When was the iceberg spotted?

[Luca Gelmetti]

However, I re-examined Barrett's statement during the 18th day of the United States Inquiry, and I must be corrected that the bell rang simultaneously with the red light indicating "STOP." It was after that the water entered about 2 feet above the floor plates.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

I re-examined Barrett's statement during the 18th day of the United States Inquiry, and I must be corrected that the bell rang simultaneously with the red light indicating "STOP." It was after that the water entered about 2 feet above the floor plates.

That would have been the Engine Room Telegraph bell, the lever of which Murdoch pulled to "STOP" within seconds after he had given the first helm order. That was before the glancing impact started.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

That would have been the Engine Room Telegraph bell, the lever of which Murdoch pulled to "STOP" within seconds after he had given the first helm order. That was before the glancing impact started.

No, not from Murdoch on the bridge. It was the stokehold orders telegraph which are orders to the stokeholds and comes from an engineer in the engine room, not the bridge. It has to do with firing the furnaces. There are four positions: Full, Half, Slow, and Stop. There is no ahead or astern.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

unless there is a hidden figure of speech that I am missing.

I think you misunderstood the point I was trying to convey. My point was that there are many people who assume that Murdoch called out his hard-astarboard helm order almost as soon as he heard the 3 bells from the nest, and then the ship started to immediately turn away and struck 37 seconds later. It was like the timing written in the British report, which concluded that the berg was sighted when it was about 500 yards away, and then allowed only a second or two for the order to turn away to be given. Thus, all the emphasis on the lookouts ability to sight the berg in time, and not taking into account what an OOW really has to do before issuing orders, and how long that assessment might take.

I always thought that you did not rule out the possibility that Murdoch saw the dark object ahead almost at the same time as Fleet and (using his binoculars) identified it as an iceberg within the next 5 seconds. I have always agreed with your view that having spotted the iceberg, Murdoch had to spend a short but finite timespan assessing the relative positions of the iceberg and the closing bow of the ship before he could give that first helm order. That meant of course that Murdoch's order was not an instantaneous "knee-jerk" response but one that was given after a quick but very necessary assessment of the situation.

Yes, I have not changed my view. My point in mentioning Hichens' 1/2 minute was that the evidence was always there that a finite amount of time needed to be taken to access the unfolding situation, and that a knee jerk reaction did not take place. Apparently, the way I tried to convey that point by quoting what Hichens said, and clearly not thought through, created some unintended confusion. Sorry for that.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

My point was that there are many people who assume that Murdoch called out his hard-astarboard helm order almost as soon as he heard the 3 bells from the nest, and then the ship started to immediately turn away and struck 37 seconds later.

Thanks for explaining that Sam.

The way I look at Murdoch's response to the 3 bells from the crow's nest was that he did respond immediately. The first part of that response was to look and spot the dark object himself and perhaps use his binoculars to identify it as an iceberg - which he very likely did in 5 or 6 seconds. Then he had to briefly observe the changing perspective of the iceberg as the bow of the speeding ship closed on it so that he could decide about the helm order, which he gave at the end of 15 to 16 seconds from the bells. Like you have explained in your book and elsewhere, Murdoch had to do it that way; unlike the lookouts, whose responsibility ended as soon as they rang the bells and perhaps made that phone call, Murdoch had to assess the situation very quickly and make a decision on which a lot depended.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

We agree Arun. And yes, it is possible that Murdoch may have even spotted the berg seconds before Fleet did, but we just don't really know.

The advantage of the lookout position higher up in the nest exists only for spotting objects (like a ship's light or in daytime a mast or funnel) that is first coming up over the horizon. On Titanic, that amounts to something like 3 minutes of advanced warning, a little over a mile further out, (assuming 22 knots and knowing the difference in height of eye between the bridge and the nest). But a light coming up over the horizon is not the same as a berg at night that's already less than a mile ahead and whose peak is just slightly higher than the height of the bridge itself. It's been argued that a position lower down, say on the forecastle deck in the bow, would be more advantageous.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Sir Alfred Chalmers following the publication of the British Inquiry Report, made his views quite plain on the cause of the collision:
"This finding also blinks in a measure of the true cause of the disaster, which was undoubtedly an inattentive lookout. That the two men in the crow's nest and the two officers on the bridge were not keeping an alert lookout is an absolutely certain, the two former being probably talking to one another, the listening attitude of mind being entirely destrictive (sic) of the sense of observation. What the Officers were about is difficult to define, but the whole blame should have been placed on the bad lookout."

As I said elsewhere, IMO Chalmers' lofty opinions were his own and not reflected in in the Final Report of the British Inquiry.

The report was rather evasive in my opinion about the issue of visibility on a night like the one the Titanic was passing through.
TIP | British Wreck Commissioner's Inquiry | Report | Account of Ship's Journey across the Atlantic/Messages Received/Disaster - Weather Conditions

However, they clearly alluded to their opinions on a change of course and/or reduction in speed.

The question is what ought the Master to have done. I am advised that with the knowledge of the proximity of ice which the Master had, two courses were open to him: The one was to stand well to the southward instead of turning up to a westerly course; the other was to reduce speed materially as night approached. He did neither.

