Jack Phillips' final moments

the wireless operators would be listed as causal factors which contributed to the disaster

Hi Rob,

I would put it quite a bit more serious than that. Phillips and Bride IMHO were primary responsible for the disaster, assuming the bridge would have reacted (as they ought to have done, and many other ships did) to the receipt of all the ice warning messages had they all been delivered to the bridge.

Let us recall that the British Inquiry imparted no blame whatsoever upon Captain Smith, or Phillips or Bride (Mike Spooner will like this!)

Cheers,

Julian
 
Agreed Julian.

Obviously, despite the Captain being ultimately responsible and Phillips and Bride being causal factors there is nothing to say they wouldn't have been investigated and punished.

Take the loss of the HMS Oceanic (the White Stars SS Oceanic acting as a WW1 auxiliary cruiser). The primary causal factor was an inaccurate fix by Lt David Blair (non other than the former 2nd officer of the RMS Titanic) other causal factors were a dispute between the merchant master Captain Smith and the Navy appointed Captain of the vessel, Captain Slayter.

Blair, Smith and Slayter all faced a court martial. Slayter was ultimately responsible as the ships Captain however it was only Blair who received any punishment.

Ironically the Oceanics first officer at the time of her loss was one Charles Lightoller.

Just because the Captain failed in his duty the causal factors should be identified and blame weighted accordingly.
 
Hi Rob,

It's all very interesting - the matter of causation.

Lots of Maritime disasters seem to be pretty complicated in respect of causation. And I suppose one ought to add that the British Inquiry was not a 'trial' - it was what it said it was - an Inquiry - to find out what happened and why.

The court cases came later. And in the court cases White Star was found liable and negligent. Marconi UK Co got off on a sort of technicality because they had not been sued as a joint defendant, as White Star was sued only, and Phillips and Bride were not employed by White Star. A plaintiff was at risk as to costs in suing joint defendants if one was found not liable.

(I hope the above makes sense. I have simplified the above quite a bit, but the drift is the same had I not simplified it).

It is an interesting legal point that in the court cases White Star could have formally joined Marconi UK Co into the proceedings as what is known as a 'third party', but did not do so. The court could then have apportioned blame and compensation (and costs). (Negligence cases and contract cases often included joint defendants and third party proceedings).

I recall one or two particular accident cases I dealt with where the landowner was unclear and we could have sued 2 potential owners, but the risk as to costs of the proceedings resulted in no court case at all.

UK Railway disasters are much more straightforward!

Cheers,

Julian
 
Hi Julian.

Yes, I compeletly get what your saying regarding the relationship between White Star and Marconi.

Regarding Railway Disasters, I'm not so sure, but I know this is one of your areas of speciality. Having started work with Network Rail last September, I've read a lot of RAIB and accident inquiry reports to become familiar with the learning points and what can and has gone wrong. The legal cases surrounding Hatfield involving two companies and corperate manslaughter charges must have been a real tangle.

As for Marconi, it's obviously clear that all those hard yards the company put in from the moment the Carpathia steamed in to New York paid off wonderfuly. Friends in high places also helped.
 
Hi Rob,

I presume by Hatfield you mean the most recent Potters Bar Rail Accident in 2002?

In the 9 years I worked on the railways, my own depot had 5 accidents in so many years. As a Trade Union Rep for the RMT, and H&S Rep, and with my legal background, I wasn't well liked by management! Other potential accidents were covered up, and of the 5 that occurred, I was privy to 4 as to what went on, and was only directly involved in one. But in all cases there was an almighty cover up! We were dealing at the time with very old coaches and class 37 diesel locomotives in 4 of those cases, and a depot that had appalling track work dating back probably to the 1930s.

I suppose this has coloured my view of things Californian and Titanic.

I am well aware of myself and others being given a typed 'statement' by management. "Sign This". (I refused in the incident I was involved in). I was terribly conscience stricken over all this. I was going to condemn a very close colleague to dismissal and losing his pension who was just a few years off retiring on his pension after over 40 years railway service.

