What if the Titanic had been slowed down earlier?

[Jim Currie]

OK, two questions then.

First, at just 30% kinetic energy compared with the actual event, would the resultant damage be still bad enough to sink the Titanic? If so, over what time scale approximately?

Second, all other parameters and events being the same (as before), at what speed would the Titanic have completely avoided collision? This may sound awkward, but there has to be a speed limit at or under which collision would definitely have not taken place.

Hello Arun,
Unless you know the exact mechanics of the damgage and the quality of the involved material and workmanship during construction of the areas which failed, you cannot predict the outcome of even a minor encounter.
As to speed to make sure they missed it? There was no such speed.
Because the rudder being hard over means maximum turning efford had already been applied. The ship would still follows the same path...just at a slower speed. The outcome would be the same...impact. Even if she stopped the engines. it woud simply delay the inevitable due to residual momentum.
However, the slower the speed the better the head-on scenario looks. additinally, the energy of impact would be less. Which brings us back to your first question.
Even better, a FULL ASTERN engine movement would have a good chance of bringing the vessel to a halt before impact

 

[Samuel Halpern]

The Carpathia has nothing to do with this discussion.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

First, at just 30% kinetic energy compared with the actual event, would the resultant damage be still bad enough to sink the Titanic? If so, over what time scale approximately?

Second, all other parameters and events being the same (as before), at what speed would the Titanic have completely avoided collision? This may sound awkward, but there has to be a speed limit at or under which collision would definitely have not taken place.

To your first question, my answer is essentially the same as Jim's. We know that at 22.5 knots it was enough to open an aggregate of about 12 sq ft over multiple compartments. I have no idea what the damage would have been at 12 knots except with only 30% the kinetic energy of 22.5 knots, it is reasonable to expect far less overall damage.

As to your second question, my answer is also the same as Jim's. if Murdoch's order came when the berg was at the same distance ahead, the ship would have struck in about the same place but at a later point in time. Speed does not really affect the turning circle. The way to avoid is to turn away sooner and that means making a decision to turn away sooner. At slower speed, you have more time to react and turn away sooner. But you really have to be very careful because turning a little bit sooner means that your bow might clear the obstacle but your machinery spaces and your stern may become vulnerable points since on a ship the stern swings out away from the turn.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

In post #88 above I gave two options:

A. Berg not directly ahead and ship turns very little if any away from it before striking.
B. Berg mostly ahead and ship turns about a compass point before striking.

If A is chosen, that means Fleet and Hichens were not telling the truth about the ship veering to port between 1 and 2 points prior to the collision. Also Lee was not truthful about seeing the ship veer to port as if she would clear the berg. In 6 seconds, from the time the helm order is received and getting the wheel hard over, the ship's heading would change by only about 1 degree, or roughly 1/10 of a point. (A point is 11.25°.) Also, if Murdoch gave the helm order while Fleet was at the phone, which is at variance to what Hichens said, then the ship would have struck just before or a couple of seconds after Fleet put down the phone, assuming Hichens was right about the ship striking as soon as he got the wheel hard over. Furthermore, if you want to believe Boxhall's version of events, he hears 3 bells while coming out of the officer's quarters which was about 60 ft from the bridge. He also hears engine order telegraphs ring and Murdoch's helm order given. He gets abreast of the Smith's quarters just when the ship struck, before entering the bridge. Allowing 3 seconds for closing the officer's quarters door just as 3 bells went, and then allowing 12 seconds to cover the 60 ft (average person crossing intersections go at 4.9 ft/s), we find about 15 seconds (or less since he didn't quite make it onto the bridge when she struck) as the time from 3 bells to collision. Subtracting 6 seconds for Hichens to get the wheel over hard, we have about 9 seconds or less between 3 bells and Murdoch's order under this scenario. This also means Hichens was vastly incorrect when he said the helm order came about 1/2 minute after 3 bells, or Fleet saying he was at the phone for about 1/2 minute. It also means that QM Olliver was lying when he said he was at the amidships compass platform when 3 bells went, and was just entering the bridge as the ship struck. To cover the distance from the platform to the bridge (a distance of about 250 ft) it would have taken him about 50 seconds at a fast pace, including the time to get down from the platform.

