David G. Brown
RIP
Sam-- Hichens and Boxhall imply the warning bell came less than a minute before impact. However, Boxhall in particular heard bells twice--or he was in two places when he heard bells once--but either way his divergent testimonies (US vs BOT) make anything he said on this subject highly suspect.
Olliver never said anything about the duration between when he heard the bell and when he started walking back to the bridge. We have imputed that time, but he never said anything beyond that the errand taking him to the platform had been completed. How long did that errand take. At what point during the duration of the errand did the crow's nest bell ring? He never gave any hint. "I left that (errand) and came, was just entering on the bridge just as the shock came," is what he said.
Ice blink does not require "clouds" in the fashion you imply, only moisture in the atmosphere (which is really the same thing, but not as visible). The day had been sunny and warm, ideal for creating moist air above the ice which the still wind would not have dissipated. The result could have been sufficient to create the visual image described by the lookouts. Don't forget, they never said it was bright, just visible.
Rostron's distance estimate to the ice was just that, an estimate. It is not a measurement. In addition, Titanic moved under its own steam between impact and its final stop.
Another improbable is that the icebergs with their deep drafts were being moved by deep currents that did not affect Titanic while it was on the surface.
There is no reason to believe that the ship-to-ice distance was the same at 6:30 a.m. as it was the preceding 11:40 p.m. Instead, there is every reason to believe that: 1.) Rostron's estimate was not perfect; and 2.) Titanic sank some unknown distance from where it struck; and, 3.) we do not have data on the currents at various levels to predict differences in the drifts between the ship and the icebergs.
Your discussion of the angular width of the ice field across the bow is based upon the assumption that the lookouts had calibrated eyeballs. "Two points" in ordinary sailor talk may be more or less than 22.5 degrees.
However, my argument is based on the ice field growing larger as the ship approaches. A two-point turn makes sense at the time the decision was taken, given Captain Smith's current knowledge and the ordinary practice of seamen at the time. On Titanic, the placement of the standard compass required extra time to make a course alteration compared to a more traditional bridge layout with the standard on the wheelhouse roof. Allow Boxhall 45 seconds from the officer quarters door to the platform, 3.5 minutes to actually conduct the course change, and 45 seconds to come back to opposite the captain's suite, and you have a 5 minute evolution--which validates Scarrott's testimony.
We cannot know Smith's intentions. However, there is no doubt that a two-point turn was insufficient to avoid the ice. It is probably not too far out on the historic limb to say that Smith would have known a two-point turn would not fully clear the ice. If we put his actions into 1912 context, it is probable that he intended only to go far enough south to get into the southern end of the ice field. Whether sound thinking or not, he may have expected the density of ice to be less at the "toe" of the field and so it would have been easier to pick his way through.
You cannot say there was no course alteration based on any of your arguments. Nothing you have pointed out prevents my hypothesis from being true. On the other hand, I am claiming only what Hichens and Boxhall claimed--that the ship turned left under starboard helm (1912 parlance) and that turn resulted in an iceberg accident.
As to maneuvering with engines, my experience in twin-screwed vessels doing this maneuver at high speed indicates there is stern swing. I've done just the maneuver I propose for Murdoch to save my ass entering Port Clinton harbor. It worked.
The outward swing of the stern is not just from rudder pressure. Most of it is generated by pressure differentials created on the hull itself. High pressure is created on the inside of the turn, low on the outside. Differentials are created when one prop is "weak" as well. That's why you have to crab-steer a twin-screw boat when one engine is out of order.
However, I agree with Sam that stopping the starboard screw of Titanic would have forced the starboard bow toward the ice. That's why Murdoch also needed full right rudder at the same time. It was a combined maneuver. BUT IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO AVOID THE BERG.
Murdoch's intent was clearly to avoid raking the starboard side and mostly to to prevent damage to the starboard screw. He could not avoid hitting the iceberg and knew it.
One possibility has just entered my head. When you are going to hit something, you can take the blow at the precisely right point to "spring" the side and stern out of harm's way. This is a subset case of Sam's concept of trying to spread the impact of the blow. This is extremely difficult to do. I've done this in my career, but my rate of success is equal only to chance. If the bow hits too soon, you swing the stern into trouble. Too late, and the object rakes down the side. Murdoch may have been attempting to cause the impact in way of Titanic's pivot point. And, an argument that he was highly successful might be made.
As to the Stop order to the stokeholds, Sam is making a rather large assumption that whoever sent that boiler order correctly interpreted the engine order he received from the bridge. Perhaps he reacted too quickly? Could he have sent a Stop order to the boiler rooms automatically when he saw Stop on one telegraph? Could his instinctive reaction have overridden the fact that he still needed steam for the port engine? The assumption of perfect response to every situation is simply not supported by the human condition.