I re-wrote the statement, but omitted the condemning sentence I could have included. I had actuated the brake on the train, instead of the driver, but I left this out. Dai 'Crunchie' Thomas, the driver, had all these plans for his retirement, that was imminent. He had bought his council house and done it up. He had started at Cae Harris loco depot in 1960. The derailment was probably due to Net Work Rail and poor track conditions rather than 'Crunchie' going too fast and not actuating the brake, which I had actuated myself.

This is the sort of situation you find in UK accidents. I can see this sort of thing all too clearly in Titanic and 'The Californian Incident'.

And what became of my dear old friend driver Dai 'Crunchie' Thomas? 4 weeks before he was due to retire he had a heart attack and died.

Cheers,

Julian
 
Hi Rob,

I would put it quite a bit more serious than that. Phillips and Bride IMHO were primary responsible for the disaster, assuming the bridge would have reacted (as they ought to have done, and many other ships did) to the receipt of all the ice warning messages had they all been delivered to the bridge.

Let us recall that the British Inquiry imparted no blame whatsoever upon Captain Smith, or Phillips or Bride (Mike Spooner will like this!)

Cheers,

Julian
Julian, I have to disagree with you on the assertion that Bride and Phillips were primarily responsible for the disaster. There's no doubting they made mistakes not reporting all the ice messages they received that fateful day, Jack Phillips indeed did not deliver the Mesaba message to the bridge.

But I think it's important to look at how the crew of most of these Liners in general viewed the threat of Ice before the disaster. Capt Smith for example had crossed the North Atlantic time and time again even before wireless, and had never had any problems with Icebergs, they were fairly common in the North Atlantic at that time of the year and getting ice warnings was also common.

Phillips and Bride were the Marconi operators on the ship, and the navigation of Titanic was not their concern or responsibility, but that of the captain and officers on the Bridge. Now with that in mind, let's see how Captain Smith that very same day dealt with obtaining an ice warning from The Baltic which WAS delivered to him by Bride and Phillips.

He got the warning, then instead of immediately taking it to the chart room for his officers to look at (standard procedure) he took it and gave it to Bruce Ismay, so that Ismay could put it in his pocket and show it off to passengers. Captain Smith eventually got the message back a couple of hours later but he still didn't take it to the bridge where it belonged and it's assumed it simply stayed in his pocket since the surviving officers make no mention of this ice warning.

Now I'm not trying to dig on Captain Smith at all, but the fact of the matter is the crew of the Titanic simply underestimated the threat of the ice ahead of them. The bridge knew they were in an icefield, they knew that their proximity to the ice was why the temperature dropped so radically, they knew and yet they did not slow down, and they didn't post extra lookouts. Why?

Because it was a clear night, and they genuinely believed they could see any iceberg's big enough to damage the ship in time to evade them. Yes, Jack Phillips should've delivered the mesaba warning to the bridge, but it seems in all likelihood he just simply forgot to. He couldn't have known the importance of it at the time, and Bride and Phillips would have assumed that any threat in the ships path would be spotted by the Bridge in due time and swiftly avoided on a clear night in calm seas anyways.

After reading Paul Lee's research, I am positive that both inquiries were somewhat whitewashed so we really don't know (and likely never will) what happened on the Titanics bridge that night leading up to the fatal collision. Anyways, Titanic's disaster is such that you can't blame one individual for it's happening. Many mistakes and an alarming amount of unlucky circumstances came together for this tragedy to happen.
 
Phillips and Bride were the Marconi operators on the ship, and the navigation of Titanic was not their concern or responsibility, but that of the captain and officers on the Bridge. Now with that in mind, let's see how Captain Smith that very same day dealt with obtaining an ice warning from The Baltic which WAS delivered to him by Bride and Phillips.

He got the warning, then instead of immediately taking it to the chart room for his officers to look at (standard procedure) he took it and gave it to Bruce Ismay, so that Ismay could put it in his pocket and show it off to passengers. Captain Smith eventually got the message back a couple of hours later but he still didn't take it to the bridge where it belonged and it's assumed it simply stayed in his pocket since the surviving officers make no mention of this ice warning.
Yes, that Baltic ice warning is one of the cruicial aspects of the entire disaster.