Now to fuel the flames of conspiracy and collusion further with option A, suppose there was never a hard-astarboard helm order given. The lookouts spot the berg more or less ahead and Fleet strikes the bell 3 times, goes to the phone and calls down to the bridge, but the call is never answered. The next thing that happens is Murdoch rings down Stop to engine room just as the ship strikes the berg. Then he goes to close the WTDs. Boxhall lies about hearing Murdoch calling out any helm orders, but hears the engine telegraphs ring as, or seconds before, he feels the ship strike.

Now if B is chosen, that means Hichens was mistaken when he said the ship struck just as he got the wheel hard over. Olliver leaves the amidships platform when he hears 3 bells and heads for the bridge as he said he did. Fleet goes around Lee to get the phone on the starboard side of the nest and calls down to the bridge. He calls out "Are you there?" waiting for someone to answer, which Moody does by saying, "Yes, what do you see?" After thanking Fleet for the report, Moody runs to the WH door and calls out "Iceberg right ahead" to Murdoch who then yells out "hard-astarboard" and rushes to the engine telegraphs. (He goes to ring down stop, first on the engine order telegraphs and then the emergency telegraphs.) Meanwhile , Fleet leaves the phone and goes back to his station on the port side of the nest as Lee tells him that the ship is starting to veer to port (which was admitted in evidence). They both watch as the ship turns about a point to port and looks like it will just clear the berg just as it strikes forward of them on the starboard side. Meanwhile, after ringing down stop on both telegraphs, Murdoch reaches the WTD switch and presses the warning bell button for several seconds before closing the switch that closes to doors on the tank top just seconds before the ship strikes. As the ship strikes, QM Olliver reaches the entrance to the bridge and sees Murdoch by the WTD control switch as he feels and hears the ship strike something. Boxhall, who may have heard the engine order telegraph bells ring after leaving the officer's quarters, feels the ship strike something as he passes Smith's quarters on his way the to the bridge. (His eyes were not night adapted so he doesn't see what passes along side.) When he arrives on the bridge he sees Murdoch by the WTD switch. He asks Moody what happened, and Moody tells him that the ship struck an iceberg. This a few moments before Smith rushes out from his quarters.

In either scenario, the 2 points that Hichen sees on the compass happens when the ship reaches its max swing away from its initial courseline, not when the ship first struck ice.

 

[Jim Currie]

The Carpathia has nothing to do with this discussion.

Sam, "Carpathia" is just a name and an example as I wrote in my post #89. It is an example of a ship approaching, probably the same iceberg but in better berg visibility conditions in the same area at a speed closer to that posed bythe hypothetical question in this thread. A ship with a bridge and deck crew primed and ready to act at a moments notice.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Berg mostly ahead and ship turns about a compass point before striking.

That means Hichens was mistaken when he said the ship struck just as he got the wheel hard over. Olliver leaves the amidships platform when he hears 3 bells and heads for the bridge as he said he did. Fleet goes around Lee to get the phone on the starboard side of the nest and calls down to the bridge. He calls out "Are you there?" waiting for someone to answer, which Moody does by saying, "Yes, what do you see?" After thanking Fleet for the report, Moody runs to the WH door and calls out "Iceberg right ahead" to Murdoch who then yells out "hard-astarboard" and rushes to the engine telegraphs. (He goes to ring down stop, first on the engine order telegraphs and then the emergency telegraphs.) Meanwhile , Fleet leaves the phone and goes back to his station on the port side of the nest as Lee tells him that the ship is starting to veer to port (which was admitted in evidence). They both watch as the ship turns about a point to port and looks like it will just clear the berg just as it strikes forward of them on the starboard side. Meanwhile, after ringing down stop on both telegraphs, Murdoch reaches the WTD switch and presses the warning bell button for several seconds before closing the switch that closes to doors on the tank top just seconds before the ship strikes. As the ship strikes, QM Olliver reaches the entrance to the bridge and sees Murdoch by the WTD control switch as he feels and hears the ship strike something. Boxhall, who may have heard the engine order telegraph bells ring after leaving the officer's quarters, feels the ship strike something as he passes Smith's quarters on his way the to the bridge. (His eyes were not night adapted so he doesn't see what passes along side.) When he arrives on the bridge he sees Murdoch by the WTD switch. He asks Moody what happened, and Moody tells him that the ship struck an iceberg. This a few moments before Smith rushes out from his quarters.

The 2 points that Hichen sees on the compass happens when the ship reaches its max swing away from its initial courseline, not when the ship first struck ice.

The above scenario appears to be the most likely sequence of events, doesn't it? There might have been a few minor differences, but there is correlation to almost all survivor witness statements later, the only discrepancy being Hichens.

