When was the iceberg spotted?

[Samuel Halpern]

View from nest and stem head when berg is 1000 ft ahead of the nest.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Thank you very much Sam. Based on what you have said/drawn and taking into account the Titanic's speed (approx 38 feet/sec) plus the more optimal position of a lookout on the stemhead that night, I calculated that in theory at least he could have spotted the object ahead 4 or maybe even 5 seconds before either the lookouts or OOW. Do you agree?

 

[Samuel Halpern]

I'm not surer how anyone can calculate how much earlier, if at all, the iceberg could have been spotted since the perspective from the stem head was quite different from on the bridge or up in the nest? From the stem head, the top of the berg was higher than the horizon by some small degree. I just don't know if that would have been enough for it to be noticed much sooner.

 

[Richard C Elliott]

I calculated that in theory at least he could have spotted the object ahead 4 or maybe even 5 seconds before either the lookouts or OOW.

It is a very uncertain calculation but I think it is safe to say that it would only have been a few seconds at most, so it wouldn't have added a significant margin of safety for operating a passenger ship. Yes, it might have made collision avoidance a little more possible but it wouldn't have been an acceptable form of risk mitigation.

Sir Ernest Shackleton was one of the people who recommended the practice of stationing a lookout in the 'eyes' of the ship but I think he had in mind the very different scenario of operating an exploration vessel. Such a vessel would be deliberately entering a very high risk situation for encountering ice and adding a small extra safety margin might be worthwhile, though accepting that there was still a very substantial residual risk to the ship and crew. Accepting risk was part of the job.

Any sensible risk assessment for a passenger vessel should not accept a high residual risk so the appropriate mitigation would be not to deliberately enter any area where there was a high probability of encountering ice at a shorter range than could be safely avoided by a normal (not emergency) manoeuvre. As a corollary to that it must be assumed that the minimum visual range of the average normal lookout in the conditions at the time is greater than the safe manoeuvering distance of the ship.

Oddly enough that is arguably what the SOP was supposed to achieve, even though nobody formally analysed it in those terms. The erroneous assumption was that the visual range of the lookouts would always be greater than the safe manoeuvering distance, which enabled them to turn the logic on its head and conclude that the risk of entering known icefields was acceptably low.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

It is a very uncertain calculation but I think it is safe to say that it would only have been a few seconds at most, so it wouldn't have added a significant margin of safety for operating a passenger ship

I only opined that based on the fact that an additional lookout in the stemhead would have been about 150 feet closer to the iceberg than Murdoch on the bridge and it would have taken the Titanic approximately 4 seconds to cover that distance. However, I was not insinuating that it would have made a difference; in fact, unless he also had a handheld bell, it would have taken a bit longer (from the moment of first sighting) for the stemhead lookout to alert Murdoch than Fleet from the crow's nest, thus nullifying those 4 seconds. I am not sure if his act of grabbing the telephone with the resultant ring on the bridge would have been as quick as Fleet simply reaching up and ringing the bells.

But where it might have mattered is the angle of vision as illustrated by Sam above. I have always believed that there was a latent period of uncertainty for Fleet between the moment that he thought that he spotted something in the ship's path to the one where he decided that it was indeed there and rang the bells. The down angle that Fleet was looking at the iceberg might have contributed to that period of uncertainty and it is possible that a stemhead lookout might have saved that.

 

[Bob Read]

It is a very uncertain calculation but I think it is safe to say that it would only have been a few seconds at most, so it wouldn't have added a significant margin of safety for operating a passenger ship. Yes, it might have made collision avoidance a little more possible but it wouldn't have been an acceptable form of risk mitigation.

Sir Ernest Shackleton was one of the people who recommended the practice of stationing a lookout in the 'eyes' of the ship but I think he had in mind the very different scenario of operating an exploration vessel. Such a vessel would be deliberately entering a very high risk situation for encountering ice and adding a small extra safety margin might be worthwhile, though accepting that there was still a very substantial residual risk to the ship and crew. Accepting risk was part of the job.