Going by Paul Lee's research article, the first message from the Baltic to the Titanic arrived at 1:57 pm ship time. It was actually a message from the Greek liner Athenai that the Baltic was passing on to her bigger sister and other ships. But later testimony by the captain of the Baltic suggested that there might have been further ice messages sent to the Titanic. The Captain was given just one of those, presumably the first - presumably by Bride directly without any deck officer being the intermediary.

Soon afterwards, Bruce Ismay was talking to the Wideners when the Captain walked past, wordlessly handing the message to Ismay. The reasoning behind this action is uncertain and it was around 2:30 pm by then. Ismay put the message in his pocket according to Mrs Widener. What did he do with it over the next 3 and a bit hours?

At around 6:00 pm Emily Ryerson and Marion Thayer were relaxing on deck chairs when a passing Ismay stopped to chat. In the midst of 'pleasantries', he reportedly showed the message to them; this was witnessed by Grace Bowen, sitting a few chairs away. After Ismay left, Mrs Ryerson reportedly confirmed the Chairman's action to Mrs Bowen.

At about 7:10 pm, Major Arthur Peuchen was going to his cabin to dress for dinner when he passed Captain Smith heading towards the First Class Smoking Room. It was there that he met Ismay and asked for the Baltic message to be returned, which was done. One assumes that the Captain's intention was to post it in the chart room for his officers to see.

But when the Minahan family arrived at the a la carte restaurant just after 7:15 pm, Daisy Minahan noticed that Captain Smith was already at the Wideners' dinner party table. Therefore he must have had the Baltic message still in his pocket at the time.

As per Lightoller's report, Captain Smith arrived on the bridge at 8:55 pm to check conditions and remained for 25 minutes or so (but Lee and others believe it was probably less than 10 minutes). He was seen by Boxhall "around 9 pm" once. Lightoller made no mention of the Baltic ice message - neither did Boxhall, who spent a lot of time in the chart room. Afterwards, according to Lightoller, the Captain retired to his cabin. BUT, Daisy Minahan said that the Captain was still at the Wideners party table when the Minahan family left the restaurant at 9:45 pm. This was supported by Maybelle Thorne's statement that she saw the Captain leave the table just after 10 pm.

So, did Captain Smith go back to the party after stopping at the bridge? If so, what did he do with that crucial Baltic ice message?
 
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I presume by Hatfield you mean the most recent Potters Bar Rail Accident in 2002?

Off topic

Hi Julian.

No not Potters Bar, Hatfield occurred in Oct 2000. A train derailed and 4 passengers were killed when a fatigued rail broke up under a 225 Express Train. The fines and costs of covering emergency speed restrictions on the network sent Railtrack into receivership and Network Rail was formed in the aftermath.

Things are slowly getting better. The last time a passenger died as a result of an accident on a train was a derailment at Grayrigg in 2007.

This is a fascinating site if you are interested.

Rail Accident Investigation Branch

Back to topic.
 
Hi Rob,

In respect of the matter of causation, I don't claim to have any definitive analysis.

Why did the disaster happen?

Had Titanic not hit an ice berg then all the failings of the Board of Trade and the lack of lifeboats etc are irrelevant.

So why did Titanic hit an ice berg that fateful night? Many other ships at the time took avoiding action as a result of the ice warnings exchanged between the ship's wireless operators. They changed course and went southwards to avoid the ice such as the Mount Temple.

We don't know exactly if some of the ice warning messages reached the bridge of Titanic except we can piece together a picture of that Sunday evening. We know which messages definitely got to Titanic's bridge because Captain Smith replied to them.

We can infer that the Mesaba ice warning message was not taken to the bridge by Phillips. Why? Because Lightoller said he had no knowledge of it ('He would say that, wouldn't he?' one might argue). But Adams was quite clear at the British Inquiry he heard Phillips continuing to communicate with Cape Race, and got no official acknowledgement to his message from Titanic.

Bride had already ignored The Californian's ice warning message, by Bride's own account sent to him as well as The Antillian (though Bride thought it was to The Baltic). I don't think The Californian - Antillian message would have made much difference to Titanic's bridge, had it been delivered, but it is yet another example of an ice warning message not being sent to the bridge by Phillips and Bride.

