When was the iceberg spotted?

[Jim Currie]

No Sam. Time zones were in use by the RN and other organisations well before the conventions of the 1920's. These just standardised their use by navies. I believe they started using them big-time when the RN established telegraph communications with their bases world-wide. The use of wireless extended their use to vessels at sea.

Jim C,

 

[Samuel Halpern]

Based on David's post above, what we have is the following string of events:

David said: "The 10 o'clock setback I suggest allows the extra 47 minutes to be split evenly between Second Officer Lightoller and First Officer Murdoch. It also properly exempts Chief Officer Wilde from any extra time on duty."

As shown in the above timeline, that indeed would be the case. However, there are three things that I must point out as to why I must disagree with this proposed timeline of events:

1. Setting the clock back at 10pm by 24 minutes would indeed add 24 minutes of extra time to 2/O Lightoller's watch on deck, which was from 6 to 10pm. However, it would have also added 24 minutes of time to the lookouts who were on duty at that time, which were Symons and Jewell. But we know from Fleet that he and Lee expected about twenty minutes extra time up in the nest during their watch, which was from 10 to 12. According to David's scenario, that would not happen.

2. QM Robert Hichens was the standby QM on duty while Lightolller was still the OOW. Hichens was the one who called upon 1/O Murdoch at quarter to 10 to inform him that he was due on deck in 15 minutes time to replace Lightoller. Hichens then had other duties to perform as standby before taking his trick at the wheel, including calling up and getting the taffrail log reading from QM Rowe who was out on the poop "at half a minute to ten, as near as I can tell." At 10pm, 4 bells, Hichens took the wheel from QM Olliver (who became the standby), Murdock replaced Lightoller as OOW, and Fleet and Lee replaced Symons and Jewell in the nest. According to Hichens, he was at the wheel "One hour and forty minutes" when the accident happened. By the way, according to Hichens, the advance of the ship by log from 8pm to 10pm was 45 miles, consistent with an interval of 2 hours, not 2 hours and 24 minutes.

3. Lightoller specifically said that 4/O Boxhall was to have more than two hours remaining on duty after he, Lightoller, went off duty because of the clock change. That could only happen if the clock change occurred after Lightoller was replaced by 1/O Murdoch at 4 bells.

David also noted: "the uniformity of 11:40 p.m. as the time of the accident as noted by both crew and passengers. In theory, there should be a 23 or 24 minute difference between the two no matter when the crew clocks were retarded."

I fully agree with this observation.

David also said: "The obvious answer is that both the crew and passenger clocks were showing the same time — 11:40 p.m. No other possibility exists for people quoting the same time for the same singular event other than that all of their various clocks were showing the same time."

Again, I fully agree with this statement.

However, David referred to these observations as "next big horologic problem for Titanic historians" which I happen to disagree with. It is only a problem for historians who believe that clocks were put back before the accident happened.

 

[Jim Currie]

Hello Steven! Nice to see fresh 'blood' and hopefully another view of the situation.

Pretty good for a 'first post'. Like your charts. I note your use of the expression 'middle watch'. Are you perhaps a seaman or ex seaman?

If you are, then you will understand the protocol at sea as far as Watch and time keeping is concerned.


You will know that in most vessels; if an uneven amount of minutes of clock change is planned, the amount is divided between the 8 to 12 Watch and the Middle Watch. The greater amount is usually served by the 8 to 12 Watch. It is simply tradition and has no real importance.
You will also know that it was, and still is, tradition for those going on Watch to relieve the Watch a few minutes early so that the outgoing crewman does not have to spend more time that necessary at his post. Additionally, you will know that that in fact, there was often a first and second call. The first at 1 bell and the second 5 minutes before 8 bells to make sure that the on-going crew member had not gone back to sleep after the first call. Also that when 8 bells rings, the total planned number of hours including any adjustments for the preceding Watch have passed.
You will be absolute in no doubt whatsoever that every Watch-keeper is jealous of his time below and would never, knowingly go on Watch too early except in an emergency. This being the case, you do not need to look at evidence of times on clocks to find out if a clock change had been made; all that is needed is a sufficient amount of evidence pointing to an imminent change of Watches at the normal time, or of a Watch being called too early.

