Since on fast ships this was done twice each night, the total extra time westbound or less time eastbound would be split between two senior officers, just as it was between two watch sections. The Captain did not stand regular watches. He came and went as he saw fit. Same was true of the Chief engineer down in the machinery spaces.

 

[Scott Mills]

Scott: In answer to your first question, an experienced ship handler once wrote, “To avoid or minimize contact damage should an iceberg, for example, be encountered unexpectedly at close quarters, the rudder must be put hard over away from the iceberg. The engine speed must be increased, if not already at full speed ahead. The instant the bow clears or hits the iceberg, the rudder must be put hard over the other way and the engine speed maintained. This is vital in preventing the hull abaft the pivot point from striking the iceberg.” I’m sure Jim will have something quite different to say

Samuel,

Bare with me here as I am having some difficulty understanding this.

1. So in the scenario that we have Murdoch sees the iceberg either right before, just as, or immediately after the 3 bells. I think we can all agree that it was before Fleet actually phones the bridge. Correct?

2. It takes some amount of time for Murdoch to react. In the most recent book you've edited I believe Tad argues (I actually could be remembering a post here and not the book!) that Murdoch, having identified the obstacle must now wait to get a baring on the berg, as it if he acts to soon and he's going to actually miss the object, he can inadvertently cause a collision. I believe its argued that he was in just this situations some time prior to Titanic and avoided collision by doing nothing.

In any case, depending on who is doing the telling this delay is as little as 17 seconds or closer to 40 (did David argue several minutes?)

3. When Murdoch determines that the ship will collide with the berg, he orders the helm hard over to the starboard, or a hard over turn to port. This choice may be because the berg is more right then left, or it may be because Murdoch knows that Titanic is a bit faster in a port turn.

Okay so far?

One question though that might be a digression. Assuming that Lightoller's granddaughter isn't correct regarding her story, how long does it take Hitchen's to put the helm hard over? Could this (the time he takes to respond and get the wheel over) be affected at all by the fact that this was his first voyage on a large ship and it was his first sailing with White Star Line?

4. Getting back to it: The wheel is hard over to starboard (port turn) and Titanic's bow begins to move, it moves two points, correct? Is this accurate up to here? Because this is where I get confused.

5. The full astern order was never given (again I think we all agree on that).

Now according to Jim, this is the last helm order given until the berg is no longer in contact with the ship. Correct? What I am having a hard time understanding is this (and I still don't think I've gotten a concrete answer, well at least one that I can understand! ):

Having read the introduction to David's "Last Log of the Titanic," I find myself wondering how a port only turn that results in a glancing blow along the starboard side of the ship can result in anything other than damage down the entire length of the ship. Particularly given that no hard over port (turn to starboard) order is given until contact ceases?

Jim argues that the force of the collision actually causes the berg to move (Jim yell at me if this is wrong) away from the ship; However, it seems to me that if penetrating contact is being made with Titanic by the berg, as in pieces of ice are actually sticking into Titanic's hull as she passes, that the tendency would be for the berg to not be moving away very quickly due to the type of friction being caused.

I think this should be doubly true if there is any substance to the grounding theory. If Titanic is riding over an underwater ice shelf (take this with a grain of salt as I know nothing about engineering) the weight of Titanic acting on the berg's underwater bits should tilt the berg towards Titanic's starboard side, not push it away.

Furthermore, it seems that once grounding contact is made the tendency would be for the ships momentum to carry the whole length of the ship over the ice spur unless something was done to swing the stern out of the way.

Am I just completely off base about this?

The other thing I am wondering is, taken your original quoted comments above, how is this necessarily incompatible with a hard-a-port turn after contact has been made? You are Murdoch, you hear and feel contact with the side, but you know the blow is glancing as said contact does not feel very significant. You also note probably pretty quickly that your course and speed, i.e. your control over the ship, has not altered since contact begins. Therefore would it not be in the realm of possibility to try to throw the wheel hard over to port to try and clear the stern?

Also, and I know this is the bit where Oliver's testimony becomes important, is it not plausible (let's ignore testimony just for a moment here) that the port turn appears to have worked (I believe this is actually what David argues in "Last Log") in as much as the bow is clear of the visible portion of the iceberg, so the starboard turn order is given to clear the stern. Unfortunately in this scenario, the starboard bow makes contact with the underwater portion of the berg, but the helm orders succeed in clearing the stern?

Jim believes that the ‘hard-aport’ order came after Smith arrived on the bridge to put the ship back on her course for NY, when Smith telegraphed down ½ ahead to the engine room.

I don’t think that was the case, and certainly getting the ship back on course for NY was not the immediate priority.

I agree that something like this occurred, and I am of the opinion that I know some here share, and some don't, that forward momentum after the collision was kept up for at least 10 minutes. I find a more compelling scenario, however, is that Smith acting on input from Ismay and preliminary damage reports was making way towards Halifax, not New York.