Any sensible risk assessment for a passenger vessel should not accept a high residual risk so the appropriate mitigation would be not to deliberately enter any area where there was a high probability of encountering ice at a shorter range than could be safely avoided by a normal (not emergency) manoeuvre. As a corollary to that it must be assumed that the minimum visual range of the average normal lookout in the conditions at the time is greater than the safe manoeuvering distance of the ship.

Oddly enough that is arguably what the SOP was supposed to achieve, even though nobody formally analysed it in those terms. The erroneous assumption was that the visual range of the lookouts would always be greater than the safe manoeuvering distance, which enabled them to turn the logic on its head and conclude that the risk of entering known icefields was acceptably low.

What we have to remember is that the crow’s nest lookouts could ring their bell almost immediately and the OOW would have heard it and looked in the direction they signaled. A bow lookout would have to use the portable phone to call the wheelhouse then they would have to alert the OOW who would have to verify what the lookout saw then give helm orders. If anything I would expect reports from the bow lookout to take longer to elicit a response from the OOW.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

But where it might have mattered is the angle of vision as illustrated by Sam above. I have always believed that there was a latent period of uncertainty for Fleet between the moment that he thought that he spotted something in the ship's path to the one where he decided that it was indeed there and rang the bells. The down angle that Fleet was looking at the iceberg might have contributed to that period of uncertainty and it is possible that a stemhead lookout might have saved that.

I agree. According to what Fleet told Leslie Reade, when he first spotted something ahead he wasn't sure what it was and he asked Lee if he knew what it was. Fleet said that Lee said, "No," and that is when he reached up to strike the bell. A few seconds of waisted time. We do know that Fleet must have figured out what he saw within a few seconds because the words he used on the phone (and confirmed by Lee and Hichens) was "iceberg right ahead."

 

[Arun Vajpey]

It still comes back to the fact that we really don't know who spotted the fatal berg first, Murdoch or Fleet, and how long it actually was prior to Fleet's striking the bell 3 times. (Where talking about seconds here.)

Yes. But if we look at the extremely leading and almost bear-baiting series of questions asked by Senator Smith on the first day of Fleet's testimony at the American Inquiry, the lookout must have felt extremely stressed by it and keen to move on. Even if he had mentioned the dark object ahead to Lee before ringing the bells (like he told Leslie Reade decades later), I doubt if Fleet had the courage to tell Smith that at the time of his testimony. Instead - and again in response to a leading question - Fleet admitted that he "talked to Lee about it" before ringing the bells. Interestingly, Fleet also said this:

Senator SMITH.
Who sighted the black mass first; you or Lee?

Mr. FLEET.
I did. I say I did, but I think he was just as soon as me.

The good Senator had started by asking Fleet if he's seen the iceberg an hour before impact and had gradually wound down to 10 minutes before the lookout said "I reported it as soon as ever I seen it" - what else could he have done?

By the time he testified at the British Inquiry, Fleet had got around to talking about the infamous "haze", even admitting (again to a leading question by Rufus Isaacs) that the haze was present right up to time the Titanic impacted with the iceberg. But the issue there was of course that Lee had testified 11 days before Fleet and mentioned the haze already, something that Fleet had to work with (or around it, depending upon one's point of view).

All that is what makes me believe that it was Fleet who saw the dark object on the horizon first, but he was uncertain whether he was actually seeing anything through the 22-knot wind blowing in his face. (Murdoch might have seen it almost at the same time, but he had the responsibility to assess the situation - including use of his binoculars - and giving the necessary orders.) After Fleet decided that he was indeed seeing something, he had some sort of exchange with Lee before reaching up to ring the bell. That means there was a latent period, but how long it actually was is debatable. As I have some idea about how the human brain reacts under such conditions, a part of me still believes that the latent period was something like 20 to 25 seconds. I know @Samuel Halpern believes that it was less and perhaps he is right. We just will never know.