If you are not an ex seaman then the foregoing provides you with a picture of part of the daily life at sea. Whether you are or are not an ex seaman,I leave you to make your own investigation guided by the foregoing. I continue as if you were never at sea.

All of Titanic's public space clocks were adjusted by means of a master clock on the bridge. Separate adjustments to public space clocks would not have been made.
Crew members were not required to carry personal time pieces therefore those on duty relied on hearing the ship's time bells and/or seeing the ship's official time on a public clock. Those off duty relied on personal time pieces(if they had them) to check if they awakened early as well as when a crew member called them at the time of the 1 bell warning.
It follows that the first call for all those below would be a physical one made by a member of the Watch on duty. Each department would designate someone to go call the next Watch and make sure there was hot water for tea or coffee for them and for those coming off Watch. When the first call was made, those called would consult personal time pieces if they had one or ask a mate what the time was. This was to make sure that they had not been called too early or too late. The first would be greeted with many cusses and a shoe or two. The second would be used as a reason for being late.
On the other hand, those on Watch would hear 1 bell being sounded and would know they had but 15 minutes left on duty. Thereafter, if they had a personal time piece, they would consult it from time to time and create hell if the 15 minute period was exceeded.

Clock alterations were made at "First Midnight". At that moment, an alteration of the Master Clock or any other clock only effected those on duty. It might have been a full or partial alteration. The latter would have more uses for those members of the catering staff and night Stewards waiting to go off duty and who could see the time on the public clocks but could not hear the 1 bell warning. (Yes David! The hotel staff did keep the same Watches as the engine and deck crew.) It follows that in the public spaces.. smoke rooms, dining rooms, mess-rooms etc and in the galleys; depending on the method of clock alteration chosen, stewards and galley staff would see the clock turn back for either the full change or partial change.
I believe that the Master Clock would have been retarded twice. The first time when a period of 12 hours had elapsed since Noon April 14 and the second time when the Log Book Day for April 14 had ended and Log Book Day April 15 started. In that way, the entire clock adjustment would have been completed in 24 minutes. Those working in public spaces which closed at 11-30 pm unaltered time would be able to check time remaining for them to work. Unfortunately the second adjustment was never made.

However, as I inferred earlier; the next best thing to proof positive of a clock change other than by some one saying they actually saw the clock change, is the evidence of a crew member hearing 1 bell and /or of hearing 8 bells. Or the evidence of a crew member who was about to, or waiting to, go on or off duty at 12 Midnight.

Keep the following in mind.

If impact took place at 11-40 pm on an unaltered clock then the 8 to 12 Watch had still 44 minutes to run. More to the point: those due on at adjusted midnight would have had almost half an hour of sleep left before they were due to be called at 1 bell. Those on duty would have to serve another 44 minutes and would most certainly not be 'waiting to be relieved'. Nor would there be a single witness who was 'about to go on duty'.

Jim C.

 

[Jim Currie]

Hello Sam.

No doubt you' have note the following wireless message sent by Captain Rostron on Carpathia to his owners, Cunard and the Associated Press via RMS Olympic at 8-25 pm EST on April 15.:

"Carpathia. Cunard New York and Liverpool:
Titanic struck iceberg Monday. 3 a. m., 41.16 north,. 50.14 west. Carpathia picked up many passengers in boats. Will wire further particulars later. Proceeding back to New York.

ROSTRON.

Note the time... 3am, Monday. Rostron would consult Titanic's surviving Officers...particularly Lightoller and Boxahall. If one of these two gave him a time of 3 am for striking the iceberg, then it would be Greenwich Mean Time, not EST or New York time since the equivalent times for these occurred on Sunday

GMT 15 d 03 hours 00 minutes April 15 would have been 2 minutes after midnight, not 20 minutes to midnight Titanic time on an unaltered clock. i.e. a clock which was 2 hours 58 minutes SLOW of GMT.
However, it would be 14 days 23 hours 38 minutes (11:38 pm)on a clock partially set back by 24 minutes. i.e. a clock which was 3 hours 22 minutes SLOW of GMT.
If Titanic's clock had not been partially set back, Rostron should have reported the GMT time of striking the iceberg as 15 days, 02 hours 38 minutes. (2:38am not 3:00am)

I understand you believe that Captain Rostron simply used his own ship's LAT to convert times but that does not make sense. I remind you of what he told Senator Smith at the US Inquiry.