AFAIK, after Fleet completed his communication with the bridge, he returned quickly to his station and both he and Lee were looking at the Titanic's bow and the 'approaching' iceberg. They both testified that the ship started to turn to port and even got the impression that she might just clear the berg, when the grinding sideswipe occurred. That would tally with what Olliver and Boxhall thought they saw/felt and later testified to that effect. That's 4 out of 5 survivors who were in the 'vicinity' at the time.

The fifth survivor, Hichens, was in the enclosed wheelhouse and so could not see the relative positions of the ship and the iceberg as the two closed in. In fact, he admitted several times in the inquiries that he could see nothing but his compass, which is of course true.

In the American Inquiry, held soon after the disaster, Hichens said:

Senator SMITH.
I wish you would tell now, in your own way, what occurred that night from the time you went on watch until the collision occurred.

Mr. HICHENS.
All went along very well until 20 minutes to 12, when three gongs came from the lookout, and immediately afterwards a report on the telephone, "Iceberg right ahead." The chief officer rushed from the wing to the bridge, or I imagine so, sir. Certainly I am inclosed in the wheelhouse, and I can not see, only my compass. He rushed to the engines. I heard the telegraph bell ring; also give the order "Hard astarboard," with the sixth officer standing by me to see the duty carried out and the quartermaster standing by my left side. Repeated the order, "Hard astarboard. The helm is hard over, sir."


Senator SMITH.
I think I understand you.

I want you to tell the committee, if you can, why you put the ship to starboard, which I believe you said you did, just before the collision with the iceberg?

Mr. HICHENS.
I do not quite understand you, sir.

Senator SMITH.
You said that when you were first apprised of the iceberg, you did what?

Mr. HICHENS.
Put the helm to starboard, sir. That is the order I received from the sixth officer.

Senator SMITH.
What was the effect of that?

Mr. HICHENS.
The ship minding the helm as I put her to starboard.

Senator SMITH.
But suppose you had gone bows on against that object?

Mr. HICHENS.
I don't know nothing about that. I am in the wheelhouse, and, of course, I couldn't see nothing.

Senator SMITH.
You could not see where you were going?

Mr. HICHENS.
No, sir; I might as well be packed in ice. The only thing I could see was my compass.

Senator SMITH.
The officer gave you the necessary order?

Mr. HICHENS.
Gave me the order, "Hard a'starboard."

Senator SMITH.
Hard a'starboard?

Mr. HICHENS.
Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.
You carried it out immediately?

Mr. HICHENS.
Yes, sir; immediately, with the sixth officer behind my back, with the junior officer behind my back, to see whether I carried it out - one of the junior officers.

One doubt here. What did Hichens mean "the quartermaster standing by my left side? Who was standing to his left at the time?

***************************************************************************************************************************

This was tackled a bit more in depth during the British Investigation next month.

945. Do you remember the vessel striking?
- Yes.

946. Did you notice the time when she struck?
- Yes.

947. What was it?
- Twenty minutes to twelve.

948. Had you had any instructions before she struck? Had you been told to do anything with your helm before she struck?
- Just as she struck I had the order "Hard-a-starboard" when she struck.

949. Just as she struck, is that what you said?
- Not immediately as she struck; the ship was swinging. We had the order, "Hard-a-starboard," and she just swung about two points when she struck. (1)

950. You got the order, "Hard-a-starboard"?
- Yes.

951. Had you time to get the helm hard a starboard before she struck?
- No, she was crashing then.

952. Did you begin to get the helm over?
- Yes, the helm was barely over when she struck. The ship had swung about two points. (2)

953. She had swung two points?
- Yes.

954. (The Commissioner.) Do let me understand; had she swung two points before the crash came?
- Yes, my Lord. (3)

955. (The Attorney-General.) I am not quite sure that I understand what you had done to the helm before this. You had got an order, "Hard-a-starboard"?
-"Hard-a-starboard," yes.

956. You proceeded at once to put the wheel hard-a-starboard?
- Immediately, yes.

957. Before the vessel struck had you had time to get the wheel right over?
- The wheel was over then, hard over.

958. (The Commissioner.) Before she struck?
- Oh yes, hard over before she struck.

The Attorney-General:
I rather understood him to say the opposite before. I do not think he understood.

The Commissioner:
Let me see if I understand it. Someone gave an order, "Hard-a-starboard"?

The Attorney-General:
Yes.

The Commissioner:
This was before she struck?