That is what makes the idea of the hypothetical solo lookout on the stemhead so interesting to me. He would have been 85 to 90 feet ahead of Fleet and almost 150 feet ahead of Murdoch's position on the bridge. He would have been looking at the horizon at a much more optimal angle of sight and would have had no partner to share his doubts with. Most importantly, being in a non-routine position, the stemhead lookout would have been very aware of why he had been placed there and for that reason, extra-alert. Therefore, I believe that he would have seen the object on the horizon 4 to 5 seconds before anyone else and reacted immediately; then if he had a handheld bell........

 

[Bob Read]

then if he had a handheld bell........

As far as I know there was only the portable telephone which negates any distance advantage.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

As far as I know there was only the portable telephone which negates any distance advantage.

Yes I know and agree with you that the need to use the telephone could well have negated any time advantage that a stemhead lookout would have had. I mentioned the bell just hypothetically, but it wouldn't have been too difficult to install one there.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Ian Lang, former chief marine accident investigator, makes the same point in his book Titanic - a Fresh Look at the Evidence. It comes under his discussion of an inadequate lookout as a contributory cause. He believes this did not directly contribute to the accident and that there was no strong case for posting additional lookouts. The situation that night was not an emergency until after the iceberg was spotted, and it was actually spotted pretty much at the maximum possible distance so it is questionable whether an additional pair of eyes on the bridge would have made any difference.

Yes, that is questionable as long as we consider only the conventional lookouts up in the Crow's Nest and the OOW (and any 'assistants') on the bridge. From that point of view, I agree with you that Moody or Boxhall on the bridge with Murdoch are unlikely to have made much difference.

But ever since @Samuel Halpern brought up the hypothetical scenario of a lookout on the stemhead, I have been doing a lot of (over)thinking about that and came to the conclusion that there may be more to that scenario than meets the eye. I agree with @Bob Read that the possible 4 seconds or so gained by a man in that position would have been negated by his need to use the telephone to alert Murdoch on the bridge. But could there have been a not immediately obvious additional time factor that could have been saved if there had been a stemhead lookout?

I'll get back to that in a moment.

It still comes back to the fact that we really don't know who spotted the fatal berg first, Murdoch or Fleet, and how long it actually was prior to Fleet's striking the bell 3 times.

I think the highlighted part above has more significance than apparent at first glance. Even in his American Testimony, Fleet admitted that after he saw a dark object on the horizon, he "talked to Lee about it" before ringing the bells. Later during his British Testimony, he elaborated on it but even after filtering out all the controversy about the non-existent 'haze', it still emerges that Fleet briefly discussed what he was seeing with Lee before ringing the bells. That's where my obsession with a latent period emerges and I think it could have been a wee bit longer than apparent.

I have tried to break that latent period to what I think based on the Lookouts' testimonies, but I know and expect that some will disagree. That's their privilege, of course.

• Fleet thinks he sees a dark object ahead on the horizon, directly in the ship's path but isn't sure.
• It takes his brain a few seconds, perhaps no more than 2 or 3, to consider this possibility.
• Fleet then mentions this to Lee, who is also staring at the horizon but there is some uncertainty between them whether there is anything there.
• Fleet finally decides that he is seeing an object ahead and rings the bells.

I believe that those 4 steps could have taken up to 20 seconds - what I call the 'latent period' -, especially the exchange between the lookouts. But I accept that it might have been less.

I agree with Sam that Murdoch as the OOW might have seen the iceberg about the same time as Fleet, maybe even a couple of seconds earlier. But unlike Fleet, Murdoch had to check what he was seeing through his binoculars, identify the iceberg, make a quick assessment to the berg's position in relation to the speeding ship's bow and only then issue the first helm order of Hard-a-Starboard. I also agree with Sam (the Specific Events table in his book) that the entire process took Murdoch about 15 or 16 seconds.