"The New York time at 12:35 was 10:45 p. m. Sunday night."

By that reckoning, if Rostron was talking about EST, then Carpathia;s clocks were about 3 hours 10 minutes SLOW of GMT. 3 hours 10 minutes of time = the longitude of 47 degrees 30 minutes west of Greenwich. It follows that Carpathia had fully advanced her clocks to the LMT of Noon April, 15. before Captain Rostron received Titanic's distress call. That being the case, then if he had been using his own GMT to calculate the time when Titanic hit the iceberg, he would have applied 3 hours, 10 minutes to the given time of 11-40pm for time hitting the iceberg Friday night and got the equivalent GMT of 02:50 am, Saturday Morning. Not 03-00am Saturday morning as seen in the wireless message.

I have made a rough calculation that Carpathia would have been advancing her clocks about 29 minutes every 24 hours so It seems she was on Solar Noon April 15 time when she received the distress call

Feed-back?

Jim C.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

Jim,

First of all, you are assuming Rostron was correct when he said 12:35am Carpathia was 10:45pm NY. It is easy to show that this was not correct, just like he said that the Boxhall's CQD position was correct.

As you point out, those times given by Rostron correspond to Carpathia being 3h 10m behind GMT. It was the same time difference that was carried on board the SS Californian, and corresponded to a longitude of about 47° 30'W. But look at Carpathia's DR for 12:35am Apr 15th. According to Rostron, he was 58 miles and 128°T from the Boxhall CQD. That puts him at 41° 10’ N, 49° 13’ W at 12:35am. Local apparent noon for April 15th was expected 11 hours and 25 minutes later. At 14 knots, and heading within a few degrees of due east on a great circle course toward Gibraltar in the vicinity of latitude 41° N, her eastward progress would take her about 160 miles east, or 3° 32'E from a DR longitude of 49° 13’ W at 12:35am to a longitude of 45° 41’ W at Noon. At that longitude on Apr 15th, LAN came at 3:03pm GMT, making the time difference between GMT and Carpathia time 3h 3m, not 3h 10m. In other words, when it was 12:35am Apr 15th on Carpathia, it was 03:38am Apr 15th GMT, or 10:38pm Apr 14th in NY.

Secondly, I agree that Carpathia's clocks were being advanced 29 minutes near midnight, and that she was on Apr 15th time when the CQD was received. At the Senate Investigation Harold Cottam was asked how much time elapsed between the time when he received the distress call and the time he communicated it to Rostron. His answer was, “A matter of a couple of minutes.” He was then asked, “Only a couple of minutes?” to which he replied, “Yes, sir.” The distress call was picked up at 10:35pm NY time. Three minutes later, when it was 10:38pm NY it would have been 12:35am apparent time Carpathia.

As far the 3am time in that wireless message sent at 8:25pm NYT from Rostron to Cunard that you quoted from, I agree that it would have been GMT even though he did not put that little detail in his message. But the message was not giving any real specific details except the Boxhall CQD position. Notice that it simply said "struck iceberg Monday 3 a.m., 41.16 north,. 50.14 west. Carpathia picked up many passengers..." If you look back to the message sent to Olympic at 4:00pm NYT, you will fined: "Titanic foundered about 2.20 a.m., 5.47 G.M.T., in 41.46 north. 50.14 west." From Titanic's officers he must have heard that she struck the berg about 11:40pm Sunday night, or 2 hours 40 minutes earlier. If you subtract 2 hours 40 minutes from a foundering time of 2:20am you get a time of impact of 11:40pm. Subtracting the same 2 hours 40 minutes from a foundering time of 5:47am GMT gets you to 3:07am GMT for an impact time corresponding to 20 minutes to 12 ship's time. So you see that there is really no big mystery here as to where Rostron got that 3am GMT time from. It seems that he was told, or someone calculated, that Titanic was 3h 27m behind GMT when she foundered. This was the same information that Lightoller gave at the American inquiry when asked about the time that the ship sank.

