Many years ago I married a farmer's daughter. My new father-in-law took me down a dirt road in a classic Chevy pickup. Over against the tree line he pointed out a clump of animals. "Thirty-nine head," he said, "that one heifer must be down by the creek again." I saw a clump of animals, he saw individual cattle and even noted one was missing. Weeks later, he came to visit me on Lake Erie and we went sailing. "See the buoy?" I asked. Our boat was no farther from the buoy than the herd of cattle had been from the pickup truck. Yet, he could not pick out the shape of the floating aid to navigation. From these two incidents I learned the importance of our individual personal backgrounds when it comes to what we each perceive in what we see.
This is the context in which I view Sam's comments. We see the same things, but perceive them quite differently. What I perceive is that the usual and customary interpretation of the testimonies adds up to an impossible accident. So, to me, the canonical interpretation must be incorrect. The result is the theory that I have proposed.
From the outset, I do not claim to have God's eye when it comes to seeing nearly a century into the past. Some of Sam's individual criticisms of my theory are valid. My theory has its difficulties and weak points. But, I believe it is a lot closer to what really happened than the claptrap we have been fed by the likes of Senator Smith and Lord Mersey.
The traditional story of using hard-over rudder in conjunction with reversing the engines is absurd. The conventional accident description of the ship sideswiping its bow in a left turn and not damaging the rest of its length is impossible. I fail to see why anyone is interested in continuing to defend an such a bizarre interpretation of events.
To me, the biggest mistake that has been made in Titanic research is the canonical assumption that Murdoch's actions were intended to avoid the iceberg. My approach is built on the concept that when Murdoch finally perceived Titanic was "in extremis" with the iceberg, he was bright enough to realize that no maneuver of any sort--turning or stopping--would prevent impact. Instead of trying to avoid the berg, the underlying context of my theory is that Murdoch deliberately intended to take it as nearly bow-on as possible and all of his efforts with engine orders and steering commands were for the sole purpose of mitigating damage.
Murdoch never tried to dodge the iceberg. He tried to reduce the damage the ship was about to absorb. That’s my view of his events.
Because I do not believe Murdoch tried to avoid the berg, I have to say that Sam is totally incorrect in his assessment of reversing the starboard engine for an object fine on the starboard bow at short range. That was Murdoch's only choice of engine command to achieve his true goal of mitigating damage. Given the time available, he knew the starboard engine could not be reversed prior to impact. But, he also knew he had to do something to protect that starboard propeller and shaft from ice damage. Stopping would limit damage, and reversing would possibly put enough moving water into the equation to prevent ice-to-blade contact.
From my point of view, the choice of reversing the starboard engine with less than 45 seconds to impact would have been seamanship bordering on brilliant. I say this because it takes into full account the time lag between issuing engine orders at sea and the response of the engineers. If Murdoch did what I suggest, he took what is normally considered a disadvantage--the lag time--and used it to his advantage. He maintained maximum steerage during the approach. Once the ship got to the berg, the engine was stopping or reversing, so he gained sideways movement of the stern away from danger.
However, the opposite action of reversing the port engine, if accomplished quickly enough might well have exposed the whole of the starboard side to the iceberg. It is really an insult to Murdoch to suggest that he sought to combine a steering maneuver with stopping or reversing all engines in conjunction with an emergency helm order. He knew better. Murdoch knew that reversing the engines would reduce the effectiveness of Titanic’s rudder. And, irrespective of engine orders, the "hard a-starboard" order in the canon would have been almost suicidal. Murdoch had more than sufficient experience to know the result would certainly have been ice damage along the full length of the starboard side.
As to the topic of crew assuming that Titanic had lost a propeller blade, QED my argument that something odd took place at the stern in conjunction with the accident.
Those who thought about propeller problems were well aware they were sensing something from the back of the bus, not the front. Propellers are at the back. The ship did not lose a blade. What did happen to give so many different people the sense of an event "back there" instead of in the bow? It really does not matter why they thought about a propeller blade (the Olympic incident), the fact that so many people looked toward the wrong end of the ship is proof enough that something was going on back there. Not one of those persons would have conjured up an image of Olympic if all of the noise, rumbling, or mayhem had been confined to the bow.
Down in the engine room there were no survivors who actually operated the controls. We do not have a copy of the bell book. Instead, we must rely on untrained coal handlers for their opinions of equipment they did not know how to operate. This does not mean those men should be ignored, just that their testimonies must be considered as subject to their own ignorance. In the end, however, I believe that what they saw during the roughly 60 seconds surrounding the accident was pretty much what they described. The telegraph bell did ring before impact. The engines were running and did not stop until afterward.
As I have stated, I do not have a bullet-proof argument to replace canon. What I have is an overall interpretation of the available testimony that better fits reality. Undoubtedly I've miscued on an individual point or two, but my theory puts damage where it occurred and does it in a way consistent with the way real ships maneuver in real water. Plus, it follows standard shiphandling practice. Perfect? No! Just my attempt to come a bit closer to the truth.
Now, to end where this began, how did my father-in-law count the animals in his herd. Of course, he counted feet and divided by four, which is the way you count Olympic class ships. You count the funnels...
-- David G. Brown