The most important factor therefore was when Murdoch saw the iceberg and what he then did about it as far as the accident was concerned. Even if he had spotted the object before the bells rang, it could not have been more than a couple of seconds earlier. So, for sake of clarity of what I am saying, let us assume that Murdoch was first alerted by the bells from the Crow's Nest and started scanning ahead immediately, which tallies with Sam's table on pp127-8 of his book. But that table considers the moment of the first bell as T-second zero, which does not consider the aforementioned latent period and so is not the same as the moment Fleet first thought that he saw something on the horizon ahead.

Up to the moment that Fleet thought he saw something, he and Lee were on a routine 2-hour stint as lookouts on what till then was an uneventful voyage; the atmospheric conditions were dark, but clear and calm. I believe that - and the fact that Fleet had a partner in Lee - was what made the former check with the latter; the common human nature of "Do you see what I see?" thing.

Getting back at last to the hypothetical stemhead lookout, if there had been one placed there, he would have known exactly why he was ordered to that non-routine position - as an additional insurance against ice; therefore IMO a stemhead lookout would have been extra vigilant. I have already suggested that from his optimal position at the stemhead, a lookout might have spotted the dark object a few seconds before either the lookouts or OOW. IMO, combining that with the fact that he would have been on higher-alert and all alone with no one to check & confirm with, the stemhead lookout would have reacted the moment he even thought that he saw something in the ship's path. If he had been provided with a bell (not a particularly difficult thing to do) instead of just the telephone, he would have rung it instantly, alerting Murdoch on the bridge, thus negating the aforementioned latent period that I believe Fleet and Lee spent in the 'real world' scenario. That in turn would have meant that Murdoch would have started his scanning the horizon about 16 to 18 seconds at least before he actually did. All other things including the ship's speed remaining the same, whether that additional time could have made a difference is something that I don't know.

 

[Richard C Elliott]

That in turn would have meant that Murdoch would have started his scanning the horizon about 16 to 18 seconds at least before he actually did. All other things including the ship's speed remaining the same, whether that additional time could have made a difference is something that I don't know.

In other words if they had done everything maximally possible to increase the sighting time it might, just, have gained Murdoch enough time to pull off a near miss. Fine as a purely hypothetical discussion of the topic of this thread but hardly an acceptable real-world risk mitigation strategy.

This is why John Lang, former chief marine accident investigator in his book Titanic - a Fresh Look at the Evidence, decides that the sole primary cause of the accident he would record as a modern investigator would be the decision to 'turn the corner' on schedule despite the known encroachment of an icefield into the normal shipping lane. That set up a substantial risk of an accident and every precaution taken after that was of uncertain or at best marginal, value in reducing that risk.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

John Lang, former chief marine accident investigator in his book Titanic - a Fresh Look at the Evidence, decides that the sole primary cause of the accident he would record as a modern investigator would be the decision to 'turn the corner' on schedule despite the known encroachment of an icefield into the normal shipping lane. That set up a substantial risk of an accident and every precaution taken after that was of uncertain or at best marginal, value in reducing that risk.

Sure, and Lang is likely quite right in opining that a change to a slightly more southerly course earlier would have been the best action to have avoided that - and probably any other - iceberg. But as I have pointed out before, this forum gives us the opportunity to discuss other practical possibilities and a lookout in the stemhead was one of them. This thread is about when the iceberg was spotted, which automatically includes the question "could it have been spotted sooner?" Moreover, as you can see from my post above, I merely explained my reasoning of events had there been such an additional lookout but did not claim that it would definitely have avoided the accident.

All other things including the ship's speed remaining the same, whether that additional time could have made a difference is something that I don't know.

@Richard C Elliott, I know that you like being the DA (and I don't mean the District Attorney) but it would be nice to hear what you think could have happened in an alternate scenario - in this case a stemhead lookout.

 

[Richard C Elliott]

this forum gives us the opportunity to discuss other practical possibilities and a lookout in the stemhead was one of them.

The highlighted word is the one I have difficulty with. I have no objection at all to discussing theoretical 'what ifs' in the forum but it is all too easy to present them as realistic practical measures that would have prevented the accident, and I don't consider a lookout in the stemhead to fall into that category.

but it would be nice to hear what you think could have happened in an alternate scenario - in this case a stemhead lookout.