The Attorney-General:
Yes.

The Commissioner:
He put the wheel hard over?

The Attorney-General:
Yes; and got it hard over.

The Commissioner:
And got it hard over. The ship moved two points?

The Attorney-General:
That is right. (4)

The Commissioner:
She did not move any more, because, as I understand, the crash came?


993. You have told us what happened; first of all, the signal of the three bells, then the telephone message, then it was repeated to the First Officer, "Iceberg right ahead"; then the First Officer went to the telegraph to give an order to the engine room and gave you the order, "Hard-a-starboard"?
- Yes.

994. At any rate up to his going to the telegraph as I follow you, there was no change of speed? - No, Sir.

995. What that order was you do not know?
- No, Sir.

996. Then "Hard-a-starboard," and you immediately put up your helm?
- Hard-a-starboard.

997. Right over?
- Yes.

998. What is it, 35 degrees?
- Forty degrees.

999. Then you got the helm right over?
- Right over, Sir.

1000. Then she comes round two points and then strikes. Is that right?
- The vessel veered off two points; she went to the southward of west.(5)

1001. And then struck? - Yes.

As we can see, some of Hichens' statements were slightly confusing and at one point almost mutually exclusive (note the Attorney General's remark to that effect i the surmise after 958. But taken overall, it seems like:

- Hichens did manage to get the helm hard over to starboard as ordered.
- He mentions no less than 5 times (numbered above) that the Titanic had turned 2 points before she collided with the iceberg.
- In 949, Hichens clarifies that the Titanic did NOT strike the iceberg immediately after he put the helm hard over to starboard but she swing two points before doing so.

That's why I feel that Jim's impression that the Titanic was almost upon the iceberg when the helm order was given is not likely.

 

[Jim Currie]

Sam wrote..." Berg mostly ahead and ship turns about a compass point before striking. "
I posted the following sketch:

I think we can all agree that the ship did not turn 2 points befor hitting the berg but turn she did and initially she would start off slowly... not 1 point in half the time....18.5 seconds... but more like 10 seconds or even less. it is a pity that that absent- minded fool Hichens could not even remember things down to the last second.

There is one thing you all fail to address, and that is what happened to TItanic's bow direction the moment she contacted the ice? If a wave or heavy swell can effect the heading of a ship.- and it most certainly does.. why not contact with a similarly immoveable object?

As to the QM standing behind Hichens' taking notes?

To understand this, you must know about bridge procedure regarding Log book entries and engine movements.
After "Full away on Passage" the engines are seldome touched except for minor adjustments to speed as required. The "Movement Book" which records all such movements is put away until arrival at the next port.
However, anything that adversely effects the voyage must be entered into the Log Book... that includes all engine and emergency helm orders. At the time of impact, the Movement Book would be in a drawer and the Scrap Log on the chart desk in the chart room. Not until there was tme to do so would Murdoch g ive Moody the order to record all engine and helm movements together with details of the incident. This would have been done when Olliver was on the bridge, just before he was sent to find the Carpenter. That would be when the ship came to a final standstill...when the final STOP order was given. At that time, there was no reason for anyone to think that the voyage would not continue. Consdequently if there was a QM behind Hichens when a helm order was given, it was QM Olliver and it was after Captain Smith arrived on the bridge and before the former was sent to find the Carpenter. Consequently the helm order Hichens was referring to mistakenly, was the second one that Olliver heard...hard - a - port. At the same time, the captain ordered the engines briefly ahead. He needed that to assist the ruddrer since at that time, his sbhip was almost stopped.
Everything on board ship is inter-connected...the time of the final STOP order would have been the most accurate one -11-45 or 46 pm time Boxhall woud get from the scrap log... put there by Moody.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

it is a pity that that absent- minded fool Hichens could not even remember things down to the last second.

As to the QM standing behind Hichens' taking notes?

This would have been done when Olliver was on the bridge, just before he was sent to find the Carpenter.

Consequently the helm order Hichens was referring to mistakenly, was the second one that Olliver heard...hard - a - port. .

Jim, there are a few contradictory statements here, if you don't mind me pointing out.

That "absent minded fool Hichens" has you call him now, has been your favourite baby quite a few times in the past when his statements suited your line of reasoning. For example, you repeatedly quoted him in supporting your view (correctly in terms of quote, not content) how Hichens insisted that there was only one helm order from Murdoch, the hard-a-starboard one. And yet, you point out above that Hichens was quoting a second helm order, a hard-a-port one, which Olliver also head. You cannot have it both ways.