This 3h 27m behind GMT is erroneous, and is tied directly to Boxhall's erroneous CQD position. There is a interesting little navigational exercise one can do here to show how these two were connected as I will post at a later time.

 

[Mila]

I've just read two papers posted on this site. The firs one https://www.encyclopedia-titanica.org/iceberg-right-ahead.html states:

On dark, clear nights icebergs may be seen at a distance of from 1 to 3 miles, appearing either as white or black objects with occasional light spots where waves break against it.

The second one https://www.encyclopedia-titanica.org/lookouts.html states:

Distance to the Horizon:


From Forecastle 8.3 N. Miles


From Bridge 9.8 N. Miles


From Crows Nest 11.2 N. Miles

and then it states:

From the above it can be seen that the iceberg seen at night as a BLACK area, lacking the stars right down to the horizon that the rest of the horizon is showing, should have become increasingly dominant as the ship steamed toward it that fateful night.

So here's what I do not understand: According to the first paper the iceberg could have been spotted 1 to 3 miles ahead, but by that time it would have been much closer than the horizon was (11.2 miles), and not the starry sky would have been in the iceberg background, but rather just the ocean.
What do you think?

Thanks.

 

[Luca Gelmetti]

I’d like to contribute a more detailed analysis regarding the time between the sighting of the iceberg and the collision. Based on the available testimonies and documented Olympic movements, I believe approximately 1 minute and 7 seconds could have passed between the lookout's warning and the iceberg striking the Titanic.

Quartermaster Hichens testified that about half a minute passed between the moment the lookouts rang the warning bell and First Officer Murdoch gave the order to turn the ship to starboard. This initial delay, while brief, would have been crucial as Murdoch assessed the danger before giving his command.

In addition, Frederick Fleet mentioned that he spent about 30 seconds on the phone with the bridge after sounding the bell. This time period would overlap with the ringing of the warning bell, adding another 30 seconds to the timeline before any significant corrective action was taken.

It is well known that the Titanic turned 2 points in 37 seconds.

When we sum these intervals—30 seconds for the initial reaction, 30 seconds for Fleet’s phone call, and 37 seconds for the ship to turn—we arrive at a plausible total of around 1 minute and 7 seconds before the collision occurred.

 

[Thomas Krom]

@Samuel Halpern made an excellent timeline of the collision in his book 'Prelude to Allison', where he gave an estimate of 43 seconds between Fleet ringing the bell to the impact itself.

 

[Luca Gelmetti]

That analysis reminds me of an estimate made by Dr. Paul Lee, which was also based on a series of testimonies, particularly those of Alfred Olliver and Frederick Barrett. Barrett mentioned that the emergency alarms sounded when the hull was breached, which is significant in understanding the timeline. We know that the iceberg took 6 seconds to reach Boiler Room 6, and before the watertight doors could be closed, the emergency alarms had to be activated 10 seconds prior.

Dr. Lee’s research references that Olliver supposedly saw First Officer Murdoch closing the watertight doors using the lever on the bridge. Considering the alarms sound 10 seconds before the doors begin to close, and adding the 6 seconds for the iceberg to reach the boiler room, we can estimate that about 44 seconds passed between the sighting and the collision.

Although I haven’t had the chance to read Halpern's book Prelude to Allison yet, I’ve come across discussions where he meticulously reconstructs the timeline of the collision. As you say, he estimated around 43 seconds between the time Fleet rang the warning bell and the impact, which aligns well with Lee analysis.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Yes. Sam's 43 seconds fits in with various survivor accounts from the "exposed" areas (bridge, crow's nest etc) except, of course, those of Boxhall. Take QM Olliver's testomony for example; he was cleaning the Auxilliary Compass on the platform amidships, about 250 feet aft of the bridge. He faintly heard the bells from the crow's nest, stopped what he was doing, got off the platform and started for the bridge. I estimate a total reaction time of about 7 to 8 seconds before he started his brisk walk to the bridge. Olliver testified that he had almost reached the bridge when he felt the shock of the first impact, continued and entered the bridge after perhaps another 10 seconds. That was the reason I calculated that it might have taken Olliver about just under a minute from the moment he heard the bells and his entry onto the bridge.