There was a later ice warning message sent after the Mesaba's message to Titanic. It was a message Sutherland, the wireless operator of The Parisian, wanted Titanic to forward on to Cape Race on behalf of Captain Hains of The Parisian. This report would have been extremely relevant to Titanic if it's content was along the lines of it's hydrographic report. The Parisian, after sighting 3 ice bergs that afternoon (often assumed to be the same 3 that The Californian reported at 6.30pm, Californian's time) then later veered south west to avoid the ice field seen ahead, and later gave very detailed information to Olympic.

Then we have the around 11pm ice warning message sent by Evans on The Californian to Phillips on Titanic. We know what Phillips did as a result however inept and casual Evans' message sent was.

We basically have a load of lads playing around on the wireless airwaves and ignoring the Marconi General Orders a copy of which is in the Marconi Archive at Oxford and was quoted by Deputy Manager Turnball at the British Inquiry.

Now, one can argue that had Titanic's bridge received the Mesaba massage (and perhaps what The Parisian asked to be communicated to Cape Race) Captain Smith would not have ordered a change of course or speed and proceeded regardless at 22 knots into an ice field. The evidence from Lightoller was that a haze or fog was the only reason to reduce speed.

My own view is that very quickly, when Captain Smith told them they had struck an ice berg and Titanic was doomed and sinking, Phillips thought 'Oh f*ck, what have I done!' And he might have also noticed what Bride had recorded in the PV.

Anyway, apologies for my ramblings.

Cheers,

Julian
 
We don't know exactly if some of the ice warning messages reached the bridge of Titanic except we can piece together a picture of that Sunday evening. We know which messages definitely got to Titanic's bridge because Captain Smith replied to them.

The evidence from Lightoller was that a haze or fog was the only reason to reduce speed.

OK. If you suppose that - and I agree - let us look at that message from the Baltic earlier in the afternoon. It was definitely acknowledged by Smith but none of the surviving deck officers seemed to know about it, including Fourth officer Boxhall, which suggests something else.

That message was received just before 2 pm Titanic time and passed directly to Captain Smith by one of the radio operators (likely Bride); Smith must have told Bride to send the acknowledgement, which was received by the Baltic. But instead of posting that message, Smith appears to have given it to Ismay, who had it in his pocket for over 3 hours, during which time he showed it to some passengers, certainly including Mrs Ryerson and Mrs Thayer. The Captain asked for and got back the Baltic message around 7:15 pm but it does not appear to have been posted even then because Smith was seen in the Wideners' party table at the a la carte restaurant soon afterwards.

According to Lightoller, Captain Smith arrived on the bridge just before 9 pm, discussed the conditions, remained for 25 to 30 minutes and then retired to his cabin. Lightoller makes no mention of any ice message and neither does Boxhall, who saw the captain on the bridge around 9 pm. But there is a possibility that the Captain returned to the Wideners' party after his visit to the bridge if one accepts Daisy Minahan and Maybelle Thorne's statements. They would have no idea of the significance of those times and so no reason to lie one way or another.

The Captain's visit to the bridge must have had some specific purpose in addition to checking conditions. I think it could be because the Captain belatedly decided to post that Baltic ice message on the bridge. Now, let us suppose he simply gave it to Lightoller, instructed the latter to post the message and returned to the party? Lightoller at the time had other things in mind - concerns about fresh water freezing etc - and could he have simply forgotten to post that ice message? That would explain why Boxhall, who was in the chart room a lot of the time, never saw it and why Murdoch, who came on duty at 10 pm did not take any action to slow the ship down and increase lookouts.

IMO therefore, the Baltic ice message remained either in Captain Smith or Second Officer Lightoller's pocket and never made it to the notice board in the chart room. I am more inclined to think it was the latter.
 
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There was a later ice warning message sent after the Mesaba's message to Titanic. It was a message Sutherland, the wireless operator of The Parisian, wanted Titanic to forward on to Cape Race on behalf of Captain Hains of The Parisian. This report would have been extremely relevant to Titanic if it's content was along the lines of it's hydrographic report.