As it is pretty clear from my own reading of the evidence (and as is argued by Tad and one other--sorry I don't remember your name off the top of my head!) that Smith knew pretty quickly Titanic was seriously damaged, but importantly not that the ship was foundering until maybe 30-45 minutes after the collision.

Given that, what makes the most sense is Halifax as the closest port with the infrastructure to handle a damaged Titanic and her passengers.

And given that reading part of David's book got my blood up about this when he argues that there is circumstantial evidence that suggests the "everyone safe and heading to Halifax" news report came from White Star Boston and by extention Titanic herself.

 

[David G. Brown]

We know from a number of crew members that the accident took place at 20 minutes prior to change of watch. Likewise, the surviving crew agreed that the extra 47 minutes of Sunday were to be split equally between the on-duty Starboard Watch and the off-duty Port Watch. And, we know from a practical standpoint that you can't “borrow time” from one day into the next. All of those extra 47 minutes had to be served before the official resetting of both ship's time and ship's date from April 14th to Monday, April 15th. The official ship's time/date for Titanic could not have been changed until after the Port Watch worked off its half of the 47 extra minutes.

A major confusion factor has been the use of the “a.m.” and “p.m.” time references by historians. Those extra 47 minutes were neither. They can only be expressed correctly in the 24-hour system of timekeeping in which 12 p.m. becomes 2400 hours. For Titanic, April 14th was to keep on ticking past that to 2447 hours. If not for an iceberg, 2447 hours would have become 0000 hours April 15th. This would have been the resetting of the clocks that was never done that night.

2447 hours April 14th = 0000 hours April 15

The other confusion factor is that historians confuse the crew's so-called “midnight” change of watch with 2447/0000 hours. No matter what they called it, this change had to take place halfway between 2400 and 2447 hours April 14th to contain all of Sunday's extra time within that day. Because 47 does not divide evenly, I have the practice of giving the Starboard Watch 24 extra while the Port Watch gets 23 extra minutes. This puts the crew's “midnight” change at 2424 hours April 14th. No matter whether any clocks had been set back or not, the change of watch must have been scheduled for 2424 hours in order not to “borrow” time from April 15th.

Another confusion factor is the meaning of “midnight.” It is obvious that the “midnight” change for the crew did not occur at either 2400 or 2447 hours. It also had to occur prior to the official resetting of ship's time and date to April 15th. Even so, this change of watch did represent the end of the last watch of April 14th and the beginning of the first watch of April 15th. So, while not officially “midnight” in terms of the date or time, the change still represented midnight for the crew.

2424 hours April 14 = “midnight” Crew Time

We know from so many of the crew that the accident took place 20 minutes prior to change of watch at 11:40 o'clock. Several crew identified the time as 5 minutes prior to the striking of one bell to rouse out the Port Watch. That bell was to ring 15 minutes before change of watch, or at 11:45 o'clock. These testimonies make it obvious that the crew clocks had been reset prior to the accident so that 12:00 o'clock would be “midnight” in terms of the change of watch.

12:00 o'clock Crew = 2424 hours April 14th

If the crew clocks had not been reset in this manner, all of the crew testimonies about the time of the accident being 20 minutes prior to change of watch place the accident at 12:04 o'clock in April 14th hours.

12:00 - 20 min. = 11:40 o'clock Crew
11:40 Crew = 12:04 o'clock April 14th

We can now see that the engines ran 12 hours and 4 minutes from noon (1200 hours) that Sunday. Conventional wisdom has erroneously held that they ran for 24 minutes less – the exact amount of the overlooked setback of crew clocks.

The Port Watch came on deck at 2424 hours. We know this from testimonies like that of quartermaster Hichens who stated he was relieved at 12:23 o'clock in April 14th hours. He was. That's a fact. But, in crew time that was one minute before “midnight” and the proper moment for his relief to begin taking over. As Hichens stepped away from the wheel he had completed his half of the 47 extra minutes.

12:23 o'clock = 2423 hours April 14th
2423 hours = 1 min. before Change of Watch

Ships time based on its noon longitude that day continued in use to mark the change of date. In that sense, the official time of Titanic had not been changed even though the crew was using an altered clock. The official resetting of Titanic's clocks so that all would be “correct” for noon, April 15th never took place because of the ongoing emergency. The niceties of timekeeping aren't very important when the ship is sinking.

That passengers using 11:40 o'clock as the time of the accident had me perplexed for many years. It makes no sense. Clocks in passenger areas should not have been reset until 2447 hours. But, we know a group of men were gathered in the first class smoking lounge at 11:40 o'clock when the ship struck. Something is obviously wrong. I propose that the problem lay with the ship's Magneta master clock system.

Titanic was supposed to have two different master clocks. Each was capable of operating double the number of slave clocks actually installed in the ship. Why such overkill in terms of clock power? The obvious answer was that two master clocks were needed to provide two different “time zones” for the ship. One zone would continue ticking from noon without any changes until whenever the ship's time was reset to the next day. This was most likely the “passenger time zone.” The other master clock could be reset to match the crew needs (see above). The result was that clocks in some parts of the ship could show different times than in other parts.