Well I summed up the conclusion in my last post but let us expand it. As @Samuel Halpern already pointed out it is impossible to accurately estimate how much sooner the iceberg could have been spotted but let us take as a starting point your own estimate of 16-18 seconds. That converts to a distance of about 600 ft - approaching 2/3 of a ship length - and scaling from Sam's scenarios in Prelude to an Allision it would give Murdoch sufficient space to pull off the 'porting around' manoeuvre so yes, it is possible in theory that a stemhead lookout could have prevented the collision.

However you made a number of 'optimal' assumptions. You suggest that the stemhead lookout would have been more vigilant than those in the crow's nest. Possibly, but is there any actual evidence to support that? You have suggested that he would have rung the bell more promptly because he didn't have a colleague with whom to cross-check his uncertain observation. Might he not instead have spent a little longer peering at the doubtful shadow ahead himself? You have assumed he was provided with a bell, but there wasn't one readily available and I suggest that might have been more difficult than you think. I could go on, but that explains the italicised words in my summary:

In other words if they had done everything maximally possible to increase the sighting time it might, just, have gained Murdoch enough time to pull off a near miss. Fine as a purely hypothetical discussion of the topic of this thread but hardly an acceptable real-world risk mitigation strategy.

The second sentence reflects the contrast between such a late avoidance strategy and an earlier navigational decision that would have avoided the iceberg by about 20 miles. Real world safety planning versus last-minute heroic action.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

However you made a number of 'optimal' assumptions.

True, but none of them are overly complicated nor go against any SOP of the time. Other captains placed lookouts in the stemhead if they felt that it was necessary and the fact that there was a telephone link to that position on the Titanic meant that the option was a consideration, probably including while negotiating awkward harbour entrance/exits under pilot guidance.

You suggest that the stemhead lookout would have been more vigilant than those in the crow's nest. Possible, but is there any actual evidence to support that?

It would be next to impossible to provide real-life 'evidence' because each situation would be different from another and so unless one was doing tests (which would immediately take out people's 'natural' reactions), comparisons make no sense. I was opining based on human nature, which is valid even for untrained persons, perhaps more so. If there are two people assigned to the same task - Fleet and Lee for example - unless it is an extreme "fight or flight" situation, there is always a small zone of uncertainty in the mind of the 'first' person prompting a double check with the partner, simple because the latter was there and the former does not want to be shown as being wrong. On the other hand, someone on their own - like our stemhead lookout - instinctively relies entirely on his capacities and always tends to play safe. One of the reasons for that is even if he is wrong, he can always offer an 'acceptable' explanation later that there would be no one to challenge, something that can happen if there is a partner. Recall the conflicting statements between Lee and Fleet during the British Testimony abut the so-called "haze" etc?

You have assumed he was provided with a bell, but there wasn't one readily available and I suggest that might have been more difficult than you think. You have suggested that he would have rung the bell more promptly because he didn't have a colleague with whom to cross-check his uncertain observation. Might he not instead have spent a little longer peering at the doubtful shadow ahead himself?

I do not know how difficult it would have been to provide a bell once the Titanic set sail, but considering that they could provide a telephone link to the stemhead, I would have thought that a bell - not exactly an expensive bit of equipment - in that position could have been SOP, especially as it was occasionally used for an additional lookout.

As for my assumption that a lone stemhead lookout would have been more alert and left nothing to chance, that is also related to human nature and in this case the fact that it was not a 'routine' position for a lookout. For instance, if Captain Smith had ordered Olliver to be there after the latter handed over helmsman duties to Hichens, the QM would immediately have realized why he was being placed in the stemhead, one of the expectations being the strong probability that he would be able to see something in the ship's path before anyone else. The one thing that Olliver would not have wanted at any cost if he was the stemhead lookout would have been for OOW Murdoch or conventional lookouts up in the Crow's Nest to spot something before he did. That is why I think he would have been hyper-alert.