For the sake of accuracy, can I add what I ought to have added yesterday evening that Captain Hains of The Parisian said this was a message to the Allan Line reporting their position... "To notify the Allan Line agents where we were"

Boston Globe 18th April 1912, courtesy of Paul Slish in his post 15 in the following thread

Parisian's destination

Captain Hains sent quite long detailed messages to Olympic the next day.

Cheers,

Julian
 
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Come to Bride defence and I am sorry to say that Smith was at fault failing to have full control of the Marconi wireless room and relying too much on there information! Smith knew at Southampton of the unusual large icefield ahead. If the ship did not have a wireless like others to. Smith himself brought up with non wireless ships for years knew only too well the Atlantic.
White Star may of have a private arrangement with Marconi of ice warning ahead as the wireless was not the standard equipment as required by the Board of Trade.
Far as Marconi concern the wireless was the benefit of paying passengers service first and not ice ahead.
Smith should of realised this and stamped his authorities and made very clear to the operators that ice messengers come first.
I view this was probably the standard practice happing on the Olympic too in tempt to please the very rich first class passengers. Certainly boost the image for White Star new luxury liners.
If the message from Mesaba did not reach the bridge only show that Smith did not full control of the wireless operators. Then the message from Baltic were Smith handed over to Ismay. This is clearly out of order and should of been handed to the bridge and not to a first class passenger!
As for Bride he was the junior operator only working to his senior man Phillips instruction who was in charge. Therefore cannot been held guilty of his action.
I may be rather harsh on Smith but unfortunately that is part and parcel of a Captain role. His safety precaution behand was poor. If he was using the wireless service as guides should of had far better control over them. I go as far to say he was just not thinking straight for a captain role! Having your boss on board did not help matters either as his company role is very different to Smith!
I personal think looking into the back ground of Smith beforehand of Titanic I can see the ever increasing pressure and stress of the job been place on him. He may of been the schedule for the job at the time, but that does mean you are fit for the job on the day!
 
Why did the disaster happen?

We don't know exactly if some of the ice warning messages reached the bridge of Titanic except we can piece together a picture of that Sunday evening. We know which messages definitely got to Titanic's bridge because Captain Smith replied to them.

Julian, you seem hell bent on blaming the radio operators as the primary cause of the disaster. While I admit that they were to blame to some extent, IMO the Captain and some of his officers should take the primary responsibility as monitoring and navigation of the ship were their responsibility and not that of the radio operators. To understand that, rather than going on and on about the ice messages that Phillips and Bride did not take to the bridge, consider those that they did deliver and what the Captain and/or his officers did with them.

It was you who drew my attention to that Paul Lee link, which I read carefully. It is an excellent piece of research work but the conclusions drawn by Lee do not necessarily tally with your own. In fact, Lee highlights the vagueness, convenient alterations and hiding under the "I don't clearly recall" blanket by the surviving deck officers, especially Lightoller.

The very first ice message was probably that of La Touraine, received at about 7:10 pm Titanic Time (TT) on Friday 12th April 1912. This was delivered to the bridge and acknowledged and posted on the chart board. Later Boxhall noted that the location of the ice field was well north of the Titanic's track. Boxhall also alluded to another ice message received the same night but after that of La Touriane but could not recall the name of the ship.

On Saturday 14th April 1912, the first ice message was from Caronia received at 9:12 am TT that was delivered to the bridge and acknowledged by Captain Smith. Lightoller claimed later that the Captain had shown him that message around 12:45 pm TT but afterwards seemed to suggest that he found out about it when he 'glanced at the chart'. Lightoller was rather vague when mentioning whether he had discussed it with First Officer Murdoch when the latter returned from his lunch break. Pitman also indicated that he might have seen it at some stage but 'could not recall' when or where. Boxhall appears to have claimed two slightly different things about the Caronia ice message - first that he 'copied' it to the board at around 4 pm TT but elsewhere that he had simply seen it between 4 pm and 6 pm TT but one thing he seemed certain was that the position given of the ice field was north of the Titanic' s track. Lowe also mentioned seeing it but like Pitman, did not recall when or where; Lee writes that Lowe was not unduly concerned about the message, did not communicate with any of his colleagues about it and later did not even glance at the board.

