No, Boxhall didn't hear 3-bells twice. Like the testimony of many others, there were differences in the details of what people said only a few weeks apart. And that is to be expected in any accident investigation. Some witnesses were more consistent and better at remembering specific details than others.
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Olliver never said anything about the duration between when he heard the bell and when he started walking back to the bridge. We have imputed that time, but he never said anything beyond that the errand taking him to the platform had been completed. How long did that errand take. At what point during the duration of the errand did the crow's nest bell ring? He never gave any hint. "I left that (errand) and came, was just entering on the bridge just as the shock came," is what he said.
I agree that Olliver never specifically mentioned time, but in his description he said: "I looked, but could not see anything, and I left that and came ..." So how long are we suppose to believe he was still at the platform trimming the oil lights after instinctively looking up when he heard 3 bells from the nest? Are we to believe it takes another 5 to 8 minutes (minus 45 seconds to walk to the bridge) to finish trimming the lights?
When we look at what others have said, excluding Scarrott, we see that Olliver's description fits in nicely if he started to leave the platform for the bridge very soon after hearing those bells as his statement implies. Allowing 45 seconds to walk the distance, an interval that was timed by Cameron, and allow 10-15 seconds for reaction (looking up, etc.), we are left with an estimate of about 1 minute from 3 bells to the collision imputed from Olliver. Now, one minute is 2280 ft of steaming at 22 1/2 knots. A little over a 1/3 nautical mile. Reginald Lee testified (British inquiry 2447) that he thought the berg was about 1/2 mile away when they first spotted it from the nest. And this too makes sense as I pointed out in my paper, “Iceberg Right Ahead” (on this site), where data collected by Lt. Commander Fred Zeusler of the USCG in 1925 on iceberg visibility distances listed a 1/2 mile for spotting icebergs on a clear, moonless night. Also James Bisset, in his book Tramps & Ladies, wrote that icebergs are visible by starlight half mile ahead in clear weather. But you insist on takings Scarrott's unsure ("As I did not take much notice of the three strikes on the gong, I could hardly recollect the time") estimate of 5-8 minutes as the valid interval. I believe it is nothing more than a recollection of time from when they struck 7 bells (11:30) to when he heard the 3 bells.
So how do you find support for a 5-8 minute interval, which is a 2 to 3 mile distance for spotting the iceberg? First of all you have to reject the testimony of others. Lee testified, “The first thing that was reported was after seven bells struck; it was some minutes, it might have been nine or ten minutes afterwards. Three bells were struck by Fleet….’” So here we have direct conflicting testimony as to the time between 7 bells and the 3 bell warning. You choose to accept Scorrott’s unsure estimate because you developed a theory that included an unsubstantiated 2-point course change to go around field ice that stretched about 2 points on either side of dead ahead at 11:30; a course change that makes little sense to any ship or boat handler or an airplane pilot who needs to get around an obstruction to navigation ahead.
Second of all, it seems you have to redefine the meaning of “haze” as “ice blink”. I pointed out to you even privately some time ago that ice blink is light seen on the horizon from the underside of low clouds caused by light reflecting off field ice immediately beyond. Usually, that will be from reflected moon light causing a double reflection, first off the ice and then off the clouds ahead. You now say it requires "only moisture in the atmosphere (which is really the same thing, but not as visible)” and that “the day had been sunny and warm, ideal for creating moist air above the ice which the still wind would not have dissipated.” I strongly suggest you look at the weather conditions past 6 p.m. where the air and water temperatures dropped sharply after the ship turned the corner. What matters is the weather conditions in the region they were steaming into, not where they came from. In that region, there was less than a 2° F difference between air and sea temperatures all night long. We have hard evidence for that. There were no clouds in the sky whatsoever, clearly indicating that the relative humidity was very low to begin with. The conditions you say existed simply were not there.
The talk of haze came from lookouts Fleet, Lee, and Symons. According to testimony given by Symons at the Ryan Vs. WSL trial, “There was a slight haze on the water obscuring the view of the sky-line.” He said it was about the same throughout his two hours in the nest. Symons was up in the nest from 8 till 10 before Fleet and Lee. And Lee, as you know, said the “haze” was all around the horizon soon after he and Fleet took to the nest. Care to explain these other accounts with your haze hypothesis?
You also said:
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There is no reason to believe that the ship-to-ice distance was the same at 6:30 a.m. as it was the preceding 11:40 p.m. Instead, there is every reason to believe that: 1.) Rostron's estimate was not perfect; and 2.) Titanic sank some unknown distance from where it struck; and, 3.) we do not have data on the currents at various levels to predict differences in the drifts between the ship and the icebergs.