I really do believe that Murdoch asked for reverse on the starboard engine. However, that is only a possibility permitted within the context of my hypothesis. It is also permitted that he ordered All Stop instead. My hypothesis does not change.
--David G. Brown
Olliver never said anything about the duration between when he heard the bell and when he started walking back to the bridge. We have imputed that time, but he never said anything beyond that the errand taking him to the platform had been completed. How long did that errand take. At what point during the duration of the errand did the crow's nest bell ring? He never gave any hint. "I left that (errand) and came, was just entering on the bridge just as the shock came," is what he said.
Ice blink does not require "clouds" in the fashion you imply, only moisture in the atmosphere (which is really the same thing, but not as visible). The day had been sunny and warm, ideal for creating moist air above the ice which the still wind would not have dissipated. The result could have been sufficient to create the visual image described by the lookouts. Don't forget, they never said it was bright, just visible.
Rostron's distance estimate to the ice was just that, an estimate. It is not a measurement. In addition, Titanic moved under its own steam between impact and its final stop.
Another improbable is that the icebergs with their deep drafts were being moved by deep currents that did not affect Titanic while it was on the surface.
There is no reason to believe that the ship-to-ice distance was the same at 6:30 a.m. as it was the preceding 11:40 p.m. Instead, there is every reason to believe that: 1.) Rostron's estimate was not perfect; and 2.) Titanic sank some unknown distance from where it struck; and, 3.) we do not have data on the currents at various levels to predict differences in the drifts between the ship and the icebergs.
Your discussion of the angular width of the ice field across the bow is based upon the assumption that the lookouts had calibrated eyeballs. "Two points" in ordinary sailor talk may be more or less than 22.5 degrees.
However, my argument is based on the ice field growing larger as the ship approaches. A two-point turn makes sense at the time the decision was taken, given Captain Smith's current knowledge and the ordinary practice of seamen at the time. On Titanic, the placement of the standard compass required extra time to make a course alteration compared to a more traditional bridge layout with the standard on the wheelhouse roof. Allow Boxhall 45 seconds from the officer quarters door to the platform, 3.5 minutes to actually conduct the course change, and 45 seconds to come back to opposite the captain's suite, and you have a 5 minute evolution--which validates Scarrott's testimony.
We cannot know Smith's intentions. However, there is no doubt that a two-point turn was insufficient to avoid the ice. It is probably not too far out on the historic limb to say that Smith would have known a two-point turn would not fully clear the ice. If we put his actions into 1912 context, it is probable that he intended only to go far enough south to get into the southern end of the ice field. Whether sound thinking or not, he may have expected the density of ice to be less at the "toe" of the field and so it would have been easier to pick his way through.
You cannot say there was no course alteration based on any of your arguments. Nothing you have pointed out prevents my hypothesis from being true. On the other hand, I am claiming only what Hichens and Boxhall claimed--that the ship turned left under starboard helm (1912 parlance) and that turn resulted in an iceberg accident.
As to maneuvering with engines, my experience in twin-screwed vessels doing this maneuver at high speed indicates there is stern swing. I've done just the maneuver I propose for Murdoch to save my ass entering Port Clinton harbor. It worked.
The outward swing of the stern is not just from rudder pressure. Most of it is generated by pressure differentials created on the hull itself. High pressure is created on the inside of the turn, low on the outside. Differentials are created when one prop is "weak" as well. That's why you have to crab-steer a twin-screw boat when one engine is out of order.
However, I agree with Sam that stopping the starboard screw of Titanic would have forced the starboard bow toward the ice. That's why Murdoch also needed full right rudder at the same time. It was a combined maneuver. BUT IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO AVOID THE BERG.
Murdoch's intent was clearly to avoid raking the starboard side and mostly to to prevent damage to the starboard screw. He could not avoid hitting the iceberg and knew it.
One possibility has just entered my head. When you are going to hit something, you can take the blow at the precisely right point to "spring" the side and stern out of harm's way. This is a subset case of Sam's concept of trying to spread the impact of the blow. This is extremely difficult to do. I've done this in my career, but my rate of success is equal only to chance. If the bow hits too soon, you swing the stern into trouble. Too late, and the object rakes down the side. Murdoch may have been attempting to cause the impact in way of Titanic's pivot point. And, an argument that he was highly successful might be made.
As to the Stop order to the stokeholds, Sam is making a rather large assumption that whoever sent that boiler order correctly interpreted the engine order he received from the bridge. Perhaps he reacted too quickly? Could he have sent a Stop order to the boiler rooms automatically when he saw Stop on one telegraph? Could his instinctive reaction have overridden the fact that he still needed steam for the port engine? The assumption of perfect response to every situation is simply not supported by the human condition.
I really do believe that Murdoch asked for reverse on the starboard engine. However, that is only a possibility permitted within the context of my hypothesis. It is also permitted that he ordered All Stop instead. My hypothesis does not change.
--David G. Brown