Then there is QM Olliver himself. He was the standby QM on the bridge, but in his own statement admitted that he was NOT actually on the bridge but just entering it when the collision occurred (see below).

Senator BURTON.
Where were you when the collision occurred?

Mr. OLLIVER.
I was stand-by quartermaster on the bridge. I had been relieved from the wheel at 10 o'clock, and I was stand-by after 10 o'clock. I was running messages and doing various other duties. I was not right on the bridge; I was just entering the bridge. I had just performed an errand and was entering the bridge when the collision occurred.

That does not tally with Hichens' statement to Senator Smith that the QM was actually standing on his left side when he was carrying out Murdoch's first (and only - according to Hichens) helm order.

Of course, the "absent minded" Hichens could have been referring to the second helm order - the hard-a-port one - by which time Olliver was definitely on the bridge, perhaps to Hichens' left side. But that means that there was a second helm order after all, something that you have been reluctant to accept in the past.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

There is one other thing that I don't quite understand.

In his testimony before the American Inquiry, QM Hichens stated that when he was carrying out Murdoch's helm order, Sixth Officer Moody was standing to his right and the QM (Olliver) to the left. It is more likely that Olliver entered the bridge quite a few seconds after Murdoch gave the first helm order (let alone Hichens carrying it out) but that is immaterial for my question.

I assume Hichens had a light in his enclosed wheelhouse? So, if Moody, the junior officer on bridge watch, entered it to stand next to Hichens to "see that the order was carried out", would that not affect the Sixth Officer's night vision acclimatization?

 

[Jim Currie]

Jim, there are a few contradictory statements here, if you don't mind me pointing out.

That "absent minded fool Hichens" has you call him now, has been your favourite baby quite a few times in the past when his statements suited your line of reasoning. For example, you repeatedly quoted him in supporting your view (correctly in terms of quote, not content) how Hichens insisted that there was only one helm order from Murdoch, the hard-a-starboard one. And yet, you point out above that Hichens was quoting a second helm order, a hard-a-port one, which Olliver also head. You cannot have it both ways.

Then there is QM Olliver himself. He was the standby QM on the bridge, but in his own statement admitted that he was NOT actually on the bridge but just entering it when the collision occurred (see below).

Senator BURTON.
Where were you when the collision occurred?

Mr. OLLIVER.
I was stand-by quartermaster on the bridge. I had been relieved from the wheel at 10 o'clock, and I was stand-by after 10 o'clock. I was running messages and doing various other duties. I was not right on the bridge; I was just entering the bridge. I had just performed an errand and was entering the bridge when the collision occurred.

That does not tally with Hichens' statement to Senator Smith that the QM was actually standing on his left side when he was carrying out Murdoch's first (and only - according to Hichens) helm order.

Of course, the "absent minded" Hichens could have been referring to the second helm order - the hard-a-port one - by which time Olliver was definitely on the bridge, perhaps to Hichens' left side. But that means that there was a second helm order after all, something that you have been reluctant to accept in the past.

I don't mind you pointing anything out, Arun, it beats the heck out of blind acceptance of a single viewpoint.

The statements of Hitchens do not "suite my reasoning" Arun. They paint a picture in my minds eye and awaken old memories. When I read what these men stated, I can very clearly imagine what they are describing, since I have done everything they have done in exactly the same way (except hitting an iceberg).

As for the helm orders? You and others conveniently neglet the fact that Hichens was being questioned about what orders were given to avoid the iceberg. On both occassions in the States and in the UK he was asked a specific question about how many avoiding helm orders were given (to avoid the iceberg)? He very clearly stated that only one was given. Had he been asked how may helm orders in total before "Finished with the helm" he would have answerd "two".
If two helm orders were given as part of the avoiding attempt, why did not the Lokouts see the second one? After all, they saw the first one.
Incidentally, Hitchens knew very well that the surviving Lookouts on duty could destroy any false evidence he gave regarding change of heading.

Apart from this You also conveniently forget what Boxhall said about the avoiding action...a statement which corrobrated the evidence of Hichens...Besides the evidence quoted by Sam....Boxhall also stated in the US that Murdoch told Smith "I intended to port around it but she hit before I could do any more." and in the UK " "I was going to hard-a-port round it but she was too close.".
The foregoing tells any reasonable individual that despite the best of intention, Murdoch had no time to give a second helm order to avoid the iceberg.
Again, why would Boxhall make such a statement if he knew that there were at least 3 survivors whocould contrad ict him... survivors who gave evidence after he did?