1. Rostron’s estimate of 2-3 miles from wreckage to the edge of the ice field was taken during daylight after the sun came. It is the best that we have to go with from someone with years of experience on the Atlantic.
2. After the collision the Titanic headed northward approximately paralleling the eastern edge of the ice field, an ice field which ran from northward to southward.
3. I don’t really care about the drift of icebergs here. I care about the drift of the field ice which would be taken by the same surface current as affected the stopped Titanic.
You said:
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A two-point turn makes sense at the time the decision was taken, given Captain Smith's current knowledge and the ordinary practice of seamen at the time.
Explain why a 2 point course change makes any sense at all. What was Smith’s “current knowledge” that you seem to know so much about, yet later say “We cannot know Smith's intentions”? What “ordinary practice of seaman” are you talking about here?
You said
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It is probably not too far out on the historic limb to say that Smith would have known a two-point turn would not fully clear the ice. If we put his actions into 1912 context, it is probable that he intended only to go far enough south to get into the southern end of the ice field. Whether sound thinking or not, he may have expected the density of ice to be less at the "toe" of the field and so it would have been easier to pick his way through.
How could you possibly believe yourself? What does 1912 context have to do with any of this? To say he probably intended to go only far enough south to get to the southern end of the ice field, but that required him to have some prior knowledge of the extent of the ice field. Cite for me which ice warnings would have given him that information? I know of non that would lead him to alter course by only 2 points so late in the game. If an ice field was seen and recognized 3-4 miles ahead of them at 11:30, an alteration in course of much more than 2 points would be called for.
What it seems to me you are trying to do is come up with a scenario to fit your version of events based on no real evidence, and to reject what little evidence we have. Your trying to turn Hichens' 2 point hard-astarboard turn into a non-emergency 2 point course change that I find totally unsupported.
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You cannot say there was no course alteration based on any of your arguments. Nothing you have pointed out prevents my hypothesis from being true. On the other hand, I am claiming only what Hichens and Boxhall claimed--that the ship turned left under starboard helm (1912 parlance) and that turn resulted in an iceberg accident.
What I’m saying is that your arguments for a 2 point course change has little, if any basis. You are
NOT claiming the same thing that Boxhall and Hichens claimed. They claimed that a hard-starboard order was received from Murdoch shortly before the ship collided. You reject that. You also must therefore reject Lee’s testimony that “the helm must have been put
either hard-a-starboard or very close to it, because she veered to port, and it seemed almost as if she might clear it, but I suppose there was ice under water” which certainly does sound to me like they were just steadying up after completing a routine 2 point course change.
Continuing:
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As to maneuvering with engines, my experience in twin-screwed vessels doing this maneuver at high speed indicates there is stern swing.
I never said there is no swinging of the stern with spilt engines. What I said is that in a turn with rudder, it is the hydrodynamic force on the rudder that kicks the stern out at the start of the turn. Running the inside engine astern would tend to tighten the turn and is used especially in crowded quarters such as narrow channels to turn a ship on its heel as they say. Backing one of the engines also tends to move the pivot point toward the stern. And putting things in “1912 context,” an order for a helm change after the object goes past the ship’s pivot point will get the result you want much faster than issuing engine orders before the object makes contact given the uncertain delay in having them carried out, especially when a change in engine orders would come unexpectedly down below.
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Murdoch's intent was clearly to avoid raking the starboard side and mostly to prevent damage to the starboard screw. He could not avoid hitting the iceberg and knew it.
Now we have something we both agree on. Nobody can say for sure what Murdoch knew or did not know, but I would agree that he needed to avoid raking the starboard side, which would also prevent damage to the starboard screw as well as the central screw and rudder. His actions as described by Olliver and indirectly supported with what Rowe observed indicated that he did just that.
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As to the Stop order to the stokeholds, Sam is making a rather large assumption that whoever sent that boiler order correctly interpreted the engine order he received from the bridge. … The assumption of perfect response to every situation is simply not supported by the human condition.
Let me put it a different way, the assumption that you are making that an engineer may have sent a premature Stop order to the stokeholds has no observational support. However, there is observational support that a Stop order for
both engines came down from the bridge at the time of the collision.
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I really do believe that Murdoch asked for reverse on the starboard engine. However, that is only a possibility permitted within the context of my hypothesis. It is also permitted that he ordered All Stop instead. My hypothesis does not change.
I have no problem with anyone developing an hypothesis, which is nothing more than a tentative assumption based on insufficient evidence made in order to draw out and test its logical or empirical consequences. And I enjoy testing these on both accounts.