We cannot really correlate statements of the likes of Olliver, Fleet, Lee or even Hichens with somone like Barrett who was deep within the ship and had no visual or auditory reference point about what was going on outside until the Engine Telegraph bells sounded.

 

[Luca Gelmetti]

Yes. Sam's 43 seconds fits in with various survivor accounts from the "exposed" areas (bridge, crow's nest etc) except, of course, those of Boxhall. Take QM Olliver's testomony for example; he was cleaning the Auxilliary Compass on the platform amidships, about 250 feet aft of the bridge. He faintly heard the bells from the crow's nest, stopped what he was doing, got off the platform and started for the bridge. I estimate a total reaction time of about 7 to 8 seconds before he started his brisk walk to the bridge. Olliver testified that he had almost reached the bridge when he felt the shock of the first impact, continued and entered the bridge after perhaps another 10 seconds. That was the reason I calculated that it might have taken Olliver about just under a minute from the moment he heard the bells and his entry onto the bridge.

We cannot really correlate statements of the likes of Olliver, Fleet, Lee or even Hichens with somone like Barrett who was deep within the ship and had no visual or auditory reference point about what was going on outside until the Engine Telegraph bells sounded.

43 seconds seems logical to me. However, it was not clear to me whether that chronology would place Murdoch simultaneously ordering "hard to starboard" at five seconds after the three bells, knowing that the Titanic may have turned 1 or 2 points before the collision, and between 22 seconds and 37 seconds for both, or 30 seconds if we want to use an average of 1.5 points.

 

[Luca Gelmetti]

Arun, I had forgotten to mention that, as for Barrett, he had said that the alarms went off after the side had opened, and that was six seconds after the initial collision. Still, you are right to mention that he wasn't that aware of what was really happening outside, and everything that happened to him was in the blink of an eye.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Interesting how the focus always tends to be on the lookouts because they reportedly gave the initial warning. Yet, if one looks at all the evidence given, it is found that the OOW did not instantaneously act upon hearing the three-bell warning.

I confess that I am a bit surprised that you should say that Sam, unless there is a hidden figure of speech that I am missing. From your work in Prelude To An Allison and several old posts in these forums, I always thought that you did not rule out the possibility that Murdoch saw the dark object ahead almost at the same time as Fleet and (using his binoculars) identified it as an iceberg within the next 5 seconds. I have always agreed with your view that having spotted the iceberg, Murdoch had to spend a short but finite timespan assessing the relative positions of the iceberg and the closing bow of the ship before he could give that first helm order. That meant of course that Murdoch's order was not an instantaneous "knee-jerk" response but one that was given after a quick but very necessary assessment of the situation.

You have described the sequence clearly in the Specific Event table on pp127-8 of your book. The way that I understood it, Murdoch did act instantaneously to the bells but the first part of that "action" was to scan the sea ahead, spot and identify the iceberg as well as to assess and decide what he was going to do about it. Considering that the table shows (and I agree) that Murdoch did all that and issued the first helm order about 15 seconds after the bells is commendable IMO.

Hichens, "Well, as near as I can tell you, about half a minute" from the time of the three-bells to when the order was given to turn the ship.

That part I can understand. Hichens would have heard the bells from the crow's nest and then the ring of the telephone, the implications of which he would have instantly realized and tensed for the helm order that he knew would come any moment. Under those circumstances, the 15 seconds or so that Murdoch needed before the helm order would have seemed like "about half a minute" to Hichens enclosed in his wheelhouse.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Barrett, he had said that the alarms went off after the side had opened, and that was six seconds after the initial collision

I believe Barrett was referring to the WTD alarm ringing. That tallies with Olliver's testimony; the QM felt the first shock of the impact just as he neared the bridge and when he continued and entered it, he saw Murdoch at the WTD lever.

 

[Luca Gelmetti]

Yes, exactly. That's what I meant.