The most interesting and involving part is their opinion about the collision itself.
TIP | British Wreck Commissioner's Inquiry | Report | Account of Ship's Journey across the Atlantic/Messages Received/Disaster - The Collision

If you read that, it becomes obvious that the report based their conclusions to a large extent on the testimonies of Lightoller and Boxhall, particularly the latter who was on duty at the time and claimed to be alongside the Captain's Quarters and approaching the bridge when he heard the 3 bells from the crow's nest.

The ship appears to have run on, on the same course, until, at a little before 11.40, one of the look-outs in the crow's nest struck three blows on the gong, (Hichens, 969) which was the accepted warning for something ahead, following this immediately afterwards by a telephone message to the bridge "Iceberg right ahead." Almost simultaneously[?] with the three gong signal Mr. Murdoch, the officer of the watch, gave the order "Hard-a-starboard," and immediately telegraphed down to the engine room "Stop. Full speed astern." (Boxhall, 15346)[?] The helm was already "hard over," and the ship's head had fallen off about two points to port, when she collided with an iceberg well forward on her starboard side.

Boxhall was the only survivor who claimed that he was approaching and then on the bridge who both saw and heard the events that followed the bells. Fleet and Lee knew nothing of what was happening on the bridge; Hichens would have heard the bells, shouted orders etc but enclosed as he was in his wheelhouse, he would not have been able to see anything. Olliver arrived around 50 seconds after the bells and reported that felt the first shock of the impact as he neared the bridge and upon continuing and entering it, saw Murdoch at the WTD lever.

The point that I am trying to make is that both Inquiry Committees relied vary heavily on Boxhall's account of events from the moment he claimed that he heard the bells. Even today, several sources still continue with that belief but if that was the case, the iceberg really would have been less than 500 feet from the bow when Fleet rang the bells. People like Alfred Chalmers based their opinions and accusations on that belief but careful analysis by the likes of @Samuel Halpern (in A Prelude To An Allison and elsewhere) have shown that Boxhall was not only wrong, he was actually lying. Wherever the 4/O was at the time, he did not hear the bells and was not alongside the Captain's Quarters when they were rung. Fleet saw the iceberg (as a dark object on the horizon) rang the bells about 43 seconds before the first impact; Murdoch did not give the first helm order 'simultaneously', but about 15 seconds after the bells after a quick estimation of his limited options. And as has been discussed several times elsewhere, it is now believed that Murdoch put the engine telegraphs to STOP and not FULL ASTERN like Boxhall claimed.

 

[Richard C Elliott]

Boxhall was the only survivor who claimed that he was approaching and then on the bridge who both saw and heard the events that followed the bells. ... both Inquiry Committees relied vary heavily on Boxhall's account of events from the moment he claimed that he heard the bells. Even today, several sources still continue with that belief ... but careful analysis by the likes of @Samuel Halpern (in A Prelude To An Allison and elsewhere) have shown that Boxhall was not only wrong, he was actually lying.

So both inquiries accepted an account of events from the sighting to the allision that was incorrect in detail, but did it actually matter? It does, of course, to later analysts like ourselves who are either trying to piece together the most accurate account we can or exploring the 'what ifs' - could a few seconds or a few hundred feet have been saved here or there, could the avoidance manoeuvre have been better planned?

Those niceties didn't really matter to either inquiry. They weren't academic researchers, nor were they courts aiming to administer justice. They were investigative committees with officially defined remits (and a few unofficial hidden agendas besides). Regardless of the discrepancies in testimony regarding the period in question the overall picture emerging was that the iceberg was sighted at a very short distance, too short for any avoidance manoeuvre to have a high probability of success. An allision was almost inevitable and the outcome, in terms of damage, would largely be a matter of pure chance. They weren't going to 'blame' anyone for their actions in that period nor were they likely to make any specific recommendations in their report. All they needed to do was to include a summary account of that time period and Boxhall's testimony offered a ready-written script, coherent and comprehensible to a lay audience.

You and I have differing opinions on why Boxhall lied. You (and indeed most others) suspect he was covering up some embarrasssing admission about his whereabouts when he heard the bells, so he distorted his timings and introduced some inaccuracies into an otherwise correct witness statement. I suspect he wasn't on the bridge at all until after his inspection below decks so much of his account was second hand. It was essentially a 'script' right from the start and he just couldn't resist writing in a part for himself and putting his account in the first person. It was perfect material for 'lifting' into a committee report, or a book, or a film. No wonder it wasn't seriously questioned for decades.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

So both inquiries accepted an account of events from the sighting to the allision that was incorrect in detail, but did it actually matter? Regardless of the discrepancies in testimony regarding the period in question the overall picture emerging was that the iceberg was sighted at a very short distance, too short for any avoidance manoeuvre to have a high probability of success. An allision was almost inevitable and the outcome

It might seem that it did not matter back then since the accident did occur anyway, but it does now - in the sense that with forums like here giving other people to dissect and opine on various events and their causes, there might be fingers pointed at individuals or groups. I some cases that might seem justified, but with others it is not and IMO blaming the lookouts in the manner that Chalmers did was not justified.