 

[Jim Currie]

There is one other thing that I don't quite understand.

In his testimony before the American Inquiry, QM Hichens stated that when he was carrying out Murdoch's helm order, Sixth Officer Moody was standing to his right and the QM (Olliver) to the left. It is more likely that Olliver entered the bridge quite a few seconds after Murdoch gave the first helm order (let alone Hichens carrying it out) but that is immaterial for my question.

I assume Hichens had a light in his enclosed wheelhouse? So, if Moody, the junior officer on bridge watch, entered it to stand next to Hichens to "see that the order was carried out", would that not affect the Sixth Officer's night vision acclimatization?

No Arun, the only lights in the wheelhouse was the one which lit the compass card and perhaps a dim one to illuminate the course board. in any case, both Moody and Boxhall did not require good night vision because they both worked in the chartroom on a desk and chart table which constatnly had a table light illuminating it. There would have been a blackout curtain between chart room and wheelhouse.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

As for the helm orders? You and others conveniently neglet the fact that Hichens was being questioned about what orders were given to avoid the iceberg. On both occassions in the States and in the UK he was asked a specific question about how many avoiding helm orders were given (to avoid the iceberg)? He very clearly stated that only one was given. Had he been asked how may helm orders in total before "Finished with the helm" he would have answerd "two".

Apart from this You also conveniently forget what Boxhall said about the avoiding action...a statement which corrobrated the evidence of Hichens...Besides the evidence quoted by Sam....Boxhall also stated in the US that Murdoch told Smith "I intended to port around it but she hit before I could do any more." and in the UK " "I was going to hard-a-port round it but she was too close.".
The foregoing tells any reasonable individual that despite the best of intention, Murdoch had no time to give a second helm order to avoid the iceberg.

Well, thanks for clearing that up. In previous (other) threads, you had not responded specifically to my question about whether you believed that Murdoch gave only one helm order - the hard-a-starboard one and none other and so I was led to believing (mistakenly it now seems) that was what you thought. I was also confused by your continued argument with Sam on that point because AFAIK Sam always said that the second helm order - the hard-a-port one, was given after the collision to ensure getting the stern out of the way.

I know this because a few years ago I asked Sam whether there was a remote possibility that Murdoch had time to give the second helm order before the collision (in a Private Conversation). Sam responded with an illustrated explanation about why this could not have been the case and since then I have also believed that the Port order was given immediately after the collision. It now looks like that was what you also believed but that was lost on me amidst all other points being discussed.

 

[Jim Currie]

Glad I was able to clear up these points for you.

As Sam knows, I do not subscribe to the second helm order being part of the berg -avoiding attempt. I believe it was given after the ship stopped for the first time...before Captain Smith knew his ship was doomed. I believe that like everyone else at that time, he thought his ship had had close shave and that once the inspection confirmed this, they would be resuming passage for New York. When the ship stopped for the first time, Hichens would have been asked how she was heading or Captain Smith would have had a look to see how she was heading. Because of the emergency turn she would be well off her original course... perhaps as much as 2 points?
At that moment, Smith, like any other prudent captain, would bring his ship back onto her original heading, thus saving time when he got the expected all clear to proceed on the original course. That was the moment when QM Oliver was on the bridge, saw Smith telegraph half ahead and heard the OOW.... Murdoch order hard-a- port. The head would start to swing right again and Hichems woud steady her on her original heading. This took about 2 minutes and Titanic would hardly have moved ahead at all.
Since we know the secondf helm order was too late to be part of a damage limitation effort, tforegoing explanation for it is the only feasible one left.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

As Sam knows, I do not subscribe to the second helm order being part of the berg -avoiding attempt.

And as you know, neither do I. But I do believe the 2nd helm order came soon after the berg passed the bridge to keep the starboard side of the ship from striking to berg again, which it would have done if the helm remained hard-astarboard (left full rudder).

 

[Samuel Halpern]

I think we can all agree that the ship did not turn 2 points before hitting the berg but turn she did and initially she would start off slowly... not 1 point in half the time....18.5 seconds... but more like 10 seconds or even less.

No, what your sentence should say is:
I think we can all agree that the ship did not turn 2 points before hitting the berg but turn she did and initially she would start off slowly... not 1 point in half the time....18.5 seconds... but more like 20 seconds or a little more.