If one of the ship's two Magneta master clocks malfunctioned (or was not installed), then IMM/White Star Line regulations required that all clocks show the time being used by the crew (paragraph 305). This was so that the engine room and bridge would use the same when making log entries. It would seem that on the night of April 14, 1912 both the crew and passengers were using crew time altered by 24 minutes from official ship's time.

In any event, the sinking of the ship at 2:20 o'clock was recorded in April 14th time. It translates to 2620 hours in the 24-hour system.

– David G. Brown

 

[Jim Currie]

David,

Go to my last post on the engine hours running time.. it's all there for everyone to have a go at.

Jim C

 

[Rob Lawes]

Hello all, Long time reader, first time poster.

I've really enjoyed the cut and thrust of this debate and have to admit to having done a little head scratching throughout as each side of the discussion has been presented.

It's easy to see why in the years that followed the loss of the Titanic, many of the practices and procedures of life on board sea going vessels were modified and simplified as is highlighted most obviously in the discussion about the ships time and if the clocks were changed or not.

In my experience (19 years in the Royal Navy and counting) when he have a requirement to r~~~~~ clocks at sea I have known it done between the first and second dog watches (1600-1800 first dog, 1800-2000 second dog) in order that both the affected watches will only do 2 1/2 hours or alternately the clocks will go back at 0200 at night to 0100, this means that the non watch keeping crew get an extra hour in it and those who watch keep will normally split the hour at the change over from the first to the middle (i.e. those on watch for the first would be relieved at 0030). The fact that ships of the day in 1912 used parts of hours makes it a challenge to track anything. I find it even more confusing when discussing crew and passenger time. If the rules of today were applied, the 47 minutes would be removed at 0047 but the watch hand over would take place at 0023 meaning that the additional time would have been split but the retarding of the clock would be done just once.

Having re-read the testimony of Quartermasters Hitchins and Oliver it's easy to see how much confusion can be built up around the activities of those on the bridge immediately prior to and in the moments after impact. Hitchins states that the order to hard to starboard the wheel was witnessed by 6th Officer Moody and by the Quartermaster on my left. (BOT1010) and again in the US inquiry he states that the first officer told the quartermaster standing by me to take the time and for the 6th officer to enter it in to the log. Now the question is, who was that Quartermaster? If it is Oliver then he would have not only later heard the Port helm order but should also have heard the Starboard order and to have been on the bridge prior to the collision which we know from his testimony he was not.

As for the collision and the helm orders themselves, the sequence that makes the most sense to me is as follows:

The Iceberg warning is issued from the crows nest and or spotted on the bridge.
The order is given to hard to starboard the helm (as we know to turn the ship to port) and the stop command is telegraphed to the engine room.
The ship commences it's turn to starboard.
The ship impacts with the iceberg.

At this point the forward momentum of the ship is still greater than the turning momentum. As a ship turns it will at first have to overcome it's forward movement hence the turn if traced from above would look as if the ship was going into a spiral i.e. the angle of the turn will increase up to a maximum for a given wheel setting as the ship changes direction. At the point of impact with the iceberg, the forward momentum is greater than the turning momentum and in my opinion the iceberg acts as a fulcrum where the forward motion of the ship acts against the wheel order and to some extent reduces the pivot causing the ship to crab sideways eventually breaking contact between the ship and the berg. At this point with the loss of the action of the berg on the hull the balance of forces returns to the state before impact and the ship resumes its port turn. Given that the berg is now away from the side of the ship and heading aft the next logical step is to either steady up on the new course or turn to starboard to bring the ship back around to the old course and the stern away from the berg. Given that the engines have been stopped and the way coming off the ship then either order would require a greater amount of helm than would normally be required.

Hence now the helm is turned hard to port and the stern of the ship swings away from any potential danger astern.

At some point as the way comes off the ship it may have been then that Captain Smith rang down half ahead to facilitate the turn back on to the previous course before bring the engine to a stop and then running them astern in order to remove all way from the ship to enable the launch of the lifeboats.

I look forward to your thoughts.

Regards

Rob.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Arun, the corridor running straight out from the bridge is the bridge wing. The wing cab is at the very end. You can see the Morse signaling lamp on top of it. The boat seen in that photo is emergency lifeboat No. 1. It is swung out. You can see this by the angle presented by the davit in the photo. Collapsible C cannot be seen in that photo because it lays on the deck, and the small bulwark running fore/aft that you see in the photo is hiding it from view.

Thanks Sam but may I explain why I am still a bit confused? A photographic representation of that view (not sure if from the Olympic or Titanic) is in may Titanic books, minus the tip of the iceberg, of course. I think some of them also show the port wing of the bridge near where Emergency Boat #2 was located and presubaly in the vicinity of the point where the distrss rockets were being fired that night. In both cases, why does the lifeboat, the top of which is just visible, seem so close to the bulwark? That is why I assumed that in might be Collapsible C (on the starboard side). In the overhead view sketch, #1 is some distance from the bulwark.

Is that just an optical illuision?