The ice message from the Noordham was relayed via the Caronia at 11:47 am TT and the Titanic's response was received quickly within the hour. It was an official Captain's acknowledgement, meaning that Phillips or Bride delivered it to the bridge and Captain Smith certainly saw it. Murdoch was on duty in the Bridge at the time but it is uncertain if he or any of the other officers saw it. Lee thinks that during the investigation there was some confusion about the ice messages from Caronia and Noordham because the former not only sent its own ice message to the Titanic but also relayed the one from the latter.

The ice warning from the Amerika might be more important - even crucial - but for some reason it is not discussed at length. It was received at 1:47 pm TT and was delivered to the bridge because Boxhall recalled the message from "the German ship Amerika". The Amerika's message reportedly was not designated MSG and so was probably not shown to the Captain or posted on the board. But Boxhall recalled enough to say that this position too was to the north of the Titanic's track. However, Paul L.ee believes that the position sent by the Amerika was several miles south of the Titanic's intended track. If that is correct, then the later decision to delay 'turning the corner' late might have put the Titanic directly in the path of the ice field seen and reported by Amerika.

The Baltic's ice message and what happened to it has been discussed at length before. It was received at 1:57 pm TT and one of the radio operators, presumably Bride, delivered it directly to Captain Smith. Instead of posting the message in the chart room, Smith gave it to Ismay, who had it on his person for at least 3 hours, during which time he showed it to Mrs Ryerson & Mrs Thayer. Captain Smith did not reclaim the message from Ismay till around 7:10 pm but then was seen soon afterwards in attendance at the Widener's dinner party. Therefore, it is probably safe to assume that Smith did not stop by the bridge to post Baltic's message and among others Boxhall, who spent a lot of time in the chart room that evening, had not seen the message.
Whether the Captain mentioned or even gave the Baltic's message to Lightoller when he visited the bridge at 8:55 pm is anybody's guess. I personally believe that the captain left the party to check with Lightoller and give him that message before returning to the Wideners' table. But the fact that no one else, including Boxhall, saw the Baltic message suggests that Lightoller might have missed posting it. It is speculation, of course but something happened to that crucial message.
There is even a suggestion that the Baltic might have sent further ice messages to the Titanic soon afterwards, one of them probably received from Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm.

Sometime after 5:00 pm, The Californian sent an ice message to its sister Leyland ship the Antillan. This was heard on the Titanic, which called the Californian at 7:37 TT about it; the Californian offered a Service Gram ice report but the Titanic seemingly knew about the location of that particular ice field from the earlier intercepted message.. Bride claimed that he delivered it to the Captain around 5:30 pm (in which case it would have been the earlier intercepted one) but later changed his story to make the time later and delivery to the 'officer of the bridge' whom he did not know. Lightoller was on duty on the bridge at the time but did not recall receiving that message. Lightoller also suggested the message might have been delivered at a time when Murdoch relieved him for dinner but this seems a bit too pat on part of the Second Officer, shifting the blame onto a man who could not defend himself while appearing not to do so at all.

Another rather odd statement that Lightoller made was that when he came on duty at 6 pm that evening, he instructed Sixth officer Moody to work out the time the Titanic would reach the ice field and Moody is supposed to have done this and decided that it was around 11:00 pm TT but Lightoller himself computed that it would be earlier, around 9:30 pm. Lightoller was rather vague about what information he was basing those times on but if he knew about the Californian message, Moody's 11 pm calculation would be closer to the correct position. By calculating that the ship would reach the ice field much earlier, was Lightoller absolving himself from any knowledge of the Californian message (or by proxy suggest that Moody did?) Of course, Moody did not survive to testify in any other way. Paul Lee does not rule out the possibility that Lightoller might have "reverse engineered" his estimations with hindsight that he later had and something that Murdoch or Moody could never dispute.

Boxhall was reported to be in the Chart Room between 8 pm and 10 pm and did not see any new messages come in and he admitted that he did not look at the board. Lightoller was vague inhis memories about what he told Murdoch about the ice when the latter relieved him on the bridge at 10 pm. On Paul Lee's page, Lightoller's answers about that in the US and later in the UK were different.