They weren't going to 'blame' anyone for their actions in that period nor were they likely to make any specific recommendations in their report. All they needed to do was to include a summary account of that time period and Boxhall's testimony offered a ready-written script, coherent and comprehensible to a lay audience.

I think both Inquiry Committees took the official view (which is different from unsubstantiated personal opinions of those like Chalmers) that there was not enough conclusive evidence to place the blame on actions - or lack of - any particular individual. The one exception was what the British Inquiry said about Captain Smith (qv "He did neither") but that was probably considered necessary to make their Final Report appear complete rather than left too open-ended. They still used Boxhall's testimony about events during the collision because it was conveniently there and helped to bring about a closure of some sort to the investigation and not because they believed in it verbatim.

You and I have differing opinions on why Boxhall lied. You (and indeed most others) suspect he was covering up some embarrasssing admission about his whereabouts when he heard the bells, so he distorted his timings and introduced some inaccuracies into an otherwise correct witness statement.

True, but we agreed to disagree on that over a drink and I suggest we leave it at that. Otherwise, you might find yourself needing to buy those "others" drinks as well and being a retired man, I am not sure I'd want to share the tab .

 

[Richard C Elliott]

IMO blaming the lookouts in the manner that Chalmers did was not justified.

We are in complete agreement on that.

Chalmers' lofty opinions were his own and not reflected in in the Final Report of the British Inquiry.

Even Lord Mersey would agree with us on that. A pity he isn't around to buy us another round.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

Talking about blame.
There were twenty-six questions formulated by the Board of Trade for the Wreck Commission to answer. In question #10 it was asked about keeping a proper lookout:

10 (b) Was a good and proper look-out for ice kept on board?

The answer given in the report to above was:

10 (b) No. The men in the crow’s-nest were warned at 9.30 p.m. to keep a sharp look-out for ice; the officer of the watch was then aware that he had reached the reported ice region, and so also was the officer who relieved him at 10 p.m. Without implying that those actually on duty were not keeping a good look-out, in view of the night being moonless, there being no wind and perhaps very little swell, and especially in view of the high speed at which the vessel was running, it is not considered that the look-out was sufficient. An extra look-out should, under the circumstances, have been placed at the stemhead, and a sharp look-out should have been kept from both sides of the bridge by an officer.

This, though not explicitly said, placed the blame for an insufficient lookout being kept on the ship's Commander.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

10 (b) No. The men in the crow’s-nest were warned at 9.30 p.m. to keep a sharp look-out for ice; the officer of the watch was then aware that he had reached the reported ice region, and so also was the officer who relieved him at 10 p.m. Without implying that those actually on duty were not keeping a good look-out, in view of the night being moonless, there being no wind and perhaps very little swell, and especially in view of the high speed at which the vessel was running, it is not considered that the look-out was sufficient. An extra look-out should, under the circumstances, have been placed at the stemhead, and a sharp look-out should have been kept from both sides of the bridge by an officer.

This, though not explicitly said, placed the blame for an insufficient lookout being kept on the ship's Commander.

Agreed. But since the lookouts actually on duty that night - Fleet and Lee - had no power to authorize another lookout, Chalmers' opinion that they were doing an inadequate job and so were to blame was completely out of order.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

But since the lookouts actually on duty that night - Fleet and Lee -

I was not talking about Chalmers or his opinions. This was the conclusion of Lord Mersey and his assessors (Rear Admiral the Honourable S. A. Gough-Calthorpe, C.V.O., R.N.; Captain A. W. Clarke; Commander F. C. A. Lyon, R.N.R.; Professor J. H. Biles, D.Sc., LL.D.; and Mr. E. C. Chaston, R.N.R.)
And by look-out they meant all of those whose duty it was to be looking out. That included Fleet, Lee and Murdoch, and anyone else who was ordered to join them. The ultimate responsibility to appoint other crew members, including officers, to do that task rested with the ship's commander, Captain Smith. And that would include himself being out on the bridge while the ship was crossing the ice region instead of being just inside.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

An extra look-out should, under the circumstances, have been placed at the stemhead

I wanted to ask about that. I assume "stemhead" with reference to a ship like the Titanic meant the most forward part of the prow on the forecastle. An additional lookout stationed there would have had a straight line of vision of the horizon similar to Murdoch on the navigating bridge, but some 150 feet closer to the object (and I think some 85 feet closer than the lookouts in the crow's nest). Theoretically at least, could that have made any difference?

Interestingly, in Cameron's film there was a man stationed there, although it was a bit unclear when he had arrived.

Also, AFAIK there was neither a bell nor a telephone at the stemhead. Therefore, if a man stationed there did see something a few seconds before anyone else did, how was he supposed to alert the OOW?

 

[Samuel Halpern]

Good questions Arun. First of all, it wasn't the distance out in front on the stem head that made it advantageous, but it was the height above water being much lower than those other two locations. And yes, there was a one of those laud-speaking telephones located in a weather proof box located there with direct connection to a phone in the wheelhouse.