It is possible that the ice warning from the Mesaba which reached the Titanic at 9:40 pm TT may not have reached the bridge. Phillips was working Cape Race at the time; he acknowledged the message but the Mesaba did not receive the Captains response. But when you consider Lightoller's tall story about Phillips practically confessing to him before dying atop Collapsible B about taking responsibility for not delivering the Mesaba message to the bridge, there are question marks. Lightoller was on duty on the bridge when the Mesaba message arrived in the wireless room of the Titanic.

Finally, there is the Californian's second message sent at 11:07 and Phillips infamous "shut up!" response. I think it is safe to say that message never reached the bridge.

Looking at it from a wider perspective, Phillips and Bride were certainly guilty of not taking the Californian's second message to the bridge; they probably did not report the Mesaba one either but IMO this is conjectural and we cannot be certain. But they certainly did report several other messages previously, including the one from Baltic which did strange rounds and likely never reached the chart room notice board. Based on that, I don't think anyone can say that Phillips and Bride were primarily responsible for the disaster.
 
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But when you consider Lightoller's tall story about Phillips practically confessing to him before dying atop Collapsible B about taking responsibility for not delivering the Mesaba message to the bridge, there are question marks.

For a moment I'm going to enter the world of wild and fruity speculation.

From the bits and bobs I've pieced together in comments made and books read over the years, Lightoller, like so many involved that night, seems to have something of a complex personality. When we look at the Mesaba story, its clear that from Lightoller's point of view, had he actually received the message then staying silent and not mentioning the fact would be to his benefit. That much is certain. If he had said nothing then everyone would naturally assume that Phillips never passed it on.

Richard Nixon once said, and he was an expert in these matters, that it wasn't the action that got you but the lie. In the end he said, the lie will always get you. If Lightoller told a story about Phillips using his last few hours on earth to issue an apology for not forwarding a critical safety message and this collapsed under the weight of counter evidence, witnesses denying Phillips made it to B for example, then people would have a lot of questions to ask Lightoller as to why he felt the need to make up such a tale. This then could point to the fact that Lightoller thought he was telling the truth.

On the other hand, what if Lightoller, stewing for years over any and all perceived injustices in the wake of the disaster, the never having made it to a command, alwasy being known as one of the officers of the Titanic etc, decided that he was sick of hearing about the heroic wireless men who remained at the post to the last calling out for help when he knew they hadn't performed their duties to the fullest and were perhaps as responsible as he was for some of the failures that night. So, in his book he took a size ten boot to the reputation of Phillips.

You only have to look at how Lightoller was used as the central figure in the film A Night to Remember. How he was played as the hero of the hour by Kenneth Moore. Obviously, in the 5 years between his death and the release of the film, some one had done an outstanding job on creating the man, the myth and the legend.
 
When I first got "into" the Titanic over 50 years ago, I had no preconceived notions about either the event or any of the personnel involved. By then the film ANTR had come and gone and so I did not get to see it till the mid-1980s. But I had read the book and some others by then and one cannot help but make- up mental picture of various personnel.

With Murdoch, I always felt rather sorry for him. I got the impression that somehow all luck deserted him in the 12 hours leading up to the disaster and he continually missed being in the right place at the right time and finally ended by being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Despite trying to think as neutrally as possible, I cannot come to believe that Murdoch shot anyone or himself that night. To the end of my days I'll believe that First Officer William Murdoch died by being knocked overboard while trying to help with Collapsible A.

I have always got the impression that Lightoller was a man who would run with the hare and chase with the hounds, depending on what served his interests best. Over the years, that feeling has only grown to a near certainty, something that I am unable to shrug off. In fact many well researched papers like that of Paul Lee only strengthen that feeling. Maybe I am biased and see only what I want to see, but I honestly cannot help the feeling.

There might be something in Rob Lawes' feeling that in writing Titanic and Other Ships Lightoller was venting some of the frustrations built over the years and the so-called injustices to his reputation. In the first 20 or 30 years following its publication, he might even have succeeded in making it appear that he was vindicated. But in the long run the book has only served Lightoller as the proverbial shot in his own foot.
 
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